-Caveat Lector-
>From www.commentarymagazine.com/9907/books.html
> Big Picture
>
> The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order
>
> by Francis Fukuyama
>
> Free Press. 368 pp. $26.00
>
> Reviewed by
> Charles Murray
>
> FRANCIS FUKUYAMA likes to paint on a big canvas. He came to international
> attention in 1989 with an article in the National Interest, "The End of
> History?," controversially proposing that liberal democracy might constitute the
> end point of our political evolution. This was followed by two books, The End of
> History and the Last Man (1992) and Trust (1995), in each of which, calling upon
> all the social and behavioral sciences, he grappled with the meaning of life in
> a world grown (hypothetically) rich and peaceful.
>
> He has not scaled back. In his new book, The Great Disruption, Fukuyama takes it
> upon himself to explain the sudden downward slide on a wide variety of social
> indicators that began in the mid-1960�s and in some ways is still with us: what
> happened, why it happened, and whether we might hope for a Great Reconstruction
> to follow the Great Disruption. Fukuyama has considerably broadened the many
> previous treatments of this topic by bringing to bear an international
> perspective and, still more ambitiously, by grappling with what he sees as the
> underlying aspects of human nature that govern large historical swings.
>
> Fukuyama groups the social problems that characterized the Great Disruption
> under the headings of crime, family, and trust. The indicators for crime and
> family are by now familiar: steep rises in violent and property crime, a soaring
> divorce rate, illegitimacy ratios that went from a few percent of live births at
> the end of the 1950�s to a third or more in the 1990�s. What may be less
> familiar to readers is the extent to which these same problems have plagued not
> just America but Western Europe.
>
> For more than a decade now, peaceful, civil England has had a property-crime
> rate higher than the crime-ridden U.S. In Sweden, the Left�s one-time model, the
> rate of violent crime is now as high as in the United States�far fewer murders,
> to be sure, but just as many assaults, robberies, and sex crimes. The breakdown
> of the family is also far advanced in most of Western Europe. England has
> leapfrogged America�s illegitimacy ratio, going from one much lower than ours in
> the 1970�s to one considerably higher in the 1990�s. In Sweden, marriage appears
> to be a dying institution. Added to these indicators is a plunge in fertility,
> with many European countries now far below the replacement rate.
>
> Fukuyama�s treatment of the theme of trust draws on his 1995 book of the same
> name and is intimately linked with a central construct of The Great Disruption,
> social capital. Social capital is the "set of informal values or norms shared
> among members of a group that permits cooperation among them." These shared
> norms facilitate one�s trust that another person will act reliably and honestly,
> while trust itself acts "like a lubricant that makes the running of any group or
> organization more efficient."
>
> Social capital, lubricated by trust, is what has let the Japanese sustain their
> extraordinarily low crime rate without a lot of prisons; the lack of social
> capital is what has saddled southern Italian villages with amoral familism (in
> Edward Banfield�s term). Social capital makes the free market work in the United
> States; the lack of social capital makes a free market impossible, so far, in
> the former Soviet Union. During the period of the Great Disruption, Fukuyama
> tries to demonstrate, trust deteriorated, including trust in one�s fellow
> citizens and trust in government; and so, inevitably, did social capital.
>
> Turning to causes, Fukuyama lists four alternative explanations of the Great
> Disruption, each identified with a particular point of view. The contemporary
> Left has blamed rising crime figures and the breakdown of families on the
> persistence of economic and social inequality, while a smaller group of
> theorists, straddling the political divide, has found the culprit to be greater
> wealth and security. Then there are libertarians like me who concentrate on
> mistaken government policies. Finally, social conservatives point a finger at
> cultural values.
