-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
The Secret War Against The Jews
John Loftus & Mark Aarons�1994
ISBN 0-312-11057-X
658pps - first edition
St. Martin�s Press
175 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY, 10010
-----
Whatsoever ye shall do
unto the least of men . . .
So shall ye do
also unto me
�Jesus of Nazareth, called by the Romans
"King of theJews," circa A.D. 32
Fuck theJews . . .
they won't
vote for us anyway.
�The Honorable James Baker, Secretary of State,
United States of America, circa A.D. 1992
INTRODUCTION
THE SECRET WAR AGAINST THE JEWS
The major powers of the world have repeatedly planned covert operations to
bring about the partial or total destruction of Israel. Long before there
even was a Jewish state in Palestine, Western spies already were out to wreck
the Zionist dream. The savage extent of the secret wars against the Jews will
horrify the Western public. This chapter of espionage history, beginning in
the 1920s, and continuing to the present day, has never been revealed before.
Half a world away from Israel, a sleepy suburban community hides one of
the secret entrances to the underworld of espionage. Most, but not all, of
the classified archives of the U.S. government are in Suitland, Maryland,
just outside Washington,D.C. The Suitland complex contains several restricted
access buildings, including the one where Jonathan Pollard worked for Naval
Intelligence, before he was discovered to be an Israeli spy.
Across from the Naval Intelligence facility with its geodesic radar domes
is a one-story brick warehouse, built as a storage annex for the National
Archives. This is where the government's secrets are buried, literally. Only
the top floor shows above ground. It is a long, low building, about the
length of a football field, surrounded by wide, well-mowed grassy fields that
yield no clue of what lies beneath.
Anyone can visit the top floor of the facility. It is open to the public.
There is even a shuttle out to the Suitland annex from downtown Wash ington.
The gray government van stops halfway between the White House and the Capitol
on the corner of the imposing main Archives building on Pennsylvania Avenue,
in front of the motto carved in stone: "What is past is prologue."
It is chilling to be reminded that history really does repeat itself. The
National Archives hold the records of the Indian wars, the American
Revolution, the War of 1812, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World
War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these records are held in
storage at Suitland. The original documents lie in humble gray boxes, on row
after row of dark metal shelves. Here are the orders of generals and rosters
of immigrants. Here are the files of American diplomacy and foreign policy.
The Suitland vaults also contain the records of American espionage and
covert action, the kind of foreign policy that the history books are not
meant to mention. Beneath the public reading rooms on the first floor is
another world. It is entered from a locked elevator that can be operated only
with a coded security card.
In the underworld below, one-third of modern history is still classi
fied. Here are the captured files of the Third Reich, some of which are still
secret half a century later. Here are records of the British secret service,
which no unprivileged British or American citizens are allowed to see. There
are levels and levels of hidden nuances, layers of secrets. After the journey
down, the elevator doors open onto a long, wide underground street stretching
off into the distance, dimly lit by ceiling lights fifty feet overhead.
On either side of the cement street are tall, thick, blast-proof doors,
the kind you see in old-fashioned banks. Some of the heavy steel doors are
open. Small squares of bright light spill out onto the street from the
entrances to the vaults. There are about twenty of these enormous storage
caverns, each approximately an acre in size. It is like the last scene from
the movie Raiders of the Lost Ark.
The aisles of the vaults stretch hundreds of feet away into the darkness.
>From the aisles, rows and rows of shelves stacked with classified files reach
two stories up to the ceiling. The workers scurry about pushing giant
stepladders on wheels as they retrieve the old documents from their slumber.
As you come out of the elevator, the number-six vault on the left belongs
to the National Archives. Just inside the door to this top-secret room are
several plain wooden tables, a small office, and several rows of filing
cabinets. Only a few people from the National Archives staff work here. The
rest are teams of retired spies or reserve officers from one of the military
intelligence agencies on their annual tour of duty. They are reviewing the
old classified files, page by page, to see what can be handed over to the
Archives staff and passed upstairs into the public domain. It is a slow
process, and the reviewers are a little behind in their work. "About a half
century to be exact," said the escort. "They're still at the beginning of
World War II."
