-Caveat Lector-

<A HREF="http://www.weberman.com/nodules/nodule0.htm">NODULE 0</A>


William K. Harvey hid ZR/RIFLE in Division D. It was known as FI/D.
Division D had contact with the National Security Administration during
the 1960's since it was involved in obtaining foreign ciphers through
safe cracking. William Harvey was questioned about Division D by F.A.O.
Schwartz Jr. of the SSCIA:

Harvey: It was a division of Clandestine Services, which was the focal
point and was responsible for primarily two things (Deleted). We had
nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of research and analysis
use which was handled in a (Deleted) in the what I believe was the DDI,
Deputy Director of Intelligence.

Schwartz: Did Staff D include within its responsibilities the (deleted).

Harvey: Yes, in two ways: complete control and coordination of any such
efforts, approval and assessment of the security risk, and also the
direct procurement through operational means abroad, but not in this

Schwartz: Now, did a man called James O'Connell work for you in Staff D?

Harvey: Yes he did.

Schwartz: At some point did James O'Connell recount to you a
conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba?

Harvey: Briefly, (Deleted) came to me and said that he had been
approached by Richard Bissell, who was then the Deputy Director for
Plans, to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of
which was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he
had declined to undertake this assignment.

Schwartz: Did Mr. Bissell subsequently have a conversation with you in
which he also recounted the fact that he had requested Mr. O'Connell to
undertake such an operation?

Harvey: Yes he did.

Schwartz: Do you know anything about what happened with respect to Mr.
Lumumba, apart from those two conversations?

Harvey: I assume do you mean do I know any of the details of Lumumba's

Schwartz: No, that is not what I mean. I mean do you know about any
steps undertaken on behalf of the Agency in connection with any
proposals to eliminate Lumumba.

Harvey: No I do not.


In William Harvey's handwritten notes on ZR/RIFLE contained no mention
of assassination, These are the notes:

1. Identification. The purpose of ZR/RIFLE is to spot, develop and use
agents assets for Division D Operations. Agents will be spotted in
several areas, including the United States, but for operational security
reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence.
Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas
but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division
areas. The project will be operated against third party country
intelligence and personnel.

2. Objective. The objective of this project is the procurement of code
and cipher materials and information concerning such materials in
accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services,
primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are
subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for
the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the
basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division
D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the
operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D
in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity.
During that same period requirements from the National Security
Administration became more refined and in many respects more sensitive.
Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation
and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over
this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in
closest touch with the National Security Administration on procurement
requirements, could best conduct this activity. The spotting activity
has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational Assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent,
with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first
contacted in 1958 through the (deleted) in connection with an illegal
narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a
half he was contacted by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in behalf of
the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of the Bureau reflect and excellent
performance by QJWIN. On October 1960...

Another series of William Harvey's notes on ZR/RIFLE combined with its
first draft:

1) Legal, ethical morale, operational problems; political;

2) Our own experience (Bangkok), (& effect on DDP) and experiences w/KGB
(Crossup, Bandera group Khokilov) require most professional, proven
operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers
(few available) able to conduct patient search and with guts to pull
back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should with known high regard
for operational security. Assessments are all important)

3) Maximum security: Sigler [?] not secure enough.

a. Within Kubark only (e.g. How much does Siragusa now know?);
Limitation on number of code clerks for enciphering and deciphering.
Guise of Lauvide [?] objective. no approach to other government

b. Within Kubark one focal point for control, search tracing, case
officering etc. DDP authority in the focal point mandatory. DCI
officially advised? Overseas one man control base with own (non-Station)

c. Maximum security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no
restrictions of travel; possibility of one man overseas (Europe) control
base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering
from start to finish. No silk shirt PA's.

e. No approach to officials of foreign governments...Avoid discussion
with foreign until all possibility of search through private citizens
(e.g. QJWIN) had been examined.

f. No use of agent who ever worked for U.S. Government Agency. Tracing
by opposition would end.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g. Mankel - QJWIN) in the search.

h. Standby list of Kubarkers who can pass as foreigners and limited
official reference. Non-attributability. No American citizen or American
residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements.
No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency.

I. Pretext: Kutuke/D search. this established (es. Rome).

j. No discussions in Stations.

k. No 'team' until ready to go if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained a U.S.

b. No chain of (illegible) from person to person; singleton ops. No
chain of connections permitting blackmail.

c. Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

d. Exclude organizations e.g. Sicilians, criminals, those with record of
arrest, those with instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Soviets or
Czechs in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential re: following directions, security and

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility. (OSS Archives)

8. Use nobody who has never dealt with criminals; otherwise will not be
aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted
lists, etc. Exclude organization criminals, those with record of
arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime. Corsicans
recommended. Sicilians lead to Mafia.

9. Should have phony 201 file in RI to backstop this, all documents
therein forged & backdated. Should look like CE [Counter-Espionage]

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. Silverthorne

12. Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13. All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14. Silverthorne & stable in Paris.

15. What are the limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until
ready to go.

16. Danger of standbys.

Keeping of files.

Another series of William K. Harvey's handwritten notes contained these

25/ 1 - Exec Action. The magic button. Narcotics Buro. [doodle of knife]
'for a living' - RIS [Russian Intelligence Service] 201 cover - Caution
- Bankruptcy - No star eyes - JIM A. - contradestruct from U-2 Not a TSD
problem. Apply brakes. Last resort beyond last resort & confession of
weakness. El Benefactor - assumptions - wrong framework of Sid's job.
(Ledford). Elict R & D - Memo. Translating machines - the basic sounds
project phenous (rumble CB) Commit gear. Anathesia - never mention word
assassination. 6/1 AS - (illegible) No file review.

1. Select proper officer to run -

2. Place and cover.

3. Security rules.

4. (Illegible) lives.

5. Last Resort - Brakes - substituted - What next. B - WKN - AS - Sid -

6. No other agencies.

7. No projects or (illegible) except for cover.

8. Principal agent (Mankel) ? AF Project LCH tested 1500 - from NB. Mask
(illegible) requirement staff AF project.

9. Disposal.

10. Targets who where, must know before we can spot -

11. Case officering

12. Cover file - create to from RIS or open it. non Sov.

13. Note dangers of RIS counteraction & mention if they are blamed. FDJ
list remember

AS Fanfarro / Dictler. No file review. Max on 2/3.- Project draft LCH.

