On 2011-01-26 8:59 AM, Adam Back wrote:
I think for its flaws, its still significantly useful that a FIPS algorithm
or crypto library certificate certifies that an implementation passes its
test vectors, startup tests etc. It gives some reasonable assurance that
the algorithm is implemented according to the spec, and typically some
thought and cryptographic review went into the spec, and it is specified at
least as opposed to "what ever this chunk of code does".
Some-random-stuff that a guy hacked up one evening - does it do what he
thinks it does? Is what he thinks it does secure? If he attempted to
implement to a spec and there is no certification, no test vector - is what
is implemented even the same algorithm? (The degree of stupid mistakes
anyone who does much implementation and crypto review comes across suggests
any attempt to check things is a GOOD THING).
It is obviously a good thing that people should do X, for various values
of X, one of the values of X being that the test suite should run the
code against standard test vectors.
That the government should ensure that X is in fact done does not
follow, since in practice, the government is apt to ensure that X is not
in fact done.
Sarbannes Oxley is a spectacular example of this.
Enron did funny stuff with its books. A bunch of accountancy students
went over its books, smelled something funny, word got out, investors
and creditors panicked, suddenly Enron found itself unable to buy stuff
except for cash on the barrelhead, and unable to sell stuff except for
stuff it could actually deliver on the spot, unable to sell stuff except
for what was in the barrel - which meant that Enron could no longer buy
nor sell. Suddenly Enron's paychecks started bouncing, and shortly
thereafter, no one was showing up for work, the landlords were chucking
their stuff in the street, and so on and so forth.
So, the federal government announced that something must be done, and
created Sarbannes Oxley, which theoretically forbade doing funny stuff
with the books.
Now, in the recent financial crisis, it was revealed that lots of
too-big-to-fail institutions had been massively doing funny stuff with
their books - but only revealed *after* the money ran out - Sarbannes
Oxley instead of mandating the release of the smelly information that
those accountancy students spotted in the Enron case, forbade the
release of similarly smelly information.
In the present foreclosure crisis, a lot of strange accounting has come
to light, strange accounting often curiously similar to that conducted
by Enron - but due in part to Sarbannes Oxley, only came to light
*after* numerous financial institutions bit the dust, whereas before
Sarbannes Oxley, it came to light before Enron bit the dust, and caused
Enron to bite the dust.
Sarbannes Oxley was intended to require that accountants tell the truth
- but accountants were already required to tell the truth. What the
accountants did in the Enron case was tell the truth in the most
obscure, complexified, obfuscated, evasive, and uglified way possible.
Sarbannes Oxley, therefore, instead of requiring that accountants tell
the truth, required that accountants tell the *official* truth - in
other words, required that they lie, forbidding the release of the
truthful information that brought Enron down.
A government requirement that the test suite test the code against known
good test vectors will in practice be implemented in much the same
fashion as Sarbannes Oxley was.
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