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Sunday Herald - 09 June 2002
http://www.sundayherald.com/25366
UK sells chemical weapons to the world
Breaking international law, Britain exports lethal TCPs to Iran, Sudan, Libya
and Israel
Exclusive by Neil Mackay

BRITAIN is supplying chemical warfare technology to 26 countries including
Libya, Syria, Israel and Iran -- which was labelled part of the 'axis of evil' by
the United States.

A Sunday Herald investigation has revealed that the UK is allowing the
export of the lethal chemicals, which are illegal under international law
and controlled under the chemical weapons convention because they can
be used in weapons of mass destruction.

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which authorised the sales,
has admitted that it does not know whether the exports will be used to
create chemical weapons once they are exported, or not.

Among the countries to which Britain is exporting 'toxic chemical
precursors' (TCPs) is Sudan. The US bombed a factory in the Sudanese
capital Khartoum in 1998 with the full support of the Blair government for
allegedly producing the deadly VX nerve agent.

The UK is also exporting chemical weapons technology to countries that
are not signatories to the chemical weapons convention and therefore do
not recognise the international ban on chemical warfare.

Sudan and Jordan, which the UK also exports to, have signed the
convention but not ratified it, making the treaty virtually meaningless
there. The other nations Britain exports TCPs to are: Cyprus, India, Kenya,
Kuwait, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Turkey, Uganda and Yemen.

TCPs are known as 'dual-use chemicals' as they can be used for harmless
activities like farming or adapted or turned into chemical weapons. The DTI
admitted the sales were on-going, but said the weapons were sold 'in the
belief' that they would be used 'benignly' in agriculture or as detergents.

The DTI said it relied on assurances from foreign governments in the form
of 'end user undertakings' that they would not use British TCPs to make
chemical weapons. A spokesman agreed that this was in effect nothing
more than a promise that could be broken.

'We aim to minimise risk,' the spokesman said, 'but obviously it is very
difficult to say what happens to these things once they get to their final
destinations. It is impossible to clamp down 100%. It is impossible to know
what happens to them in the stages that come after they leave Britain.

Labour MP Ann Clwyd, who sits on international development, human rights
and arms export committees, is to raise the Sunday Herald investigation
with the Prime Minister in the Commons.

She wants the Arms Export Bill, which is currently going through
parliament, to be amended to give MPs the right to scrutinise and approve
all weapons exports before they leave the UK. The government has so far
refused to give MPs these powers.

She said claims by the DTI that it monitored chemical sales were 'a myth'
and 'did not stand up to scrutiny'. Clwyd added: 'We have no idea what
happens with these chemicals when they get to their final destination. If
we are going to sell these things we have to be 100% sure what happens to
them when they are sold. If we can't be sure, we shouldn't sell them.'

Clwyd accused the government of having a 'skewed morality', adding that
the suspicion now hung over the Blair government that it was 'aiding and
abetting dodgy regimes in the development of weapons of mass
destruction'.

Professor Julian Perry Robinson, a chemist at the Science and Technology
Research Unit at Sussex University, said TCPs were the main constituent of
chemical weapons. Robinson, who worked on the drafting of the chemical
weapons con vention and is a member of its UK National Authority Advisory
Committee said reve lations about trade in TCPs were of great public
concern. He explained how one TCP, dimethyl methylphosphonate, could
easily be turned into lethal sarin nerve gas -- the same agent used by the
Aum Shinrikyo cult to kill 12 people on the Tokyo subway system in 1995.

Robinson said it was easy for countries buying chemicals from the UK to lie
about their end use, and backed calls for parliamentary scrutiny of export
licences, saying: 'It is impossible to say whether the current safeguards
work.'

Richard Bingley, of the group Campaign Against the Arms Trade, warned
that Britain was selling chemical weapons technology to regimes that could
one day turn the capabilities Britain is giving to them back against it and its
allies.

l The revelations of Britain's trade in chemical warfare follow an anti-arms
trade demo nstration outside 10 Downing Street yesterday. Prot esters
were calling for a ban on weapons sales from the UK to India and Pakistan
as the two nations teeter on the brink of war.

