On 2010-03-23 1:09 AM, Sergio Lerner wrote:
I've read some papers, not that much. But I don't mind reinventing the wheel, as long as the new protocol is simpler to explain.
Reading the literature, I couldn't  find a e-cash protocol which :

- Hides the destination / source of payments.
- Hides the amount of money transferred.
- Hides the account balance of each person from the bank.
- Allows off-line payments.
- Avoids giving the same "bill" to two different people by design. This means that the protocol does not need to detect the use of cloned "bills". - Gives each person a cryptographic proof of owning the money they have in case of dispute.

I someone points me out a protocol that manages to fulfill this requirements, I'd be delighted. I think I can do it with a commutative signing primitive, and a special zero-proof of knowledge.

Gap Diffie Helman gives you a commutative signing primitive, and a zero-proof of knowledge.

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