On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:24 AM, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Despite previous reassurances about the security of the system, > Nate Lawson of Root Labs claims that the unique identity numbers > used to identify the FasTrak wireless transponders carried in cars > can be copied or overwritten with relative ease. >
Nate hasn't disclosed details of the code that wirelessly overwrites a transponder's ID. The temptation would be too great for many to copy an annoying neighbour's transponder ID, and then drive through a busy mall parking lot cloning it onto every transponder in proximity. As mentioned in the article, the vendors have claimed it was read-only, even though it uses flash memory (I guess technically they could cut the write line in manufacturing, but realistically that was highly unlikely even before Nate did this work). I would speculate that they just looked at the high level design, which didn't contain any specifications for features to write to memory, and decided that meant 'read-only'. In the meantime, the implementers don't see any harm in adding a few extra features *beyond* what is in the design (viz.: the overwrite code) especially where that might be useful for testing and diagnostics. As an aside: Isn't it noteworthy how much less press this has gotten than the Boston subway hacks, even though it is (IMO) of much greater severity? There might be a lesson there for the Massachussetts Bay Transit Authority. Ken --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]