----- Original Message ----- From: "Peter Gutmann" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > [...] > If you think that's scary, look at Microsoft's CryptoAPI for Windows XP FIPS > 140 certification. As with physical security certifications like BS 7799, you > start by defining your security perimeter, defining everything inside it to be > SECURE, and ignoring everything outside it. Microsoft defined their perimeter > as "the case of the PC". Everything inside the PC is defined to be SECURE. > Everything outside is ignored.
I believe that is typical of most software crypto modules that are FIPS 140 certified, isn't it? It classifies the module as multi-chip standalone. This is why you get requirements of the type that it should run on Windows in single-user mode, which I take to mean have only an admin account. This prevents privilege escalation attacks (regular user to root) that are easily done. I think this is reasonable, since you really are relying on the OS and the PC for the security of the module. More scary to me is stuff like "DSSENH does not provide persistent storage of keys. While it is possible to store keys in the file system, this functionality is outside the scope of this validation." This is where Microsoft's CSPs do the dirty work, and use what is called the Data Protection API (DPAPI) to somehow safeguard keys somewhere in your system. --Anton --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]