What makes matters worse is that even after the intelligence files are
declassified, there are few archivists to index them. After Ronald Reagan
became president in 1981, the budget of the U.S. National Archives was cut to
the bone, allegedly in the interests of economy. Some grumble that it is in
the interest of government secrecy. Without an index, locating a declassified
file is like searching for a need]e in a haystack. The Archives are the
perfect place to bury a scandal.
The Archives staff cannot wander down the underground street into the
rest of the vaults. Those are still the private property of other government
agencies: the State Department, Naval Intelligence, the army, and so on. A
chain-link fence with a locked gate blocks off the rest of the street beyond
vault six. It takes more than a mere top-secret clearance to get through that
gate.
A top-secret clearance is good only for American files. You need a
"COSMlC clearance" to see the top-secret records from NATO countries and a
code word clearance for each security compartment you want to access above
top secret. There is one compartment for satellite intelli gence, another for
electronic espionage, another for cryptography, and so on. Each compartment
has its own subset of secret access words, known only to the initiated.
It is also essential to obtain a special "Q" clearance from the Atomic
Energy Commission. Many embarrassing records have been intentionally misfiled
down in vault two in the special security cage for nuclear warfare documents.
Hiding documents in another agency's vault is the intelligence equivalent of
putting a soul in limbo. Files can be lost in this underground graveyard
until Judgment Day, or so it is hoped
. Why aren't the records just destroyed? Shredding is not always an
option. Each copy of a top-secret document is accounted for on a security
log. Shredding would require filling out a "document destruction form'' and
fielding a lot of questions from the Archives staff. Even if an agency
obtained permission to shred one of its own files, it could not hope to
retrieve all the copies that previously had been distributed to other
agencies. Asking another agency to return a file is a guarantee that someone
will read it and make a copy first. Losing records in the vaults with a
little judicious misfiling is much simpler. lt happens all the time.
A record may disappear from the official files but still be known to the
"institutional memory." The retired intelligence officers remember where a
lot of the bodies are buried, and some of them can be quite help ful. A few
years ago there was a public scandal when French intelligence accused the
U.S. State Department of protecting Klaus Barbie, the notorious Nazi war
criminal. The State Department issued the usual denials, but then the French
released a memo quoting State Department file numbers on the Barbie case. The
State Department said that it could not find the files and knew nothing about
Barbie.
Our source recalled that the Slate Department had hidden a lot of its
secret correspondence over in the army vault, with the records for the
Military Government of Germany. He found the "missing" Barbie files and
passed the word to one of the authors, who promptly telephoned his former
colleagues in the Justice Department. The State Department was not amused and
retaliated by blaming Army intelligence for protecting Barbie.
Our source, who had been in Army intelligence, was not amused himself.
He knew that it was the Stale Department's intelligence group which was at
fault for hiring Nazis like Klaus Barbie. The old spy and his friends told us
precisely which State Department files to request from the vaults for
declassification under the Freedom of Information Act. It is easy to find a
needle in a haystack, if you have the help of a magnet. The result was our
last book, Unholy Tnnity, a history of Nazi smuggling by the Vatican, the
State Department, and the British secret service.(1)
It seems that little has changed in the State Department for the last
fifty years. We told one of our sources about our proposed dedication to this
book. He laughed and said, "Did Baker really say 'Fuck the Jews,' or was it
just attnbuted to him by the press?"
Although there is some dispute about the exact wording, the secretary of
state's vulgarism has been confirmed by two reporters from different sources
who were present when he said it.(2) Nor was it the first such outburst. When
Baker was being sworn in, one of the White House aides commented humorously
that every American secretary of state had left office hating the Israelis.
