Leichter, Jerry wrote: ... > If you think about this in general terms, we're at the point where we > can avoid having to trust the CPU, memory, disks, programs, OS, etc., > in the borrowed box, except to the degree that they give us access to > the screen and keyboard. (The problem of securing connections that > go through a hostile intermediary we know how to solve.) The keyboard > problem is intractable, though it would certainly be a step forward > if at least security information didn't go through there. This could > be done either by having a small data entry mechanism on the secure > device itself, or by using some kind of challenge/response (an LCD > on the device supplies a random value - not readable in any way by > the connected machine - that you combine with your password before > typing it in.) Maybe HDMI will actually have some use in providing > a secure path to the screen? (Unlikely, unfortunately.)
Would it not be possible to solve the keyboard problem by allowing a keyboard (e.g. USB) to be plugged directly into the device? Nicholas -- Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 870285 (+44 1279 870285) Mobile 07715 419728 (+44 7715 419728) PGP public key ID: 0x899DD7FF. Fingerprint: 5248 1320 B42E 84FC 1E8B A9E6 0912 AE66 899D D7FF --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
