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• • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Nico Williams
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Watson Ladd
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Watson Ladd
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Salz, Rich
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? David Mercer
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Richard Outerbridge
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? James A. Donald
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Zooko O'Whielacronx
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Christian Huitema
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Jonathan Thornburg
  • Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3? Bill Frantz
• Re: [Cryptography] [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] Hardware Trojan Protection Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] Hardware Trojan Protection Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Alan Braggins
  • Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Nico Williams
  • Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Gerardus Hendricks
  • Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation d.nix
• [Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation d.nix
  • Re: [Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation d.nix
  • Re: [Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] InfoRequest: How to configure email clients to accept encrypted S/MIME Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Specification: Prism Proof Email Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Specification: Prism Proof Email Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI Dirk-Willem van Gulik
  • Re: [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI Dirk-Willem van Gulik
• [Cryptography] Some (limited) info about Apple A7 security for fingerprints, keychains Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] FISA court releases its "Primary Order" re telephone metadata John Gilmore
  • Re: [Cryptography] FISA court releases its "Primary Order" re telephone metadata Alfie John
• Re: [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities John Gilmore
  • Re: [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities Pat Farrell
• [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal John Gilmore
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Walter van Holst
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Kent Borg
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Kelly John Rose
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Eugen Leitl
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal james hughes
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal james hughes
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Stephen Farrell
  • [Cryptography] TLS2 ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Adam Back
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Adam Back
  • Re: [Cryptography] [cryptography] TLS2 Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Hanno Böck
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Philipp Gühring
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 dan
  • [Cryptography] Linux /dev/random and /dev/urandom Isaac Bickerstaff
  • Re: [Cryptography] Linux /dev/random and /dev/urandom Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] Linux /dev/random and /dev/urandom Gary Mulder
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 James A. Donald
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Bill Stewart
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 James A. Donald
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 James A. Donald
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 James A. Donald
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] Passwords Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] Passwords Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] TLS2 Stephen Farrell
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • Re: [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities John Gilmore
  • Re: [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] Johns Hopkins round table on NSA and Crypto Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] Johns Hopkins round table on NSA and Crypto Jens Kubieziel
• [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening John Kemp
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Viktor Dukhovni
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Christian Huitema
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Albert Lunde
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Salz, Rich
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Max Kington
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Salz, Rich
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening d.nix
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Russell Nelson
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Viktor Dukhovni
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Viktor Dukhovni
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Viktor Dukhovni
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Robin Alden
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Carl Wallace
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening John Kemp
  • Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening ianG
• [Cryptography] Ivan Ristić blog post on TLS best practices Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Ars Technica on the Taiwanese National ID smart card break Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis] Tim Newsham
  • Re: [Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis] Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis] Dave Howe
  • Re: [Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis] William Muriithi
• [Cryptography] Apple and Certificate Pinning Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] End to end Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] End to end Ben Laurie
  • Re: [Cryptography] End to end Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] End to end Christoph Gruber
  • Re: [Cryptography] End to end Max Kington
  • Re: [Cryptography] End to end Christoph Gruber
  • Re: [Cryptography] End to end Max Kington
• [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Watson Ladd
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Dan McDonald
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Stephan Neuhaus
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing Sandy Harris
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing John Kelsey
  • Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Ray Dillinger
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Ray Dillinger
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Alan Braggins
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Jerry Leichter
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Dave Horsfall
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. ianG
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Kristian Gjøsteen
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. James A. Donald
  • Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products. Jerry Leichter

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