Baker is supposed to have joked: "What if one started that way?"(3)
"l hadn't heard that story," said our source. "That's pretty funny."
That depends on whether one is the butt of the joke or not. The Israelis were
not laughing. Secretary Baker was, in theory at least, a neutral umpire in
the 1992 peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Yet he
seemed to have a bit of a bias.
In fact, Baker's personal investments in oil interests were so extensive
that he may have been violating federal conflict-of-interest law by having
any influence on Middle East policy.(4) In 1990 President Bush asked the
attorney general to grant Baker a secret waiver from the statute.(5) It may
be no coincidence that rapid progress toward peace was achieved in the six
months immediately following Baker's departure from office.
In 1993 Jews and Arabs finally found themselves looking across the
bargaining table without outside onlookers. For the first time in seventy
years, Jews and Arabs met on a level playing field, without the help of
"neutral" arbitration from one or another of the superpowers. To the chagrin
of many Western diplomats, the citizens of the Middle East appeared capable
of solving their own problerns without anyone's help. Perhaps all they needed
was to be left alone.
The main thesis of this book is that the secret bias of Western
governments against the Jews was and is the single largest obstacle to peace
in the Middle East. We present a shameful history of racism, greed, and
secret betrayal that is so sickening that it will be difficult for many
Western readers to accept. On the other hand, our evidence is particular]y
hard to ignore.
This book presents the point of view of non-Jews, most of whom are
retired intelligence officers. These "old spies" plotted against Israel and
the Zionist movement that built the Jewish homeland. Most of the hundreds of
intelligence officers we interviewed over the last decade were trained to
regard Jews, and hence Israel, as hostile targets. Their input does not
require that this book be hostile to theJewish people.
Indeed, many of our sources regret their past hostility to theJews and,
in speaking out, were motivated, at least in part, to make amends and clear
the air. The classified information they provided, and which is presented
here for the first time, is far more damaging to those leaders of Western
countries who have purported to be Israel's friends and allies than it is to
our sources.
The espionage professionals whose stories are told here for the first
time served with both the civilian and military branches of the far-flung
intelligence communities on both sides of the Cold War. They include the
services of most countries in the Western alliance and several from the old
Soviet bloc. Many are now retired, others work as university professors,
lawyers, and businessmen.
The international intelligence community is fairly small�perhaps fewer
than 50,000 people really count. They all seem to know each other or at
least-of each other. In many ways, it is an intellectually incestuous
community, even nepotistic. One introduction in the United States can lead to
several generations of intelligence officers, especially among the families
who worked on CIA covert operations. The spouses of spies seem to have the
best memories and the most developed sense of humor. They often take what
their husbands or wifes did for a living with a large grain of salt.
British spies are the best educated and the most wittily incisive of
American foibles. Two of the brightest people we met were women from the
British intelligence services. Their male counterparts in the Secret In
telligence Service, or MI6, the counterintelligence service, MI5, and the
Ministry of Defense were a bit dull by comparison. This may explain why
Britain is now the only nation to have a woman, Stella Rimington, in charge
of an intelligence service.
The Russians, on the other hand, are predominantly male, more affable,
and almost as corrupt as the British. Our impression is that the civilian KGB
has consisted of lip-service Communist yuppies and politicians' children,
while the military GRU has benefited by recruiting the less well connected on
the basis of intellectual merit and fanatical devotion. Still, for several
generations, the Soviet communists ran the best intelligence operations in
the world. No one else came close. The Russians do not want to talk about the
past, but they often are frightened by the future. In the next generation,
they see their economy run by leftist dilettantes or ex-KGB incompetents and
the government controlled by nationalistic right-wingers from the GRU, the
worst of all possible combinations. Our Russian sources thought it a waste of
time to talk about past Soviet transgressions against Jews when the rise of
Russian fascism is staring them in the face.
The only ones worse to interview than the Russians are the code breakers.
