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WORLD WAR II

Far East and Pacific Theaters

Willoughby


Campbell, Kenneth J. "Major General Charles A. Willoughby: A Mixed
Performance." Text of unpublished paper.



An edited version of this paper was published as: Campbell, Kenneth J.
"Major General Charles A. Willoughby: General MacArthur's G-2 -- A
Biographic Sketch." American Intelligence Journal 18, no. 1/2 (1998):
87-91.



Introduction

This article covers the long career of Major General Charles A
Willoughby in the US Army, where he was G-2 for General Douglas
MacArthur in both the Pacific and Korean Wars. His performance as an
intelligence officer was characterized by both success and failure, but
the latter showed up chiefly in estimation of enemy capabilities and
intentions, which is so crucial to a military commander. General
Willoughby's record indicates the necessity of appointing military
intelligence chiefs who have long experience in this area, not simply
those officers who may be good administrators.

Career

General Willoughby was born as Karl Weidenbach in Heidelberg, Germany,
on 8 March 1892, to Baron T. Scheppe-Weidenbach and his wife Emma from
Baltimore, Maryland, whose maiden name was Willoughby. The father's
family was Junker in origin, according to Willoughby. An article in the
Reporter in 1951, however, claimed that he was the "bastard son of a
ropemaker," though the truth of the matter is difficult to ascertain.(1)
[Frank Kluckhorn, "From Heidelberg to Madrid - The Story of General
Willoughby," The Reporter, August 19, 1952.] At eighteen years of age,
in 1910, Karl came to the United States, where he had relatives. At some
time around 1910, Weidenbach became an American citizen and changed his
name to Charles Andrew Willoughby, thus selecting his mother's surname.
He enlisted in the Regular Army, serving as a private, corporal and
sergeant of Company "O," Fifth US Infantry, from 1910 to 1913. In 1913
Willoughby entered Gettysburg College as a senior, graduating in 1914
with a Bachelor of Arts degree.

His college career raises a curious problem. According to the Department
of Defense, Office of Public Information Press Branch, Willoughby had
taken courses at Heidelberg University in Germany and the Sorbonne in
Paris before he came to the United States at the age of eighteen. Most
young Germans are, and have been, age nineteen when they pass the Abitur
, which is necessary to get into a German university, such as
Heidelberg. Either Willoughby was extremely intelligent, which his later
career does not suggest, and passed this very demanding test at perhaps
seventeen years of age, or something is amiss.

After graduation from Gettysburg College, Willoughby was commissioned a
Second Lieutenant in the Officers' Volunteer Corps of the US Army in
1914. Prior to the time that he entered the Regular Army as an officer,
Willoughby taught in the Howe School, a private institution in Indiana,
and Racine College in Wisconsin in the Modern Languages departments.
Willoughby, commissioned a Second Lieutenant on 27 November 1916, was
also promoted to First Lieutenant on this same day. He was part of the
American Expeditionary Force in World War I from 1917-18, leaving the
United States for France in June 1917 and being promoted to Captain
(permanent) on 30 June 1917. Serving initially with the 16th Infantry,
First Division, he transferred to the US Army Air Corps, where he was
trained as a pilot by the French military. He was next executive to
Major (later General) Carl Spaatz who was then commander of the Aviation
Training Center at Issoudun, France. Willoughby later took command of
the Aviation Branch School at Chateroux, this posting lasting until May
1918. Major Willoughby was then sent back to America to develop the
first Aerial Mail Service, but left that position in December 1918 to
return to the Infantry where he assumed command of demonstration machine
gun units at Ft. Benning (Georgia).

In the early 1920s, Willoughby visited Morocco, where the Spanish were
fighting guerrillas in the Rif, at which time he met General Francisco
Franco of the Spanish Army, whom he strongly admired. (2) [D. Clayton
James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-64 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 54.] Having served in several US Army posts
in this period, Willoughby was assigned in 1923 to the Military
Intelligence Division on a temporary basis to prepare himself for
assignment as military attache in an American embassy abroad. He served
successfully with the American Embassies or Legations in Venezuela,
Columbia, and Ecuador, receiving decorations from the governments of
Venezuela and Ecuador. While serving as an attache, he published his
first book, House of Bolivar, a study of the Latin American
soldier-statesman Simon Bolivar. In May 1927 Willoughby was assigned to
Ft. D.A. Russell, Wyoming, once again serving in the Infantry and being
promoted to Major (permanent) on 6 March 1928. In September 1928 he was
sent to Ft. Benning to attend the advanced course of the Infantry
School, graduating in June 1929. His military education was enhanced by
graduation from Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth in
June of 1931, a two-year course, after which he became an instructor in
intelligence and military history at this institution.

In his 1931 book, The Economic and Military Participation of the United
States in the World War, Willoughby carefully covered the American
involvement in various battles of this conflict, supplemented by useful
maps, along with such topics as mobilization, clothing and equipment of
the army, and other supply problems. (3) [Charles A. Willoughby, The
Economic and Military Participation of the United States in the World
War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School, 1931).]
Despite the richness of his detail and statistics in all of these areas,
Willoughby failed to come to any firm conclusions at the end of the
book, which reflects the fact he had not mastered the art of the
historian. However, he did enter a graduate program at the University of
Kansas in 1933, though he did not obtain a graduate degree from the
university. Major Willoughby entered the US Army War College in
Washington, DC, in 1935, graduating in June 1936. At the end of the
Spanish Civil war, probably in 1938, he visited Spain and later referred
to its dictator, Francisco Franco, as the "second greatest general in
the world," General Douglas MacArthur being the greatest in his
pantheon. (4) [James, op. cit., p. 54.] In 1936, Charles Willoughby was
assigned back to Ft. Benning where he served as an instructor in the
Infantry School.

