-Caveat Lector- from: http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/1/11.html' <A HREF="http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/1/11.html">Smith: Social Structures and Chaos Theory </A> ----- Connectionism 5.1 The second point of interest is the role of connectivity. Complexity theorists have realised that only when all the sandgrains can 'communicate globally' with one-another do the phenomena associated with sandpiles manifest themselves. Connectionism thus appears to be essential. It also goes without saying that the specific dimensions of communication (or connectivity) dictate the global attributes observed. The sandgrains must be in physical contact and within a gravitational field of significantly greater magnitude than their mass alone could generate. The formation of the pile depends centrally on an 'external' gravitational field providing meaning to the term 'up'. Only then can avalanches cascade 'down'. We also need to recognise the rather arbitrary distinction between the sandpile and the beach - a beach made up of more sandgrains - upon which it is built. 5.2 Connectionism refers to a paradigm or model in which particular attention is given to the ways in which the actors, units or elements of the theory are related to (connected to) each other. The basis of these interrelations involves additional concepts like transmitter and receptor. 5.3 The approach to defining structure suggested here is quite close to that put forward a few years ago by network theorists. Network theorists defined structures as groups of elements which were linked together by ties (the density of ties, how often they were used, which way the communication or influence flowed, who initiated the communication and so on were all advanced as descriptors of the structures thus identified). (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981; Marsden and Lin, 1982; Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988)). Figure 7 shows an early approach to network analysis in which connectedness and directionality of influence are displayed. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Two major connectivity dimensions are overlaid here. The 'mutual' and 'nonreciprocated' ties represent architectural features of this network. The flux patterns are a distinct type of structural category. The actual architecture only indicates what pathways the flux may follow and what qualitative kinds of ties they may be. Not all reasons for mutual choice are equal and so even though person 3 is mutually tied to both person 1 and person 2 this does not mean these two individuals have the same ability to influence person 3 to exploit any of his/her nonreciprocated ties. The idea of nonreciprocity is potentially subject to change as well. The architecture is thus not fixed permanently but only presumed to be constant for one or two cycles (iterations) of the flux structure. Excessive demands (or failures to engage in mutuality) could rupture some ties and create others. This network's architecture is itself capable of changing but it would likely do so at a slower rate than the actual transmission of information (or other communications) takes place. The pioneering work of Hunter (1953) was one of the first systematic attempts to employ network concepts in the analysis of communities. Today's technology is still woefully inadequate to do carry out his project adequately. Figure 7: Sociogram Showing Friendship Networks in a School Fraternity ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5.4 Second, network theorists in general never articulated a consistent and agreed-to conceptual base of their advanced ideas which would have allowed them to be treated quantitatively and dynamically. 5.5 This being said, however, the following two figures show patterns which allow something akin to 'structures' to be approximated in network theory. (Recently this has been put to very good use for tracking criminal conspiracies and other forms of organised crime). ------------------------------------------------------------------------ A network is saturated if all possible links are present. The density of the connections in (a) is almost saturated as only the A-D link is absent. In (b) the role of C is crucial and this status is sometimes called a 'sociometric star'. It could also be called a hub (as in hub-spoke airports) in airline industry terminology. Figure 8: High and Low Density Networks ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This network has three subgroups each of which is either connectively saturated or only one link short of saturation. Taken as a whole the network is moderately saturated. If one redefines a network as a group of connected elements with more than one pathway able to connect any two elements then this figure represents three networks. Using such a bright-line definition is essential for some kind of conceptual simplicity but as even this simple illustration reveals it is not totally accurate. In this rendering we assume Links A and B are in the same dimensions as the dimensions which connect the elements of X, Y, and Z. Figure 9: Fuzzy Structure: A Network with Three Distinct Sub-groups ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5.6 For all of the initial intuitive appeal network theory ran into two problems. First it was too complex for 1970s computer technology to manage. (Anyone who has tried to construct even a simple neural-net model of a social process has similar complaints about 1990s computer technology). 