>
> Fukuyama finds something unsatisfactory in each of these explanations,
> preferring instead to focus on the way many factors work in tandem to produce
> certain effects. For example, family breakdown has clearly had an adverse impact
> on the socialization of children, and that in turn has had much to do with
> rising crime, which in turn has fostered distrust, of neighbors in particular
> and of the world in general. Family breakdown similarly promotes what Fukuyama
> calls the "miniaturization of community," the displacement of affiliation with
> large institutions (a labor federation, for example) by smaller, more local
> institutions (aerobics groups, Internet chat rooms) sporting a smaller "radius
> of trust." As for the causes of family disorder itself, they too are multiple
> and variegated�but the special role of the feminist revolution has been crucial,
> and Fukuyama devotes one long and important chapter to it.
>
> In the end, however, what makes this book so valuable is neither Fukuyama�s
> description of the Great Disruption nor his analysis of its proximate causes.
> Rather, it is his prolonged meditation on what comes next.
>
> Where do norms come from? How do cooperation and trust emerge from them? How,
> once disrupted, can they be expected to reemerge? Such questions, framed in
> other vocabulary, were the stuff of social analysis from the Greeks to the 19th
> century. Is man, by nature, fitted for society? But then, for most of this
> century, the question virtually disappeared. The renewed interest in it is one
> of the happier trends in today�s social science, and Fukuyama does a masterly
> job of surveying and synthesizing what has been learned.
>
> He begins by laying out a useful conceptual framework. Briefly, it consists of a
> horizontal axis anchored on one side by pure hier-archically-generated norms
> (the Qu�ran�s proscription of alcohol, California�s proscription of smoking in
> restaurants) and on the other by pure spontaneously-generated norms (the incest
> taboo, the price of a commodity). Along the vertical axis is a continuum ranging
> from "rational" on the top ("rational" merely in the sense of deliberately
> chosen) and "arational" (meaning socially inherited) on the bottom. The four
> quadrants in this scheme (hierarchical/rational, spontaneous/ arational, etc.)
> represent four basic types of norms, and Fukuyama sets out to explain how each
> comes about.
>
> Here, he draws on a wide and vivid set of examples from the sociobiological and
> anthropological record to demonstrate a few basic points. Most basically of all,
> human beings are naturally gregarious. They do not behave as the ruthlessly
> profit-maximizing model of Homo economicus would have us believe. Reciprocity,
> generosity, and loyalty are integral parts of human nature. Humans are not
> entirely trustworthy�not angels, Fukuyama repeatedly reminds us�but everything
> we have learned from modern behavioral and biological science gives us sound
> reason to think that they are indeed fitted for society.
>
> To be sure, most of these new "findings" about human nature have also been
> stated in other terms, by thinkers from Aristotle to Adam Smith. But it is
> important at the end of our century to have the imprimatur of science on them,
> and I suppose we can also be said to have learned a few new things along the
> way, or at least to have stated old truths with greater precision. Certainly we
> have acquired a better understanding of the biochemical origins of behavior, and
> that understanding may be expected to increase. In any case, these chapters of
> The Great Disruption are uniformly fascinating.
>
> Shifting gears abruptly, the book takes us into the world of organizational
> theory, which, as Fukuyama sees it, is increasingly in sync with the sources of
> human cooperation. The 20th century began with Max Weber telling us that the
> essence of modernity was bureaucracy. It ends with bureaucracies everywhere in
> decline, replaced by spontaneous, self-organized markets and networks.
>
> These two things are not identical, Fukuyama explains. In a market, agreements
> and cooperation require only a minimal set of shared values. That minimal set
> includes some exceedingly important items, especially a common agreement to
> engage in voluntary, good-faith transactions. But in every other aspect of their
> lives, the members of a market can be highly individualistic. They do not even
> need to like each other.
>
> By contrast, a network is defined by larger shared values. The members of the
> Sierra Club are part of a network, and so are members of a kinship group or a
> religion. For that matter, organizations that are putatively market-driven
> routinely take on some of the characteristics of a network, as in the
> development of corporate cultures that shape behavior far beyond the narrow
> terms of a job description.