Willoughby was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel (permanent) on 1 June
1938, and his book, Maneuver in Warfare, appeared in 1939. (5) [Charles
A. Willoughby, Maneuver in Warfare (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service
Publishing Co., 1939).] Willoughby had been thorough in his preparation
for the writing of this book, even reading German regimental histories.
Lt. Col. Willoughby showed himself capable of thinking in broad
strategic terms. For example, he believed that an embargo placed upon
Japan would induce the Japanese military to attempt to seize the Dutch
East Indies, Indo-China, the Philippines, and Malaya in the quest for
oil, iron ore, tin, and rubber. (6) [Ibid., p. 229.] This is exactly
what happened in 1941 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt limited the
amount of gas and oil exported to Japan. However, Willoughby's lack of
scholarly sophistication comes through in this volume. For example, he
wrote of the German Chief of the General Staff, Count Alfred von
Schlieffen in these terms:

There is no doubt that in the evolution of this plan one is in the
presence of a superior mind -- perhaps a genius. (7) [Ibid., p. 121.]

In his 1939 book, Lt. Col. Willoughby tended to write in areas where he
was no competent, such as economics, which diminished his generally
excellent analysis of maneuver warfare. For example, he wrote of Japan:

...it may as well be acknowledged that under this heading Japan assumes
the role of champion of the capitalistic and monetary economy. (8) [
Ibid., p. 197.]

This statement is nonsense, written by a man deficient in economics, yet
willing to discuss it. (9) [The author of this article taught economics
at the college level for thirty years, which is thirty years more than
Charles A. Willoughby taught this subject.] In June 1940 he was
reassigned to Headquarters, Philippine Department, Manila, as Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-4 (logistics). This assignment was based partly on his
fluency in Spanish, a result of Willoughby's prior experience as a
military attache in South America. In Manila he became friends with
General MacArthur, then Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, who
appreciated Willoughby's use of military history at Ft. Leavenworth.
Willoughby transferred to MacArthur's command in mid-1941, after the
latter became commander of the new United States Far Eastern Command.
Willoughby at the time was named Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence of the US Army Forces in the Far East and was promoted to
Colonel (temporary) on 14 October 1941. When war with Japan broke out on
December 7, 1941, Willoughby fought under General MacArthur and was with
him on Corregidor, when the Japanese were closing in on the American
forces. Colonel Willoughby was fortunate enough to come out of the
Philippines with MacArthur's group in March 1942 on a PT boat to
Australia, where the latter set up a new command.

Willoughby Faces A New Challenge

On 19 April 1942 MacArthur announced that Colonel Charles A. Willoughby
was G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, of the General
Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). He was promoted to
Brigadier General (temporary) on 20 June 1942. This new responsibility
was a huge challenge, because Willoughby was severely hampered not only
by his own weak background in intelligence, but also by limited means
for collecting intelligence in this part of the world. The informational
base for the establishment of an intelligence system was simply lacking,
which required General Willoughby to "begin from scratch." For example,
geographic, topographic, and hydrographic data on New Guinea and
adjacent areas were obsolete, false, or didn't exist. Further, there was
 little, if any, organizational base on which an intelligence chief
could expand to meet his new tasks, which only added to Willoughby's
problems. (10) [D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: 1941-1945
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), p. 178.]

Organizations Established. Most importantly, General Willoughby set up
the Central Bureau, a cryptological unit in his intelligence system
which engaged in code-breaking and "reading the enemy's mail." This
group added considerably to various Allied victories in the Southwest
Pacific by indicating to field commanders both Japanese capabilities and
intentions. This organization was under Lt. Col. Spencer B. Akin, who
had extensive experience before the war as a signals officer with the US
Army in Panama. The new material from the Central Bureau went to
Willoughby, who analyzed it, but it was Brigadier General (later Major
General) Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, who decided
whether General MacArthur would see these results. In July 1942
Willoughby set up the Allied Geographical Section to collect, evaluate,
and disseminate geographical information. This section eventually
distributed 200,000 copies of its

...110 terrain studies, sixty-two terrain handbooks, and 101 special
reports on all phases of SPA geography. (11) [Ibid., p. 179.]

In June 1942 General MacArthur ordered Willoughby to form an apparatus
to work underground in the Philippines, stressing operations to destroy
Japanese facilities. This organization, the Allied Intelligence Bureau
(AIB) set up in July 1942, was also to conduct propaganda with the
object of demoralizing Japanese troops and to give courage to the people
under their brutal control. AIB has coastwatchers, including those from
the Royal Australian Navy system, who were inserted behind enemy lines
with radio transmitters for communications with the American and
Australian military. Their information frequently aided Allied planes to
be off the ground to meet attacking Japanese aircraft and also passed on
information on Japanese ship movements. The AIB also collected
information in occupied territories and encouraged guerrilla resistance
movements. Though General Willoughby was ultimately responsible for
resistance in the Philippines, daily operations were under the control
of Colonel Allison Ind.

General Willoughby created the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section
(ATIS) in September 1942 which, under the leadership of Col. Sidney F.
Mashbir who was fluent in Japanese, made significant contributions to
the Allied war effort. By the end of the war, Mashbir's unit, which
included over 4,000 Nisei (Japanese-Americans) as interpreters and
translators would have interviewed

...over 14,000 prisoners and published more than twenty million pages of
enemy documents. (12) [Ibid., pp. 178-179]

Although most of the families of these Nisei had been interned in the
United States at the beginning of the war, these young men gave
invaluable services to the United States Army units fighting against the
Japanese. Willoughby also organized an Order of Battle Section in August
1942, whose purpose was to locate various Japanese units, assess their
leadership and morale, weapons, effectiveness, and mission. (13) [Edward
J. Drea, MacArthur's Ultra (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press,
1992), p. 22.] Willoughby's organizational accomplishments were most
impressive, when one realizes that, despite his limited experience in
intelligence, he created a vast intelligence organization from nothing
in a relatively short period of time.

Willoughby's Estimates

When we consider Willoughby's difficulties in estimation in various
campaigns in New Guinea and the Philippines, it becomes clear that his
total performance in World War II was indeed a mixed one, reflecting
considerable accomplishment in organizational matters, but serious flaws
in the estimation of enemy capabilities and intentions.

New Guinea. MacArthur's strategy in New Guinea was to capture a Japanese
weak point with minimal losses, construct an airfield at this site, and
then to use air power to cut off supplies to Japanese troops who had
been bypassed. Willoughby's basic task in estimation was to identify
these weak spots and to clarify their capabilities.

