-Caveat Lector-

from:
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/1/11.html'
<A HREF="http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/1/11.html">Smith:
Social Structures and Chaos Theory
</A>
-----

Connectionism

5.1
The second point of interest is the role of connectivity. Complexity
theorists have realised that only when all the sandgrains can
'communicate globally' with one-another do the phenomena associated with
sandpiles manifest themselves. Connectionism thus appears to be
essential. It also goes without saying that the specific dimensions of
communication (or connectivity) dictate the global attributes observed.
The sandgrains must be in physical contact and within a gravitational
field of significantly greater magnitude than their mass alone could
generate. The formation of the pile depends centrally on an 'external'
gravitational field providing meaning to the term 'up'. Only then can
avalanches cascade 'down'. We also need to recognise the rather
arbitrary distinction between the sandpile and the beach - a beach made
up of more sandgrains - upon which it is built.
5.2
Connectionism refers to a paradigm or model in which particular
attention is given to the ways in which the actors, units or elements of
the theory are related to (connected to) each other. The basis of these
interrelations involves additional concepts like transmitter and
receptor.

5.3
The approach to defining structure suggested here is quite close to that
put forward a few years ago by network theorists. Network theorists
defined structures as groups of elements which were linked together by
ties (the density of ties, how often they were used, which way the
communication or influence flowed, who initiated the communication and
so on were all advanced as descriptors of the structures thus
identified). (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981; Marsden and Lin, 1982; Wellman
and Berkowitz, 1988)). Figure 7 shows an early approach to network
analysis in which connectedness and directionality of influence are
displayed.



------------------------------------------------------------------------



Two major connectivity dimensions are overlaid here. The 'mutual' and
'nonreciprocated' ties represent architectural features of this network.
The flux patterns are a distinct type of structural category. The actual
architecture only indicates what pathways the flux may follow and what
qualitative kinds of ties they may be. Not all reasons for mutual choice
are equal and so even though person 3 is mutually tied to both person 1
and person 2 this does not mean these two individuals have the same
ability to influence person 3 to exploit any of his/her nonreciprocated
ties. The idea of nonreciprocity is potentially subject to change as
well. The architecture is thus not fixed permanently but only presumed
to be constant for one or two cycles (iterations) of the flux structure.
Excessive demands (or failures to engage in mutuality) could rupture
some ties and create others. This network's architecture is itself
capable of changing but it would likely do so at a slower rate than the
actual transmission of information (or other communications) takes
place.

The pioneering work of Hunter (1953) was one of the first systematic
attempts to employ network concepts in the analysis of communities.
Today's technology is still woefully inadequate to do carry out his
project adequately.

Figure 7: Sociogram Showing Friendship Networks in a School Fraternity



------------------------------------------------------------------------

5.4
Second, network theorists in general never articulated a consistent and
agreed-to conceptual base of their advanced ideas which would have
allowed them to be treated quantitatively and dynamically.

5.5
This being said, however, the following two figures show patterns which
allow something akin to 'structures' to be approximated in network
theory. (Recently this has been put to very good use for tracking
criminal conspiracies and other forms of organised crime).



------------------------------------------------------------------------



A network is saturated if all possible links are present. The density of
the connections in (a) is almost saturated as only the A-D link is
absent. In (b) the role of C is crucial and this status is sometimes
called a 'sociometric star'. It could also be called a hub (as in
hub-spoke airports) in airline industry terminology.

Figure 8: High and Low Density Networks



------------------------------------------------------------------------



------------------------------------------------------------------------



This network has three subgroups each of which is either connectively
saturated or only one link short of saturation. Taken as a whole the
network is moderately saturated. If one redefines a network as a group
of connected elements with more than one pathway able to connect any two
elements then this figure represents three networks. Using such a
bright-line definition is essential for some kind of conceptual
simplicity but as even this simple illustration reveals it is not
totally accurate. In this rendering we assume Links A and B are in the
same dimensions as the dimensions which connect the elements of X, Y,
and Z.

Figure 9: Fuzzy Structure: A Network with Three Distinct Sub-groups



------------------------------------------------------------------------

5.6
For all of the initial intuitive appeal network theory ran into two
problems. First it was too complex for 1970s computer technology to
manage. (Anyone who has tried to construct even a simple neural-net
model of a social process has similar complaints about 1990s computer
technology).

5.7
Connectionism arose in the field of computer science as a way of deal
with parallel processes. Connectionist systems not only have rich
interconnections (as all networks do) but the capacity to carry on more
than one operation or set of instructions at a time (ie. in parallel).
In connectionist systems the various processes are not only carried out
simultaneously but often without reference to one-another. Another
feature of connectionist systems is the tendency to regard 'information'
not simply as whether a particular bit is on or off, but also as the
pattern of network activation. In this second sense information can be
understood as the pathway along which a signal flows.

