On 30 March 2012 22:23, Landon Hurley <[email protected]> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > Does anyone have any knowledge of academic papers focused on methods > of detecting whether a crypto scheme has been compromised in situ or > on how to utilize intelligence gleaned from compromised cipher texts > without giving away that compromise to the enemy? > > I'm thinking in terms of scenarios like how could the Nazis have > methodologically shown Enigma's compromise in a systematic manner; the > converse as well though: has there been research into scenarios > similar to the Allies and Enigma (i.e. how to not give the game away), > or has it all just been highly intuitive guesswork? It doesn't have to > be period sensitive, anything from Caesar to the recent would be helpful. > > Regards,
This sounds like game theory to me. I doubt the game is particularly different when dealing with a crypto leak vs any other any information leak (mole, stolen documents, etc). -- Eitan Adler _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