William K. Harvey commented on his notes to Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence: "Now these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of
paper, what they are from -- they are in my handwriting. It's from a
yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used to keep on my
desk and just make rough notes of conversations that I had, telephone
and otherwise, with various people. Once a week I would go through them
and either destroy, classified trash, dictate from them, or occasionally
save them. There is no relationship between the material that appears
after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just before the
26/1(deleted) and the material which appears above it which is tabbed
SID G tab 21.

Schwartz: That would be Sid Gottlieb?

Harvey: Sid Gottlieb.

Schwartz: Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb on January 25
indicate that you had a discussion that included the word bankruptcy and
you felt assassination was --

Harvey: There was a general philosophic discussion of assassination and
assassination techniques...This was sort of an exchange of ideas and
briefing session, probably held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my
office shortly after he either took over a new job in Technical Services
Division or took over as actual Chief of Technical Services
Division...[Last resort beyond last resort and confession of weakness]
that's obviously referring to assassination. That's probably what I told
Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the use and propriety of assassination as a
technique was. The confession of weakness -- let me put it just as
plainly. A great nation should be able to take care of a defaulting bank
clerk other than eliminating him physically. [El Benefactor was Mr.
Trujillo] obviously, yes. That is what he liked to be referred to

Schwartz: Was the use of assassination against Mr. Trujillo brought up
in conversation with Mr. Gottlieb?

Harvey: Not as you are stating it. In other words if what you mean was,
was the question of should we assassinate Trujillo brought up in that
sense, that answer is no."

William K. Harvey was asked to name the other two candidates for
assassination. William K. Harvey: "I presume that the logical candidates
would have been Lumumba and Castro, I mean not that we were considering
them in this discussion as logical targets for assassination, but that
these were sort of the three people that would have come to mind if you
are going to go into this, these are three to be considered. But you
will notice Mr. Schwartz, 'Framework of Sid's job (deleted) Memo.'
(Deleted) is the name of the Staff Officer who worked for me in Division
D at that time. This 'translating machine' was an experimental device,
done under -- hoped for development (deleted) that I was most interested
in, because of the serious translation problem we had and (deleted)..."
William K. Harvey was read the passage: "Within Kubark, one focal point
for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- DDP authority in
this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" He responded: "I do
not know [if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency] was
advised that I had been asked to set up an Executive Action capability
and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in that
connection...I was completely convinced during this entire period, that
this operation had the full authority of the White House, either from
the President or from someone authorized and known to be authorized to
speak for the President. But I must answer, so this does not get out of
context, that I have no personal knowledge whatever of the individual's
identities, times, exact words or channels through which such authority
may have been passed...In February 1961 [Mr. Bissell] brought up the
question of Executive Action. He said he was concerned about it -- about
not only our capabilities, if any, to perform it, but the basic
questions of protections, methods, techniques, decisions, judgement as
to the advisability in any given case, and this whole sort of panoply of
-- again, pardon the term -- expertise required. I cannot be positive
the word assassination was actually mentioned, but to the best of my
recollection, it either was mentioned in other words [Executive Action],
that exact word either did come out, or the implication was so clear as
to be beyond any misunderstanding...Well, I'm not trying to be humorous,
but the first thing I did, quite honestly, was to go back and think
about it, and try to think out my own thoughts, and then I did conduct a
very discreet -- not completely, but almost completely Eyes Only --
survey is a bad word, its too formal and connotes more of an official
inquiry than this was, but what I did do was to discuss in theoretical
terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly the whole
subject of assassination, our possible assets, our posture, going back,
if you will, even to the fundamental question of A, is assassination a
proper weapon of an American intelligence service and B, even if you
assume that it is, is it within our capability within the framework of
this government to do it effectively and properly, securely and
discreetly...If useful at all, assassination could be used only most
rarely and then under the most carefully controlled conditions and as a
result of the greatest provocation, without attempting to determine the
fundamental policy question of whether the government should ever
entertain such a technique or tactic, which was not really my province."
Schwartz: Your note has as report to the DCI, the January 26th
reference, which reads in the first line (deleted). That is (deleted) I
take it?"

Harvey: "I'm sure that's (deleted).

Schwartz: Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI matter.

Harvey: I am not sure. The closest I could come to that is a fairly
illogical Fanfani, and Fanfani was never even dreamed of, as far as I
know, in any such context. Fanforn -- Burton Wides raised that with me
and just had to throw up my hands. I just don't know. [Harvey SSCIA
Test. 6.25.75 NARA SSCIA 157-100002-10105]


"Spotting," not killing, was allegedly the primary activity of the CIA's
contract killer QJWIN, ZR/RIFLE'S principal agent: "Principal agent
(Mankel)?" Several candidates were considered for Mankel's job and on
October 11, 1960, the CIA Chief of Station (deleted) sent William K.
Harvey, Chief Division D, this document:

(1) (Deleted) as source and spotter for (deleted) to pick his brain and
pinpoint his ability to do this job for us, but once selection is made,
(deleted) to be eliminated. (Deleted) believes KUBARK handling as matter
of convenience in behalf of Narcotics Bureau. (Deleted) to follow up
with (deleted) on word from Hqs. Purpose is selection of one or two
(deleted) as entry men to be teamed with (deleted).

(2) (Deleted) Thoroughly acquainted (deleted) picture. Appears to have
on tap (deleted) type, ca 40 years old, whom he had once mentioned to
(deleted) outside man in (deleted) to follow up with (deleted) after
briefing by (deleted) and (deleted). Purpose is select (deleted) for
teaming with (deleted) split them after job done. Possible find
(deleted) speaking German as well as Italian. Possible German

(3) Siragusa, Assistant Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, as source on
Corsicans and Sicilians; query him whether District #2 (N.Y. / N.J. /
New England) had West Indian colored contacts usable for our purposes.

(4) (Deleted) contact: (Deleted) Rome, American Citizen, has clearance,
good potential PA, experienced with criminals; educated England and US.