>
> Fukuyama, putting distance between himself and libertarians, is careful to note
> the limits of markets and networks alike. Although their spontaneity and
> flexibility give them great range and vitality, some degree of hierarchy, he
> believes, is necessary, especially in large social units. Gossip, for example,
> can be a wonderful mechanism of control in a community of 50 to 100 people; in
> an anonymous urban neighborhood, it needs to be replaced by more formal systems.
> And besides, Fukuyama notes, people like to organize themselves hierarchically.
> What they dislike, he observes trenchantly, "is not hierarchy in principle, but
> hierarchies in which they end up on the bottom." Hierarchies, including powerful
> government hierarchies, we will always have with us.
>
> Where, then, are we left? Fukuyama urges us, as a first step, to reject the
> notion that the engine of our destruction is, as some on both Left and Right
> would have it, capitalism itself, relentlessly eating away at our social
> capital. Quite the contrary. Although he seldom says anything unequivocally, on
> this point Fukuyama is unequivocal:
>
>
>
> Montesquieu and Adam Smith were right in arguing that commerce tended to improve
> morals; [Edmund] Burke, Daniel Bell [in The Cultural Contradictions of
> Capitalism], and [the British social critic] John Gray are wrong to assert that
> capitalism necessarily undercuts its own moral basis or more broadly that the
> Enlightenment is self-undermining.
>
>
>
> It is not capitalism that worries Fukuyama but the state. Governments, he
> believes, can help generate social capital�the American public educational
> system in the first half of this century is his example�but they can also
> destroy it. Are modern liberal states ineluctably drawn to promote individualism
> at the expense of social capital? Not necessarily, Fukuyama tells us, but he
> does not sound wholly confident. For government, the trick is not to contrive
> artificial ways of restoring social capital but to provide an environment in
> which the natural human tendencies to create norms and values can reassert
> themselves.
>
> About the likelihood of this happening, Fukuyama is refreshingly sanguine. In
> the 1820�s, he reminds us, the United States was mired in a slough of alcoholism
> and crime; a few years later, it had been turned around by the Second Great
> Awakening. Similarly, 19th-century England was caught in the grip of the most
> wrenching national economic transformation in history: within a matter of
> decades, it shifted from a country of agrarian hamlets to an urbanized
> industrial power suffering from all the severe social ills that Charles Dickens
> would make notorious. But by the second half of the century, even as the
> economic transformation continued at full force, Victorian middle-class values
> had been propagated so relentlessly that crime dropped to the very low levels
> that would remain characteristic of English society all the way through the
> first two-thirds of the 20th century.
>
> We have seen the pendulum swing many times before: from license to prudery, from
> profligacy to thrift, from social chaos to social order. Social capital will be
> regenerated in the natural course of things: that is the central theme through
> which Fukuyama draws together the many strands of his argument. Maybe all we
> need to do is wait.
>
> Fukuyama�s historical reconstruction is persuasive, and his understanding of
> human nature is one with which I emphatically agree. My reservations lie
> primarily in his tendency to use society as a whole as his unit of analysis.
> Where he tends to aggregate, I would often prefer to disaggregate.
>
> Doing so tempers his picture in interesting ways. A strong case can be made, for
> example, that even as trust of fellow citizens was deteriorating appallingly in
> some parts of America�like inner cities�in others, both trust and civil
> institutions were continuing to function largely unchanged. Similarly, the loss
> of trust itself needs to be disaggregated. When it comes to government, a loss
> of trust in the courts is palpably bad because the rule of law is at stake, but
> what about a loss of trust in the efficacy of government programs? To me the
> latter sounds like part of the solution, not part of the problem.
>
> Disaggregation is especially important in thinking about the future, where
> Fukuyama�s wide-angled focus may yield too bright a picture. As it happens, I
> see harbingers of a Great Reconstruction everywhere�for the middle class on up.
