> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Trei, Peter > Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 1:17 PM > [SNIP] > > Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an > unnecessary complication. > Except to those of us who don't trust the system.
Implemented correctly it could be cheap and complications could be hidden from the voter. It could be cheaper - no need to pay people to do an audit when "the people" will do it for you. You only need a small fraction of "the people" to verify their votes to get a high level of confidence that the election is valid. You only need one failure to cast doubt on the election. This requires an un-forgeable receipt that cannot be used for coercion. Un-forgeable we have been doing for a while now with lots of different PK options. A receipt that cannot be used for coercion cannot give any indication to others of who you voted for. Right now this is a big complication (at least to me - I don't know how to create such a receipt that doesn't require mental gymnastics on the part of the voter). -Michael Heyman --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]