Jon Callas <j...@callas.org> writes: >In Silent Text, we went far more to the "one true ciphersuite" philosophy. I >think that Iang's writings on that are brilliant.
Absolutely. The one downside is that you then need to decide what the OTS is going to be. For example Mozilla (at least via Firefox) seems to think it involves Camellia (!!!?!!?). >One True Suite works until that suite is no longer true, and then you're left >hanging. One way to deal with this that got discussed some time ago over dinner (dining geeks, not cryptographers) is to swap at random among a small number of probably-OK suites and/or algorithms, a sort of probabilistic-security defence against the OTS having a problem. It's not like there's a shortage of them in... well, SSH, SSL/TLS, PGP, S/MIME, etc, anything really. Peter. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
