Hal Finney wrote:
An example where this concern might arise would be an overly simplistic protocol that used AES in ECB mode - "simple by design", while the "encryption purist" advocated GCM, "more difficult to break into" but more complex. Now, I'm sure EKMI is not doing things this way but it is an example where "simple" would not look good to "encryption purists".
You are right, Hal. EKMI does not support AES in ECB mode. While this may not be acceptable to everyone, in SKSML version 1.0 we have chosen to currently support only the algorithms specified in XML Encryption (http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/#sec-Algorithms): Block Encryption 1. REQUIRED TRIPLEDES http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-cbc 2. REQUIRED AES-128 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc 3. REQUIRED AES-256 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc 4. OPTIONAL AES-192 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes192-cbc Key Transport 1. REQUIRED RSA-v1.5 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 2. REQUIRED RSA-OAEP http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p Message Authentication 1. RECOMMENDED XML Digital Signature http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig# Message Digest 1. REQUIRED SHA1 http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1 2. RECOMMENDED SHA256 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256 3. OPTIONAL SHA512 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 Encoding 1. REQUIRED base64 http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#base64 Even though SHA-384 does not appear on the XMLEnc digest list, we do support it too (the underlying crypto libraries support it, so it was no big deal to add it). We will also recommend that SHA1 not be used, along the timelines suggested by NIST, despite its appearance on this list. I understand that the W3C has started-up the XML Security WG again, and as these standards are updated, we will follow their work and support them in EKMI as appropriate. Should there be requests from the OASIS community that there be support for algorithms that are not in XMLEnc, the Technical Committee will discuss and vote on it. Arshad Noor StrongAuth, Inc. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
