On Wed, May 09, 2007 at 06:04:20PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
> | > > Frankly, for SSH this isn't a very plausible attack, since it's not
> | > > clear how you could force chosen plaintext into an SSH session between
> | > > messages.  A later paper suggested that SSL is more vulnerable:
> | > > A browser plugin can insert data into an SSL protected session, so
> | > > might be able to cause information to leak.
> | > 
> | > Hmm, what about IPSec?  Aren't most of the cipher suites used there
> | > CBC mode?
> | 
> | ESP does not chain blocks across packets.  One could produce an ESP
> | implementation that did so, but there is really no good reason for
> | that, and as has been widely discussed, an implementation SHOULD use
> | a PRNG to generate the IV for each packet.
> I hope it's a cryptographically secure PRNG.  The attack doesn't require
> any particular IV, just one known to an attacker ahead of time.
> However, cryptographically secure RNG's are typically just as expensive
> as doing a block encryption.  So why not just encrypt the IV once with
> the session key before using it?  (This is the equivalent of pre-pending
> a block of all 0's to each packet.)

But if the key doesn't change between messages then this makes the IV of
the second block constant and if any plaintext repeats in the first
block of plaintext then you have a problem.

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