On Tue, Jan 25, 2011 at 5:59 PM, Adam Back <[email protected]> wrote: > I think for its flaws, its still significantly useful that a FIPS algorithm > or crypto library certificate certifies that an implementation passes its > test vectors, startup tests etc. It gives some reasonable assurance that > the algorithm is implemented according to the spec, and typically some > thought and cryptographic review went into the spec, and it is specified at > least as opposed to "what ever this chunk of code does". I'm aware of two companies which claim to offer FIPS validated modules via OpenSSL sources, yet they do not even build fipscanister.o. Hopefully, NIST will strengthen the process so QA can actually verify such claims without a source code review. But then again, the auditor must have some knowledge of the OpenSSL (or <favorite lib>) build process.
> Some-random-stuff that a guy hacked up one evening - does it do what he > thinks it does? Is what he thinks it does secure? If he attempted to > implement to a spec and there is no certification, no test vector - is what > is implemented even the same algorithm? (The degree of stupid mistakes > anyone who does much implementation and crypto review comes across suggests > any attempt to check things is a GOOD THING). You gotta love crowd-sourcing. > For example in the past I came across some code based on one of my > size-hacked perl codes that had been hacked into a library, they used no > test vectors, while it could decrypt what it encrypted, IT wasnt compatible > with my code. So it was in fact broken - it clearly no longer implemented > the algorithm correctly. Was it secure? Who knows- quite probably not. You gotta love crowd-sourcing. Is GNU's Mailman still storing passwords in the plain text? Jeff > On Wed, Jan 26, 2011 at 07:55:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: >> >> On 2011-01-26 12:10 AM, Jack Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> The problem with this approach is the people doing the certifying do >>> not actually understand cryptography or security engineering in any >>> meaningful way, so have no real ability to make such judgements. >> >> An attempt to provide certification by idiots is unlikely to have the >> intended results. As government certification always winds up being done by >> idiots, government certification is unlikely to have the intended results. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> cryptography mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