The former officers of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and the
British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are hopeless. Having
been inundated with daily mountains of trivial information, they are
conditioned against any belief in reasoned analysis. They are the cynics of
the intelligence community. One former NSA officer, now a partner in a
prominent Boston law firm, stated that an agency that dumps forty tons of
intercepts in the trash everyday has no time to understand anything.
FBI types are fun to watch a football game with, but their eyes glaze
over when asked to explain a knotty contradiction in a twenty-year-old
intelligence report. Their job was to report every rumor as potential fact
and not to think about how the pieces of the puzzle fit together. Perhaps our
opinion was biased by a classified Justice Department study reporting that a
sample of FBI databases revealed a 50 percent error rate. The FBI compounded
the confusion by sending deliberately misleading files to the CIA. To be
fair, the CIA men and women present themselves as corporate professionals,
but after a few drinks they candidly admit that they often don't have a clue
either
. Far and away our favorite interviews were with former members of the
U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). Recruited for their high lQs, CIC
folk seem to love the game of analysis, the hunt for the layer beneath the
layer. Although their agency fell out of political favor long ago after a
contretemps involving a security check on Eleanor Roosevelt's lover, the CIC
has a tradition of stubborn honesty, diligent research, and meticulous file
indexing. Because of these traits, the CIC has earned the enmity of most of
the American intelligence community. No one is more despised around
Washington than someone who insists on telling the truth and can back it up
with good files.
Not that the CIC types were all Boy Scouts. For example, the lateJohn
Mclntyre of Quincy, Massachusetts, was a hilariously funny man who survived
numerous trips behind the Iron Curtain when all the other American agents had
been betrayed by Soviet moles inside Western intelligence. Mclntyre threw
away his officially issued phony passport and, without telling anyone in the
U.S. govemment, built an international network of Communist border guards who
thought they were part of his black-market liquor business.
Neither the CIA nor Army intelligence ever suspected that on his
weekends off, Mclntyre drove up and down the border delivering bottles of
scotch from the American military store to his Communist "emp]oyees" who
warned him whenever the KGB was closing in. Mclntyre's choirboy looks and
amazing success as a border-crosser enabled him to escape the wrath of his
superiors for such pranks as dropping his trousers and ''mooning" General
Reinhard Gehlen, Hitler's former intelligence chief who was then working for
the CIA.
Not all of the tales are funny. William Gowen, a former CIC agent,
discovered from the authors' last book that he had been falsely portrayed in
U.S. intelligence records as a man who smuggled Nazi war criminals to the
United States. His reputation had been defamed, his carreer side tracked, in
a vicious forty-year campaign to mislead congressional investigators and make
him the secret scapegoat for others' misdeeds. Gowen was a victim in the
secret war against the Jews, and we are glad to help him clear his reputatian
in this book. We also are grateful for his assistance with document location
and for his introduction to other sources.
We are indebted to many, many others whom we cannot name, but whose
efforts were equally valuable. Over the years, they have approached us on the
lecture circuit, at airports and at intelligence seminars. A few are welded
in our memory. There was the middle-age businessman who wept as he described
his previous work as a professional assassin. The daughter of a senior CIA
official who wanted to know why her father committed suicide. The elderly Jew
who knew what Western intelligence had done to Israel but begged us not to
write about it for the sake of future relations between Israeli intelligence
and its Western counterparts. All of the "old spies" have some amazing
stories to tell. Convincing them to talk, even off the record, is not an easy
task. There is a tendency among former inteIligence officers to clam up when
approaching the borders of their clandestine history, as if they were
approaching a checkpoint at the old Iron Curtain. When you ask them exactly
what they did during the Cold War, most give you the same look, a sudden
aversion of the eyes, upward and away from the subject. The sad part is
they want to talk, especially the retired spies who were present for the
birth of Israel. They want to tell someone about the secret world in which
they once lived. Not that it was exciting or glamorous, far from it. Most of
the business of the intelligence community is boring, pedantic scholarship,
the cross-checking of gossip and exacting fact. Not the kind of
"facts-are-stubborn-things" that politicians say for sound bites, but real
facts. Secrets of state, the kind that politicians want to hide from the
voters.