On 21 April 1942 Commander Edwin T. Layton predicted a Japanese
offensive in New Guinea, pointing to the possibility of an attack on
Port Moresby with the objective of cutting off Australia from American
troops and supplies. (14) [Ibid., p. 36] General Willoughby received
basically the same information as Layton, but came to a different
assessment. Willoughby believed the Japanese planned to occupy the
northeast coast of Australia, but shortly thereafter, reversing himself,
predicted a Japanese landing at Port Moresby which is near Australia. On
7 May 1942, when the Japanese Combined Fleet was moving toward Port
Moresby, an American carrier force intercepted it, and the Coral Sea
battle commenced. Although this battle was largely a draw, it was the
first time the American fleet had been able to withstand a Japanese
naval attack and to force it back.

On 13 July 1942 Willoughby predicted that the Japanese would engage in
large-scale troop movements near Buna or Milne Bay, but within three
days, he again reversed himself, now claiming that the Japanese merely
wished to reinforce present concentrations of troops. In 1942 US Naval
Intelligence deciphered a message which revealed that Japanese troops
would land at Buna on 21 July 1942 with the goal of moving over the Owen
Stanley mountain range to Port Moresby, since their naval approach to
this objective had been frustrated in the Battle of the Coral Sea. On 18
July Willoughby reported to General MacArthur that a convoy of Japanese
troop ships was headed toward Lea or Buna in New Guinea, or Guadalcanal,
not a very precise warning. When Japanese troops landed at Buna on 22
July 1942, General Willoughby doubted the possibility of a Japanese
advance over the Owen Stanley mountains in view of the dense jungle in
this area [Ibid., p. 43] and believed that the Japanese leadership had
seized Buna simply to get an air base in this strategically important
area. However, in his 1954 book on General MacArthur, Willoughby implied
that he, not US Naval Intelligence, had assessed the situation
correctly, writing:

There remained the overland threat to Moresby: intelligence reports soon
made it plain to MacArthur that the Japanese planned to cross the 14,000
foot Owen Stanleys along the Kokoda Trail. (16) [Charles A. Willoughby,
MacArthur, 1941-45 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 86.]

General Willoughby also believed that Japanese reconnaissance flights
over the Milne Bay region were a prelude to an amphibious operation
against this new Allied air base, which turned out to be correct. (17)
[Drea, op. cit., p. 44.] As a result, MacArthur reinforced the Milne Bay
base to nearly 10,000 troops. (18) [Ibid., p. 45.] On the night of 24-25
August 1942, the Japanese landed their troops at Milne Bay, but, due to
the severe American response, they later had to evacuate thier troops
from this area.

Having blunted the Japanese attack across the Owen Stanley mountains
towards Port Moresby, General MacArthur planned an attack on their
launcing point, Buna, in order to cut off their retreat, as Australian
troops punched the Japanese back. Willoughby estimated that the Japanese
defenders at Buna numbered somewhere between 1,500-2,000 troops,
believing their only capability was that of a delaying action. When
Allied troops landed at Buna on 19 November 1942, they found something
entirely different from what Willoughby had foreseen. They faced
reinforcements, altogether about 3,500 rested Japanese troops with
orders to fight fanatically to their death. (19) [Ibid., p. 52] Once
again, Willoughby was wrong in his estimates.

However, General Willoughby and his organization did make several
important estimates which were important contributions to Allied
victories in SWPA. For example, Allied aerial reconnaissance of Rabaul
Harbor on 22 February 1943 identified 59 Japanese merchant vessels at
anchor at Rabaul. (20) [Ibid., p. 69] In assessing this material,
Willoughby decided that in consideration of the inactivity in the
Soloman Islands, these ships could be used by the Japanese to reinforce
their strongholds in New Guinea. Willoughby narrowed down his estimation
to assert that the destination of these ships was Lae, which enabled
Major General Joseph C. Kenney, commander of the US Army Air Force in
SWPA (Fifth Air Force) to set in motion the destruction of the convoy
from Rabaul Harbor. Kenney's forces destroyed the main body of this
convoy, killing approximately 3,000 enemy troops, (21) [Ibid., p. 71.]
sinking seven out of eight transports and four destroyers, and knocking
out 25 Japanese planes. American losses in this attack were only "two
bombers and three fighters." (22) [Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper
Encyclopedia of Military Biography (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 1995), p.
399.]

Before the Finschafen invasion, Willoughby declared in early September
1943 that the base [was] lightly defended, having only about 350 men.
(23) [Drea, op. cit., p. 87.] By October 1943, Gen. Eizo Yamada's
defenses had been increased to approximately 5,400 troops, who fiercely
fought the Allied invasion. (24) [Ibid., pp. 87-88.] In his book on
MacArthur, Willoughby glided over his error, (25) [Willoughby, MacArthur
, pp. 130-131.] not even discussing the matter.

As MacArthur's forces prepared for the invasion of the Admiralties on 29
February 1944, Willoughby reported 4,000 Japanese troops in this area,
although General Kenney maintained there were very few enemy soldiers on
this target area. (26) [Drea, op. cit., p. 102.] Because of the speed of
World War II planes, air reconnaissance did not produce an accurate []
estimate of enemy troops, a difficult job under the best of
circumstances, and in this instance the Japanese commander had taken
care to hide his troops from American planes. The Japanese actually had
3,646 troops in the Admiralties (27) [Ibid., p. 103] , though such a
precise calculation might be difficult to defend. General Willoughby did
produce a reasonably correct estimate in this particular situation.