Britain's Chemical Bazaar   >>>Next Article  A<:>E<:>R <<<

Should the government step in to stop British firms selling arms abroad? Air
your views in the forum



Copyright � 2002 smg sunday newspapers ltd. no.176088

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Sunday Herald - 09 June 2002
http://www.sundayherald.com/25290
Britain's chemical bazaar
Investigation: The UK sells the components of chemical weapons to some
of the worst regimes in the world. Home Affairs Editor Neil Mackay looks at
the dark side of the arms trade

ON August 20 1998 American missiles blew the El Shifa pharmaceutical plant
on the outskirts of the Sudanese capital Khartoum to bits. The Clinton
administration claimed the factory was making VX nerve gas -- a lethal
chemical weapon banned under international law.

Britain, in the form of Labour's then defence secretary George Robertson,
supported the strikes, claiming there was 'compelling evidence' that the
factory was producing chemical weapons.

Yet a Sunday Herald investigation has revealed that Britain is now selling
chemicals to Sudan -- and others among the most dangerous regimes on
earth -- which give them the capability to make weapons of mass
destruction.

Among the countries to which Britain is selling chemical warfare
technology is Iran -- a regime labelled as part of the 'axis of evil' by
President Bush.

Others include Libya -- long seen by the west as a state sponsor of
international terrorism; Israel -- which is involved in one of the bloodiest
conflicts in recent times; and Taiwan -- a nation which has been on the
brink of war with China for decades.

The sale of these chemicals is strictly controlled by the international
chemical wea pons convention, to which Britain is a sig natory, and any
sale to nations that may use them as a weapon of war is illegal. Libya, Israel
and Taiwan are not signatories to the convention. Nor are Thailand and
Syria, yet Britain sells them the technology.

Another customer is Jordan. Like Sudan, Jordan has signed the convention
but not ratified it, making the treaty effectively meaningless for both
governments. The other nations to which the UK deals chemicals are
Cyprus, India, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Tanzania,
Turkey, Uganda and Yemen.

The products that Britain is selling to these nations are known as toxic
chemical precursors (TCPs), a variety of chemicals which when combined
with other compounds create weapons such as sarin -- the nerve agent
used in the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo cult's attacks on the Tokyo subway which
killed 12 people -- and mustard gas. These TCPs are known to chemists as
dual-use chemicals. This means they can be used in harmless industries like
agriculture or turned into weapons of mass destruction when mixed with
other chemicals.

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which controls strategic
exports, including all forms of armaments and components of chemical wea
pons, admitted that Britain was selling TCPs to 26 countries. It also
admitted that there was no way they could be sure that the chemicals
would not be used to manufacture weapons once they arrived at their
destination.

Holland considers the sale of TCPs to coun tries like Sudan so dangerous
that it has banned the trade in dual-use chemicals for both civilian and
military application. Sudan has tried to buy TCPs from Dutch companies for
use in fertiliser, but the Dutch ministry of economic affairs outlawed the
transactions, saying it had 'indications that [the chemicals] might be used
for other ends', including the manufacture of nerve gas.

A DTI spokesman said the chemicals were sold overseas 'under the belief'
that they would be used 'benignly' for agricultural purposes or for use in
detergents. 'If there are concerns about the end use of such chemicals
we will closely look at export applications under the consolidated EU
national arms export licensing criteria,' a spokesman said.

He added that the risk of recipient countries diverting TCPs into chemical
weapons was closely assessed. The DTI said the main assurance it relied
upon to trust foreign governments that they would not use TCPs bought
from Britain for chemical weapons programmes was 'an end user
undertaking' -- amounting to a promise that the chemicals would be used
for non- military means.

'We aim to minimise risk,' the DTI spokesman added, 'but obviously it is very
difficult to say what happens to these things once they get to their final
destination. It is impossible to clamp down 100%. It is impossible to know
what happens to them in the stages that come after they leave Britain.'

Labour MP Ann Clywd, who sits on the commons international development
select committee, the backbench human rights committee and the
quadripartite committee on arms exports, said she will now press the
Prime Minister in parliament to explain the government's policy on sales of
chemical weapon technology to 'dubious regimes'.

'If chemicals are being sold to such regimes, questions need to be asked,'
she said. 'The DTI's claims that it monitors such exports do not stand up to
scrutiny. It is a myth that this takes place. Frankly, we have no idea what
happens with these chemicals when they get to their final destination.