(5) Milan offers good possibilities of finding (deleted) and

(6) (Deleted) contact Florence (deleted) bar owner, speaks Italian,
German, English, had thorough knowledge underworld Antwerp and Brussels
and working knowledge underworld Frankfurt, Cologne, Nice.

(7) (Deleted) had two expert (deleted) who were introduced to Cusack on
July 19, 1960, in Barcelona.

(8) (Deleted) born May 11, 1910, Antwerp; stateless (of Russian
descent); alias (deleted) Knowledgeable northern underworld. Possible
spotter. Has worked for (deleted) and (deleted). Speaks English. Can
locate thru CID, Fran, or thru desk at Frankfurter Hof, asking for
(deleted) and using (deleted) name as reference with him.

(9) For training purposes: French commercial film (deleted); can be
obtained thru (deleted) excellent detail on planning and execution of
(deleted) job."


The CIA settled on candidate number six, FNU Mankel, QJWIN (IRD
#34,944). QJWIN was identified as a 44-year-old Luxembourg citizen. In
1919 he was arrested at Geneva for complicity in an assassination and
sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1925, he was released through the
influence of his friends. In December 1939, he was accused of
embezzlement in Luxembourg. In December 1939, he was arrested by the
French authorities on suspicion of espionage and interned at Gurs.
Again, he was released through the influence of friends - Muchen, Laval
- in June 1940. In August 1941, he was given an important intelligence
post in Bordeaux by the Germans. In November 1943, he was arrested by
the gestapo and imprisoned at Frennes. A few days later he was released
and placed under house surveillance at his Paris home. It was reported:
"Reported to be art dealer and homosexual. Subject was described as
wealthy and cultured. Subject had numerous friends in good Parisian
circles and appeared to be more than a collaborator." In December 1943,
 he was expelled from France by the Gestapo and instructed to live at
"fudelange" in Luxembourg. When he was arrested in Luxembourg on
September 16, 1944, papers found on him indicated he had a fair amount
of influence with the Germans and possibly was an agent.[CIA 201-245882
7.17.59] On August 7, 1945, he was mentioned at the trial of Marshall

On September 5, 1958, Priority Traces on Subject and family were
requested from (deleted) to the Chief Western European Division:

1. Priority A traces are requested on Subject who is the (deleted)
informant referred to in para 2 of (illegible) 0010. Depending on the
outcome of the traces, it is planned to use Subject as an Agent
Provocateur and or a double agent against the Soviets.

2. (Deleted) has known Subject since the early 1950's when Subject was a
successful smuggler. (Deleted) 3 and (Deleted) used Subject as an
informer on the activities of other smugglers in Luxembourg. Subject is
financially indebted to (deleted) who has loaned him money to get
started in a legitimate business. (In addition, (Deleted) knows a lot
about Subject's past illegal activities, which might conceivably be used
against Subject.) Subject has many varied contacts among illegal traders
and petty criminals as well as among influential legitimate businessmen.
He is described by the (Deleted) as a quick thinker and one who can
"think on his feet." When the question arose as to who a suitable
candidate for provocateur might be, (Deleted) suggested Subject.
(Deleted) was called in and without hesitation he answered the same
question immediately with Subject's name. When the question is put to
(Deleted) who is more conservative in judgement than either (Deleted) or
(Deleted) he also agreed Subject was ideal choice. According to the
(Deleted) assessment of Subject, he is the type of person who would
appeal to (Deleted) and since we have been searching for means to probe
into KGB activities in Luxembourg, Subject may well be the man for the


The CIA: "QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the (deleted) in
connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States.
For a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by Chief of Station,
Luxembourg in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics." This case involved the
allegation that the Chinese Communists were giving heroin to a smuggling
ring for free so it could be smuggled into the United States. The CIA:

1. Chief of Station, Luxembourg has provided the following information
concerning an approach to a Luxembourger by a French national who
desired to join a narcotics ring disposing of narcotics supplied by the
Chinese Communists.

A Luxembourg citizen reported that in mid-April 1959 one (Deleted) asked
him to join a ring which received large amounts of free Opium from
Chicoms on condition that it be smuggled into the United States.
(Deleted) said that two Sicilian residing in Paris and successfully
engaged in this traffic; one who allegedly had received 50 kilograms of
free opium in Hong Kong and delivered it personally in the United States
after entering via Canada. Full French documentation needed for an
American visa can allegedly be obtained for $200.

Address is given as (Deleted) Paris and he is described as
follows...Born in Basque country Smuggled narcotics before and after the
war from North Africa. Convicted three times, the last time for theft
and was last released in December 1958. (No Headquarters traces)

The Luxembourger stated his willingness to accept (Deleted) offer if he
can have American guidance. COS, Luxembourg, who interviewed him,
observed that he probably knows more than he told or is involved in some
deal for which he hopes to protect himself by being able to state that
he is working for the Americans. COS, Luxembourg suggested a (deleted)
representative be sent to Luxembourg where he could fully interrogate
the Luxembourger and assess his story. QJWIN would be an agent
provocateur and would try to make contact with the Chicoms though the
contacts he made when he was a successful smuggler in the 1950's. [CIA
470 9.9.58] By 1960: "QJWIN was under written contract as a principal
agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates."


Mankel was not a safecracker, nor did he have access to false documents
- Mankel was a killer. The candidates he spotted were candidates for


On August 18, 1960 the CIA Station in Leopoldville cabled the DCI:
"Embassy and Station believe Congo experiencing classic communist effort
takeover government. Many forces at work here: Soviets...Communist
Party. Although difficult to determine major influencing factors to
predict outcome struggle for power. Decisive period not far off. Whether
or not Lumumba actual commie or just playing commie game to assist his
solidifying power, anti-West forces rapidly increasing power in Congo
and there may be little time left in which to take action to avoid
another Cuba." [CIA Cable IN 39706 Leopoldville to Director 8.18.60]
This cable also stated the Station's operational "objective of replacing
Lumumba with pro-Western group." Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the
Africa Division of the CIA's Clandestine Services, replied the same day
that he was seeking State Department approval for the proposed operation
based upon: "Our belief that Lumumba must be removed if possible." [CIA
Cable Out 59741]