Willoughby's Central Bureau had broken various Japanese codes, thereby
learning that Hollandia was not adequately defended. Allied codebreakers
also learned that Japanese military leaders expected an invasion off the
Madang-Hansa Bay area, which they could capably defend, though by now
Japanese military leaders should have known that General MacArthur
tended to avoid such garrisons. Willoughby suggested in February 1944
that the Allied invade Hollandia, thereby bypassing the Madang-Hansa Bay
stronghold, a possibility which MacArthur and his staff accepted.
General Willoughby also recommended that the Allies reinforce Japanese
expectations of an Allied invasion of the Madang-Hansa Bay area through
various means of deception. Among the deception techniques utilized, for
example, were the placing of rubber boats on the beaches of the
Madang-Hansa Bay region, which suggested pre-invasion intelligence
forays, and having B-25s bomb this area more heavily. The Allied landing
at Hollandia occurred on 22 April 1944, which attained relatively
complete surprise. Just before the assault, the Central Bureau estimated
the Hollandia to be defended by roughly 22,000 Japanese troops, but
there were actually 16,000. (28) [Ibid., p. 115.] This was not a crucial
mistake on the part of G-2, because General Willoughby had correctly
estimated these defenders to be mainly service, base construction, base
defense, and air service units.

In April 1944 MacArthur sent the 41st Army Division to invade the
Wakde-Sarmi region, another step in his mission to liberate the
Philippines. On 28 April 1944 General Willoughby estimated that the
Japanese had 6,050-6,750 troops at Wakde-Sarmi, of which 3,950-6,650
were combat troops. (29) [Ibid., p. 126.] There were actually 11,000
Japanese soldiers defending the area, including 6,000 combat troops,
indicating that G-2's error was probably not grossly destabilizing for
the Allied invaders. (30) [Ibid., p. 127.]

General MacArthur decided to invade Biak island on 27 May 1944, although
Willoughby had been against this move because of the danger that the
relatively small American fleet nearby might be defeated by a
potentially larger Japanese naval contingent in the vicinity. Although
Willoughby estimated in May 1944 that there were 5,000-7,000 Japanese
troops on Biak, there were actually 12,350 troops there, and many of
these were in caves where they were especially difficult to kill. (31) [
Ibid., p. 135.] Willoughby had been aware of Biak's topography and the
advantage it gave to the defense. (32) [Stephen R. Taaffee, MacArthur's
Jungle War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, p. 147.] The
American seizure of Biak encountered a stern Japanese defense. This
inaccurate estimate was a major factor accounting for General
MacArthur's expectation of a quick victory and consequent pressure on
General Walter Krueger and Lt. General Robert Eichelberger to speed up
conquest of the island. In his 1954 book on MacArthur, Willoughby
skipped over this intelligence failure, in this way attempting to hide
his blunder. (33) [Willoughby, MacArthur, op. cit., pp. 188-190.]

Although the landing at Hollandia had gone relatively smoothly,
complications from this action arose in July 1944 because of the
tenacity and skill of the Japanese commander, Lt. General Adachi Hatazo,
Commander of the 18th Army. MacArthur had outflanked Lt. General Adachi,
who was then in the Wewak region where the next major American blow was
expected. Not to be defeated, Adachi moved his troops towards Aitape,
which is approximately between Wewak and Hollandia. General Willoughby
believed that it made better sense for Adachi to bypass Aitape and
strike directly at Hollandia, which, in Western war colleges, might have
been recommended by many strategists. This is also an excellent example
of mirror-imaging, the belief that one;s enemy has the same basic thoug
ht processes, values, and military intelligence as oneself, despite the
fact that Adachi was clearly from a different culture. Willoughby was
convinced that because Adachi's 18th Army was in all likelihood
exhausted, lacking in supplies, and having to cope with the jungle, they
could nor present a major threat to either Aitape or Hollandia.
Nevertheless, ULTRA, air reconnaissance, POW interrogation -- all
indicated that Adachi was preparing an attack on Aitape. (34) [Drea, op.
cit., p. 147.]

However, in June 1944 Willoughby began to warn of a Japanese attack on
Aitape, predicting it would occur in late June or July. (35) [Taaffe,
op. cit., p. 191.] On 10 July 1944 Willoughby reported that Adachi had
possibly delayed his attack so that he could get additional supplies
from submarines, but on that night, 10,000 raging Japanese attacked the
American stronghold at Aitape. (36) [Drea, op. cit., p. 150.] One result
of this Japanese surprise was that a month-long battle followed along
the Driniumor river where the Americans suffered approximately 3,000
casualties, with 400 killed-in-action. (37) [Ibid.] Although Willoughby
claimed that Adachi's attack had not been a surprise, he had made a
serious mistake and then tried to cover it up, stating in a Daily
Summary of 12/13 July 1944:

>From the accumulated intelligence, it can be seen how logically the
attack was built up and reported, giving us a very clear picture of the
enemy's plan of attack prior to it actually being scheduled. (38)
[Taaffe, op. cit., p. 200.]

Campaign in the Philippines. The Allied invasion of the island of Leyte
began on 20 October 1944. On 31 October-1 November Willoughby declared
that it was unlikely that the Japanese would send any "sizable" merchant
ships into the area in view of American air bases now on Leyte. (39)
 [Drea, op. cit., p. 168.] However, at roughly the time this
intelligence was being distributed, the Japanese Army was unloading
11,000 soldiers at Ormoc on Leyte, it leadership persuaded by
exaggerated Japanese naval reports of alleged victories at Leyte Gulf
and the consequent likelihood of MacArthur's force being wiped out in
this campaign. (40) [Ibid.] Once again, Willoughby was mirror-imaging,
assuming that the enemy had the same thought patterns and intelligence
as himself.

In December 1944 as General MacArthur prepared for the invasion of
Luzon, General Willoughby estimated that there were 137,000 Japanese
troops on Luzon, a gross underestimate since the true statistic was more
likely 276,000. (41) [Ibid., p. 182.] Both MacArthur and Willoughby
discounted the possibility of a fanatical Japanese defense of Manila,
though it is not clear on what basis this mistaken assumption was made.
On 1 January 1945 the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) instructed
Filipino guerrillas on Luzon to destroy infrastructure and blow up
Japanese military facilities, a prelude to a general uprising to
coincide with the approaching Allied invasion of this island. On 9
January 1945 American troops invaded Luzon.

On 17 March 1945 Willoughby was promoted to Major General (temporary),
though with the coming of peace in August 1945, he moved back to
Brigadier General (temporary) on 31 May 1946, but this latter rank was
made permanent on 24 January 1948. On the same day, Willoughby moved up
to Major General (temporary) again.

