Russell Nelson wrote:
>
> Caspar Bowden writes:
> > And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services
> > should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the
> > plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who
> > refuse.
>
> Nobody's mentioned the possibility of an encryption system which
> always encrypts two documents simultaneously, with two different keys:
> one to retrieves the first (real) document, and the second one which
> retrieves to the second (innocuous) document.
>
> With such a system, it should be clear that coercing decryption has
> the same negative attributes as coercing self-incrimination.
>
> As an aside, why hasn't anybody mentioned this before? It seems
> obvious to me. Am I some sort of supergenius or something (more
> likely the latter, in my experience!)? Or is there an information
> source that I'm missing out on? Are people saying things about
> cryptography that don't make it to [EMAIL PROTECTED]?
Julian Assange has long advocated (and implemented) such things, using
an unknown number of keys, and a certain amount of excess entropy in the
ciphertext, too. His intent, as is yours, is to provide a defence
against coercion.
Cheers,
Ben.
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