There are large institution with 1000s of tape drives and 1,000,000
or more cartridges. Even simple solutions are huge to implement. This
is a non-trivial matter. The technical solutions are possible, there
are vendors out there that are already doing this. Getting from here
it there, even if the solutions were available for free is still a
very expensive challenge.
One proof point is that the standards are not in place for this yet.
Bottom line, this issue is here to stay and will take years to solve.
It is not a cryptographic problem, it's harder than that.
jim
On Jun 7, 2005, at 6:19 PM, Mark Allen Earnest wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> The bigger issue, though, is more subtle: keeping track of the
keys is
non-trivial. These need to be backed up, too, and kept separate
from (but synchronized with) the tapes. Worse yet, they need to
be kept secure. That may mean storing the keys with a different
escrow company. A loss of either piece,the tape or the key,
renders the backup useless.
Basically, expensive or not, security is very hard to get right.
When you look at Choicepoint, Bank of America, and Citigroup (not
to mention universities and smaller businesses) they have little to
no incentive to keep your personal data secure. YOU bear the cost
of data compromise, not them. The worst they get is some bad
publicity and only if it affects CA residents, otherwise it can be
kept quiet. The threat of bad publicity does not mean much when
next week your compromise due to bad security will be forgotten as
the media switches to the next one.
As it stands today, the cost/benefit analysis easily directs them
away from taking strong measures to protect customer's financial
data. Doing so is time consuming, opens up potential for problems,
and gets them next to nothing in return.
--
Mark Allen Earnest
Lead Systems Programmer
Emerging Technologies
The Pennsylvania State University
Lt Commander
Centre County Sheriff's Office Search and Rescue
KB3LYB
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