On August 19, 1960, Richard Bissell signed a follow up cable to
Leopoldville: "You are authorized to proceed with operation." [CIA Cable
Out 59959] Several days later the Stanleyville Station reported that a
plan to assassinate Patrice Lumumba had been proposed to President K
asavubu by Congolese leaders: "Kasavubu refused to agree saying he was
reluctant to resort to violence and no other leader sufficient stature
to replace Lumumba." [CIA IN 42761 8.24.60]

On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended a meeting of the Special Group
- a subcommittee of the National Security Council responsible for
planning covert operations. The Special Group "finally agreed that
planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of
any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of
Lumumba." [Special Group Minutes 8.25.60] The next day Allen Dulles
signed a cable to the Leopoldville CIA Station which stressed the
urgency of 'removing' Patrice Lumumba: "In high quarters here it is the
clear-cut conclusion that if Lumumba continues to hold high office the
inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to
Communist takeover of Congo with disastrous consequences for the
prestige of the United Nations and for the interests of the free world
generally. Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent
and prime objective that under existing conditions this should be a high
priority of our covert action." [CIA Cable OUT 62966 Dir. To Leopoldv
ille 8.26.60] Allen Dulles cabled that the Station was to be given wider
authority "including even more aggressive action if it can remain
covert...We realize that targets of opportunity may present themselves
to you." [CIA Cable 8.26.60] Allen Dulles authorized $100,000 "to carry
out any crash programs on which you do not have the opportunity to
consult Headquarters." Dulles assured the Leopoldville Station that the
message had been seen and approved at a competent level in the State
Department. [CIA Cable 8.26.60] But the Director of Central Intelligence
made a special point of assuring the Leopoldville Station that he was
authorized to act unilaterally in a case where the United States
Ambassador to the Congo would prefer to remain uninformed: "To the
extent that Ambassador may desire to be consulted, you should seek his
concurrence. If in any particular case, he does not wish to be
consulted, you can act on your own authority where time does not permit
referral here." [CIA Cable 8.26.60] "This mandate raises a question as
to whether the Director Central Intelligence was contemplating a
particular form of action against Lumumba which the Ambassador would
want to be in a position to plausibly deny United States involvement.
Richard Bissell would later tell the SSCIA that he was "almost certain"
that the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the
President wanted Lumumba killed." [SSCIA 9.10.75 p33, 64-65]

QJWIN was met in Luxembourg on October 19, 1960, and October 20, 1960,
 by two Agency officers and was asked if he would undertake a trip to
Africa, presumably Dakar. He was not given the true objective of his
mission because of its extreme sensitivity and pending a final decision
to use him. Instead he was told that the Soviets were operating in
Africa among nationality groups, specifically the Corsicans, and he was
being asked to spot, assess and recommend some dependable, quick-witted
persons for our use. On October 30, 1960, QJWIN was paid 3,500 Belgian
Francs. On November 2, 1960 he accepted an offer to proceed to
Leopoldville, Belgian Congo. He was informed the mission might involve a
large element of personal risk. On June 26, 1963 William K. Harvey noted
that some of the funds given to QJWIN during September and October 1960
 could not be accounted for. On November 3, 1960, QJWIN was in Paris. On
November 6, 1960, he received 15,000 Bfrs. November 11, 1960, 25,000
Bfrs; November 15, 1960, 30,000 Bfrs. In November 1960, Sidney Gottlieb
prepared an assassination kit which included a lethal biological agent,
hypodermic needles etc., then personally delivered it to the CIA Station
in Leopoldville, where QJWIN had been placed. [Powers Secrets p184]

On December 8, 1960, QJWIN was in Leopoldville where he wanted to
recruit a Yugoslav Air Force pilot, however, the CIA considered the
target marginal: "We wish to keep him clean of any operational
involvement other than that originally planned for him." In December
1960, he was paid $1,000. On December 9, 1960, the Director sent this
cable to Leopoldville: "Exploring (deleted) interest possible purchase.
Will advise. Have no ops interest pursuing lead but request continuing
intelligence coverage important developments in diamond sales picture.
*Desk Comment: (Deleted) diamonds collected by Kasai officials from
villages as taxes, supposedly valued at 20 million dollars. Wanted
(deleted) intact (deleted) about this. Request headquarters comments
about having (deleted) being (deleted) and eliciting diamond sales
pitch. Then arrange (deleted) Accra based rep of (deleted) meeting.
Glenn D. Fields, AC/AF."


QJWIN related: "While in Leopoldville Subject met IDENTITY F, [WIROGUE]
who passed himself off as an Austrian, flashed a bankroll and attempted
to recruit Subject to work for an undetermined Western intelligence
service, hinting that he was working for the (deleted). Subject reported
this to his local Case Officer." In March 1975, the CIA attempted to
determine why WIROGUE had approached QJWIN and asked him to be a member
of an execution squad. It concluded: "The research did not clarify this
matter to any great extent."

Memorandum for Record

WIROGUE Mission to (Deleted)

December, 1960.

On March 13, 1975, a search of available documents was made to determine
the reason for the comment in paragraph 2 of a December 17, 1960, cable
from Leopoldville indicating that WIROGUE/1 had attempted to recruit a
European to be a member of an execution squad. The research did not
clarify this matter to any great extent, although some assumptions can
be made on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

WIROGUE was an ethnic Georgian recruited and trained for the old
(deleted) program. Although born in the Soviet Union, he moved to
Western Europe when he was two years old. Involved peripherally with the
French Resistance, WIROGUE was sentenced to death by the Germans, but
was liberated by the United States in 1945 and returned to Paris. By
1950 he had managed to rob a (deleted) bank of a sizable sum of money,
receive a prison sentence and be released five years later for good
behavior. He fought in the French Foreign Legion, and as of 1960, was
essentially stateless. He was brought to the United States originally
for use as one of two agents for Project A (deleted). He spoke native
French and fluent Georgian, German and English.

