>You propose to put a key into a physical device and give it
>to the public, and expect that they will never recover
>the key from it?

It's been on the market for six years now; so far, the foundation
has held up.    (We also were darn careful about the design
and evaluation; we ended up earning the first FIPS 140-1 Level 4
cert, but went beyond it in several respects.)

But there are numerous war stories and drawbacks---which is
why I find the new generation of initiatives interesting.
(Particularly since I don't have to build products anymore! :)

> Seems unwise

As does the alternative proposition that one should NEVER, under any 
circumstances, have sensitive data or computation on a remote machine.


Sean W. Smith, Ph.D.                         [EMAIL PROTECTED]   
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sws/       (has ssl link to pgp key)
Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover NH USA

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