Victor Duchovni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >As 1024 RSA keys are not a major risk *today*,
I would go further and say that for most applications of PKCs/PKI today, 1024- bit RSA keys are not a risk at all, or more specifically that on a scale of risk they're so far down the list that they're close to negligible. As numerous security HCI studies have shown, user comprehension of PKI is close to zero percent, which means that the security effectiveness of the same is also close to zero. As the multi-billion dollar phishing industry has ably demonstrated, the bad guys are more than aware of this too. So going from x- bit RSA to y-bit RSA on a component with close to zero-percent effectiveness is... well, I'll let you do the maths. Until the hundred other constituent parts required to secure something like web browsing are fixed, changing the key size is just pointless posturing, since it's not fixing anything that anyone is attacking. Once all the other bits are fixed and working as intended, then we can go back to debating whether length is more important than width in key sizes. Peter. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
