-Caveat Lector- from: http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ <A HREF="http://www.aci.net/kalliste/">The Home Page of J. Orlin Grabbe</A> ----- Der Fuhrer Invades Yugoslavia NATO Bombs a Civilian Bus: 60 Killed "Better put some ice on that" A NATO missile struck a passenger bus in Kosovo yesterday killing at least 60 people, according to Yugoslav television and news agencies. The missile slammed into the bus north of the capital, Pristina, cutting the vehicle in two and incinerating passengers. If confirmed as a civilian bus, the death toll would be one of the highest in the 39-day Nato air campaign. The news came as Slobodan Milosevic announced the release of three American soldiers held captive by Yugoslav authorities for more than a month. They are expected to be released this morning and allowed to fly home with the Reverend Jesse Jackson, the American civil rights leader who met Milosevic in Belgrade. Last night the Yugoslav authorities were making propaganda out of the bus attack, which took place amid one of the most intensive daylight bombing strikes since the Nato campaign began. Serb television ran extensive footage of the charred remains. According to the Yugoslav state-run Tanjug news agency, the bus was split apart by the force of the blast as it was crossing a bridge in the village of Luzane at about 1pm local time. Part of the vehicle plunged from the bridge while the other half remained on the span. Reports from journalists on the scene, including some from Western news agencies, said about 15 bodies were trapped in the charred wreckage. Most were burned beyond recognition. Maksic Rajko, a Serb farmer, said: "I turned towards the sound of a plane. I saw a bus and it suddenly exploded. I heard screams." Nato sources said they were checking the reports. Pentagon officials said the bridge was not on the target list. The London Telegraph, May 2, 1999 Nuclear Spying by China Clinton Was Warned of Lab Spy Threats, Espionage May 2, 1999 1998 Report Told of Lab Breaches and China Threat By JEFF GERTH and JAMES RISEN WASHINGTON -- A secret report to top Clinton Administration officials last November warned that China posed an "acute intelligence threat" to the Government's nuclear weapons laboratories and that computer systems at the labs were being constantly penetrated by outsiders. Yet investigators waited until March to search the computer of a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory who had been under investigation for nearly three years, suspected of spying for China. And it was not until April that the Energy Department shut down its classified computer systems to impose tighter security over their data. Meanwhile, in February, the scientist, Wen Ho Lee, tried to delete evidence that he had improperly transferred more than 1,000 files containing nuclear secrets, officials said. The classified report contains numerous warnings and specific examples showing that outsiders had gained access to the computer systems at United States weapons labs as recently as June 1998. Lawmakers from both parties have raised questions about why the Clinton Administration failed to address security breaches at the laboratories sooner, and the report, which has been shared with Congress, is certain to fuel the debate. The report, the first comprehensive review of its kind, was prepared by United States counterintelligence officials throughout the Government. It confirmed and elaborated on longstanding concerns about the vulnerability of the weapons laboratories to espionage. The report was distributed to the highest levels of the Government, including Bill Richardson, the Secretary of Energy; William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense; Janet Reno, the Attorney General; President Clinton's national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, and three dozen other senior officials at law enforcement, defense and intelligence agencies. A Government official gave a copy of the report to The New York Times. According to the report, the Energy Department recorded 324 attacks on its unclassified computer systems from outside the United States between October 1997 and June 1998, including instances when outsiders successfully gained "complete access and total control to create, view modify or execute any and all information stored on the system." The document does not say where the computer attacks originated. A select Congressional committee sent the President additional warnings about the security of the weapons laboratories in a separate report that was also secret delivered in January of this year. Richardson said in an interview that he was briefed extensively on the report and that it "confirmed the already strong counterintelligence measures I approved in October, including cyber-measures." The search of Lee's computer "should have happened earlier," Richardson said. But he defended waiting until April 2 to shut down the computer systems at the laboratory, saying: "It wouldn't have made much of a difference to have gone earlier." "The shutdown was the most extreme of measures," he said. After learning on March 30 that Lee had improperly moved vast amounts of nuclear secrets, Richardson said he decided to "speed up" plans adopted months earlier to improve computer security. He defended his department's performance but said that some Energy officials might be disciplined once an internal inquiry he ordered had been completed. Incidents Involved Many Other Countries The 25-page counterintelligence report contains many examples of lax security and serious intelligence breaches at the labs that have not been previously disclosed, involving more than a dozen foreign countries. Foreign spies "rightly view D.O.E. as an inviting, diverse and soft target that is easy to access and that employs many who are willing to share information," the report states. The Energy Department is responsible for building and designing America's nuclear weapons. China is cited in the report as posing the most serious security threat to the United States weapons labs. The report also singles out Russia and India as immediate threats. "China represents an acute intelligence threat to D.O.E.," the report said. "It conducts 'a full court press' consisting of massive numbers of collectors of all kinds, in the United