Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Huh? What are you claiming the problem with sending
> client certificates in plaintext is (as if anyone uses
> client certificates anyway)?

Well that is one problem - no one uses them, and no one
should use them, while PKI was designed under the
assumption that everyone would be using them.

Another problem is that in practice the system merely
ensures you are getting the purported domain name. Since
we are overwhelmed by a multitude of irrelevant and
confusing domain names, this is not much help. Further,
I frequently get the warning that the certificate does
not agree with the domain name when I know well that I
am communicating with the intended entity - frequent
misconfiguration results in false warnings, which I am
thus trained to ignore, rendering the system entirely

Since we rely on passwords, social security numbers, and
so forth, shared secrets, people are trained to give
away secrets to purported authority, which creates the
phishing hazard. We need to fix both problems.

Of course, if the phishing hazard was fixed, we would
still have the malware hazard, but we now know how to
fix the malware hazard.

We should fix both problems, rather than using one as an
excuse for not fixing the other.  We need to fix the
network assuming the node is going to be made safe, and
fix the node assuming the network is going to be made

>> Does anyone have an idea how we can fix this flaw
>> within SSL/TLS within a reasonable timeframe, so that
>> it can be implemented and shipped by the vendors in
>> this century?

Eric Rescorla wrote:
> This gets discussed on the TLS mailing list
> occasionally, but the arguments for making this change
> aren't very convincing. If you have an actual credible
> security argument you should post it to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

I don't think that is a useful discussion forum.  The
IETF is moribund, paralyzed and increasingly irrelevant.
If the internet is to be fixed, the fixes have to bypass
the IETF.

When one has a large group, group dynamics can make the
large group a little bit smarter than its smartest
members, but more commonly, make it a lot dumber than
its dumbest members.  If the IETF was capable of
handling, or even noticing, the crisis that we in then
we would not be in this crisis.

To fix the phishing problem, we need to
cryptographically secure relationships, rather than
attempting to cryptographically secure true names, and
to greatly reduce reliance on revealing shared secrets.
It should be unusual and disturbing to reveal shared
secrets, rather than routine, and it should only be done
with humans, not machines.

1.  As with Skype to Skype IM, the fact that you can
receive a message from what purports to be an entity
with which you have a relationship, should be compelling
evidence that it really is that entity, the entity to
which you have given a petname on your contacts list.
Thus phishing is hard to initiate.  As with Skype, what
we seek to secure is petnames, not true names.  We want
to secure the bookmark list, and the list that comes up
in a Google search.  We want to secure that when you
click on a the top entry of the Google list, you are
contacting the intended entity.

2.  As with Skype to Skype IM, this should be symmetric.
If you respond to a message from your bank, or initiate
a message to your bank, you should not have to reveal
some shared secrets to prove an existing relationship
before getting on with your task. Thus phishing should
fail to catch any phish.

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