5.7 Connectionism arose in the field of computer science as a way of deal with parallel processes. Connectionist systems not only have rich interconnections (as all networks do) but the capacity to carry on more than one operation or set of instructions at a time (ie. in parallel). In connectionist systems the various processes are not only carried out simultaneously but often without reference to one-another. Another feature of connectionist systems is the tendency to regard 'information' not simply as whether a particular bit is on or off, but also as the pattern of network activation. In this second sense information can be understood as the pathway along which a signal flows. 5.8 A connectionist model allows two kinds of patterns to be studied. The first is the pattern of the signals, communications or other influences which flow through the lattice. This shall be referred to as the flux pattern. The Lorenz Attractor (Figure 4) has, for example, been used symbolically in clinical psychological practices to describe what might be happening in the brain of a person with a bi-polar disorder such as manic-depression. The two attractor foci represent the two mood-poles and the trajectory around these two poles is chaotic in two ways: first because the precise symptomatology from one episode to another is similar yet different since no point on the trajectory is encountered twice; second: because even though the transition from one mood-state to another is predetermined by the initial conditions the prediction of when these transitions will take place cannot be made with any accuracy. 5.9 The second kind of pattern which can be studied is defined by the architecture of the lattice itself: the pattern of connections among the various elements of the lattice and through which the signals propagate. This is known as the architecture, the matrix, or the lattice. The lattice places, for practical purposes, limits on what flux patterns are possible. The architecture allows us to differentiate plausible futures from implausible futures and, perhaps, from impossible futures.[13] 5.10 Using a connectionist model of a process (eg. Eiser, 1993) requires that we treat the phase- state as the current network location of the influence under study. The propagation pathway is not infinite but confined to orbits which follow the pre-existing pathways between various elements.[14] 5.11 The simplest kind of model allows only one kind of influence with one direction of flow. Each neuron in the human brain is susceptible to between 100 and 200 neurotransmitters, has multiple outputs and inputs, can create new connections, lose old ones, change their resistance to certain pathways, and die. The complexity of the human brain is significant (Harth, 1991) and one should at least be prepared to believe that human society is at least of equal complexity. 5.12 It is therefore the flux pattern chaos theorists explicitly study and it is in these patterns chaos theorists will ultimately be compelled to define their own notions of structures. 5.13 In other words they do not study structures qua structures themselves but their study of structures is geared to understanding the implications of the 'structures' which in the connectionist paradigm be understood as the flux patterns called social interactions. 5.14 Initially it is useful to draw a distinction between the connectivity pattern of the lattice (the architecture) and the communications which may or may not flow through this lattice. The lattice constrains what flow patterns might exist but does not require that they do. This constraining influences not only what channels and nodes but also what dimensions may be followed. 5.15 Using a more sociological description of these terms: the lattice may be likened to the actors, actresses, props and stage where a play is to be given. The flux or flow pattern is to be compared to the actual performance itself. Traditional uses of the term 'social structure' have - by paying insufficient attention to the time dimensions - made it rather more difficult than necessary to tell the difference between props and people. 5.16 The criticism Homans made can be seen not just as the requirement that sociological laws be rooted in physiological laws but that our conceptual paradigms should allow us to understand or express one set of abstractions in terms of another.