5.8
A connectionist model allows two kinds of patterns to be studied. The
first is the pattern of the signals, communications or other influences
which flow through the lattice. This shall be referred to as the flux
pattern. The Lorenz Attractor (Figure 4) has, for example, been used
symbolically in clinical psychological practices to describe what might
be happening in the brain of a person with a bi-polar disorder such as
manic-depression. The two attractor foci represent the two mood-poles
and the trajectory around these two poles is chaotic in two ways: first
because the precise symptomatology from one episode to another is
similar yet different since no point on the trajectory is encountered
twice; second: because even though the transition from one mood-state to
another is predetermined by the initial conditions the prediction of
when these transitions will take place cannot be made with any accuracy.


5.9
The second kind of pattern which can be studied is defined by the
architecture of the lattice itself: the pattern of connections among the
various elements of the lattice and through which the signals propagate.
This is known as the architecture, the matrix, or the lattice. The
lattice places, for practical purposes, limits on what flux patterns are
possible. The architecture allows us to differentiate plausible futures
from implausible futures and, perhaps, from impossible futures.[13]

5.10
Using a connectionist model of a process (eg. Eiser, 1993) requires that
we treat the phase- state as the current network location of the
influence under study. The propagation pathway is not infinite but
confined to orbits which follow the pre-existing pathways between
various elements.[14]

5.11
The simplest kind of model allows only one kind of influence with one
direction of flow. Each neuron in the human brain is susceptible to
between 100 and 200 neurotransmitters, has multiple outputs and inputs,
can create new connections, lose old ones, change their resistance to
certain pathways, and die. The complexity of the human brain is
significant (Harth, 1991) and one should at least be prepared to believe
that human society is at least of equal complexity.

5.12
It is therefore the flux pattern chaos theorists explicitly study and it
is in these patterns chaos theorists will ultimately be compelled to
define their own notions of structures.

5.13
In other words they do not study structures qua structures themselves
but their study of structures is geared to understanding the
implications of the 'structures' which in the connectionist paradigm be
understood as the flux patterns called social interactions.

5.14
Initially it is useful to draw a distinction between the connectivity
pattern of the lattice (the architecture) and the communications which
may or may not flow through this lattice. The lattice constrains what
flow patterns might exist but does not require that they do. This
constraining influences not only what channels and nodes but also what
dimensions may be followed.

5.15
Using a more sociological description of these terms: the lattice may be
likened to the actors, actresses, props and stage where a play is to be
given. The flux or flow pattern is to be compared to the actual
performance itself. Traditional uses of the term 'social structure' have
- by paying insufficient attention to the time dimensions - made it
rather more difficult than necessary to tell the difference between
props and people.

5.16
The criticism Homans made can be seen not just as the requirement that
sociological laws be rooted in physiological laws but that our
conceptual paradigms should allow us to understand or express one set of
abstractions in terms of another.[15]

5.17
Connectionism however allows a different approach to theorising. Because
connected networks can exhibit chaos the roles of individual elements
cannot be discounted in advance. Because some networks can, under other
conditions, exhibit highly predictable patterns, macro level analysis
can be carried out and meaningful macro level generalities sought.
Connectionist models lead us to consider the 'structure' of the
architecture, the 'structure' of the flux, the temporal permanence of
both. At this point we can join the debate over reductionism.




Reductionism

6.1
When reductionism first entered the vocabulary of the social sciences,
it was employed by Durkheim in his arguments to legitimate sociology as
an academic discipline. His definition implied that reductionism was to
speak of wholes solely in terms of their parts - the wholes in this case
being social aggregates while the parts individual human beings. While
perhaps polemically justifiable this position has always faced a few
problems. How can one reconcile an opposition to reduction with the
widely held belief in evolution? What does it mean to say the observed
patterns (laws) of living things have evolved or emerged from natural
and inanimate processes but that life cannot be explained in terms of
the laws of physics (or social behaviour in terms of psychology)? How
can reductionism be rejected and evolution be retained? On the other
hand, how can social structures and sociology itself be regarded as a
legitimate discipline if only individual humans are really real?
6.2
In the 1930s philosophers of science addressed some of these issues.
Nagel attempted to redefine reductionism by dealing with matters like
'generality of explanations', 'generality of laws' and relating these to
the 'reduction of theories' (Nagel, 1961: p. 37). For Nagel,
reductionism could mean extending the application of one theory to
incorporate the full range of application of another but without
reconceptualising anything (eg. extending the law of gravity as seen on
Earth to include celestial objects as well). A second kind involves
redefining some terms in order to expand the range of measurement. When
temperature is measured with mercury thermometers then any temperature
above which mercury vaporises (350�C) cannot be measured (Nagel, 1961:
p. 341)[16].

