On Tue, 15 Aug 2006, Bill Stewart wrote:
Crypto is usually about economics and scalability.
If you're doing this for DOS/DDOS prevention,
you don't need the NP-completeness perfection you get from
Hamiltonian paths or similar problems - SHA is fine,
or any other hash that's quick to verify and
hard to reverse. Even MD5 is probably still ok...
Calculating any of the hashes probably takes less time than
handling the packets does.
It's almost certainly better for you if they harass you by
sending you bogus SHA pieces that you can process quickly
than bogus DH pieces that take you a while,
and if it's not too distributed an attack,
you can also blacklist senders IP addresses.
But if the packets are forged, wouldn't that turn it into a different kind
of DOS?
If I can get you to blacklist Alice by sending n forged attack packages,
then my DOS succeeded, if my goal is to deny a connection between you and
Alice.
--
"I want to live just long enough to see them cut off Darl's head and
stick it on a pike as a reminder to the next ten generations that some
things come at too high a price. I would look up into his beady eyes and
wave, like this... (*wave*!). Can your associates arrange that for me,
Mr. McBride?"
- Vir "Flounder" Kotto, Sr. VP, IBM Empire.
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