By 1960 the Agency was involved in a reasonably major effort to resettle
WIROGUE, possibly in Mexico for the mission for which he had been
brought to the United States had been canceled...WIROGUE'S file
indicates that as of August 30, 1960, steps were being taken to resettle
him in Mexico. However, on September 19, 1960, two members of Africa
Division met with him to discuss "an operational assignment in Africa
Division." In connection with this assignment, WIROGUE was to be trained
in demolitions, small arms and medical immunization. Plans to resettle
him in Mexico were canceled. He was provided with a new pseudonym and
immunization shots. In October 1960, a cable to Leopoldville stated that
WIROGUE was being prepared for deep cover assignment to arrive
Leopoldville late November. Headquarters noted the intent to use him as
utility agent in order to

(a) organize and conduct surveillance team;

(b) intercept packages;

© blow up bridges; and

(d) execute other assignment requiring positive action. His utilization
is not to be restricted to the Leopoldville Station. Indeed he may be
subject to call by other African Stations although it is expected for
him to be resident in Leopoldville.

In this cable WIROGUE was described correctly as an inventor,
photographer, architect, forger and former bank robber. He was judged to
be ingenuous, observant, shrewd, glib, and one who relished intrigue and
daring. He was assessed as able to 'learn quickly and carry out any
assignment without regard to danger.' As he was in the United States
black, and the plan for him was to depart black, documented as an
Austrian to surface in West Germany and from there proceed on his own to

In November 1960, "to prevent his identification with the U.S.
Government or (deleted) and to preclude any unexpected recovery of his
past which would associate him with his pre-(deleted) life', WIROGUE
underwent plastic surgery to change the shape of his nose. He was provi
ded a toupee for constant wear and documented as an Austrian who had
never been to the United States. Cover for his presence in Leopoldville
was to be shopkeeper, possibly that of photographer. A rather lengthy
assessment of his character can be summed up by saying he was able to
rationalize any action if he had strong case officer direction. Training
records of WIROGUE/1 subsequent to his engagement by the Africa
Division, indicate training only in SW. [Secret Writing]

"WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville on December 2, 1960. His case officer
gave him the following instructions:

(a) to build cover possibly by opening photographic shop.

(b) to try to spot persons for a surveillance team, intelligence assets,
particularly in (deleted) and paramilitary assets. Almost immediately
upon arrival he ran into QJWIN who told the station that WIROGUE looked
like an intelligence agent. In attempting to recruit QJWIN for his
'execution squad' WIROGUE/1 exceeded his instructions to avoid making
approaches without checking with Leopoldville Station.

"In January 1961 Leopoldville asked for authority to permit WIROGUE to
take flying lessons so that the station plane could be used for
clandestine missions. (The plane was registered in YQCLAM'S name).
Station acknowledged disadvantage of crossing WIROGUE and YQCLAM OPERAT
IONS (YQCLAM was never involved in any assassination schemes).
Headquarters approved flying lessons. By March 1961 WIROGUE/1 had
obtained the position of advisor to the (deleted) and was almost
immediately used for the purpose of gathering intelligence on the
(deleted). By April 1961 WIROGUE was teaching the (deleted) to fly
aircraft, although he himself had learned only several months earlier
and was reading navigation manuals at night to stay ahead of his class.
[By April 1961 the (deleted - Congolese Air Force?) were attempting to u
se him to obtain arms and instructors in Western Europe - CIA 5867 Att.
In July 1961, WIROGUE departed Leopoldville because he had run into
difficulty in obtaining a residence permit. He was terminated in
September 1961. (Deleted) said WIROGUE/1 knew very little about station

"It is the writer's opinion that WIROGUE/1 was recruited for his
(deleted) assignment because of his third country national background in
order to establish a support mechanism in Leopoldville. At the time
Leopoldville was in chaos, station had very few assets and there was
some likelihood that the political situation would degenerate quickly.
The (deleted) possibly also wanted to have latent paramilitary
capability and WIROGUE'S background and previous training for the
(deleted) program made him a suitable candidate. This is, of course,

"Perhaps pertinent is an October 1964, assessment of WIROGUE who had
been turned over to (deleted) for resettling in Mexico. Resettling him
had turned out to be an enormous problem. The October 1964 cable notes
that WIROGUE had an intense desire for intelligence service and enjoyed
the role of lower echelon action agent. Although he threatened to go to
work for the (Deleted) it was not believed that he thought himself would
be accepted. The assessment indicated there was little flap potential
with WIROGUE/1 since he knew little about the Agency. In particular, in
(deleted) he was aware of the (deleted) contact with (deleted).
WIROGUE/1 spent most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not
directly involved in any particular operation."


On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Premier Patrice
Lumumba from his government despite the strong support for Patrice
Lumumba that existed in the Congolese Parliament. After having lost this
power struggle with Kasavubu and with General Joseph Mobutu, the Chief
of Staff of the Congo Army, who seized the government by a military coup
on September 14, 1960, Patrice Lumumba sort protection from the United
Nations peace-keeping force. The evidence indicated that the ouster of
Patrice Lumumba from government did not alleviate the concern about him.
The CIA continued to view him as a threat, at least until early December
1960, when he was captured by Joseph Mobutu's troops and imprisoned.
During this period CIA officers in the Congo advised and aided Congolese
contacts known to have any intent to kill Lumumba. They also opposed the
resumption of the democratic process after the coup -- by reopening the
Parliament -- because of the likelihood that this would return Lumumba
to power."

The CIA reported: "The day after Lumumba was deposed by Kasavubu, two
CIA officers met with a high level Congolese politician [Mobutu?] who
had a close relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station
reported to CIA headquarters that the politician had made a response to
a remark by the (deleted) Station that he might assassinate Lumumba: 'To
comment that Lumumba in opposition is almost as dangerous as in office.'
(The Congolese politician) indicated understood and implied he might
physically eliminate Lumumba." [CIA Cable IN 49679 9.7.60] The cable
continued to report that the (deleted) Station had offered to assist
this politician "in preparation for new government program" and assured
him that the United States would "supply technicians." The day after
 Joseph Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported that he was serving
as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "eliminate" Patrice Lumumba due
to his fear that Lumumba might, in fact, have been strengthened by
placing himself in U.N. custody, which afforded a safe base of

Patrice Lumumba was arrested by Congolese authorities. Circa January 21,
1961, Patrice Lumumba was moved to Katanga Province where he was kept in
a farmhouse prison under the watchful eye of Belgian Julien Gat. When
the then-Belgian Congo gained its independence, Katanga Province, headed
by Moise Tshombe, had broken away from Patrice Lumumba's central
government. On February 13, 1961, Patrice Lumumba and two of his
associates were killed. How they were killed remained a mystery. The
Congolese Government claimed that Lumumba and two of his companions
chiseled their way out of a sandstone hut, armed themselves with tree
branches, snuck up behind the guards and knocked them unconscious. Two
guards, who had recently been beaten, claimed they had been tied up with
torn-up blankets. The fugitives stole a car, hot-wired it, then wrecked
it. Local villagers found them, murdered them, and buried the bodies.
The villagers did not want to be identified for fear of reprisals.