6.3
By 'reducing' a column of mercury to its parts (a collection of mercury
atoms) and then measuring a different property of these parts (kinetic
energy) the new notion of temperature which arises both provides the
same value as the old within the original range of applicability and
extends the quantitative measurement of temperature beyond the original
limits. Reducing temperature to the atomic level made it possible to
integrate temperature, volume and pressure and derive the ideal gas law
from more fundamental assumptions.

6.4
When Durkheim used sociological analysis to identify patterns in suicide
rates he embarked on a series of 'psychological' comments designed to
answer the question 'why are these patterns seen?'. In the last 15 years
the Philippines rejected the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, the Shah
of Iran was driven from power by an elderly cleric, and Communist
regimes throughout Europe came to various ignominious ends.

6.5
At those periods in history when the structure of society is most
unstable those professors who are charged with teaching courses on these
societies discuss the personalities of the people who are making the
headlines and speculate on the ways human psychology really works.
Politics becomes local, the personal becomes political.

6.6
Inasmuch as reductionism plays a role as part of the reason for engaging
in scientific research in the first place it seems the question is not
whether to embrace reductionism but when.

6.7
Informally it appears the cognitive steps to reductionism involve at
least the following:

1.Similar patterns imply similar laws are seen to be at work
2.The same pattern means the same law is at work
3.The smallest unit (time-scale, number of elements, physical size,
etc.) in which the law is observed to hold will be taken as the
fundamental unit
4.Reductionism (deductive) shows how the macro (larger) expression of
the law can be derived from micro manifestations of it (with additional
terms included to handle (dis)economies of scale if they prove to be
needed)
5.The ability to reduce one law along a chain of levels says nothing
about the ability to reduce any other law along the same chain or any
other chain.

6.8
Some dangers which are clearly potential in reductionist attempts:

1.Hasty generalisation will lead to errors (especially as from #4 or #5
above)
2.Tendency to monocausalism (a special instance of the first of these
but pragmatically of significant interest in that it can yield the kinds
of oversimplifications which are main components of demagogic
ideologies, cult worldviews, and so on).

6.9
Let us revisit the Fannie Kaplan saga once more. Ms Kaplan had the
option of confronting Mr Lenin verbally and explaining her reasons for
opposing Bolshevism. It is just barely within the grasp of one's
imagination to suppose that had she done so, Lenin might have instantly
been persuaded to of the futility of his cause and become a Trappist
monk. Had this happened, the ideological structure the Western world
would have been vastly different than the one our history reports to us.


6.10
Had she chosen this path she would have been attempting to influence the
future memetic structure of her world by making a memetic intervention
and hoping for the kind of disproportionate change in the system of the
kind chaos theory represents. By electing to shoot him rather than
reason with him she was attempting to influence the memetic dimension by
an intervention not on Lenin's cognitive dimensions but on his
physiological dimensions.




Transduction

7.1
Two kinds of chaotic situations present themselves to observers and the
second kind involves transduction. The first kind occurs when the onset
of chaos is fully predetermined by the initial conditions (as in the
Lorenz equations) but almost impossible to predict owing to our
technological inability to specify the initial conditions with infinite
precision. This is the classic form of chaos. It arises from within the
system and is not the result of outside forces.
7.2
The second form of chaos, one which is both much less interesting to
mathematicians and much more common in the real world, involves the
intervention of external shocks or factors which while minor in
themselves have long-term and major consequences for the system under
study. Examples of such external interventions could include Fannie
Kaplan remembering her spectacles or the almost imperceptible kindness
of a stranger transforming another's mood from despair to hope.

7.3
Transduction indicates an event has produced an effect which is
qualitatively (dimensionally) different from itself. Loudspeakers are
'electro-mechanical transducers' because they convert electricity into
soundwaves.

7.4
To illustrate briefly the way transduction can be viewed we can re-use
Figures 8 and 9 and relabel the patterns of interconnectedness in them.
This re-use of the same visual pattern also has the virtue of
reinforcing our awareness of the capacity for different people to see
the same things as different things as with the duckrabbit example
earlier.

7.5
Figure 8 can be reinterpreted as follows: The same people can be
connected in different ways at the same time. In this repetition of the
linkage patterns we can envisage the same people are differentially
connected along distinct dimensions. For example, (8-a) may represent
the association patterns at a weekly golf game and (8-b)may illustrate
the same individuals as they are interconnected according to their
formal positions in the organisation which employs them all. The
connections in one dimension (golf playing) may be employed to influence
activities or decisions in the other (economic) setting. The possibility
of explicitly and formally modelling the transduction of influence or
communication from one dimension to another is an advantage of
connectionist models.

7.6
When ideas lead to actions a generic form of transduction has taken
place. It is worth remembering that the designation of the dimensions of
the phenomena under study (as, indeed, the designation of a 'phenomenon'
itself) is most likely a cognitive decision which can be located
somewhere along the objective/subjective continuum and not at either
pole.

