On 2013-07-04 2:11 AM, Wasabee wrote:
On 03/07/2013 13:31, Michael Rogers wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 03/07/13 13:26, danimoth wrote:
Not directly related to remailer, but what about dc nets [1] ?
[1] The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability (David Chaum)
DC nets have two major drawbacks: they don't scale, and any participant
can anonymously jam the channel. Dissent is a recent system that aims to
address both drawbacks:
https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi12/strong-scalable-anonymity-safetynet
is it really feasible to get good latency/bandwith with such system?
it seems users need to transmit packets at the same time; so it seems
the latency and bandwidth is a bottleneck because everyone must wait
for the users with highest latency and lowest bandwidth? Or is there a
scheduling mechanism involved (which would "eat up" "usable" bandwidth)?
Also, how much trust is put on servers compared to Tor? At first
sight, it seems that the compromise of one server will compromise all
clients connected to this server since servers knows all their shared
secret.
It suffices that one server is not controlled by your adversary, even if
all the others are NSA plants, even if the server you are using is an
NSA plant.
However, a single evil server can jam the channel, so have to identify
and throw out actively disruptive servers.
Effectively, the servers form a DC net, and client anonymity is layered
on top of that.
_______________________________________________
cryptography mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