Occupation of Japan: A Detour into Counterintelligence

Upon the surrender of Japan in 1945 and General MacArthur's having
become Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in this defeated
nation, Willoughby remained as his G-2. At this time, General Willoughby
was required by circumstances to focus his efforts into another aspect
of intelligence for which he was not well prepared --
counterintelligence. His had to concentrate his investigations into the
activities of Japanese repatriates from Soviet POW camps, some 95,000 of
whom were probably Communists sent back by Soviet authorities to form
the nucleus of a Japanese Communist Party. (42) [Willoughby, MacArthur,
op. cit., p. 320] To counter this threat, Willoughby, creative in an
organizational sense, set up a new Civil Intelligence Section and relied
upon the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) to collect information
on subversive activity. (43) [Ibid., p. 322.]

>From various sources of information, General Willoughby suspected
Herbert Norman, representing Canada's Ministry of External Affairs and
attached to the US Army CIC unit of the Office of General Headquarters
in Tokyo, of being a Communist or even a Soviet agent. Norman was at
this post from only October 1945 to January 1946, when General
Willoughby was able to remove him. (44) [Although the arguments for and
against Norman as a Communist agent are numerous, a book by James Barros
gives perhaps the strongest grounds for believing that Norman was a
likely Soviet intelligence agent and should have been removed from his
sensitive position at the Office of General Headquarters. See Barros's
No Sense of Evil (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1986.]

With the Gouzenko revelations in 1945, (45) [Igor Gouzenko was a cipher
clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, before he defected in 1945 to the
West. He brought considerable material to Western intelligence officers
about Soviet penetration in Canada, the United States, and Great
Britain.] Willoughby sent a report on the Richard Sorge spy ring to the
FBI in October 1947, claiming that an American, Agnes Smedley, had been
a member of the Sorge ring. (46) [Janice R. and Stephen R. MacKinnon,
Agnes Smedley (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), pp.
317-318.] In April 1948, J. Edgar Hoover, longtime Director of the FBI,
saw this 64-page report about the Sorge espionage cell and Smedley's
role in it, and stated

It is readily apparent that the author of the report was involved with
motives to the detriment of facts regarding the operations of the Sorge
group. (47) [Ibid., p. 322.]

Despite the rebuff and warning that this evidence would not likely be
accepted in a legal context, the US Army on 10 February 1949 used
Willoughby's report to accuse Agnes Smedley of having been a member of
the Sorge spy ring. Nevertheless, on 18 February 1949, the Army publicly
apologized to Smedley and withdrew its charges. (48) [Ibid., p. 327.]
This humiliation impelled Willoughby to spend considerable time in 1949
tracking down information on her association with the Sorge group, which
he presented to the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1951 (bee
below). However, Willoughby's attack on Agnes Smedley's espionage
activity did have one beneficial effect -- it brought the Sorge case,
and therefore the menace of Communist espionage, to the attention of the
American media. Recently published Comintern documents indicate that
Smedley was part of that organization's work in China. She was

...so close to many figures in the Sorge ring: She had a love affair
with Sorge himself while he was in Shanghai. (49) [Harvey Klehr, John E.
Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American
Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 61.]

Further, when she was in China, the American Communist leader, Earl
Browder, urged the Comintern to assist Smedley so that she could publish
an "anti-imperialist" newspaper, stating:

The CPUSA [Communist Party of the USA] can provide her with helpers,
politically and technically qualified. The Chinese comrades agree....
(50) [Ibid., p. 63.]

General Willoughby may not have had the evidence to satisfy US Army
authorities in Washington, DC in 1949, but he was on the right track.

Because Richard Sorge had admitted that Agnes Smedley was in his
espionage group (see below), Willoughby insisted in 1950 that the
Japanese had not used torture to gain confessions from either Sorge or
his agents. He attempted to prove this contention by persuading former
Japanese police officers and prosecutors to deny in written affidavits
that they had tortured suspects. (51) [However, six former members of
this ring did die in prison. These included Branko Voukelitch, Miyagi
Yotoku, Kawamura Yoshio, Funakoshi Hisao, Mizuno Shigeru and Richard
Sorge. See Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 182.] If anyone did torture members
of the Sorge ring, it would have been these Japanese police officers.
Willoughby's evidence was very "thin."

In 1950 General MacArthur ordered Willoughby to be Editor-in-Chief of a
history of his Pacific campaign, which was published in 1966 in four
volumes, The Reports of General MacArthur. (52) [Charles A. Willoughby,
ed.,The Reports of General MacArthur (Washington, DC: US Army, 1966.] It
was also during this period that General Willoughby directed the writing
of a General Intelligence Series, which focused on the Pacific War. (53)
[Charles A. Willoughby, ed.,General Intelligence Series (General
Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Military Intelligence
Section, General Staff).] In both these works, there was no mention of
his numerous errors in estimation in the Pacific conflict, and because
these publications were under his direction, we can only conclude that
Willoughby was responsible for these distortions. This is hardly
commendable in a military officer, who, as a leader of soldiers, is
required by his profession to function by the concept of honor.

Estimates Again: The Korean War

The United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
[KMAG], not General MacArthur's headquarters, was responsible for
obtaining intelligence on Korea in the postwar era. Nonetheless,
Willoughby set up a small intelligence unit in Korea, called the Korean
Liaison Office. There were other American intelligence groups at work in
the Korean peninsula from 1948-50. For example, in 1950 the newly
created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had its agents in Korea and so
did the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the counterintelligence
sector of the United States Air Force. One OSI intelligence officer,
Special Agent Donald Nichols, had his own agents throughout Korea who,
among other tasks, were to give warning of any possible North Korean
attack on South Korea. (54) [Edward J. Hagerty, The OSI Story: A 50-Year
Retrospective (Washington, DC: Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, 1997), pp. 82-89.] In February or March of 1950 Nichols
reported that the North's invasion of South Korea was likely to occur
very soon, also identifying the routes to be taken by invading forces, a
coup for which General Willoughby "unofficially" reprimanded Nichols'
commanding officer for passing on such, in his eyes, questionable
information.

