On 2010-03-23 1:09 AM, Sergio Lerner wrote:
I've read some papers, not that much. But I don't mind reinventing the
wheel, as long as the new protocol is simpler to explain.
Reading the literature, I couldn't find a e-cash protocol which :
- Hides the destination / source of payments.
- Hides the amount of money transferred.
- Hides the account balance of each person from the bank.
- Allows off-line payments.
- Avoids giving the same "bill" to two different people by design.
This means that the protocol does not need to detect the use of cloned
"bills".
- Gives each person a cryptographic proof of owning the money they
have in case of dispute.
I someone points me out a protocol that manages to fulfill this
requirements, I'd be delighted.
I think I can do it with a commutative signing primitive, and a
special zero-proof of knowledge.
Gap Diffie Helman gives you a commutative signing primitive, and a
zero-proof of knowledge.
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