On 31/03/12 13:23 PM, Landon Hurley wrote:
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Does anyone have any knowledge of academic papers focused on methods
of detecting whether a crypto scheme has been compromised in situ or
on how to utilize intelligence gleaned from compromised cipher texts
without giving away that compromise to the enemy?

I'm thinking in terms of scenarios like how could the Nazis have
methodologically shown Enigma's compromise in a systematic manner; the
converse as well though: has there been research into scenarios
similar to the Allies and Enigma (i.e. how to not give the game away),
or has it all just been highly intuitive guesswork? It doesn't have to
be period sensitive, anything from Caesar to the recent would be helpful.


This is all heavily studied inside the intelligence agencies. But I never heard of it being published in an academic sense, because any academic writings would immediately be classified. It was in a sense the biggest meta-secret of the war(s).

There are lots and lots of spy/war novels about this sort of deception planning, and plenty of WWII documentaries that reveal the deception planning that went on. An awful lot of it was to hide the use of Enigma decrypts. Some also for the location & dates of D-Day. Huge resources were spent on these exercises, like Patton's mythical 3rd Army and the bombers used to invade Pas de Calais.

("Deception Plan" is a formal term of art in military planning, might make a good search term.)

(Probably the place to look is declassified documents that are after their 50 year timespan.)

Oh, one historical reference (might appeal to Americans): the reason the Battle of the Bulge was a surprise attack was that Hitler was pissed off at his prior failures, and personally suspected the communications channels were leaking his secrets, so all the orders were sent by motor-cycle couriers. E.g., Hitler was right. His generals were wrong. (This seemed to happen often enough to keep Hitler in power...)



iang
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