On 10 March 1950 General Willoughby reported the possibility of North
Korean invasion of South Korea in June of that year. However, he also
reported in late March 1950 that war would not occur in Korea that
spring or summer, though his "Daily Intelligence Summaries" from this
period do suggest the possibility of a North Korean invasion. For
example, Willoughby reported in May 1950 that there was a "rapid buildup
of North Korean tank units close to the frontier," (55) [Goulden, op.
cit., p. 40.] which many analysts would describe as strongly indicative
of hostile intentions in Pyongyang. This information was expanded in
late May 1950 to specify that there were approximately 180 medium and
light tanks in this force, backed by 10,000 officers and men. (56) [
Ibid.] This should have been sufficient to alert both General Willoughby
and the G-2 in Washington that a North Korean invasion was a distinct
possibility, unless there officers believed that the tanks were part of
a planned good-will tour by the North Koreans leadership in the South.
After the invasion occurred, General Willoughby maintained that his
warnings of a North Korean invasion were adequate, but were ignored by
the G-2 in Washington, though his reversal in prediction in early 1950
could not have enhanced his credibility. D. Clayton James has speculated
that Willoughby's estimates on the Korean situation did not receive much
interest in Washington, because in June 1949, South Korea had been
declared outside of MacArthur's Far East Command. (57) [D. Clayton
James, Years of MacArthur, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985),
p. 416.] James pointed out further that Willoughby's obstreperous
behavior in dealing with the World War II Office of Strategic Services
and its successor CIA, as well as State Department intelligence units,
had not endeared him to these people, thus implying their propensity to
ignore someone whom they thoroughly disliked. (58) [Ibid.]

When the North Korean invasion did occur, American troops were rushed to
the aid of South Korea, but the performance of the US Eighth Army was
anything but satisfactory, as they and South Korean troops were quickly
pushed back by the North Korean army. MacArthur was shocked by his
troops' poor showing in the early part of this war. His staff, which
included Willoughby, had shielded him before the outbreak of hostilities
from evidence suggesting that Eighth Army's combat readiness was not
adequate. (59) [D. Clayton James, Refighting the Last War (New York:
Free Press, 1993), p. 43.] Why didn't General MacArthur observe the
performance of his troops in various exercises in Japan? Perhaps to
maintain his remoteness from the Japanese, as their emperors had done,
MacArthur had seldom ventured outside of his apartment in Tokyo, except
to go to his General Headquarters. Once the North's attack had occurred,
Willoughby provided specialists to the Eighth Army, who could
interrogate POWs, translate documents, and perform cryptanalysis. He
also established a Joint Special Operations staff to collate and
integrate information from all of the American intelligence agencies
concerned, including the CIA, to produce military intelligence.

When the United Nations (UN) forces which Eighth Army had become part
of, were cornered by the North Koreans in the Pusan Perimeter, General
MacArthur conceived of an amphibious landing at Inchon behind the enemy
to cut off their supply lines and to envelope them. In planning this
highly successful operation from the intelligence perspective,
Willoughby predicted quite accurately that the enemy had about 2,000
troops in and around Inchon. (60) [James, Years of MacArthur, 1941-1945,
op. cit., p. 475.] Lt. General Edward M. Almond insisted that Lt. Col.
(later Lt. General) William W. Quinn, an assistant operations officer,
be the G-2 for this venture, since he had experience in the intelligence
requirements for amphibious warfare. Having a list of other colonels
whom he thought could do the job, Willoughby went into a tirade and
tried to prevent Quinn's selection, an example of the outbursts which
often alienated Willoughby from other officers. (61) [Telephone
conversation with Lt. General William W. Quinn, (Ret.), on February 10,
1998. Quinn had been G-2 for Major General Alexander M. Patch, Jr., in
Operation ANVIL, the Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944.]

Before the Chinese Communists came into the Korean War in late 1950,
Willoughby's Far East Command intelligence, the CIA, and State
Department intelligence, along with Chinese Nationalist intelligence,
had all been reporting since approximately April 1950 that the Red
Chinese were moving large numbers of troops from south China towards the
north, probably to Manchuria. (62) [James, Refighting the Last War, op.
cit., p. 184.] On 21 September 1950 General Willoughby assessed the
number of Chinese troops in Manchuria to be roughly 450,000. (63) [James
F. Schnabel, Politics and Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC:
United States Army, 1973), p. 199.] A CIA report of 12 October 1950
ended by saying that Chinese Communist entry into the Korean War,
although a "possibility," was "not probable in 1950." (64) [James,
Refighting the Last War, op. cit., p. 188.] Willoughby's report of 14
October 1950 took an entirely reasonable view of the assessment of
potential enemy intentions at a national level:

The decision is beyond the purview of combat intelligence; it is a
decision for war on the highest level, i.e., by the Kremlin and Peiping.
(65) [Ibid.]

Although Willoughby thus recognized that the responsibility for
determining the political intentions of the Chinese government rested
with the CIA and State Department, he nevertheless did try to predict
Chinese intentions. On 28 October 1950 Willoughby stated:

>From a tactical standpoint, with victorious United States divisions in
full deployment, it would appear that the auspicious time for
intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such
a move, if planned would have been postponed to a time when remnant
North Korean forces have been reduced to a low point of effectiveness.
(66) [Schnabel, op. cit., pp. 233-234.]

This is mirror-imaging, a weakness that Willoughby had demonstrated in
his estimates in the Pacific War, as when, for example, he tried to
guess General Adachi's intentions from what seemed to him, General
Willoughby, to be rational. He had repeated a serious error, failing to
learn from experience, which can be highly dangerous in an intelligence
officer.