7.7
We can also consider the re-labelling of Figure 9 in the following
manner. X,Y, and Z can represent the same elements or individuals. Links
A and B can represent transductions which transform an output of one
type to an input of another type. People may belong to a religion, an
ethnicity and a socio-economic status at the same time. The networks
they possess as a result of each of these statuses may allow them to
transfer their influence from one to another much as Weber suggested in
his 'class, status and power' distinctions for social stratification.

7.8
The three sub-networks depicted can be composed either of the same
elements represented in different connectivity dimensions or of
different elements in all cases. The first of these possibilities can be
used to represent potential 'conflict of interest' problems in corporate
and governmental bodies and so on. The second is less likely to be
representative of many modern and interlocking social situations but
still arises between cultures where the linkage function is that of a
broker (or perhaps this role could be rephrased as: a transducer of
social relationships).

7.9
One major role of transduction links is to isolate influences and
prevent their propagation throughout the network. Chaos in sub-system X
might influence via Link A sub-system Y to some extent but have no
measurable effect via Link B on sub-system Z. A person's family problems
could disrupt his or her own working pattern but have no measurable
impact on a large corporation at all. The chaos might be confined to
specific dimensions.

7.10
Other kinds of transduction take place when psychological violence is
repaid with physical violence, when visual stimuli result in the writing
of a poem, and so on. These are examples known to us all but they are
difficult if not impossible to encompass within most of the sociological
formalisms put forward thus far. A formalism based on connectionism
seems to hold the potential for providing this level of theoretical
integration.[17]

7.11
If the previous points on transduction are taken as feasible (and it
goes without saying the theoretical justification for what constitutes a
dimension is a serious loose end) then how are structures, finally, to
be understood?

7.12
Initially we would be compelled to identify a structure as having the
following attributes:

1.Qualitative Structural Aspects: confined to one or a known set of
dimensions. The various weights each dimension has could be changed to
identify subtypes. (This was first discussed in the pioneering work of
Hunter, 1953)
2.Quantitative Structural Aspects: for an element to be taken as part of
the structure a certain threshold of connectedness must be maintained
along one or more of the structure's qualitative dimensions. There is no
a priori requirement for reciprocity along the same dimension but some
form of feedback must exist and some criteria must exist for determining
if the frequency of interactions required for membership is being
maintained.

7.13
The first of these requirements allows for transduction (the
transformation of one kind of influence into another). The second of
these allows statistical (ie. fuzzy) boundaries to be drawn around the
structure and also allows it to change through time.




Epistemology

8.1
Earlier versions of this paper prompted some to suggest that the
epistemological position being advocated here was best described as
'naturalism' (Nagel, 1961). While it is true that naturalism is enjoying
something of a renaissance at the present time (particularly in
anthropology) there are a number of reasons why neither this nor any
other extant approach to epistemology is being explicitly advocated in
this paper.
8.2
First: Naturalism shares with other approaches (eg. materialism,
realism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, empiricism, operationalism,
positivism) allegiance to the 'scientific method'. This alone cannot be
taken as a justification for privileging it.[18]

8.3
Second: Naturalism's major project is to account for the existence of
natural facts in terms of other natural facts (a goal it shares with
materialism). The problem arises when no thoroughgoing definition of
'natural facts' is presented. Do they, for example, include ideas
(memes)? Some contemporary exponents claim naturalism does but they do
not deal with the question of how this claim avoids 'reductionism' which
is something naturalism (in some of its guises) disavows.

8.4
Third: As implied in the first point and the second, naturalism shares
with other doctrines the status of being an epistemological composite: a
collection of positions on metaphysics, methodology, ontology and the
role of (human) cognition and potentially others. Given the absence of a
compelling a priori reason for accepting the unique blend expressed in
one of the variants of naturalism (given that naturalism is itself a
family of concepts), supporting or opposing it may be more of a
political than a scholarly decision.[19]

8.5
Fourth: The tenets of what appears to be neo-naturalism may be
sufficient to carry out the kinds of investigations in this paper but
they do not appear to be logically necessary.

8.6
The spirit of Duckrabbit can be recalled here. When analytic terms,
originally created to convey a precise meaning, become part of the
vernacular, there is an increasing tendency to use it as metaphor or to
generalise it. This clearly happened to 'relativity'. The result tends
to confuse much of social 'science' and allow the wooliness and
fuzziness for which social sciences have so long been criticised. To
some the sole alternative to this is to embrace what many contemporary
theorists have called 'positivism'.[20]




Summary

9.1
The preceding has been a brief overview of the connectionist approach .
To determine if it might represent an alternative paradigm it is
necessary to point to debates it has the potential to resolve and new
areas of research it has the ability to open.
9.2
Chaos theory does not require that everything be chaotic or disordered
but only that chaos and disorder must not be excluded in the formal
statement of the paradigm. The complexity theorists can on the other
hand point to equally compelling empirical observations which could be
used to direct people to 'macro' studies. Only through the development
of a formalism can we hope to imagine these two approaches will one day
meet in the middle. Connectionism, the architecture proposed in this
paper because it allowed for chaos to be present, carries with it the
potential for extreme degrees of interrelatedness, also allows for
complexity to emerge. The chaos/connectionism paradigm offers a
technically difficult but intuitively satisfying approach to the
analysis of structures.

