-Caveat Lector- an excerpt from: The Emergence of Oligopoly Alfred S. Eichner The John Hopkins Press�1968 Baltimore & London LCCN 74-7930 388 pps. � First Edition � Out-of-print also available; Greenwood Publishing Group(1978); ISBN: 0313205981 --[1b]-- The trust form proper, however, was to have only a brief existence. Even as the Sherman antitrust law was being enacted into law in the summer of 1890, a New York court decision was rendering the trust form illegal.[48] It was a decision soon to be confirmed by judicial rulings in other states.[49] But the several combinations which had been organized as trusts were unwilling to return to the status quo ante. As was to be seen again many times in the years that followed, a competitively structured industry, once destroyed, was not easily resurrected. Instead, the several combinations took advantage of a change in New Jersey's corporation law which conveniently permitted one corporation to own stock in another and thus gave sanction to the holding company.[50] Still, before other industries were willing to follow the example of the trusts that were now transformed into New Jersey-chartered corporations, two questions had to be answered. The first was whether such corporations were legal under the Sherman Act. While the majority of distinguished corporate lawyers was convinced that they were consistent with the law, a definitive answer had to wait until the Supreme Court itself ruled on the issue. The second question was whether combinations of that type were sound from a business point of view. Doubts of this sort were greatly increased when the National Cordage Company, one of the trusts which bad been reorganized as a New Jersey corporation, suffered a financial collapse which marked the onset of the 1893 Depression. The cordage combination had been victimized by rivals who organized new enterprises almost as quickly as they were bought out.[51] Somewhat ironically, it was the 1893 Depression which conclusively demonstrated the advantages of industrial consolidation to businessmen. They could not help but notice that prices fell less rapidly and that their fellow capitalists suffered less severely in those industries which had been successfully consolidated. By the time economic conditions began to improve in 1895 and the stock market had regained its buoyancy, many businessmen no longer doubted the practical soundness of combination. Meanwhile, in its decision in the E. C. Knight case, the Supreme Court had removed whatever legal uncertainty still remained.[52] Implicitly�or so it seemed at the time�the New Jersey holding company had passed the scrutiny of the law. If some businessmen still hesitated, preferring less formal and less permanent price-fixing arrangements even if they were unenforceable in the courts, they were less likely to hold back after the Addyston Pipe decision made such cartel practices a positive criminal offense.[53] The first phase of the Corporate Revolution and the change it wrought in the structure of the American economy have already been mentioned. The long-frustrated desire of businessmen to avoid the expropriating effects of competition built up a pressure for consolidation which was suddenly released in 1895 by the coincident return of prosperity and the Supreme Court's implicit approval of the New Jersey holding company. The by-this-time well-developed market for industrial securities greatly facilitated the process of combination and merger as investment bankers such as J. P. Morgan used the stock exchange to float the issues of the many newly created corporations. In fact, Morgan and his associates, with the wealth and experience gained in consolidating the nation's railroads, and Rockefeller and his partners, with the even greater wealth and experience acquired in building up the Standard Oil empire, provided the impetus and leadership for a significant number of the consolidations. The culmination of this Great Merger movement, at least symbolically, came in 1901 when Rockefeller agreed to sell his Mesabi Range properties to Morgan, thus enabling the latter to go ahead with his plans to form the United States Steel Corporation, a combination of previous consolidations in the steel industry and this country's first $1 billion company.[54] The important point about this first phase of the Corporate Revolution is that its effect was to create in a large number of industries a single giant enterprise or, in other words, conditions closely approximating those underlying the economist's theoretical model of monopoly. The second phase of the Corporate Revolution witnessed the transformation of this market structure into oligopoly and the consequent emergence of the modern corporation�or megacorp�characterized by multiplant operation and the separation of management from ownership. This second phase lasted roughly from the Rich Man's Panic of 1907, following the federal government's prosecution of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco companies, through the 1920's�though once more it must be stressed that the dates varied for each individual industry, with the structure of some even relapsing into an earlier form rather than evolving into the next stage. While the possibility of