On Jul 28, 2010, at 8:21 33AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 28/07/2010 13:18, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>> Ben Laurie <b...@links.org> writes:
>>
>>> I find your response strange. You ask how we might fix the problems, then
>>> you
>>> respond that since the world doesn't work that way right now, the fixes
>>> won't
>>> work. Is this just an exercise in one-upmanship? You know more ways the
>>> world
>>> is broken than I do?
>>
>> It's not just that the world doesn't work that way now, it's quite likely
>> that
>> it'll never work that way (for the case of PKI/revocations mentioned in the
>> message, not the original SNI). We've been waiting for between 20 and 30
>> years (depending on what you define as the start date) for PKI to start
>> working, and your reponse seems to indicate that we should wait even harder.
>>
>> If I look at the mechanisms we've got now, I can identify that commercial
>> PKI
>> isn't helping, and revocations aren't helping, and work around that. I'm
>> after effective practical solutions, not just "a solution exists, QED"
>> solutions.
>
> The core problem appears to be a lack of will to fix the problems, not a
> lack of feasible technical solutions.
>
> I don't know why it should help that we find different solutions for the
> world to ignore?
There seem to be at least three different questions here: bad code (i.e., that
Windows doesn't check the revocation status properly), the UI issue, and the
conceptual question of what should replace the current PKI+{CRL,OCSP} model.
For the last issue, I'd note that using pki instead of PKI (i.e., many
different per-realm roots, authorization certificates rather than identity
certificates, etc.) doesn't help: Realtek et al. still have no better way or
better incentive to revoke their own widely-used keys.
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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