9.3
By formally including chaos a means is provided for directly addressing
the 'reductionist' debate which has been part of social sciences and
history for many generations. Because chaos theory is intrinsically
dynamic it's implementation also formally removes the need to regard
either stability or change as problematic.

9.4
Another consequence would appear to be the need to address the matter of
how human cognition is formally involved in social theory. Great
advances in cognitive science have been made in the last few years (eg.
Edelman, 1992) and any sociological paradigm which fails to appreciate
(again, formally) the implications of these discoveries abandons the
historical mandate of social theory itself.

9.5
What are we to make of the overworked 'subjective/objective' dichotomy
as used by many contemporary writers on social issues? Objectivity seems
only to be defined in terms of statistical reliability and hence
restricted to those phenomena which are amenable to standardised
measurement. All else qualifies as subjective: a matter of opinion.

9.6
By explicitly including human cognition into the formalism,
chaos/complexity directly addresses this dichotomy and presents us with
something else. Something which is at once both intellectually more
appealing and methodologically more intractable. Subjectivity and
Objectivity are not dichotomous opposites but are opposite ends of a
continuum: the continuum we use to represent the interaction of human
cognition with the world it is able to perceive. Chaos theory sends us
back into Socrates' cave.

9.7
The need to include cognition resolves another problem. Structuralism
has often been twinned with Functionalism to produce the hybrid known as
Structural-Functionalism. The major justification for this approach was
the dual questions of 'what it is' and 'what it does' when applied to
the analysis of social institutions. This distinction, while still
eminently practical for applied sociology, is now seen to be different
ways of perceiving the same phenomenon (much as light can be either wave
or particle) and contingent upon what the applied objectives (or
teleology) of the analysis are. Within the connectionist paradigm the
distinction between structure and function needs to be reconsidered.




Conclusions

10.1
Without Shakespeare there would be no Hamlet, but without Newton there
would still be gravity. It is perhaps for this reason that Postmodernism
has enjoyed its greatest success in literary criticism and none at all
in physics. Even if one were to assume Newton's discovery of gravity was
tainted with Eurocentric and Patriarchal influences, surely by now no
sane person would choose to regard gravity as 'a matter of personal
opinion' or being influenced by it the consequence of a 'false
consciousness' imposed by some ideological hegemony.[21] What we call
gravity works whether or not people know the formula or believe it. This
is not to suggest that Newton's specific formulation of how precisely
gravity works is to be accepted as dogma. It is only to reaffirm the
idea underlying all of science; that Truth exists and that the
scientific method will, if followed, bring us asymptotically closer to
grasping how it manifests itself in that part of the material world we
are able to apprehend.
10.2
Given that the butterfly has flapped its wings that extra beat[22] there
are now 17 scenarios which will be possible, all of which include
tornadoes in Kansas in 73 days time. Two of them will move Dorothy's
house to Oz. Only one of them will happen.

10.3
The idea other timelines may exist is untestable and as far as we are
concerned pure science fiction anyway. What chaos theory also does is
force us to revisit the ideas of structure, the boundaries that separate
the social science disciplines themselves, and the roles of psychology
and human consciousness as central opportunities for theoretical
advancement.






Notes

1 The more conventional problem, the one that understands 'change' as a
transformation which takes place in or through time, is very hard to
reconcile with this definition of structure. Studying change, too, is
greatly complicated since this definition of structure mandates the use
of cross-sectional data and makes it necessary to 'bring time back in'
much as humans had to be championed as theoretically meaningful a
generation ago. If chaos theory did nothing else, its dynamical nature
forces researchers to incorporate the passage of time directly into our
formal models.
2 Ethnicity is not the only area of sociological theorising which
contains terminology which is, at best, overly general. Virtually
everyone in society realises that what is called 'the family' has been
in flux for several centuries. Attempts to articulate a formal
sociological theory which logically (ie. in its 'formalism') allows
change to be an integral component is seldom if ever seriously
discussed.

3 meme: (pron. 'meem') A contagious idea that replicates like a virus,
passed on from mind to mind. Memes function the same way genes and
viruses do, propagating through communication networks and face-to-face
contact between people. Root of the word 'memetics', a field of study
which postulates that the meme is the basic unit of cultural evolution.
Examples of memes range from melodies, icons, fashion statements and
phrases to religious ideas, political ideologies, sexual mores, health
beliefs and so on. The abstract entity manipulated by memory is known as
a mnemon (Gabora, 1996).