[15] 5.17 Connectionism however allows a different approach to theorising. Because connected networks can exhibit chaos the roles of individual elements cannot be discounted in advance. Because some networks can, under other conditions, exhibit highly predictable patterns, macro level analysis can be carried out and meaningful macro level generalities sought. Connectionist models lead us to consider the 'structure' of the architecture, the 'structure' of the flux, the temporal permanence of both. At this point we can join the debate over reductionism. Reductionism 6.1 When reductionism first entered the vocabulary of the social sciences, it was employed by Durkheim in his arguments to legitimate sociology as an academic discipline. His definition implied that reductionism was to speak of wholes solely in terms of their parts - the wholes in this case being social aggregates while the parts individual human beings. While perhaps polemically justifiable this position has always faced a few problems. How can one reconcile an opposition to reduction with the widely held belief in evolution? What does it mean to say the observed patterns (laws) of living things have evolved or emerged from natural and inanimate processes but that life cannot be explained in terms of the laws of physics (or social behaviour in terms of psychology)? How can reductionism be rejected and evolution be retained? On the other hand, how can social structures and sociology itself be regarded as a legitimate discipline if only individual humans are really real? 6.2 In the 1930s philosophers of science addressed some of these issues. Nagel attempted to redefine reductionism by dealing with matters like 'generality of explanations', 'generality of laws' and relating these to the 'reduction of theories' (Nagel, 1961: p. 37). For Nagel, reductionism could mean extending the application of one theory to incorporate the full range of application of another but without reconceptualising anything (eg. extending the law of gravity as seen on Earth to include celestial objects as well). A second kind involves redefining some terms in order to expand the range of measurement. When temperature is measured with mercury thermometers then any temperature above which mercury vaporises (350�C) cannot be measured (Nagel, 1961: p. 341)[16]. 6.3 By 'reducing' a column of mercury to its parts (a collection of mercury atoms) and then measuring a different property of these parts (kinetic energy) the new notion of temperature which arises both provides the same value as the old within the original range of applicability and extends the quantitative measurement of temperature beyond the original limits. Reducing temperature to the atomic level made it possible to integrate temperature, volume and pressure and derive the ideal gas law from more fundamental assumptions. 6.4 When Durkheim used sociological analysis to identify patterns in suicide rates he embarked on a series of 'psychological' comments designed to answer the question 'why are these patterns seen?'. In the last 15 years the Philippines rejected the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, the Shah of Iran was driven from power by an elderly cleric, and Communist regimes throughout Europe came to various ignominious ends. 6.5 At those periods in history when the structure of society is most unstable those professors who are charged with teaching courses on these societies discuss the personalities of the people who are making the headlines and speculate on the ways human psychology really works. Politics becomes local, the personal becomes political. 6.6 Inasmuch as reductionism plays a role as part of the reason for engaging in scientific research in the first place it seems the question is not whether to embrace reductionism but when. 6.7 Informally it appears the cognitive steps to reductionism involve at least the following: 1.Similar patterns imply similar laws are seen to be at work 2.The same pattern means the same law is at work 3.The smallest unit (time-scale, number of elements, physical size, etc.) in which the law is observed to hold will be taken as the fundamental unit 4.Reductionism (deductive) shows how the macro (larger) expression of the law can be derived from micro manifestations of it (with additional terms included to handle (dis)economies of scale if they prove to be needed) 5.The ability to reduce one law along a chain of levels says nothing about the ability to reduce any other law along the same chain or any other chain. 6.8 Some dangers which are clearly potential in reductionist attempts: 1.Hasty generalisation will lead to errors (especially as from #4 or #5 above) 2.Tendency to monocausalism (a special instance of the first of these but pragmatically of significant interest in that it can yield the kinds of oversimplifications which are main components of demagogic ideologies, cult worldviews, and so on). 