On 03/07/2013 13:31, Michael Rogers wrote:
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On 03/07/13 13:26, danimoth wrote:
Not directly related to remailer, but what about dc nets [1] ?
[1] The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability (David Chaum)
DC nets have two major drawbacks: they don't scale, and any participant
can anonymously jam the channel. Dissent is a recent system that aims to
address both drawbacks:
https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi12/strong-scalable-anonymity-safetynet
is it really feasible to get good latency/bandwith with such system? it
seems users need to transmit packets at the same time; so it seems the
latency and bandwidth is a bottleneck because everyone must wait for the
users with highest latency and lowest bandwidth? Or is there a
scheduling mechanism involved (which would "eat up" "usable" bandwidth)?
Also, how much trust is put on servers compared to Tor? At first sight,
it seems that the compromise of one server will compromise all clients
connected to this server since servers knows all their shared secret.
m no expert so any explanation is very welcome!
And forgive if my questions are too basic :)
Cheers,
Michael
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