In early November 1950, roughly forty Chinese soldiers had been captured
during several weeks of combat. During interrogation, many of these
troops correctly identified their units and gave reasonably accurate
information on the large number of Chinese Communist soldiers who had
already crossed the Yalu. (67) [James, The Years of MacArthur, 1954-64,
op. cit., p. 519.] On 2 November 1950 General Willoughby estimated that
16,500 Chinese soldiers were in North Korea, and about 516,000 regulars
and 274,000 irregular troops were in Manchuria. (68) [Ibid.] The CIA was
not concerned with the above information, rating these reports in the
F-6 category, which meant that neither the content nor the source was
taken very seriously by their analysts. (69) [Ibid.] On 5 November 1950
General Willoughby warned that the Chinese Communist forces had the
capability of launching an attack at any time. (70) [Schnabel, op. cit.,
pp. 241.] On 10 November 1950 Willoughby's intelligence summary, a
reversal of his 28 October report, predicted an "all out" Chinese attack
on UN forces. (71) [Goulden, op. cit., pp. 327.] On 15 November
Willoughby reported:

Information received from Chinese Nationalist military sources ... gives
strong support to an assumption that the Chinese Communists intend to
"throw the book" at United Nations forces in Korea.... It is fast
becoming apparent that an excessive number of troops are entering
Northeast China....(72) [Schnabel, op. cit., pp. 276.]

Willoughby's interrogations of Chinese troops continued right up until
26 November 1950, when Chinese forces under Lin Piao struck UN forces.
General MacArthur had ignored Willoughby's latest warnings, (73)
[Goulden, op. cit., pp. 329.] much to the peril of UN forces, a failure
for which large segments of the media unfairly blamed Willoughby.

On 10 April 1951 President Harry S. Truman dismissed General MacArthur,
essentially for exceeding his authority as a military commander and
becoming insubordinate to his Commander-in-Chief. (74) [This issue is
very complex and will not be covered in this article.] Lt. General
(later General) Matthew B. Ridgeway, MacArthur's replacement, saw
Willoughby as a "very fine Chief of Intelligence," but Willoughby was
tired, having been MacArthur's G-2 during the war in the Pacific,
fighting Japanese Communists immediately after the war in the occupation
of that country, and then being thrust again into military intelligence
in the Korean War. Furthermore, he had been roughly treated in the media
for his alleged failure to predict the North Korean invasion of South
Korea and the entry of Chinese forces into this conflict. By his own
choice, he returned to America in 1951, ending a career in the US Army
which began in 1910. He had served 41 years in the military, the last 10
under great stress, when he was no longer a young man.

Retirement

On 9 August 1951, General Willoughby testified before a Senate Committee
(75) [U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee of the Judiciary. Subcommittee to
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Security Laws. 1951. Testimony of Charles A. Willoughby, Major General,
Chief of Intelligence, Far East Command and United Nations Command. 82d
Cong., 1st sess., pp. 353-401.] in reference to the investigation of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, whose scope of operations had included
Japan. At this hearing, Willoughby repeated his espionage charges
against Agnes Smedley, maintaining that she had been a member of the
Sorge spy ring. (76) [Ibid., p. 359] This could nor result in legal
action against him, since she had died on 6 May 1950. However, he did
not present evidence to support this allegation, but simply quoted the
opinion of the attorneys who had examined the evidence against Smedley.

On 22 August 1951 General Willoughby appeared before a House Committee,
(77) [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. 1951.
Hearings on American Aspects of the Richard Sorge Spy Case. 82d Cong.,
1st sess., pp. 1161-1194.] where his testimony focused on Agnes Smedley
and the Sorge espionage organization. His testimony unfortunately
included some "purple" language, phrases such as "traveling dupes and
befuddled liberals," (78) [Ibid.] which enables left-wing academics
today to describe Willoughby as a right-wing fanatic. On the other hand,
General Willoughby presented publicly serious evidence of Agnes
Smedley's involvement in both the Richard Sorge espionage ring and
Chinese Communist activities. He quoted the following from Sorge's
confession to Japanese authorities:

...I felt most at ease when we met at Smedley's home.... (79) [Ibid., p.
1176.]

and

She was an American and a correspondent of the German newspaper
Frankfurter Zeitung. She was used in Shanghai by me as a direct member
of my group. (80) [Ibid., p. 1178.]

The December 1951 issue of Cosmopolitan published Willoughby's
incendiary article criticizing much of the media reports on the Korean
War for allegedly revealing important United Nations military
information and unjustly criticizing its forces. General MacArthur wrote
a foreword to the article, claiming that it exposed "one of the most
scandalous propaganda efforts to pervert the truth in recent times."
(81) [D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 1945-1964, op. cit., p.
668.] In 1954 General Willoughby's book, MacArthur: 1941-1951, was
published. It was characterized by a clear presentation of General
MacArthur's strategy in the Pacific campaign, but marred by his
adulation of MacArthur. For example, he described General MacArthur in
such terms as these:

The incomparable virtue of the MacArthur strategy.... (82) [Charles A.
Willoughby, MacArthur: 1941-1951, op. cit., p. 10.]

and

This master craftsman.... (83) [Ibid., p. 11.]

and made such claims as:

...General Douglas MacArthur held the name of Bataan as a shining beacon
star in his mind. (84) [Ibid., p. 20.]

and stated that Douglas MacArthur was

...a character whose nobility and modesty have at times been so wantonly
misrepresented. (85) [Ibid., p. 263.]

General MacArthur was, without doubt, a very fine general, but to
describe him in the above terms requires much more evidence than
Willoughby presented in this book.

In his later years, General Willoughby was editor of the Foreign
Intelligence Digest. Willoughby died in Naples, Florida, in October 1972
at the age of 80. Willoughby received the Silver Star in April 1942 for
"gallantry in action" on Bataan, the Distinguished Cross in 1943 for
heroism in the fighting in New Guinea, the Distiguished Service Medal in
1944 for his organizational work in setting up the intelligence service
in SWPA and received an Oak Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Service
Medal in 1946 for javing directed Allied intelligence activity in SWPA
during World War II. He had also been decorated by several foreign
governments.

Evaluation of Willoughby as an Intelligence Chief

Organizer:

In a very short time period, General Willoughby created a coordinated
and effective intelligence system from nothing. He began with very
little information, especially geographical, on the South West Pacific,
and had to train officers and men in intelligence, an area largely
neglected by the US Army during the Interwar Period, This task, which he
accomplished in a competent manner, was a daunting challenge for anyone.

