-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 "James A. Donald" <[email protected]> writes:
>> Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"? A secret is to be >> revealed only if/when signed messages stop appearing. It is to be >> cryptographically strong and not rely on a trusted other party. > Such a system cannot exist: > If the trustee wants to discover the secret, he simply stops attending > to the messages. Obviously, the trustee does not possess the secret at this stage. > Obviously the messages have to appear on the system that contains the > secret. Pull the internet connection. Good argument. Thanks. It makes Natanael's solution, or some variant of it, all the more appealing. Keep Natanael's servers secret, such as on scattered Virtual Private Servers. They read the Grantor's signed messages from a message pool such as alt.anonymous.messages and use that channel also to communicate among themselves, outputting via anonymizing remailers. The adversary wouldn't know which of the world's internet connections to pull. When the servers agree that the Grantor is dead, they release the secret, encrypted all the while with the Trustee's key. - -- -- StealthMonger <[email protected]> Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity. anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what? http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df33?dmode=source&output=gplain stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom. mailto:[email protected]?subject=send%20index.html Key: mailto:[email protected]?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.9 <http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/> iEYEARECAAYFAlBHxxMACgkQDkU5rhlDCl7MeQCgnhac0H8acs4c+gmxwnHXOauX tckAn18/yOgIs81CFvqTXmbUH6Cr5U+w =JTIf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