The CIA: "On March 31, 1961, at the request of his case officer, QJWIN
was technically interrogated in the French language at a safe site in
Frankfurt, Germany. QJWIN had admitted that circa 1953 to 1954 he was
approached by IDENTITY C, a Belgian citizen, whom he had known since
1947, to obtain a sample of a new model Belgian gun for the benefit of
an Eastern country. Subject reported this incident to IDENTITY B
[Belgian Intelligence] and to IDENTITY E, a (deleted) official at
Bitburg Air Base. Subject advised that on his return from Leopoldville
he visited IDENTITY B, but did not discuss his work with the (deleted).
Their conversation concerned the situation in the Congo in
general...Subject stated that his wife is acquainted with IDENTITY B and
he was aware that she had a relationship with him. She is also aware
that he presently has a clandestine relationship with (Deleted) without
knowing the exact extent of it. Subject describes his wife as extremely
discreet. Subject stated that he had collaborated with the Luxembourg,
Belgian and West German Intelligence Services and with the French
Marquis before his current association with the (deleted). Subject
stated he is also known to the French and Belgian Police Departments in
connection with illegal business transactions. While he was in Leopo
ldville, a sum of money was deposited to his wife's account at the
Banque International de Luxembourg. The deposit was made ostensibly by
the (deleted) Embassy in Luxembourg. However, Subject's wife did not
question this, but it is obvious to her that he is employed by some
(deleted) Agency." QJWIN was asked, "Did you reveal to anyone the nature
and details of your mission for the (deleted) in Leopoldville? Did you
honestly report everything that took place in Leopoldville? While in
Italy and Switzerland in February 1961, did you indicate to anyone that
you had a secret mission for the (deleted)?" QJWIN passed this lie
detector test.

On March 21, 1961, QJWIN was paid 5,000 Bfrs; June 30, 1961, 30,000
Bfrs. July 28, 1961, $200; August 1, 1961, 30,000 Bfrs; September 28,
1961, 30,000 Bfrs; October 10, 1961, 20,000 Bfrs. Operational Expenses;
October 31, 1961, 20,000 Bfrs. for operational expenses. October 31,
1961, 30,000 Bfrs; December 1, 1961, 7600 Bfrs, reimbursement for
(deleted). December 1, 1961, 30,000 Bfrs; June 5, 1961, received 30,000
Bfrs. January 5, 1962, 30,000 Bfrs. January 31, 1962, 30,000 Bfrs. The
CIA stated: "Agency officers who were handling QJWIN in Europe were
almost certainly aware of the fact that he was being considered as an
asset by the senior Agency official who had begun to become active in
February 1962, in the assassination plot against Castro. An undated EYES
ONLY memo from the DD/P refers to a February 19, 1962, memo and
authorizes the retention of the services of QJWIN in activities which we
have identified as coincidental with the assassination plot against
Castro." On March 1, 1962, QJWIN was paid 30,000 Bfrs; April 2, 1962,
 30,000 Bfrs; May 4, 1962, 30,000 Bfrs; July 2, 1962, 30,000 Bfrs;
September 17, 1962, 30,000 Bfrs. Evidence suggested that in April 1963
QJWIN was in Florida with William Harvey. William Harvey's expense list:
"Vouchered. All chargeable to ops expenses QJWIN/ZRRIFLE.

13/4 Phone call Plantation Key Florida to Perrine, Florida. Ditto to

15/4 Phone call Plantation Key Florida to Perrine, Florida. Ditto. Ditto
to Los Angeles. Ditto to Miami.

17/4 Phone call Plantation Key Florida to Perrine, Florida. Ditto.

17/4 Drinks and dinner for 2 (1 unofficial American and self) Eden Roc
Hotel, Miami, Florida. $26.

15/4 Boat charter for ops purposes - no receipt available - Islamorada,
Florida. $75.

17/ 4 Ditto above.

20/4 Ops hotel room Plantation Yacht Hotel, Plantation Key. $22...

20/4 Reimbursement ZR/RIFLE/MI for ops related room at Eden Roc Hotel
Miami 3 days. No receipt.

Reimbursement ZR/RIFLE /MI R trip 1st Class plane ticket Miami/Chicago.
No receipt available.

Termination payment ZR/RIFLE MI No receipt $1,000.

21/4 Phone call Plantation, Key Florida to Miami Florida. Total

The telephone numbers that William Harvey called were: 305 - 238-3725,
238-3478, 445-5178, 667-1152 and 213-CU 3-0850.


QJWIN was "terminated" on February 14, 1964. The CIA noted: "(Deleted)
told him on April 21, 1964 that the operation in which he was to play a
role had been shelved and therefore his contract, which ran out on
February 29, 1964 was not renewed. He was reassured that this action did
not result from anything he had done and his past cooperation was
appreciated. It was mentioned as conceivable that the operation might
have been off and running if he had been able to establish his cover
last year...In discussing his future (deleted) suggested, now that he
has received all the necessary authorizations in Cologne he seriously
would discuss this with his wife. His only hesitation is committing
himself to a long lease on a shop." A CIA document dated March 3, 1964,
 read: "Received 30,000 for February Salary." [NARA
1993:07.22.08:24:18:400410] QJWIN's termination document continued:
"Since January 1962 (see paragraph 6 (deleted) 1246 of December 15,
1961) QJWIN's only assignment has been to establish cover. This requi
rement was confirmed by DIR-12541 of May 28, 1962, and during (deleted)
discussions in Headquarters in July 1962.Twenty-seven months and some
$18,000 later, he is still not in place. Although (deleted) made an
issue of this with him in August 1963. Whether he ever really intended
to commit himself to this assignment remains a question. (Deleted) has
strong doubts. QJWIN's personal history reflects major instability and
the habit of hedging his bets is undoubtedly part of his character. That
does not imply a security breach. There is nothing to indicate that he
has discussed his KUBARK relationship with anyone except perhaps his
wife. (Deleted) is known to QJWIN by true name. (Deleted) used the name
'Pierre' with him but it is assumed he has identified Rozenov's true
name. QJWIN knows the telephone number of the Station outside phone but
this phone is being dismantled in October of this year. Daniel C.
Brillard." [CIA FOIA 0003306]


"According to statements by a senior CIA officer [William Harvey] in
1967, made to the Inspector General, the Agency was instructed to
develop a capability to conduct assassinations. Termed an 'executive
action' capability such a project was initiated in 1961, apparently
assuming an existing cryptonym, ZRRIFLE. At the request of the case
officer (the same officer providing this information in 1967) a
clandestine asset in Europe, QJWIN, was to be used in the project. The
case officer understood that QJWIN had been considered in 1960 for use
in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba but that the proposed operation
was never carried out because the designated CIA case officer declined
the assignment.

