On 26 June 2007 00:51, Ian Farquhar (ifarquha) wrote:

>> It seems odd for the TPM of all devices to be put on a pluggable module as
>> shown here.  The whole point of the chip is to be bound tightly to the
>> motherboard and to observe the boot and initial program load sequence.
> Maybe I am showing my eternal optimist side here, but to me, this is how
> TPM's should be used, as opposed to the way their backers originally wanted
> them used.  A removable module whose connection to a device I establish
> (and can de-establish, assuming the presence of a tamper-respondent barrier
> such as a sensor-enabled computer case to legitimize that activity) is a
> very useful thing to me, as it facilitates all sorts of useful
> applications.  The utility of the original intent has already been widely
> criticised, so I won't repeat that here.  :)   

  If you can remove it, what's to stop you plugging it into another machine
and copying all your DRM-encumbered material to that machine?

  It's supposed to identify the machine, not the user.  Sounds to me like what
you want is a personally identifying cert that you could carry around on a usb

Can't think of a witty .sigline today....

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