Lance James wrote:
...
> https://slam.securescience.com/threats/mixed.html
This site is set so that there is a frame of https://www.bankone.com
inside my https://slam.securescience.com/threats/mixed.html site. The
imaginative part is that you may have to reverse the rolls to understand
the impact of this (https://www.bankone.com with
https://slam.securescience.com frame -> done via cross-user attacks
Ok, I can do the `mental exercise` and understand the attack. But I'm
not sure what is new here. Yes, if a web-site allows such XSS, then even
SSL won't help it - it could end up sending the _wrong_ page, protected
by SSL... And in this case I don't even think we can blame browser UI;
the browser actually got this `bad` page from the server...
Maybe I miss something?
BTW, there is a new list focsed on such issues, at
http://lists.cacert.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/anti-fraud
--
Best regards,
Amir Herzberg
Associate Professor
Department of Computer Science
Bar Ilan University
http://AmirHerzberg.com
Try TrustBar - improved browser security UI:
http://AmirHerzberg.com/TrustBar
Visit my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected Login pages:
http://AmirHerzberg.com/shame
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