Most often the truth is suppressed for legitimate reasons of national
security. All too frequently, though, lies are told to secure a politician's
reelection. With respect to the Middle East, our governments do not want
their own citizens to know that a covert double standard has applied to the
Jews, and so they have lied to us for half a century. But there is one group
of citizens whom the politicians cannot deceive or, at least, not for long.
Spies are in the truth business, and truth is an acquired taste. In its
undilluted form, truth is an acid. Sooner or later it burns those who handle
it. The "old spies" keep their leaders' ugly secrets bottled up within them,
and it hurts. You can see the pain of knowing what really happened burning
inside them. Although they want to denounce these deceptions to their fellow
citizenst they preserve with painful silence the lies told by their superiors.
Unlike the rest of us, the citizens of the international intelligence
community are not free to criticize the shortcomings of their own
governments. They are bound by rules, strict rules: contracts of secrecy cast
in stone. Their job is to make history and then bury it. Silence is what they
get paid for. Continued silence keeps the pension checks coming. Not that
they are mercenaries. The men and women of the intelligence profession are,
on the whole, honorable people. They believe in constitutional government,
free speech, and human rights, which is to say they are vastly superior to
their political masters. Most of them now also realize that there was nothing
noble or honorable in their role in the secret war against the Jews.
In fact, most of the former intelligence officers whom we have met and
interviewed in the last decade are more decent, more intelligent, and more
dedicated to democracy than many of the citizens they serve. It is a pity
that such bright, capable people were given tasks that included some
despicable things. It is a tragedy that the public does not know what they
did. Perhaps they did their jobs too well. Omission from history is the
hallmark of success in covert operations. On the other hand, George Or well
said that omission is the most powerful form of lie, and it is the duty of
historians to ensure that omissions do not creep into the history books.
The little rubber stamp marked TOP SECRET is both a powerful sword and a
shield. In time of war, secrecy may be the keystone of victory. In time of
peace, classification too often is the cornerstone of cover-up. Doctors may
bury their mistakes, but politicians hide them in the intelligence vaults
under a shroud of national security. The former intelligence officers who
provided the information for this book agree that there are some secrets that
should not be kept. Political deceptions based on self-interest, not national
interest, fall within this category. A leadership that recklessly lies to its
own people commits a crime against democracy. The best method of deception is
to prevent public access by improperly classifying the records of political
misconduct.
A few of the sources we talked to admitted that sometimes they were
guilty accomplices. their complicity of silence was essential to continued
illegal conduct by their own governments. The conflict between what the state
said in public and what it did in private drove many to acts of desperation.
Some became defectors, particularly from former Communist countries where the
discrepancy between truth and lies was greatest. Some became whistle-blowers
and today endure the opprobrium of their colleagues for breaking the pact.
Most are self-condemned to the worst alternative of all. They live in Dante's
Inferno, in the Seventh Circle of Hell, the place reserved for those who had
the ability to prevent evil but did nothing.
For the honest spy, there are no easy choices. Truth can burn
politicians, but it also can burn ''sources and methods " There is more to
these words than the bureaucratic jargon of the intelligence community. To a
spy, sources are human heings who provide information�the truth, it is
hoped�usually about mutual enemies, often about their own country, frequently
at the risk of their own lives. These people are treasured and should be.
Good sources can win wars or prevent them. The "old spies'' believe that so
few good sources are available now because so many have been burned before.
Eyewitnesses are the only alternative to archives, but asking a spy to
become a source is a historian's nightmare. To intelligence officers, a
historian is simply a reporter with a book contract, and they hate reporters.
At best, the intelligence community regards members of the press as naive
simpletons, endowed with a constitutional privilege to do damage: loose
cannons with a license to leak. On the other hand, governments should not be
allowed to classify their crimes to hide them from journalists and their
readers.