Estimates in World War II:

In 1942, at the beginning of World War II, General Willoughby reversed
himself twice, something not unexpected in a person new on the job.
However, Willoughby made nine badly flawed estimates in the Pacific War,
which he later tried to cover up, whereas he was correct in only four
key estimates. His mistakes were the result, in part, of mirror-imaging.
So why did General MacArthur keep him as intelligence chief for SWPA?
First, MacArthur, never a modest man despite General Willoughby's
protests to the contrary, seemed to need adulators such as Willoughby on
his staff. Second, who was to replace him? In the Interwar Period, the
US Army was so notoriously weak in intelligence that General Dwight D.
Eisenhower chose a British officer, Major General Kenneth Strong, as his
J-2 rather than an American officer. (86) [The J-2 is the chief
intelligence officer of a joint operation. See Kenneth J. Campbell,
"General Eisenhower's J-2: Major General Kenneth Strong, British Army
Intelligence," American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997), pp.
81-83.] Third, General MacArthur probably realized that because he
utilized maneuver warfare, attacking the Japanese in their weak spots as
he moved from one objective to the other, accurate estimates were very
difficult to make. For example, German intelligence in the static
warfare of World War I had a much better opportunity to estimate Allied
capabilities and intentions than German intelligence officers in the
Blitzkrieg into France in May 1940.

Counterintelligence in Japan:

There is not enough information available in open sources to evaluate
General Willoughby's total performance in Japan in counterintelligence.
He was probably correct in spotting Herbert Norman and Agnes Smedley as
Soviet agents.

Estimates on the North Korean attack and Chinese Entry into the War:

His estimates in this War were perhaps more correct than those of the
CIA and State Department intelligence, which is indeed faint praise for
an intelligence officer.

Emotional Stability and Character:

>From 1941 to 1951, General Willoughby withstood enormous strain, going
from a relatively sudden immersion in military intelligence in World War
II to the demands of counterintelligence in Japan from 1945 to 1950, and
back to military intelligence in the Korean War. Although the ability to
withstand considerable stress is a necessary quality in an intelligence
chief, it is not sufficient to justify his appointment to and retention
in such a crucial post. Willoughby's attempts to conceal his mistaken
estimates during World War II suggests a narcissistic personality,
someone of low self-esteem who cannot admit to having made mistakes,
because his self-esteem is so dependent on his colleagues' or friends'
opinion of himself. (87) [For a concise discussion of narcissism, see
Philip Mansfield, Split Self/Self Object (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson,
1992).] From a purely military viewpoint, his attempts to conceal his
mistakes are a violation of honor, which strongly suggests that he
should never have been placed in this position.

His range of emotions was wide. For example, he sometimes became enraged
with another staff officer, whom he felt had interfered with his
intelligence section, or was depressed when one of estimates was wrong.
His dislike for the US Navy appeared to be boundless. For example, he
wrote:

The curious thing about it is that the Navy high command in Washington
never recognized the relationship between the (MacArthur's) decision to
hold this Owen Stanley Line and the decision to retake the Philippines.
(Parenthesis added) (88) [Willoughby, MacArthur, pp. 78-79.]

Whether it was General Francisco Franco or General Douglas MacArthur,
Willoughby needed heroes, particularly of the conservative variety,
people upon whom he could project his own narcissistic feelings of
grandeur and at the same time not feel guilty of egotism. Showing
narcissistic traits, Willoughby could have suffered from both low
self-esteem and feelings of grandeur at the same time. At times he also
displayed a sense of bitterness. When Vice Admiral Lord Louis
Mountbattan, Supreme Allied Commander of Southeast Asia, asked MacArthur
to send some of his limited fleet to attack Japanese shipping in
Singapore harbor, Willoughby's reaction was:

As usual, the "buck was passed" to G-2 (himself), the whipping boy of
the staff, the garbage can for all spurious or half-baked ideas.
(Parenthesis added) (89) [Ibid., p. 161.]

General Willoughby could have laughed at Mountbattan's ridiculous
request, but he chose to take it seriously, falling into bitterness.

Career as a Whole:

General Willoughby's tendency was to cover topics in his books, such as
economics, for which he had only minimal knowledge, or to publish in
areas, such as military history, for which he did not have adequate
graduate training. During his whole career, Willoughby was often placed
by circumstances in areas for which he was not remotely prepared. For
example, in 1942 he suddenly became chief of intelligence for SWPA, a
gigantic task requiring him to create a multifunctional apparatus in a
short time. His prior experience in intelligence was minimal at best.
Consequently, General Willoughby made many serious mistakes in
intelligence, chiefly in estimation, which is perhaps the most important
function of a military intelligence officer. Moreover, he tried to cover
up these mistakes in his book on General MacArthur and the two summaries
of the War in the Pacific, which he directed, a totally undesirable
characteristic in a military officer.

Lessons Learned:

There is something to be learned from General Willoughby's career. The
best chiefs in military intelligence -- such as Admiral Bobby Ray Inman,
Major General Kenneth Strong, and Lt. General Daniel Graham -- have had
long experience in this field before assuming major positions of
responsibility. (90) [See Robert Cosgriff and Kenneth J. Campbell,
"Admiral Bobby Ray Inman: A Study in Leadership," Intel 2000, Fall 1996,
pp. 25-37; "General Eisenhower's J-2," op. cit.; and Kenneth J.
Campbell, "Lt. General Daniel O. Graham: A Life of Achievement,"
Conservative Review (Mar.-Apr. 1997), pp. 13-21.] The failures of
General Willoughby in contrast to the successful performance of the
latter officers suggests that general and flag officers should not be
placed as heads of intelligence agencies on the basis of their administr
ative abilities, mastery of military history, or strategic vision with
the comfortable assurance that they will do a good job in intelligence
work. Before an officer is posted in this sensitive post, he should have
learned this complicated art from the bottom up through the
decision-making level.

Return to Far East/Pacific A - D
Return to Postwar 1950s Korea
-----
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Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
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Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris

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