> We may even be entering a golden age, recovering from the destructive
> intellectual fads of the recent past and rediscovering our attraction to the
> beautiful and the true, with technology providing wonderful new
> possibilities�for the middle class on up. But meanwhile there is the other part
> of American society�the part often called the underclass�that was the source of
> many of the statistical trends that define the Great Disruption.
>
> America, after the Great Disruption, is split in a way that it was not split
> prior to 1965. The underclass is not just a traditional lower class, eager to
> climb the ladder to middle-class respectability, but a segment of society that
> is acquiring a code, structure, and culture of its own. It has the ability,
> through its own underground economy and through the assistance extended to it by
> government policy, to exist independently of the rest of society. It is
> increasingly white, and it is increasingly making inroads into the working
> class.
>
> Added to this is one of the most potent variables that will shape social
> structure in the 21st century: intelligence. Any attempt to think through the
> question of where technology and the information economy are taking us must come
> to grips with the radically different ways this process will play out depending
> on an individual�s IQ. The smart are going to do extremely well. The average
> will do all right. Those of low intelligence are going to be excluded from many
> more social goods than we can now imagine. They are in danger of becoming
> economically and, worse, socially superfluous. Combine this with the presence of
> a sizable underclass, and even in the face of a regeneration of social capital
> of the kind Fukuyama foresees, America is likely to be a markedly different
> place from the country we knew prior to 1965.
>
> These, at least, are the strictures of one who has been working some of the same
> territory as Fukuyama. But put them aside. The Great Disruption takes on
> questions that go to the heart of social policy writ large. It is written with
> never-failing lucidity, brings together vast and disparate literatures, and
> makes one think in new ways about the prospects of post-industrial society. That
> is quite enough for one book.
>
> CHARLES MURRAY is the Bradley Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and
> the author most recently of What It Means to Be a Libertarian and (with Richard
> J. Herrnstein) The Bell Curve.
>
> 999
> The Other War
>
> Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem�Once and For All
>
> by Scott Ritter
>
> Simon & Schuster. 240 pp. $22.00
>
> Tyranny�s Ally
>
> by David Wurmser
>
> AEI Press. 166 pp. $14.95
>
> Reviewed by
> Bret Louis Stephens
>
> A SHORT six months ago, President Clinton announced the commencement of
> Operation Desert Fox, until the war in Kosovo the most aggressive military
> action undertaken by his administration. Because of Kosovo, our adventure in
> Iraq has received scant attention lately. But it is hardly over, and what the
> story of its unfolding says about the overall nature of American diplomatic and
> military strategy is most discouraging.
>
> Operation Desert Fox began on December 16, 1998. Over the course of the next
> four days, 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles rained down on Iraqi military and
> industrial facilities, damaging or destroying a total of 97 targets. Coming as
> it did after two previous threatened military strikes against Iraq had been
> called off at the last minute, and at the very moment the House of
> Representatives was debating the President�s impeachment, Desert Fox struck many
> observers as an effort at manipulation taken at a moment of maximum political
> danger. But if this was President Clinton�s intention, it did not have the
> desired effect: after a brief pause, the House voted to impeach.
>
> Whatever may have impelled the decision to strike Iraq, Desert Fox was an
> appalling failure. The targets selected were of slight strategic value; Saddam
> Hussein emerged unscathed and politically emboldened; UNSCOM, the United Nations
> inspection body set up to dismantle Iraq�s chemical, biological, nuclear, and
> ballistic-missile arsenals, was effectively shut down; and the United States
> found itself diplomatically isolated and hard put to sustain the regime of
> economic sanctions that form the core of its Iraq policy.
>
> Since then, we have been engaged in a sporadic, low-level air campaign against
> Saddam as he seeks to challenge the "no-fly zones" that are one of the last
> vestiges of the receding American position. How long this war of attrition can
> last, and what larger purpose it serves, are questions the administration has
> thus far failed to address. But they are addressed, thoughtfully and in
> interesting detail, by Scott Ritter in Endgame and by David Wurmser in Tyranny�s
> Ally.