During the last ten years we have been approached by many people from the
Western intelligence services. They wanted to confide some of their secrets.
Their conditions for sharing information were severe. In most, but not all,
cases, the first requirement was total anonymity. All discussions were
subject to the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality in a jurisdiction
that prohibits disclosure of a client's identity without explicit consent.
Due to this privilege we were able to submit portions of this book to the
intelligence community for prepublication review, with
out identifying which of their former employees had provided information to
us. While the CIA review board suggested a few helpful changes, it is not
responsible for the contents of this book.
Nor should any inference be drawn that this book is supported, or
endorsed, by the government of Israel, severaL of whose officials privately
expressed their desire that it not be written. To be perfectly blunt, it is
hard to believe that what we say will make their intelligence liaison
relationships worse than they already are. Telling the truth might even help.
The same goes for the governments of what was once the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the "People's Democracies." Our only responsibility
is accurately to publish the information that was given to us by concerned
individuals acting out of conscience and outside official channels.
It is not easy for a responsible journalist to find a middle ground
between the public's right to know and the government's legitimate need for
secrecy. As a rule, the "old spies" regard journalists as being only a cut
above politicians, who, they agree, leak more secrets than anyone else. The
Reagan administration is a classic case. In the aftermath of a terrorist
bombing in West Germany, one White House official insisted that the Libyan
government was responsible for the attack. When asked for proof at a press
conference, he boasted that United States intelligence had monitored
Gadhafi's secret cable traffic.
A groan went up among the wiretappers of the National Security Agency who
were watching. He had revealed one of the few secret advantages the U.S.
government possessed. After the press conference, Libya quickly changed its
outdated, easily intercepted, cable-coding equipment to one of the more
modern, virtually unbreakable systems.
It is an article of faith among the intelligence community that
politicians deliberately leak classified information when it favors them but
scream "national security" when they want to conceal their mistakes and, more
particularly, their crimes. The "old spies" hate politicians as much as they
hate being called "old spies." On the other hand, they have their own
derisive vocabulary. Those who serve in the field call their desk bound
colleagues
"anal-ists." In turn, the intelligence analysts describe field agents as
"spooks," when they are not calling them something worse.
"Intelligence officer" is the preferred designation, but then garbage men
prefer to be called "sanitation engineers." In this book, we frequently
describe our intelligence sources generically as the "old spies." Spying is
what they did. This book is about those who spied on Israel.
"No, it isn't," said one of our sources. "It's not about us. It's about
hypocrisy." He is correct. This is not an indictment of those men and women
from the intelligence community who were merely the foot soldiers in the
generals' secret wars against the Jews. This book is the shameful record of
those politicians around the world who made these policies and then kept them
secret from their own citizens for decades. Most of us do not know that our
own Western govemments have launched a secret war against Israel. If the "old
spies'' are right, and we think they are, even Israel's. government does not
know everything that has been and still is being done to it.
In a larger sense, this book is about more than the betrayal of one
nation. Israel is simply a good example of a bad example. Many groups have
been the victims of international double-dealing, although few have suffered
from it as much as theJews. We could have written, for examlple, about the
Western governments' complicity in the ongoing genocide of East Timor, a tiny
island nation of Catholics being murdered by Moslems for the sake of Western
oil profits. It is a silent siege, a secret war that is too rarely mentioned
in the press. But then, neither was the Holocaust at the time. East Timor has
much in common with Israel.(6) Crimes against Jews are just not news,
certainly not big news. Moslem crimes against minorities almost never make
the press.
There is much good to be said about the Western media. As much as
television is criticized, the fact remains that many people know much more
about the world around them than did their grandparents. On the other hand,
our intelligence sources say that of six recent scandals� Watergate,
debategate, Irangate, Contragate, Iraqgate, and the savings and loans
scandal�the Western media succeeded in only one investigation. Moreover, the
press got Nixon only because someone in the intelligence community spcon-fed
them the story.