6.9 Let us revisit the Fannie Kaplan saga once more. Ms Kaplan had the option of confronting Mr Lenin verbally and explaining her reasons for opposing Bolshevism. It is just barely within the grasp of one's imagination to suppose that had she done so, Lenin might have instantly been persuaded to of the futility of his cause and become a Trappist monk. Had this happened, the ideological structure the Western world would have been vastly different than the one our history reports to us. 6.10 Had she chosen this path she would have been attempting to influence the future memetic structure of her world by making a memetic intervention and hoping for the kind of disproportionate change in the system of the kind chaos theory represents. By electing to shoot him rather than reason with him she was attempting to influence the memetic dimension by an intervention not on Lenin's cognitive dimensions but on his physiological dimensions. Transduction 7.1 Two kinds of chaotic situations present themselves to observers and the second kind involves transduction. The first kind occurs when the onset of chaos is fully predetermined by the initial conditions (as in the Lorenz equations) but almost impossible to predict owing to our technological inability to specify the initial conditions with infinite precision. This is the classic form of chaos. It arises from within the system and is not the result of outside forces. 7.2 The second form of chaos, one which is both much less interesting to mathematicians and much more common in the real world, involves the intervention of external shocks or factors which while minor in themselves have long-term and major consequences for the system under study. Examples of such external interventions could include Fannie Kaplan remembering her spectacles or the almost imperceptible kindness of a stranger transforming another's mood from despair to hope. 7.3 Transduction indicates an event has produced an effect which is qualitatively (dimensionally) different from itself. Loudspeakers are 'electro-mechanical transducers' because they convert electricity into soundwaves. 7.4 To illustrate briefly the way transduction can be viewed we can re-use Figures 8 and 9 and relabel the patterns of interconnectedness in them. This re-use of the same visual pattern also has the virtue of reinforcing our awareness of the capacity for different people to see the same things as different things as with the duckrabbit example earlier. 7.5 Figure 8 can be reinterpreted as follows: The same people can be connected in different ways at the same time. In this repetition of the linkage patterns we can envisage the same people are differentially connected along distinct dimensions. For example, (8-a) may represent the association patterns at a weekly golf game and (8-b)may illustrate the same individuals as they are interconnected according to their formal positions in the organisation which employs them all. The connections in one dimension (golf playing) may be employed to influence activities or decisions in the other (economic) setting. The possibility of explicitly and formally modelling the transduction of influence or communication from one dimension to another is an advantage of connectionist models. 7.6 When ideas lead to actions a generic form of transduction has taken place. It is worth remembering that the designation of the dimensions of the phenomena under study (as, indeed, the designation of a 'phenomenon' itself) is most likely a cognitive decision which can be located somewhere along the objective/subjective continuum and not at either pole. 7.7 We can also consider the re-labelling of Figure 9 in the following manner. X,Y, and Z can represent the same elements or individuals. Links A and B can represent transductions which transform an output of one type to an input of another type. People may belong to a religion, an ethnicity and a socio-economic status at the same time. The networks they possess as a result of each of these statuses may allow them to transfer their influence from one to another much as Weber suggested in his 'class, status and power' distinctions for social stratification. 7.8 The three sub-networks depicted can be composed either of the same elements represented in different connectivity dimensions or of different elements in all cases. The first of these possibilities can be used to represent potential 'conflict of interest' problems in corporate and governmental bodies and so on. The second is less likely to be representative of many modern and interlocking social situations but still arises between cultures where the linkage function is that of a broker (or perhaps this role could be rephrased as: a transducer of social relationships). 7.9 One major role of transduction links is to isolate influences and prevent their propagation throughout the network. Chaos in sub-system X might influence via Link A sub-system Y to some extent but have no measurable effect via Link B on sub-system Z. A person's family problems could disrupt his or her own working pattern but have no measurable impact on a large corporation at all. The chaos might be confined to specific dimensions. 7.10 Other kinds of transduction take place when psychological violence is repaid with physical violence, when visual stimuli result in the writing of a poem, and so on. These are examples known to us all but they are difficult if not impossible to encompass within most of the sociological formalisms put forward thus far. A formalism based on connectionism seems to hold the potential for providing this level of theoretical integration.