'If we are going to sell these things we have to be 100% sure what happens
to them when they are sold. If we can't be sure, we shouldn't sell them.'

Clywd said the revelations about TCP sales meant that parliament should be
given the power of scrutiny over arms exports. Members of the
quadripartite committee on arms exports have recommended that MPs be
allowed to scrutinise such sales, but the government has refused to grant
these powers in the arms export bill now going through parliament.

'Without prior scrutiny there is no accountability,' she said. 'What we have
now is a system operating on a very confused and skewed morality. The US
gives elected representatives the power of scrutiny and Britain should
move immediately in that direction.

'We don't know if we are aiding and abetting supposedly dodgy regimes in
the development of weapons of mass destruction. At the moment that
suspicion hangs over these sales. There are a lot of anomalies in our
foreign policy and I, like many members of the public, am confused over
what our government is doing.'

Professor Julian Perry Robinson, a chemist at the Science and Technology
Policy Res earch Unit at Sussex University, said TCPs were the main
constituent of chemical weapons. Robinson, who helped draft the
chemical weapons convention and who is a member of its UK National
Authority Advisory Committee, said: 'These findings ought to worry people,
especially given the rather weak assurances from the DTI'.

Robinson explained that one TCP, thio diglycol, could be turned into
mustard gas by adding hydrochloric acid or ordinary household drain
cleaner. He described another TCP, dimethyl methylphosphonate, as 'the
perfect dual-use chemical'. By itself it can be used as a flame retardant,
but if mixed with other chemicals it becomes the main ingredient of sarin
nerve gas.

'Once you have your hands on dimethyl methylphosphonate you are well
on the way to making sarin,' he said. 'Every single chemical warfare agent
can be made from toxic chemical precursors.

'We need mechanisms in place to ensure these chemicals are not misused.
Currently we rely on end-user certificates from the country concerned .
But it is obvious that these countries can lie. It is impossible to say
whether the current safeguards work.'

Robinson backed Clywd's call for parliament's right to scrutinise such
export licences, saying: 'We need more transparency in the present
system'. He said the morality of the British government was now in
question, given its rhetoric against repressive regimes, its claims to be
running an ethical foreign policy and its support of the US in bombing
Sudan's alleged chemical wea pons compound. 'The ethics are twisted,'
Robinson added. 'In the end, it seems that capital counts.'

Dr Mark Phythian, principal lecturer in politics at Wolverhampton
University and the author of The Politics Of British Arms Sales, said: 'Such
chemicals are sold with political approval. Any government would be hard
pushed to say it didn't know the consequences of such sales, although it is
hard to make sense of that policy in the present climate of concerns
about terrorism and war.

'It appears this is an extension of our policy on the sale of conventional
weapons. That is a policy of sustaining the UK's industrial base, protecting
jobs in the weapons industry and maintaining our image as a global player
in arms. The government's desire to maximise trade seems to be at odds
with its rhetoric about security. History would suggest that to err on the
side of trade over security is a very short-sighted policy.'

Alastair Hay, a professor of environmental toxicology at Leeds University's
school of medicine and the biochemist who carried out the forensic tests
that proved Saddam Hussein had used poison gas against Kurds in northern
Iraq, said: 'It is a matter of real concern that we are selling these
chemicals to countries which are not signatories to the Chemical Weapons
Convention.

'These nations are looking towards Britain as a supplier because they know
we have a substantial pharmaceutical industry, there is a guaranteed
supply, and the goods will be cheap and of good quality.

'Many TCPs have no other purpose other than the making of chemical
weapons. It has to be considered as a real possibility that a country is
buying these chemicals for allegedly innocuous reasons but planning to use
them for lethal purposes.'

Richard Bingley, of Campaign Against the Arms Trade, said the sale of TCPs
made it imperative that the end use of the chemicals be closely monitored
to ensure they were not being used to create weapons of mass des
truction. 'We don't even know that, if we sell these chemicals to a
seemingly decent regime, they won't sell them on to a repressive and
dangerous nation,' he said. 'Yet we've taken that a step further by actually
selling these chemicals direct to repressive systems and nations which one
day could use the chemical capabilities we gave them against Britain or our
allies.'

Should the government step in to stop British firms selling arms abroad? Air
your views in the forum



Copyright � 2002 smg sunday newspapers ltd. no.176088

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