| > If you think about this in general terms, we're at the point where we
| > can avoid having to trust the CPU, memory, disks, programs, OS, etc.,
| > in the borrowed box, except to the degree that they give us access to
| > the screen and keyboard. (The problem of securing connections that
| > go through a hostile intermediary we know how to solve.) The keyboard
| > problem is intractable, though it would certainly be a step forward
| > if at least security information didn't go through there. This could
| > be done either by having a small data entry mechanism on the secure
| > device itself, or by using some kind of challenge/response (an LCD
| > on the device supplies a random value - not readable in any way by
| > the connected machine - that you combine with your password before
| > typing it in.) Maybe HDMI will actually have some use in providing
| > a secure path to the screen? (Unlikely, unfortunately.)
|
| Would it not be possible to solve the keyboard problem by allowing a
| keyboard (e.g. USB) to be plugged directly into the device?
Perhaps. Public systems usually don't have "unpluggable" keyboards.
If I have to carry my own, I'm well on my way to just having my
own portable system (which may be the way things end up anyway).
-- Jerry
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