States, in China, and elsewhere abroad. "China is an advanced nuclear power yet its nuclear stockpile is deteriorating," it continued. "As such, China has specifically targeted D.O.E. for the collection of technical intelligence related to the design of nuclear weapons." The report concludes, "This effort has been very successful and Beijing's exploitation of U.S. national laboratories has substantially aided its nuclear weapons program." The report states that the maintenance of nuclear weapons, so-called "stockpile stewardship," is the area of most intense interest to China. Lee was at the center of Los Alamos' stewardship program for years. The report also includes detailed information about a number of incidents in which China could have obtained sensitive weapons information, as well as some of the ways the espionage could have taken place, including these: �A Chinese scientist working at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, on Long Island, was able to send dozens of long, technical faxes to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, enabling the Chinese research center to duplicate Brookhaven experiments as they were being conducted. �China might be using its exchanges with American scientists for espionage. Chinese intelligence officials have also arranged the visits of American scientists to China to "enable Chinese experts to assess and develop these contacts," according to the report. �Thirty-seven Chinese intelligence officers have visited or been assigned to the labs and other Energy Department facilities over the last five years. More than a half-dozen Congressional committees are examining both evidence of Chinese nuclear spying and security failures at Los Alamos and other weapons labs. The secret November report, some officials believe, is the latest sign that the Clinton Administration and investigators moved too slowly and repeatedly missed opportunities to address the problems. President Clinton has said his Administration acted quickly once it learned of security problems at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories. White House officials cite the President's February 1998 directive to beef up security. That directive called for an assessment of the security threat against nuclear weapons and technology secrets at the Energy Department which was completed last November. But in recent days, with new disclosures about the extent of Lee's improper transfers of secret weapons data, the Clinton Administration is facing intensified questions about how his actions, which jeopardized secrets to virtually the entire United States nuclear arsenal, could have gone undetected for so long. "Why is it that nobody looked at his computer files until there was a crisis?" said a senior Energy Department official. "That's what we're trying to look into. Lee has not been charged. His lawyer left a message on a reporter's voice mail saying the allegations against his client are false. The report also focuses on security breaches at the labs involving other countries, citing numerous incidents. For example, Russian intelligence has intercepted communications from Los Alamos concerning nuclear power plants used for military purposes. In addition, the report says that an unknown individual sent 38 faxes to India from inside a sensitive area of the Oak Ridge Laboratory, in Tennessee, during a 30-day period in 1995 and 1996. The report grew out of a comprehensive counterintelligence review prompted by an investigation that came to focus on Lee in 1996. Questions were raised about Lee as far back as 1982. At that time, he telephoned a scientist who had been dismissed from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as a result of an F.B.I. investigation of China's theft of neutron bomb secrets, officials said. In the phone call, Lee offered to help the other scientist with his problems with the lab. The F.B.I. investigated Lee as a result of the phone call and gave him a polygraph test in late 1982 or early 1983, officials said. He passed. Suspicions Raised by Congratulatory Hug Officials say that in 1994 or 1995, another Los Alamos scientist saw Lee being hugged by a visiting Chinese scientist in a manner that seemed suspiciously congratulatory. It turned out to be a scientist Lee had visited in China in 1988. The witness reported the encounter to the F.B.I., officials said, one of the factors that eventually led the bureau to suspect him in China's theft of design information about America's most advanced nuclear warhead, known as the W-88. Some in Congress have questioned whether the F.B.I. was aggressive enough in its pursuit of Lee in the W-88 case, especially since both Lee and his wife had informally provided information to the bureau in the past, officials said. Lee gave "useful information" to the bureau in at least one case in the early 1980's, and his wife, a secretary at Los Alamos, acted as an informant for the F.B.I. from 1987 to 1992, passing on information about visiting Chinese delegations. He finally emerged as the prime suspect in the W-88 case in early 1996. In April 1996, Energy Department officials briefed Berger, then the deputy national security adviser, on the case and how it related to China's nuclear strategy. Berger took no action and did not inform the President of the matter, White House officials have said. The F.B.I. meanwhile began a criminal inquiry. But little investigative work was done by F.B.I. agents throughout the rest of 1996. In 1997, the Justice Department declined an F.B.I. request to ask a court for authority to monitor Lee's phone and to gain access to Lee's office computer. Justice Department officials argued there was insufficient evidence to convince a judge to approve the surveillance. The F.B.I. had asked the Energy Department not to move Lee from his job at Los Alamos, fearing this might alert him that he was a suspect. But the inquiry appeared to be stalled. In April 1997, the bureau's agents in Albuquerque, N.M., told Energy Department officials they could transfer Lee to a less sensitive job. But that message apparently never reached Energy Department officials in Washington, officials said. The job Lee was shifted to that month was one in which he was responsible for updating a computerized archive of nuclear secrets. Another Briefing and a