"The case officer in charge of ZRRIFLE also was involved in an operation
to assassinate Fidel Castro, running from early 1962 to mid-1963.
However, QJWIN was not used in this effort, reliance being placed
instead on a Cuban leader. [Tony Varona]. QJ WIN was never briefed on
the Castro operation, according to the officer handling ZRRIFLE and the
Castro operation.

"Records do show that QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo in 1960, being
there in November and December 1960, prior to the death of Lumumba at
the hands of the Congolese. However, there is no evidence to suggest
that QJWIN was in any way involved in Lumumba's demise. The case officer
who was the source of the information of the contemplated use of QJWIN
in such activity understood that he was never used in this manner. The
following information reviews existing knowledge beyond that summarized

"A October 13, 1960, dispatch from (deleted) transmits notes to
headquarters from one of the two officers who subsequently met QJWIN in
Luxembourg. The notes list the names of police officials and criminal
elements and allude to the possibilities of finding safe-crackers and
document suppliers.

"QJWIN was met in Luxembourg on October 19, 1960, and October 20, 1960,
by two agency officers and was asked if he would undertake a trip to
Africa, presumably Dakar. (The appropriate dispatch, dated November 2,
1960, lists only (deleted) and (deleted) as addresses.) He was not given
the true objective of his mission because of its extreme sensitivity and
pending a final decision to use him. Instead, he was told that the
Soviets were operating in Africa among nationality groups specifically
Corsicans, and he was asked to spot, assess and recommend some
dependable, quick-witted persons for our use. He agreed to go on the
trip. On November 2, 1960, QJWIN was met in Frankfurt by an Agency
officer, and he accepted an offer to proceed to Leopoldville.
(Presumably the idea for sending him there originated at Headquarters
because someone must have considered him qualified to handle a potential
operation there.)The precise mission was not conveyed to QJWIN, and he
was only informed that the mission might involve a large element of
personal risk. We do not know and at present are unable to determine
what the assignment was. Subsequent cable traffic discusses arrangements
for QJWIN to go first to Leopoldville and then to Dakar.

"On December 8, 1960, QJWIN was in Leopoldville where he cultivated a
close personal friendship with a Yugoslav Air Force pilot. There follow
suggestion in cable traffic on what approach QJWIN should use to recruit
him. However a special channel FI/D cable of December 14, 1960, rates
this target as marginal when considered against the framework of plans
for QJWIN and instructs him to desist if action has not already been
taken. The first paragraph of this cable states that we 'would like
restrict QJWIN to activity directly pertinent his mission Leopoldville
of forthcoming mission Dakar and possibly elsewhere (e.g. Milan) for
FI/D purposes. He our only asset of this type and we wish to keep him
clean of any operational involvement other than that originally planned
for him.' This cable would tend to rule out involvement in an
assassination plot, since it is highly unlikely that an individual
picked for such a sensitive and dangerous assignment would be burdened
with other chores or assignments immediately thereafter.

"Lumumba was still alive, albeit under arrest, as of the middle of
January 1961 and it seems clear that QJWIN had left the Congo in
December 1960. A December 19, 1960, cable to Leopoldville authorizes his
return to (deleted) on December 21, 1960, and instructs (deleted) to pay
him $1000 for December salary, which is the final payment for his
services on this operation. Also headquarters was working out the
details of a Congo assignment. A January 11, 1961, headquarters
memorandum, which refers to T/A's dated December 21, 1960, states that
the referenced amounts were given to QJWIN by the Chief of Station
(Deleted). This suggests that QJWIN was in (Deleted) on or before
December 21, 1960.

"Subsequently, it appears that QJWIN operated in Europe trying to spot
and assess individuals whom the Agency could use in (deleted)
operations, in line with one of the principal missions of FI/D. A May
24, 1962 cable to (deleted) mentions that a decision was made to keep
him in Europe and that the Leopoldville assignment had been canceled. A
transfer to (deleted) is deemed a good choice. Also a April 24, 1964,
dispatch from (deleted) which mentions the termination of QJWIN'S
contract, refers to the fact that his only assignment since January
1962, has been to establish cover.

"Agency officers who were handling QJWIN in Europe were almost certainly
unaware of the fact that he was being considered as an asset by the
senior Agency official who had begun to become active in February 1962
in the assassination plot against Castro. An undated (EYES ONLY)
memorandum for the Deputy Director (Plans) refers to a February 19,
1962, memorandum and authorizes the retention of the services of QJWIN
in activities which we have identified as coincidental with the
assassination plot against Castro. The date of the reference memorandum
coincides with the time that the senior Agency official became actively
involved in this enterprise, A memorandum of June 27, 1963, dealing with
the further handling of QJWIN mentions that his enterprise has been
terminated, except for one precautionary 'life line.'

"In summary it is almost certain that QJWIN had nothing at all to do
with the assassination of Lumumba, even though the contents and language
of available files are often cryptic and imprecise. If he had been, it
is highly unlikely that the number of Agency officers handling and
contemplating assignments for him would have been so large. The
headquarters division for whom he worked was concerned, inter alia, with
obtaining foreign cipher and code books and it is reasonable to conclude
that QJWIN'S primary and exclusive responsibility was to find
individuals who could this kind of job. One of the officers who first
met QJWIN in Luxembourg was on a trip overseas to find safe-crackers and
document suppliers. The December 14, 1960, cable mentions keeping him
clean and using him in Dakar and possibly Milan which was specifically
mentioned in the October 13, 1960, dispatch as offering good
possibilities for finding safe-crackers and document suppliers. Further,
good trade craft practices would dictate that the last thing that would
keep an individual clean would be involvement in an assassination plot.
Although the Chief of Fi/D was later assigned responsibility for the
Castro operation, there is no evidence to suggest that he was privy to
assassination plots prior to his briefing in late 1961.

