On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 11:48:40PM -0700, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > Given that many real organizations have hundreds of front end
> > machines sharing RSA private keys, theft of RSA keys may very well be
> > much easier in many cases than broader forms of sabotage.
>
> Or we could make it easy to have one separate RSA key per front end, signed
> using the main RSA key of the organization.
This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
For HTTPS, there is little indication yet that any of the major
browsers are likely to implement DANE support in the near future.
--
Viktor.
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