Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> On Tue, 16 Jan 2007 07:56:22 -0800
> Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> At 06:32 AM 1/16/2007, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>>> Disk encryption, in general, is useful when the enemy has physical
>>> access to the disk.  Laptops -- the case you describe on your page --
>>> do fit that category; I have no quarrel with disk encryption for
>>> them. It's more dubious for desktops and *much* more dubious for
>>> servers.
>> As governments widen their definitions of just who is a potential
>> threat it makes increasing sense for citizens engaged in previous
>> innocuous activities (especially political and financial privacy) to
>> protect their data from being useful if seized.  This goes double for
>> those operating privacy-oriented services and their servers.  As an
>> example, when TOR servers were recently seized in German raids (with
>> the implication that they were being used as conduits for child porn)
>> the police knew enough to only take the hot-swap drives (which were
>> encrypted and therefore paper weights after removal) if only for
>> show.  The main loss to the operators was repair to the cage locks.
> Legal access is a special case -- what is the law (and practice) in any
> given country on forced access to keys?  If memory serves, Mike Godwin
> -- a lawyer who strongly supports crypto, etc. -- has opined that under
> US law, a subpoena for keys would probably be upheld by the courts.  I
> believe that British law explicitly mandates key disclosure.  

The situation here in the UK is that Parliament has passed a law (RIPA)
that allows the UK government to introduce key disclosure powers if it
wishes to do so.

So far these powers have not been bought into operation but the UK
government initiated a consultation last year on whether it should take
this step.  We are still awaiting a decision on this.

   Brian Gladman

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