The almost unanimous conclusion among the people we interviewed is that
the American press has been unwilling to commit sufficient resources to
develop its own expertise in intelligence matters and has simply abandoned
any- pretense of long-term investigations. Television news has been
particularly derelict in documenting the longer, more complex sto ries. Dan
Rather, one of the most prominent American anchormen, recently admitted to a
group of broadcasters: "We should all be ashamed." The intelligence
community thinks even less of congressional investigations. Somehow we must
find a way to strike a better balance between the need for secrecy in
intelligence operations and the necessity for oversight by democratic
institutions. For the last seventy years, neither Congress nor Parliament has
been inclined to exercise its responsibilities in a responsible and effective
manner.
The result of this combined negligence of the media and public
irlnstitutions has been shameful indeed. It does not matter whether we are
talking about the savings and loan scandal, or the arms race, or the
intelligence wars against Israel. The fact remains that our politicians have
developed the cover-up into an art form. We simply do not know what our civil
servants are ordered to do, because their political masters have classified
the truth about their activities. Sometimes, although we are reluctant to
admit it, we do eleet crooks to high office. Crooked politicians and the
intelligence services make a dangerous combinatian.
Classified crime is the hardest to prosecute, even before the bar of
history. We were a little reluctant to attempt to probe into those dark
corners where oil and espionage mix. Even with the help of so many sources of
information, the subject matter is so complex that we wondered how it could
be organized into a readable form. One intelligenee officer turned art
teacher suggested a useful approach.
He displayed a color slide of an abstract sculpture. The piece was over
six feet tall, of metall branches all intertwined. There were harsh angles,
jagged pieces, fire-scored surfaces. It was, to all appearances, a random
column of ugliness. Hardly the model for a book. "Don't look at the sculpture
itself," our friend advised. "Look at the holes.'' Inside the twisted
sculpture was an orderly pattern of smooth ovals, arranged in perfect
balance, making sense of the whole.
That became the intellectual model for this book. Known history is like
the visible surface of the scuLpture, a series of harsh, twisted. seemingly
unconnected branches. The hidden parts of history, the covert sides, are more
orderly and rational, but can be seen and understood only if you are told
where to look. The holes in history are what make sense of the thing. The
hidden motives, secret agendas, classified purposes: All these tell the why
of human events. In order to understand the what of modern Israel and its
context in the harsh, twisted annals of the Middle East, it is necessary to
identify the holes in the history books. The holes are the unwritten history
of covert operations, the classified omissions that make up The Secret War
Against the Jews.
Our sources suggested that if we wanted to write the previously omitted
history of the Middle East, we should begin at the beginning, pointing out
all the classified holes along the way. That, in undiluted form, would be a
bit much for the reader to digest. For a start, including everything that the
hundreds of "old spies" have told us over the years would have made the book
too unwieldy. Each chapter therefore is based on the claims of the four or
five sources who were most dlrectly involved in the events under discussion.
To help chart the way, each chapter begins with a capsule of the known
history of the period, followed by a summary of our intelligence sources'
list of omissions. Then we present our research evidence to support or rebut
their allegations.
There are, we admit, some deficiencies in this approach. For a start,
there is a great danger in relying on interviews from anonymous sources,
especially when they are intelligence officers who are professionally trained
in spreading propaganda and deception. A further problem is that much of what
the �old spies'' have to say about Israel has never been published before and
cannot be albsolute]y corroborated, even from de-classified files. We have
made every effort to cross-check our sources against each other. That the
former intelligence officers we interviewed. agree with each others' stories
is not, of course, a guarantee that their recollections are accurate.
