There has to be a layered approach.

Traffic analysis is probably going to demand steganography and that is
almost by definition outside standards work.

The part of Prism that I consider to be blatantly unconstitutional is that
they keep all the emails so that they can search them years later should
the need arise. Strikes me that is the type of sophistry that John Yoo used
when he wrote those memos claiming that torture isn't torture.

There will be a reckoning in the end. Takes about twenty to thirty years
before the point is reached that nobody in the establishment has a reason
to protect the war criminals of years past.

I have a little theory about the reason the CIA engineered coups were so
successful from 53 to 73 and then suddenly stopped working. Seems to me
that the CIA would have been nuts to try operation Ajax without some very
powerful intel like being able to break the Persian codes. CIa stopped
being able to mount those exercises after electronic ciphers were

Given how the NSA used their powers last time round to topple democracies
and install dictators I don't think they deserve a second chance.

On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Perry E. Metzger <>wrote:

> On Fri, 23 Aug 2013 09:38:21 -0700 Carl Ellison <> wrote:
> > Meanwhile PRISM was more about metadata than content, right? How
> > are we going to prevent traffic analysis worldwide?
> The best technology for that is mix networks.
> At one point, early in the cypherpunks era, mix networks were
> something of an expensive idea. Now, however, everyone in sight is
> connected 24x7 to the internet. Similarly, at one point, bandwidthwas
> scarce, but now, most traffic is video, and even if instant messages
> and email equivalents took many hops through the network, the
> bandwidth used (except for mobiles, which need not be interior mix
> nodes per se) is negligible.
> Perry
> --
> Perry E. Metzger      
> _______________________________________________
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