On 28/07/2010 00:14, Paul Tiemann wrote:
> On Jul 27, 2010, at 3:34 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>> On 24/07/2010 18:55, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>>> - PKI dogma doesn't even consider availability issues but expects the
>>>  straightforward execution of the condition "problem -> revoke cert".  For a
>>>  situation like this, particularly if the cert was used to sign 64-bit
>>>  drivers, I wouldn't have revoked because the global damage caused by that 
>>> is
>>>  potentially much larger than the relatively small-scale damage caused by 
>>> the
>>>  malware.  So alongside "too big to fail" we now have "too widely-used to
>>>  revoke".  Is anyone running x64 Windows with revocation checking enabled 
>>> and
>>>  drivers signed by the Realtek or JMicron certs?
>> One way to mitigate this would be to revoke a cert on a date, and only
>> reject signatures on files you received after that date.
> I like that idea, as long as a verifiable timestamp is included.
> Without a trusted timestamp, would the bad guy be able to backdate the 
> signature?

Note that I avoided this issue by using the date of receipt.

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