4 The reliance of this on the 'subjective' or more accurately on the
species-universal-but-relatively-subjective idea of what 'too rapidly'
might mean is useful. It will allow us to begin formalising what is
meant by the 'subjective/objective' distinction.

5 By 'easily' is meant 'intuitively obvious'. The actual mathematical
models involved are extremely computation-intensive and computer
technology well in advance of anything currently available would be
minimally necessary to do any serious social modelling attempts.

6 Determining the dimensions for the soliton wave is crucial if this is
to be more than just another metaphor misunderstood by and perhaps
misleading to sociologists.

7 It is noted that almost all sociologists claim to believe this. The
point is, though, that these phenomena must be accounted for by the
formal logical relationships amongst the taxonomic entities of the
paradigm under study (by 'the formalism' to adopt the usage from
physics). In this terminology one might restate Homans' criticism as
saying the formalism of structuralism has no real place for human
consciousness.

8 There are at least two implications which result from this. With
respect to classical 'structural-functional' sociological theory it
means: the micro-macro distinction is without coherence. Within the
realm of ethical theory it means any attempt to justify 'situation
ethics' in terms of such arguments as 'the greatest good for the
greatest number' (a form of consequentialist argument as discussed by
Scheffler, 1982) is without any hope of being demonstrated empirically.

9 Pipes' theory is not alone in suggesting a so- called minor event
leading to the Second World War and beyond. Calvin (1983) argues that
President Woodrow Wilson's participation in the Paris peace conference
of 1919 was drastically compromised by a bout of influenza. Prior to
this incident his attitude towards Germany was to avoid humiliating it
and indeed to include it as a member in the League of Nations. Following
his illness he treated German delegates with contempt and was not a
factor in preventing the imposition of the harsher features of the
Treaty of Versailles.

Many feel that some of the consequences of Wilson's illness outlived his
presidency ... and were to be seen in the events of the following
decades - in the disastrous German inflation of the 1920s during the
reparations exacted by the Allies, in the ensuing reaction to social
disorder which led to the rise of the genocidal Nazis, and in the second
world war. (Calvin, 1983: p. 124).

Juxtaposing the two thought experiments of Calvin and Pipes does two
things: it illustrates how small changes in the initial conditions in an
historical period might lead to radically different outcomes and,
second, it draws us back to the question of system boundaries - of
taxonomy - once again. For many reasons which are clearly legitimate one
could in 1918 and again in 1998 regard Russia, Germany, and the USA as
separate from each other. For other but equally legitimate reasons they
must be seen as parts of larger entities. It is partly to deal with this
exigency that 'connectionism' is introduced later in this paper. A final
observation which can be made involves the realisation that despite the
fact that historians often argue that 'laws of history' are demonstrably
impossible as evidenced by the above complications, it is also the fact
that some of their demonstrations do so by invidiously (in some cases)
employing 'sociological laws' to reveal that more than one logically
possible future scenario is possible. It is to be noted that the claim
'there are no laws of history' is epistemologically distinct from 'the
laws of history do not yield a single and inescapable future scenario'.
To discuss 'plausible futures' is to employ theory. For example: Had
Wilson's health lasted a few more months and had Fannie Kaplan's memory
been better how many of us alive today would ever have been born?

10 If the phase-space is sufficiently differentiated to allow for a
single period longer than the effective of projected age of the universe
then an interesting result is obtained. We may not be able to
discriminate between a deterministic and a voluntaristic (free-will)
condition for human existence.

11 There is a similar apparent irony in the doctrine of free will. Free
Will is meaningless in a non-deterministic universe because it is the
very determinism of the universe which permits on of the most common
ways to exercise free will: that of selecting a course of action because
of its consequences. The statement 'I choose to do X because doing X
will cause Y to happen' contains both voluntaristic and deterministic
elements.

12 The reductionism mandated by chaos theory derive from the requirement
of a change or flux needing a matrix within which to manifest itself.
The large-scale structures as studied by complexity theory are
themselves rooted in the microstructure. One can at least speculate if
the laws which may dictate the formation of 'social structures' are
similar to 'brain structures'.

13 In more stilted language, the flux pattern is described in
phase-space while the lattice exists in space alone. We leave to future
time the discussion of the permanence of the lattice itself. People are
just as transient as sticks and stones if divorces time from the system.
(eg. Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Newton, 1993). For those who are unsure what
is meant by 'phase spaces' and 'phase states' it is perhaps better to
consult Gleick's (1988) extensive treatment of this idea. Schuster
(1995) gives a more compressed discussion of the same ideas.

14 If the path is really finite then true chaos is impossible. If,
however, the projected age of the universe is insufficiently great to
allow even one iteration of the path then even though determinism was
strictly present it might be impossible to detect this fact. This might,
by extension, allow for the unassailable defence of a doctrine of free
will, even if not one which is identical with the classical
understanding.