[17] 7.11 If the previous points on transduction are taken as feasible (and it goes without saying the theoretical justification for what constitutes a dimension is a serious loose end) then how are structures, finally, to be understood? 7.12 Initially we would be compelled to identify a structure as having the following attributes: 1.Qualitative Structural Aspects: confined to one or a known set of dimensions. The various weights each dimension has could be changed to identify subtypes. (This was first discussed in the pioneering work of Hunter, 1953) 2.Quantitative Structural Aspects: for an element to be taken as part of the structure a certain threshold of connectedness must be maintained along one or more of the structure's qualitative dimensions. There is no a priori requirement for reciprocity along the same dimension but some form of feedback must exist and some criteria must exist for determining if the frequency of interactions required for membership is being maintained. 7.13 The first of these requirements allows for transduction (the transformation of one kind of influence into another). The second of these allows statistical (ie. fuzzy) boundaries to be drawn around the structure and also allows it to change through time. Epistemology 8.1 Earlier versions of this paper prompted some to suggest that the epistemological position being advocated here was best described as 'naturalism' (Nagel, 1961). While it is true that naturalism is enjoying something of a renaissance at the present time (particularly in anthropology) there are a number of reasons why neither this nor any other extant approach to epistemology is being explicitly advocated in this paper. 8.2 First: Naturalism shares with other approaches (eg. materialism, realism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, empiricism, operationalism, positivism) allegiance to the 'scientific method'. This alone cannot be taken as a justification for privileging it.[18] 8.3 Second: Naturalism's major project is to account for the existence of natural facts in terms of other natural facts (a goal it shares with materialism). The problem arises when no thoroughgoing definition of 'natural facts' is presented. Do they, for example, include ideas (memes)? Some contemporary exponents claim naturalism does but they do not deal with the question of how this claim avoids 'reductionism' which is something naturalism (in some of its guises) disavows. 8.4 Third: As implied in the first point and the second, naturalism shares with other doctrines the status of being an epistemological composite: a collection of positions on metaphysics, methodology, ontology and the role of (human) cognition and potentially others. Given the absence of a compelling a priori reason for accepting the unique blend expressed in one of the variants of naturalism (given that naturalism is itself a family of concepts), supporting or opposing it may be more of a political than a scholarly decision.[19] 8.5 Fourth: The tenets of what appears to be neo-naturalism may be sufficient to carry out the kinds of investigations in this paper but they do not appear to be logically necessary. 8.6 The spirit of Duckrabbit can be recalled here. When analytic terms, originally created to convey a precise meaning, become part of the vernacular, there is an increasing tendency to use it as metaphor or to generalise it. This clearly happened to 'relativity'. The result tends to confuse much of social 'science' and allow the wooliness and fuzziness for which social sciences have so long been criticised. To some the sole alternative to this is to embrace what many contemporary theorists have called 'positivism'.[20] Summary 9.1 The preceding has been a brief overview of the connectionist approach . To determine if it might represent an alternative paradigm it is necessary to point to debates it has the potential to resolve and new areas of research it has the ability to open. 9.2 Chaos theory does not require that everything be chaotic or disordered but only that chaos and disorder must not be excluded in the formal statement of the paradigm. The complexity theorists can on the other hand point to equally compelling empirical observations which could be used to direct people to 'macro' studies. Only through the development of a formalism can we hope to imagine these two approaches will one day meet in the middle. Connectionism, the architecture proposed in this paper because it allowed for chaos to be present, carries with it the potential for extreme degrees of interrelatedness, also allows for complexity to emerge. The chaos/connectionism paradigm offers a technically difficult but intuitively satisfying approach to the analysis of structures. 9.3 By formally including chaos a means is provided for directly addressing the 'reductionist' debate which has been part of social sciences and history for many generations. Because chaos theory is intrinsically dynamic it's implementation also formally removes the need to regard either stability or change as problematic. 9.4 Another consequence would appear to be the need to address the matter of how human cognition is formally involved in social theory. Great advances in cognitive science have been made in the last few years (eg. Edelman, 1992) and any sociological paradigm which fails to appreciate (again, formally) the implications of these discoveries abandons the historical mandate of social theory itself. 