"While QJWIN was considered for use in the executive action capability,
there is no information available to suggest that he had ever been
approached in this regard, much less used in any of the planning.

"Based on available evidence it seems that the Agency was in no way
involved in Lumumba's assassination. However, in the course of our
research, two aspects of the Lumumba story surfaced that indicate Agency
involvement in a plot. In the one instance, our 1967 source mentioned
the name of an Agency officer who was designated as the case officer for
an assassination plot against Lumumba, but reported that he had declined
the assignment. That officer was the originator of a December 19, 1960,
 cable to Leopoldville in which he authorized the return of QJWIN to
Leopoldville on December 21, 1960, to await further instructions and the
payment of $1000 to him for his December salary by Leopoldville Station.
The last paragraph of the cable advises Leopoldville that headquarters
is working out the details of a Congo assignment for QJWIN. The same
officer was the originator of a January 31, 1961, Memorandum dealing
with payments to QJWIN.

"In the second instance, a December 17, 1960, cable from Leopoldville
deals with the activities of a newly recruited agent, WIROGUE whose
mission was to try to spot persons for a surveillance team, intelligence
assets (with emphasis on Orientale Province) and paramilitary assets.
The second paragraph of the cable mentions that he resided in the same
hotel as QJWIN (although neither knew of the other's CIA connection) and
that he approached the latter with an offer of three hundred dollars per
month to participate in an intelligence net and to be a member of an
'execution' squad. When QJWIN said that he was not interested, WIROGUE
added that there would be bonuses for special jobs. The cable mentioned
in paragraph six that the station was concerned with the free wheeling
of WIROGUE, his lack of security, his inability to handle finances and
his unwillingness to follow instructions. The Station was willing to
keep him on probation, be believed his recall would be the best
solution. A suggested alternative was to put him in Stanleyville to try
to obtain immediate intelligence on that area.

"In an attempt to reconstruct events, Africa Division was apprized of
the above and was asked to search its records in an attempt to clarify
what WIROGUE was up to in the Congo and his reference to an 'execution
squad.' The research did not clarify the matter to any great extent,
although some assumptions can be made on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. On September 19, 1960 two members of the Africa Division met
with WIROGUE to discuss an operational assignment in that division. In
connection with this assignment, WIROGUE was to be trained in
demolitions, small arms and medical immunization. Plans to resettle him
in Mexico were canceled. In October 1960, a cable to Leopoldville stated
that WIROGUE was being prepared for deep cover assignment to arrive
Leopoldville late November. Headquarters noted the intent to use him as
utility agent in order to ' (a) organize and conduct surveillance team;
(b) intercept packages; (c)blow up bridges; and (d) execute other
assignment requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be
restricted to Leopoldville. Indeed he may be subject to call by other
African Stations although it is expected for him to be resident in

"WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville on December 2, 1960. His case officer
gave him the following instructions: (a) to build a cover possibly
(deleted) and (b) to try to spot persons for a surveillance team,
intelligence assets and paramilitary assets. Shortly after his arrival,
WIROGUE ran into QJWIN, who later told the station that WIROGUE looked
like an intelligence agent. In attempting to recruit QJWIN for his
execution squad, WIROGUE exceeded his instructions to avoid making
approaches without checking with Leopoldville Station.

"In January 1961, at the request of the Leopoldville Station, WIROGUE
was given permission to take flying lessons. By March he had obtained
the position of (deleted) in that capacity he was used by the CIA for
the purpose of gathering intelligence (deleted) He departed Leopoldville
in July and his CIA contract was terminated in September 1961.

"Africa Division believes that WIROGUE was recruited for his Congo
assignment because of his third country national background in order to
establish a support mechanism in Leopoldville. At the time the Congo was
in chaos, we had few assets there, and the likelihood existed that the
political situation would degenerate quickly. The Station possibly also
wanted to have a latent paramilitary capability. An October 1964,
assessment of WIROGUE indicates little flap potential with him since he
knew little about the Agency. He spent most of his time trying to
develop contacts and was not directly involved in any particular
operation. [CIA 5867 Attachment probably Jerrold Brown]


WIROGUE was more likely to have been behind the assassination of Lumumba
than QJWIN. QJWIN was an former Nazi spy who seemed have taken a lot of
money from the CIA in the course of establishing his cover but produced
little results. WIROGUE, on the other hand, was in the country when the
assassination occurred, had made contact with members of the Congolese
armed forces,, and he may have used these men in his 'execution squad.'

On August 14, 1962, William K. Harvey generated this memo for the DD/P
in response to a memo from Landsdale suggesting the liquidation of
leaders: "The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro,
was brought up by Secretary MacNamara at the meeting of the Special
Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on August 10, 1962. It was
an obvious consensus, in an answer to a comment by Ed Murrow that this
is not a subject which has been made a matter of public record. I took
careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the
Special Group is not expecting any written comments or study on this
point. Upon the receipt of attached memorandum, I called Landsdale's
office, and in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the
inadmissability and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing
in such document...we would write no document pertaining to this and
would participate in no open meeting discussing it." William K. Harvey
suggested Landsdale delete the phrase from the memo and all copies of
it. [NARA SSCIA 157-10002-10075 8.14.62] John A. McCone sent this memo
the Director of the CIA on April 14, 1967: "Operation Mongoose...was
under the direction of General Lansdale, with William Harvey handling
CIA participation (under FitzGerald). At one of these meetings I recall
a suggestion being made to liquidate the top people in the Castro
regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion,
stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the
United States Government and the CIA were concerned and the idea should
not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the United
States Government could not consider such actions on moral or ethical


William K. Harvey knew he was guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and
avoided leaving a paper trail - as best he could in a Federal
bureaucracy. END OF NODULE.
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Roads End

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