We do not know for certain if our sources have told us the truth, only
that they want us to believe it is the truth. Much of their information can
be verified from existing archives and historical works, which are cited in
the text, but even this cannot ensure that. we have not been misled in other
ways. You may not be convinced that the spies� version is true in all
respects, but at least you may be convinced that much of what has hitherto
been accepted history is either false or, at best, seriously deficient. Our
only claim for this book is that it is an accurane account of how many spies
view the West's conduct toward Israel. This is their story, their book, and a
very different look at history.
But is it true? We have taken great pains, particularly in the most
controversial modern sections, to document extensively our sources'
allegations with concrete facts. Corroboration has been obtained from such
diverse sources as Oliver North's diary, hundreds of volumes of congressional
investigations, and thousands of declassified files.
Our goal was to present oral history in the context of the documents of
the period, giving readers enough information to judge the facts for
themselves. We believe we have made a convincing; case that at least 80
percent of what the Cold spies" say can be confirmed through open sources.
That is a remarkable claim for the power of independent research, because
less than 10 percent of their material has been officially declassified. It
is amazing how much secret information is sitting in a public archive or
library, once someone tells you where to look.
On the other hand, we hope you will find this account anything but a
boring, academic treatise. It is a lively tale of espionage told by
interesting and unusually informed people who wanted to contribute their
institutional memory to the pool of public knowledge. One of the primary
purposes of this book is to introduce the public to the world of classified
operations, without endangering lives or exposing networks. Except for the
ubiquitous genre of the spy novel, most readers are not even aware that this
other world exists. It is your history too. You are entitled to know the
weaknesses of your own intelligence services so that defects may be
corrected. Where intelligence agencies are concerned, secrecy is the
guarantee of short-term efficiency. In the long run, it is democracy that
decides whether our secret services have done more harm than good.
To make it easier for you to decide for yourselves, we have divided our
chronology of what has hitherto been omitted from history into three parts.
The first part, "The Age of Bigotry,� covers the period from the end of World
War I to just after the end of World War II. Its purpose is to show the
reader how our modern spy scandals have evolved naturally, and inevitably,
from what went on before. It begins with the biographies of the first Western
spies who betrayed the Jews because of their racial bigotry.
The middle part, "The Age of Greed;" covers the postwar era up through
the Nixon administration. This section of the book traces the transition from
crude bigotry to a sophisticated form of insider trading, using government
intelligence to further corporate policy, especially the interests of the
giant oil companies. This resulted in secret aid to the Arabs during their
wars with Israel.
The final part of this book traces the West's war against the Jews in tke
modern era, what we call "The Age of Stupidity." From the CIA's sabotage of
Jimmy Carter's presidency, through the twelve long years of President Reagan
and Bush, the secret betrayal of Israel was the touchstone of the men who
made their incredible profits from the Arabs. In a series of shocking
revelations, our sources allege that the Reagan administration set up Israel
as the scapegoat for the Iran-Contra scandal, while the White House bought
guns from a PLO terrorist and wiretapped American Jews.
There are many books about espionage by Israel, most of which have been
extremely negative. The Jews are popularly portrayed as having a siege
mentality: paranoids with yarmulkes, insufferable, ungrateful, and
untrusting. Why, for example, would Israel recruit Jonathan Pollard to spy on
the United States? Don't they know that Americans are on their side? The
American people may be so inclined, but their government has fluctuated
between reckless indifference and secret hostility, a hostility that has
manifested itself over the decades as covert action. Although Secretary
Baker was probably joking when he said "Fuck the Jews," some people feel that
he was summarizing the State Depart ment's policy toward Israel for the last
seventy-five years. If the "old spies" are right, the U.S. policy was lenient
compared to that of the British, Freneh, Japanese, Soviets, and Germans. In
fact, all the great nations have treated the Jews as expendable assets,
obstacles to the secure supply of Arab oil.
This book is the history of Western espionage against Israel. It is the
other side of the coin or, perhaps more appropriately, a look at the under
side of a rock. The spies have a view of the world that we rarely see.
Although we are loath to admit it, perhaps it is a glimpse of the world as it
really is and as it has been throughout this century.
pps 1-14
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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