At 6:38 PM -0400 9/18/03, John S. Denker wrote:

Yes, Mallory can DoS the setup by reading (and thereby trashing) every bit. But Mallory can DoS the setup by chopping out a piece of the cable. The two are equally effective and equally detectable. Chopping is cheaper and easier.

Other key-exchange methods such as DH are comparably
incapable of solving the DoS problem.  So why bring up
the issue?

It seems to me that because key-exchange methods such as DH only depend on exchanging bits (as opposed to specifying a physical layer), they can rely on a wide variety of techniques to combat DoS. If Bob and Alice can safeguard their local connections to the Internet, its multi-routing properties provide significant DoS protection. Other options available to them include the switched telephone network, wireless, LEO satellites, cybercafes, steganography, HF radio, and even postal mail. In addition, DH users have no need to call attention to themselves by leasing a fiber-optic line.

Arnold Reinhold

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