At 06:32 AM 1/16/2007, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Disk encryption, in general, is useful when the enemy has physical
access to the disk.  Laptops -- the case you describe on your page --
do fit that category; I have no quarrel with disk encryption for them.
It's more dubious for desktops and *much* more dubious for servers.

As governments widen their definitions of just who is a potential threat it makes increasing sense for citizens engaged in previous innocuous activities (especially political and financial privacy) to protect their data from being useful if seized. This goes double for those operating privacy-oriented services and their servers. As an example, when TOR servers were recently seized in German raids (with the implication that they were being used as conduits for child porn) the police knew enough to only take the hot-swap drives (which were encrypted and therefore paper weights after removal) if only for show. The main loss to the operators was repair to the cage locks.

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