9.5 What are we to make of the overworked 'subjective/objective' dichotomy as used by many contemporary writers on social issues? Objectivity seems only to be defined in terms of statistical reliability and hence restricted to those phenomena which are amenable to standardised measurement. All else qualifies as subjective: a matter of opinion. 9.6 By explicitly including human cognition into the formalism, chaos/complexity directly addresses this dichotomy and presents us with something else. Something which is at once both intellectually more appealing and methodologically more intractable. Subjectivity and Objectivity are not dichotomous opposites but are opposite ends of a continuum: the continuum we use to represent the interaction of human cognition with the world it is able to perceive. Chaos theory sends us back into Socrates' cave. 9.7 The need to include cognition resolves another problem. Structuralism has often been twinned with Functionalism to produce the hybrid known as Structural-Functionalism. The major justification for this approach was the dual questions of 'what it is' and 'what it does' when applied to the analysis of social institutions. This distinction, while still eminently practical for applied sociology, is now seen to be different ways of perceiving the same phenomenon (much as light can be either wave or particle) and contingent upon what the applied objectives (or teleology) of the analysis are. Within the connectionist paradigm the distinction between structure and function needs to be reconsidered. Conclusions 10.1 Without Shakespeare there would be no Hamlet, but without Newton there would still be gravity. It is perhaps for this reason that Postmodernism has enjoyed its greatest success in literary criticism and none at all in physics. Even if one were to assume Newton's discovery of gravity was tainted with Eurocentric and Patriarchal influences, surely by now no sane person would choose to regard gravity as 'a matter of personal opinion' or being influenced by it the consequence of a 'false consciousness' imposed by some ideological hegemony.[21] What we call gravity works whether or not people know the formula or believe it. This is not to suggest that Newton's specific formulation of how precisely gravity works is to be accepted as dogma. It is only to reaffirm the idea underlying all of science; that Truth exists and that the scientific method will, if followed, bring us asymptotically closer to grasping how it manifests itself in that part of the material world we are able to apprehend. 10.2 Given that the butterfly has flapped its wings that extra beat[22] there are now 17 scenarios which will be possible, all of which include tornadoes in Kansas in 73 days time. Two of them will move Dorothy's house to Oz. Only one of them will happen. 10.3 The idea other timelines may exist is untestable and as far as we are concerned pure science fiction anyway. What chaos theory also does is force us to revisit the ideas of structure, the boundaries that separate the social science disciplines themselves, and the roles of psychology and human consciousness as central opportunities for theoretical advancement. Notes 1 The more conventional problem, the one that understands 'change' as a transformation which takes place in or through time, is very hard to reconcile with this definition of structure. Studying change, too, is greatly complicated since this definition of structure mandates the use of cross-sectional data and makes it necessary to 'bring time back in' much as humans had to be championed as theoretically meaningful a generation ago. If chaos theory did nothing else, its dynamical nature forces researchers to incorporate the passage of time directly into our formal models. 2 Ethnicity is not the only area of sociological theorising which contains terminology which is, at best, overly general. Virtually everyone in society realises that what is called 'the family' has been in flux for several centuries. Attempts to articulate a formal sociological theory which logically (ie. in its 'formalism') allows change to be an integral component is seldom if ever seriously discussed. 3 meme: (pron. 'meem') A contagious idea that replicates like a virus, passed on from mind to mind. Memes function the same way genes and viruses do, propagating through communication networks and face-to-face contact between people. Root of the word 'memetics', a field of study which postulates that the meme is the basic unit of cultural evolution. Examples of memes range from melodies, icons, fashion statements and phrases to religious ideas, political ideologies, sexual mores, health beliefs and so on. The abstract entity manipulated by memory is known as a mnemon (Gabora, 1996). 4 The reliance of this on the 'subjective' or more accurately on the species-universal-but-relatively-subjective idea of what 'too rapidly' might mean is useful. It will allow us to begin formalising what is meant by the 'subjective/objective' distinction. 