Cato Policy Analysis No. 241                  September 26, 1995




                                ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND:
                          A CASE STUDY IN CORPORATE WELFARE

                                         by James Bovard

   James Bovard is an associate policy analyst with the Cato Institute.
His most recent book is Shakedown: How the
                           Government Screws You from A to Z (Viking,
1995).



                                        Executive Summary

The Archer Daniels Midland Corporation (ADM) has been the most prominent
recipient of corporate welfare in recent U.S.
history. ADM and its chairman Dwayne Andreas have lavishly fertilized
both political parties with millions of dollars in handouts
and in return have reaped billion-dollar windfalls from taxpayers and
consumers. Thanks to federal protection of the domestic
sugar industry, ethanol subsidies, subsidized grain exports, and various
other programs, ADM has cost the American economy
billions of dollars since 1980 and has indirectly cost Americans tens of
billions of dollars in higher prices and higher taxes over
that same period. At least 43 percent of ADM's annual profits are from
products heavily subsidized or protected by the
American government. Moreover, every $1 of profits earned by ADM's corn
sweetener operation costs consumers $10, and
every $1 of profits earned by its ethanol operation costs taxpayers $30.

One of the most politically charged debates in Washington revolves
around business subsidies known as "corporate welfare." A
number of policy organizations have published studies examining the
corporate welfare phenomenon: what qualifies as
corporate welfare, how much it costs taxpayers, and how much it damages
the economy. This study examines the dynamics of
corporate welfare somewhat differently by investigating ADM as a classic
case study of how those subsidies are obtained, how
the welfare state encourages such "rent seeking," and how such practices
fundamentally corrupt the political life of a nation.
Congress's expressed desire to foster a free marketplace cannot be taken
seriously until

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