Eric Rescorla wrote:
At Wed, 23 Jul 2008 17:32:02 -0500,
Thierry Moreau wrote:
Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote about various flavors of certificateless
public key operation in various standards, notably in the financial
industry.
Thanks for reporting those.
No doubt that certificateless public key operation is neither new nor
absence from today's scene.
The document I published on my web site today is focused on fielding
certificateless public operations with the TLS protocol which does not
support client public keys without certificates - hence the meaningless
security certificate. Nothing fancy in this technique, just a small
contribution with the hope to facilitate the use of client-side PKC.
DTLS-SRTP
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-dtls-srtp-framework-02,
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avt-dtls-srtp)
uses a similar technique: certificates solely as a key
carrier authenticated by an out-of-band exchange.
In draft-ietf-sip-dtls-srtp-framework, the detailed scheme uses
self-signed certificates created by client end-entities themselves. The
basic idea is identical. At the detailed level in my document, the
client end-entity "auto-issues" a security certificate with a "breached"
CA private key.
In the TLS Certificate request message, a list of CA distinguished names
is provided to the end entity. Referring to a "breached" CA public key
is an invitation to submit a meaningless end-entity certificate, making
the detailed scheme "more plain" with respect to TLS options (i.e. an
empty list in a certificate request message could be a not so well
supported mode in TLS software implementations).
So, maybe the reference to the notion of self-signed EE certificates in
draft-ietf-sip-dtls-srtp-framework could be replaced by "meaningless EE
certificates" (or something else), which would include both self-signed
or auto-issued. In such a case, the RFC publication for my document
would become more pressing.
A related discussion occurred on the IETK PKIX mailing list in June 2008
under the subject "RFC 5280 Question".
Regards,
--
- Thierry Moreau
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