>
> Of the two books, Endgame is the more timely. Its author is the no-nonsense
> former U.S. Marine who resigned last August as UNSCOM�s chief inspector amid
> allegations that the Clinton administration was attempting to subvert the
> inspection process and to besmirch him personally through baseless charges that
> he had engaged in espionage on behalf of Israel.
>
> Ritter divides his narrative into three sections. The first deals with the
> history of Saddam�s regime, the second with his own seven years as an UNSCOM
> inspector; a final chapter offers a set of policy prescriptions. There is also a
> tersely written and thoroughly frightening appendix listing Iraq�s current
> weapons of mass destruction.
>
> Ritter�s recounting of how Iraq evolved into a brutal and uncompromising police
> state under the rule of Saddam Hussein is not especially remarkable, although it
> does include some piquant details. Far more noteworthy is his depiction of
> Saddam�s ceaseless efforts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction
> whose value as instruments of terror, to be used against enemies both within and
> without, trumped all considerations of efficiency or cost.
>
> Saddam had already employed mustard gas to terrible effect against Kurdish
> civilians in 1988, and even more successfully against Iranian troops in the
> closing days of the Iran-Iraq war. In that same year, as Ritter relates, he put
> the program into high gear. Huge industrial complexes were set up to produce
> nerve agents and to "weaponize" pathogenic bacteria, and contracts were signed
> with a broad range of Western companies to supply essential equipment. Iraq also
> took steps that have brought it remarkably close to developing a nuclear
> capability.
>
> When Ritter joined UNSCOM shortly after the Gulf war in 1991, many observers
> thought the agency�s job would be essentially to mop up: it was widely believed
> that the bulk of the Iraqi arsenal had been destroyed, and that Saddam�s tenure
> in office hung by a thread. Those assessments were completely wrong. Saddam not
> only survived, but he undertook active and highly successful measures to conceal
> his arsenal from UNSCOM. What ensued was an almost decade-long, high-stakes game
> of hide-and-seek.
>
> Ritter writes colorfully about what inspections were actually like. Most turned
> up nothing; and even when UNSCOM got its targets right, staging "no-notice"
> visits to suspect sites, the Iraqis would go to sometimes comically brazen
> lengths to delay or frustrate its work. On several occasions, inspectors found
> themselves facing guns or being pelted with eggs and fruit by "spontaneously"
> assembled Iraqi mobs. More often than not, the Iraqis would scurry out the rear
> door with their proscribed documents or equipment as Ritter and his staff
> attempted to enter via the front.
>
> Iraqi resistance was only one part of UNSCOM�s problems, however. The prime
> difficulty lay in Washington and at the United Nations. By 1996, China, Russia,
> and France were beginning to tire of sanctions, and were leaning on UNSCOM to
> issue Iraq a clean bill of health. Britain and the U.S. were on the other side.
> This growing rift within the UN did not go unnoticed in Baghdad. With the
> Security Council split, Saddam was in a position to harass the inspectors with
> near-impunity.
>
> In June 1996, the Iraqi dictator signed a secret agreement with the UN, securing
> UNSCOM�s continued presence in Iraq but putting a range of critical facilities
> off-limits. Two years later, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright agreed to yet
> another secret protocol that further hampered Ritter�s work. By August 1998,
> Ritter resigned, issuing his dramatic public protest.
>
> Though he tells a riveting story, and paints throughout a grim picture of the
> Iraqi menace, the prescriptions Ritter draws from his observations and
> experiences are disappointing and ultimately unconvincing. The United States, he
> asserts, has neither the will nor the international support to rid the world of
> Saddam Hussein, or even to contain him indefinitely. Therefore, we would be
> better off cutting a deal. In brief, Ritter proposes replacing the current U.S.
