On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: > Trei, Peter wrote: > >Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an > >unneccesary complication. > > It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote > verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes > rather directly with the requirement to protect voters > from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particular > way.") or other incentives-based attacks. > > You can have one, or the other, but not both, right?
Suppose individual ballots weren't usable to verify a vote, but instead confirming data was distributed across 2-3 future ballot receipts such that all of them were needed to reconstruct another ballot's vote. It would then be possible to verify an election with reasonable confidence if a large number of ballot receipts were collected, but individual ballot receipts would be worthless.
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