5 By 'easily' is meant 'intuitively obvious'. The actual mathematical models involved are extremely computation-intensive and computer technology well in advance of anything currently available would be minimally necessary to do any serious social modelling attempts. 6 Determining the dimensions for the soliton wave is crucial if this is to be more than just another metaphor misunderstood by and perhaps misleading to sociologists. 7 It is noted that almost all sociologists claim to believe this. The point is, though, that these phenomena must be accounted for by the formal logical relationships amongst the taxonomic entities of the paradigm under study (by 'the formalism' to adopt the usage from physics). In this terminology one might restate Homans' criticism as saying the formalism of structuralism has no real place for human consciousness. 8 There are at least two implications which result from this. With respect to classical 'structural-functional' sociological theory it means: the micro-macro distinction is without coherence. Within the realm of ethical theory it means any attempt to justify 'situation ethics' in terms of such arguments as 'the greatest good for the greatest number' (a form of consequentialist argument as discussed by Scheffler, 1982) is without any hope of being demonstrated empirically. 9 Pipes' theory is not alone in suggesting a so- called minor event leading to the Second World War and beyond. Calvin (1983) argues that President Woodrow Wilson's participation in the Paris peace conference of 1919 was drastically compromised by a bout of influenza. Prior to this incident his attitude towards Germany was to avoid humiliating it and indeed to include it as a member in the League of Nations. Following his illness he treated German delegates with contempt and was not a factor in preventing the imposition of the harsher features of the Treaty of Versailles. Many feel that some of the consequences of Wilson's illness outlived his presidency ... and were to be seen in the events of the following decades - in the disastrous German inflation of the 1920s during the reparations exacted by the Allies, in the ensuing reaction to social disorder which led to the rise of the genocidal Nazis, and in the second world war. (Calvin, 1983: p. 124). Juxtaposing the two thought experiments of Calvin and Pipes does two things: it illustrates how small changes in the initial conditions in an historical period might lead to radically different outcomes and, second, it draws us back to the question of system boundaries - of taxonomy - once again. For many reasons which are clearly legitimate one could in 1918 and again in 1998 regard Russia, Germany, and the USA as separate from each other. For other but equally legitimate reasons they must be seen as parts of larger entities. It is partly to deal with this exigency that 'connectionism' is introduced later in this paper. A final observation which can be made involves the realisation that despite the fact that historians often argue that 'laws of history' are demonstrably impossible as evidenced by the above complications, it is also the fact that some of their demonstrations do so by invidiously (in some cases) employing 'sociological laws' to reveal that more than one logically possible future scenario is possible. It is to be noted that the claim 'there are no laws of history' is epistemologically distinct from 'the laws of history do not yield a single and inescapable future scenario'. To discuss 'plausible futures' is to employ theory. For example: Had Wilson's health lasted a few more months and had Fannie Kaplan's memory been better how many of us alive today would ever have been born? 10 If the phase-space is sufficiently differentiated to allow for a single period longer than the effective of projected age of the universe then an interesting result is obtained. We may not be able to discriminate between a deterministic and a voluntaristic (free-will) condition for human existence. 11 There is a similar apparent irony in the doctrine of free will. Free Will is meaningless in a non-deterministic universe because it is the very determinism of the universe which permits on of the most common ways to exercise free will: that of selecting a course of action because of its consequences. The statement 'I choose to do X because doing X will cause Y to happen' contains both voluntaristic and deterministic elements. 12 The reductionism mandated by chaos theory derive from the requirement of a change or flux needing a matrix within which to manifest itself. The large-scale structures as studied by complexity theory are themselves rooted in the microstructure. One can at least speculate if the laws which may dictate the formation of 'social structures' are similar to 'brain structures'. 13 In more stilted language, the flux pattern is described in phase-space while the lattice exists in space alone. We leave to future time the discussion of the permanence of the lattice itself. People are just as transient as sticks and stones if divorces time from the system. (eg. Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Newton, 1993). For those who are unsure what is meant by 'phase spaces' and 'phase states' it is perhaps better to consult Gleick's (1988) extensive treatment of this idea. Schuster (1995) gives a more compressed discussion of the same ideas. 14 If the path is really finite then true chaos is impossible. If, however, the projected age of the universe is insufficiently great to allow even one iteration of the path then even though determinism was strictly present it might be impossible to detect this fact. This might, by extension, allow for the unassailable defence of a doctrine of free will, even if not one which is identical with the classical understanding. 15 The initial definition of structure makes the assertion that social structures do not exist in the same way concrete objects such as sticks and stones do. One is prompted to ask 'are human beings concrete objects or abstractions from concrete empirical phenomena'? 16 While Nagel's explanation of how the ideal gas law can be derived from the kinetic theory of gasses is logically satisfying it is less adequate as a sociology or psychological comment. Boyle's law relating temperature to pressure was postulated in 1662. Atoms had been proposed by Democritus (c460 B.C. - c370 B.C.) and some rudimentary concept of molecules also existed but at the same time both alchemy and astrology were considered scientific. The actual ideal gas law was generally accepted in the 1850s but this was almost one-half century after Avogadro published it in 1811. When Nagel wrote of the means by which the gas laws could be derived from the kinetic theory of gasses he lived in a world which accepted the existence of protons, neutrons and electrons (but not quarks). 17 Qualitative studies and their exponents (eg. Blumer) have often exhibited their greatest analytic strengths in documenting precisely these transitions. Those engaged in field research have long known of the limitations of formal structural theory. 18 All sciences must share the same methodological precepts even as they focus on different aspects of the natural world. Physics, biology, and chemistry therefore all share overarching notions of 'objectively collected data', of the formulation of testable hypotheses which are evaluated in accord to universal rules of logic and evidence, and the formulation of theories which generalise or extend observed patterns into areas which have not yet been observed. (This ability to extrapolate is intimately tied to the question of dimensions). 'Scientific method' at its core apparently means, reliance on logic, the use of empirical evidence, and the supremacy of evidence in case of conflict. 19 In a culturally more homogeneous age it made some statistical sense to refer to a 'family' as 'two adults of opposite sex, married to each other, and living with their common children'. While it may be politically advantageous (correct?) to extend the meaning of 'family' to include same-sex couples, single-parents, nannies, adoptive and step children, and so on, it is clear that this diversity plays havoc with sociological analysis. When a composite term is seen to be made up of elements which are varying essentially independently of one-another, scientific practice requires the composite term no longer be accorded primary theoretical, practical or research importance. After the tea kettle has boiled dry, using the term 'ice' or using predictions based on observations of ice are likely to be of diminished importance. The same can be argued about composite epistemological terms as well. 20 Positivism though, like liberalism, came to mean different things to different people. When Auguste Comte first proposed the Positive Philosophy he sought to study society with the tools of the natural sciences, forgoing both metaphysics and theology, in the quest for ways to make the lives of people better. By the time the critical theorists of the current period had arrived, positivism had come to be associated with the disenchantment of the world and the imposition of Western Rationalism on all and sundry. Positivism, like so many other sociological doctrines, is both a research methodology and a political promise. Many modern scientists attempt to avoid the Janus-headed positivism of Comte and restrict their interpretation to it's methodological role only: 'That philosophical attitude which asserts that science is solely concerned with directly measurable quantities and that its aim is simply the harmonious reconciliation of observations without attempting to speak of an underlying physical reality.' 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Weinheim: Verlagsgesellschaft. SKOCPOL, Theda (editor) (1984) Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. TEZUKA, Shu (1995) Uniform Random Numbers: Theory and Practice. Boston: Kluwer. WELLMAN, Barry and S.D. BERKOWITZ (editors) (1988) Social Structures: A Network Approach. New York: Cambridge University Press. Copyright Sociological Research Online, 1998 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. 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