> nonpolicy with a kind of Marshall Plan in which Saddam would agree to recognize
> Israel and an autonomous Kurdistan in exchange for an infusion of aid.
>
> It cannot be denied that there is a kind of surface logic to this view, the more
> so since France, Russia, and other countries have seemed prepared to embrace
> something like it. But the fact is that Ritter�s proposal would merely trade
> material U.S. assistance for yet another round of hollow Iraqi pledges. His
> "deal" would enable Saddam to rebuild Iraq�s once-fearsome military machine,
> rehabilitate him as a legitimate actor in the region, betray Arab allies of ours
> who have steadfastly opposed him, and send a signal of weakness to other
> would-be regional hegemons around the world.
>
> Unfortunately, Ritter does not even weigh these counterarguments, let alone try
> to rebut them. Though his personal strengths, including the bravery he exhibited
> in carrying out his job, shine through in this book, his limits as a political
> analyst are, in the end, no less apparent.
>
> David Wurmser has a better idea. A Middle East specialist at the American
> Enterprise Institute, Wurmser is convinced that our troubles in the region stem
> from an entrenched if unstated belief that Arabs are incapable of democratic
> self-rule, and that centralized dictatorships are therefore a necessary "force
> for stability." A corollary in the case of Iraq is that a unified country is by
> definition preferable to a fractured one.
>
> These are the flawed premises, Wurmser writes, that inform current U.S. policy,
> leading us to seek an end to our troubles in Iraq by means of a "silver-bullet"
> coup that would remove Saddam but preserve the dominant power structure. Such a
> policy, however, promises only the replacement of one brutal despot with
> another, and anyway, after eight years and many failed attempts at a coup, shows
> no chance of succeeding.
>
> Wurmser�s alternative is a broad-based insurgency, one that would pit the Kurds
> in the north and the restive Shiite Muslim population in the south against the
> Sunni Muslims who dominate the state. He himself is a partisan of the Iraqi
> National Congress (INC), the umbrella organization set up in the U.S.-protected
> "safe haven" in the north that has tried to unite Iraq�s various opposition
> groups under a democratic, anti-Saddam banner. In 1995, an INC army undertook to
> march on territory held by Saddam Hussein; it was crushed because the U.S.
> reneged on promises of support. But Wurmser still holds high hopes for the INC,
> provided it can get adequate backing.
>
> Would a more active American policy, centered on fostering an insurgency of the
> kind laid out in Tyranny�s Ally, really do more than provide an attractive way
> of putting pressure on Saddam? There is room for doubt. Maybe an INC army,
> trained and supplied by the United States, would stand a chance against Saddam�s
> vastly superior forces (though most observers, including Ritter, rate its
> chances at nil). Maybe credible Iraqi moderates can be found to bring order out
> of chaos without resorting to the institutionalized violence most Middle Eastern
> states have traditionally relied upon. Maybe a federalized or retribalized Iraq,
> partitioned among Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the center, and Shiites in the
> south, could somehow survive the divide-and-conquer efforts of predatory
> outsiders like Syria and Iran. But that is a lot of maybes. The recent history
> of the region does not inspire tremendous confidence in Wurmser�s scenarios.
>
> Still, whatever its problems, Wurmser�s path is at least a path, as opposed to
> the aimless wandering represented by the Clinton policy. And it has the
> undeniable merit, again in contrast with present policy, of being consonant with
> the principles�an end to tyranny, the forthright promotion of freedom�we have
> successfully stood for elsewhere around the world. Saddam might survive in any
> case, but at a minimum a genuine American effort would have been mounted to rid
> the world of his menace.
>
> Given where we are at the moment, that would assuredly be a net plus. But given
> how wildly American foreign policy has oscillated in the six months that have
> elapsed since Operation Desert Fox, it would seem more unlikely than ever that
> anything even remotely so promising will come to pass.
>
> BRET LOUIS STIPHENS is the assistant editorial-features editor of the Wall
> Street Journal.
A<>E<>R
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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