15 The initial definition of structure makes the assertion that social
structures do not exist in the same way concrete objects such as sticks
and stones do. One is prompted to ask 'are human beings concrete objects
or abstractions from concrete empirical phenomena'?

16 While Nagel's explanation of how the ideal gas law can be derived
from the kinetic theory of gasses is logically satisfying it is less
adequate as a sociology or psychological comment. Boyle's law relating
temperature to pressure was postulated in 1662. Atoms had been proposed
by Democritus (c460 B.C. - c370 B.C.) and some rudimentary concept of
molecules also existed but at the same time both alchemy and astrology
were considered scientific. The actual ideal gas law was generally
accepted in the 1850s but this was almost one-half century after
Avogadro published it in 1811. When Nagel wrote of the means by which
the gas laws could be derived from the kinetic theory of gasses he lived
in a world which accepted the existence of protons, neutrons and
electrons (but not quarks).

17 Qualitative studies and their exponents (eg. Blumer) have often
exhibited their greatest analytic strengths in documenting precisely
these transitions. Those engaged in field research have long known of
the limitations of formal structural theory.

18 All sciences must share the same methodological precepts even as they
focus on different aspects of the natural world. Physics, biology, and
chemistry therefore all share overarching notions of 'objectively
collected data', of the formulation of testable hypotheses which are
evaluated in accord to universal rules of logic and evidence, and the
formulation of theories which generalise or extend observed patterns
into areas which have not yet been observed. (This ability to
extrapolate is intimately tied to the question of dimensions).
'Scientific method' at its core apparently means, reliance on logic, the
use of empirical evidence, and the supremacy of evidence in case of
conflict.

19 In a culturally more homogeneous age it made some statistical sense
to refer to a 'family' as 'two adults of opposite sex, married to each
other, and living with their common children'. While it may be
politically advantageous (correct?) to extend the meaning of 'family' to
include same-sex couples, single-parents, nannies, adoptive and step
children, and so on, it is clear that this diversity plays havoc with
sociological analysis. When a composite term is seen to be made up of
elements which are varying essentially independently of one-another,
scientific practice requires the composite term no longer be accorded
primary theoretical, practical or research importance. After the tea
kettle has boiled dry, using the term 'ice' or using predictions based
on observations of ice are likely to be of diminished importance. The
same can be argued about composite epistemological terms as well.

20 Positivism though, like liberalism, came to mean different things to
different people. When Auguste Comte first proposed the Positive
Philosophy he sought to study society with the tools of the natural
sciences, forgoing both metaphysics and theology, in the quest for ways
to make the lives of people better. By the time the critical theorists
of the current period had arrived, positivism had come to be associated
with the disenchantment of the world and the imposition of Western
Rationalism on all and sundry. Positivism, like so many other
sociological doctrines, is both a research methodology and a political
promise. Many modern scientists attempt to avoid the Janus-headed
positivism of Comte and restrict their interpretation to it's
methodological role only: 'That philosophical attitude which asserts
that science is solely concerned with directly measurable quantities and
that its aim is simply the harmonious reconciliation of observations
without attempting to speak of an underlying physical reality.' (
Polkinghorne, 1986: p. 108)

21 No insult to either members of the Natural Law Party or
Post-Modernists is intended here.

22 This assumption is more deceptive than it might first appear. The
model proposed here fundamentally deals with an attempt to grapple with
how things change once they have been set in motion. It does not deal
with why or how they were set in motion in the first place. It is
therefore not a model of cause and effect. It is only an attempt to
model the flux of the real.




Acknowledgements

This paper is based on one presented at Essex '96 Fourth International
Social Science Methodology Conference, July 1 - 5 1996.


References

BAK, Per, TANG, C., and WEISENFELD, K. (1988) 'Self-Organized
Criticality', Physics Review A vol. 38, p. 364.
BOHM, David and B.J. HILEY (1993) The Undivided Universe: An Ontological
Interpretation of Quantum Theory. London: Routledge.

BLUMER, Herbert (1969) Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method.
 Berkeley: University of California Press.

CALVIN, William H. (1983) The Throwing Madonna: Essays on the Brain. New
York: McGraw-Hill.

DANIELSON, Peter (1992) Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual
Games. London: Routledge.

DRAZIN, P.G. and R.S. JOHNSON (1989) Solitons: An Introduction.
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DYSON, Freeman J. (1988) Infinite in all Directions: The 1985 Gifford
Lectures. New York: Harper and Row.

EDELMAN, Gerald M. (1992) Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of
the Mind. New York: Basic.

EISER, Richard (1993) Attitudes, Chaos and the Connectionist Mind.
 Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

FISHER, J.C. and R.H. PRY (1971) 'A Simple Substitution Model of
Technological Change', Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol.
3.

