Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> writes: >I have not spent a great deal of time looking at the exact capabilities of >PRISM vs the other programs involved because from a design point they are >irrelevant. The objective is to harden/protect the infrastructure from any >ubiquitous, indiscriminate intercept capability like the one Gen Alexander >appears to have constructed.
Precisely. I made the same point recently in an interview about PRISM, that a well-designed, well-engineered protocol will be NSA-proof (or at least as NSA- proof as you can get within reason). It'll also be Russian mafia-proof, Chinese-government-proof, and your-mother-proof. There isn't some exotic class of protocol or mechanism that's needed to resist the NSA, anything well- designed and implemented can do it. Peter. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