Second Case In July 1997, Berger was briefed again. This time, the briefing included evidence that the Chinese were focusing on computer systems at Los Alamos, in particular computer simulations and codes for nuclear weapons, according to one United States official. At about the same time, officials at the Energy Department, the lab and the F.B.I. were all also warned that the Chinese were attempting to gain access to computer systems at Los Alamos. The July discussion was also broader, including other security problems, the W-88 theft and other espionage cases, including one involving a scientist who had worked for weapons labs and their contractors, officials said. David C. Leavy, a White House spokesman, said today that the 1997 briefing "included a number of troubling disclosures." He added that it was that briefing that led the White House to begin the process of seeking to tighten security at the labs. That second scientist, Peter Lee (who is not related to Wen Ho Lee) later pleaded guilty to attempting to pass classified information in 1985 and making false statements about a trip to China in 1997. The November 1998 report cited his case as "a good example of China's use of cultural ties to collect successfully." After Berger's 1997 briefing, he discussed the matter with the President, and White House officials began to draft a Presidential directive ordering better security at the laboratories, White House officials said. Meanwhile, the F.B.I.'s investigation of Wen Ho Lee continued without success. In the summer of 1998, Chinese-American F.B.I. agents, posing as Chinese spies, tried to establish a covert relationship with Lee, officials said. In their sting, what the F.B.I. calls a "false flag" operation, the F.B.I. agents called him, pretending to be Chinese spies checking up on Lee in the wake of Peter Lee's conviction earlier that year, officials said. Wen Ho Lee listened, and then called the agents back to refuse their offer to get together. By the fall of 1998, both of the Lee cases were coming under the scrutiny of the select Congressional committee, headed by Representative Christopher Cox, Republican of California. At about the same time, Richardson took over at the Energy Department from Federico Pe�a . In November, the secret counterintelligence report was completed. Richardson, prodded both by Congress and by the mounting evidence of security problems, took action to screen foreign visitors to the labs, proposals that had lain dormant for years at the Energy Department. In December, Lee was subjected to a polygraph for the first time. During that first examination, for reasons that officials could not explain, investigators did not ask Lee to consent to a search of his office computer. Government attorneys had concluded that the earlier Justice Department denial for an F.B.I. surreptitious search required Lee's permission to examine his office computer. In February, Lee took a second polygraph. This time, officials said, he was asked about his computer use and some of his answers were seen as deceptive. Two days later, apparently aware that investigators were now suspicious about his computer use, Lee deleted between 1,000 and 2,000 files, officials said. Lee's deletions involved millions of lines of computer codes he had downloaded, mostly in 1994 and 1995, from his classified computer system to an unclassified system. Such unclassified systems at the labs have been successfully attacked by outsiders, according to the 1998 intelligence report. In early March, Lee was interviewed by the F.B.I. During the interviews he gave permission for his computer to be searched. On March 8, he was fired from Los Alamos for security violations. Over the next few weeks, investigators pored through his computer records, recreated the deleted files and learned that Lee had downloaded computer data and codes that, in effect, were the distillation of more than a half-century of research on how to perfect nuclear weapons, officials said. Investigators have not determined whether another country -- China, for instance -- obtained the computer data. But officials said they have found evidence that someone retrieved the renamed files that had been switched to the unclassified system. After learning of Lee's computer transfers, Richardson shut down the computer systems at the weapons labs. He ordered new procedures to make it more difficult to transfer classified data. The inadequacy of Energy Department's monitoring of lab computer systems had been pointed out for years in low-level Energy Department reports, as well as in the November 1998 intelligence report sent to Richardson. "The reason they didn't shut down computer systems earlier is because they weren't paying attention to the problem," said one Republican member of Congress. The New York Times, May 2, 1999 Political Prisoners Jim Norman's Letter to Warden of Manchester Prison 26 April 1999 Warden FCI Manchester P.O. Box 4000 Manchester, Ky 40962-4000 via fax to: 606-599-4115 Dear Sir: On or about April 12, 1999, I mailed to you a transcript of an interview with prisoner Charles Hayes (05930-320) for your comment. Having received no reply or acknowledgment after two weeks, I expect to proceed with the story. Your response is welcome at any time, but may now likely come after publication. In addition, the April 12 letter formally requested copies of Mr. Hayes' medical and government service records, which he indicated he would approve for release. Notwithstanding the fact that he has apparently been relocated (in what appears to be violation of his sentencing order by Judge Coffman), that document request remains and your prompt response is expected. Further, for the record, I would like to request a formal statement from your office as to the reason for Mr. Hayes' transfer, the location to which he has been transferred and the reason for sending him to that facility. Your prompt response would be appreciated. Cordially yours, James R. Norman Senior Writer 212-xxx-xxxx fax:: 212-xxx-xxxx ------------------------------------------------------------------------ New Address for Charles Hayes (as of 4/28/99) Charles S. Hayes 05930-032 Wake Forest Unit F.C.I. P.O. Box 1000 Butner, NC 27509 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. 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