FUGLESANG, Andreas (1982) About Understanding: Ideas and Observations on
Cross-Cultural Communication. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation.

GABORA, Liane (1996) 'Culture, evolution, and computation' in the
Proceedings of the Second Online Workshop on Evolutionary Computation
 March 1996, Sponsored by the Society of Fuzzy Systems and Theory,
Nagoya University

GELL-MANN, Murray (1994) The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the
Simple and the Complex. New York: Freeman.

GLEICK, James (1988) Chaos: Making A New Science. New York: Penguin.

GORDON, Milton M. (1964) Assimilation in American Life. New York: Oxford
University Press.

HARTH, Eric (1991) The Creative Loop. How the Brain Makes a Mind.
 Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.

HAWTHORN, Geoffrey (1991) Plausible Worlds: Possibility and
Understanding in History and the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge
University Press.

HOMANS, George Caspar (1964) 'Bringing Men Back In', American
Sociological Review, vol.29, pp. 804 - 818.

HUNTER, Floyd (1953) Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision
Makers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

KAUFFMAN, Stuart (1995) At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws
of Self-Organization and Complexity. New York: Oxford University Press.

KNUTH, Donald E. (1969) The Art of Computer Programming (vol. 2:
Seminumerical Algorithms). Reading, Mass: Addison- Wesley.

LANGTON, Christopher G. (editor) (1995) Artificial Life: An Overview.
 Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

LEVY Jr., Marion J. (1968) 'Structural-Functional Analysis' in David L.
Sills (editor) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.
VI, pp. 22 - 23. New York: Crowell, Collier and MacMillan.

LYNCH, Aaron (1998) 'Thought Contagion as Abstract Evolution', Journal
of Ideas, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 3 - 10. Reproduced at <
http://www.mcs.net/~aaron/Lynch1991.htm>.

McNEILL, Daniel and Paul FREIBERGER (1993) Fuzzy Logic: The Discovery of
a Revolutionary Computer Technology and how it is Changing Our World.
 New York: Simon and Schuster.

MARCHETTI, Cesare (1980) 'Society as Learning System: Discovery,
Invention and Innovation Cycles Revisited', Technological Forecasting
and Social Change, vol. 10.

MARQUETTE, Jesse F. (1981) 'A Logistic Diffusion Model of Political
Mobilization', Political Behavior, vol. 3, no. 1.

MARSDEN, Peter V. and Nan LIN (1982) Social Structure and Network
Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage.

MISNER, Charles W.,Kip S. THORNE and John Archibald WHEELER (1973)
Gravitation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

NAGEL, Ernest (1961) The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of
Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

NEWTON, Roger G. (1993) What Makes Nature Tick? Cambridge, Mass.
Harvard.

PIPES, Richard (1995) Three Whys of the Russian Revolution. (The Barbara
Frum Lectureship). Toronto: Vintage.

POLKINGHORNE, John (1986) One World: The Interaction of Science and
Theology. London: SPCK.

RINALDI, S., G. FEICHTINGER and S. WIRL (1994) 'Corruption Dynamics in
Democratic Systems', Research Report #168, Institute for Econometrics,
Operations Research and Systems Theory. Technical University of Vienna.
Vienna, Austria.

ROGERS, E.M. and D. Lawrence KINCAID (1981) Communications Networks:
Toward a New Paradigm for Research. New York: Free Press.

ROSSER, J Barkley Jr (1991) From Catastrophe to Chaos: A General Theory
of Economic Discontinuities. Boston: Kluwer.

SAVAGE, Adrian (1988) An Introduction to Chaos Magick. New York:
Magickal Childe.

SAYADI, M.K. and J. POUGET (1991) 'Soliton Dynamics and Chaos Transition
in a Microstructured Lattice Model' in Ioannis Antoniou and Franklin J.
Lambert. (editors) Solitons and Chaos. Berlin: New York:
Springer-Verlag.

SCHEFFLER, Samuel (1982) The Rejection of Consequentialism: A
Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral
Conceptions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

SCHUSTER, Heinz Georg (1995) Deterministic Chaos: An Introduction (3rd
Edition). Weinheim: Verlagsgesellschaft.

SKOCPOL, Theda (editor) (1984) Vision and Method in Historical
Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TEZUKA, Shu (1995) Uniform Random Numbers: Theory and Practice. Boston:
Kluwer.

WELLMAN, Barry and S.D. BERKOWITZ (editors) (1988) Social Structures: A
Network Approach. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Copyright Sociological Research Online, 1998
-----
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris

DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER
==========
CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic
screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soapboxing!  These are sordid matters
and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright
frauds is used politically  by different groups with major and minor effects
spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL
gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers;
be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and
nazi's need not apply.

Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
========================================================================
Archives Available at:
http://home.ease.lsoft.com/archives/CTRL.html

http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/
========================================================================
To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Om

Reply via email to