organizing as a holding company largely eliminated the problem of how to control competition from within an industry, the problem of how to control competition from without still remained. The groping for a solution to this problem was one of the distinguishing features of the second phase of the Corporate Revolution. The method adopted by the petroleum industry�forced rebates from the railroads�was not necessarily applicable to other industries. Moreover, as a result of the gradual strengthening of the Interstate Commerce Act and the new-found willingness of the executive branch under Theodore Roosevelt to enforce the law, the exaction of rebates involved an increasingly unacceptable degree of risk. The consolidation of an industry into a single enterprise, if it were to prove endurable, thus required that new ways of forestalling the entry of firms into the industry be devised. A few of the combinations ignored the problem entirely or else dealt with it inadequately. Bankruptcy and reorganization tended to be their fate.[55] Most of the consolidations, however, were able to protect their market positions by erecting substantial barriers to entry. This came about in a variety of ways, depending on the circumstances prevailing in each industry. Some of the monopolistic firms created were able to establish exclusive distribution systems by either taking over an existing dealer network or creating their own.[56] Others managed to obtain sole control over strategic raw materials and thereby put themselves in a position to deny these materials to others.[57] Of course, the older techniques of patent control and selective price cutting continued to be employed.[58] To supplement and reinforce these methods of limiting entry, a new technique offering substantial economies of scale was developed and expanded. This new technique was national advertising. These methods, however, could not suppress all outside competition. In some cases, firms had been allowed to remain outside the combination because their owners refused to join and, after they had given assurances that they would match the combination's prices, it had not seemed worthwhile to press them further. To their numbers were soon added other firms, some established to take advantage of a specialized or geographically separated segment of the market, others formed by persons who, after selling out to the combination, found the enforced retirement unbearable. It seemed as though the sight of a single large corporation dominating an industry and enjoying substantial profits presented too tempting a target for outside interests to ignore; and while most of the efforts to invade the industry might fail, still a few firms managed to gain a foothold and survive at the fringe. As a result it was not unusual for the single large corporation created during the first phase of the Corporate Revolution to find itself coexisting with numerous but relatively insignificant smaller rivals. This competitive "tail" of the monopolistic industry generally bad little or no effect on the ability of the consolidation to control prices. But it did provide the basis for the later growth of firms able to match the original combination in size and strength. The emergence of powerful rivals was then given a considerable boost by the political and legal reaction which the first phase of the Corporate Revolution produced in its wake, a reaction that was to impose an upper limit on the share of the market which any one firm could control. This political and legal reaction, identified with the Progressive movement, was a second distinguishing feature of the second phase of the Corporate Revolution. The fears and apprehensions to which the consolidation movement gave rise did not find a meaningful political expression until the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. The concern, however, was not so much over the actual changes in economic structure as over the implied threat to the democratic order. The question, as many persons including the president saw it, was whether an economic power had been created which could and would dictate to the political institutions of the country.[59] It was for this reason that Roosevelt, at a very early point in his administration, moved pre-emptorily in the Northern Securities case to reassert the primacy of the government�and in the process succeeded in reviving the moribund Sherman Act.[60] Initially Roosevelt felt that eliminating railroad rebates was all that would be required. Denied any unfair advantage in transportation costs, only those consolidations which truly reflected economies of scale would be able to survive. But to his chagrin Roosevelt soon learned that simply eliminating railroad rebates was not enough. Other barriers to entry also existed, or were quickly devised to replace those found to be illegal. To attack what be viewed as "bad trusts," that is, combinations whose market power rested on some unfair advantage, Roosevelt found himself forced to fall back on the Sherman Act-despite fears that it might subsequently be used indiscriminately against all combinations, whatever their social value.[61] The dissolution and dismemberment of the Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and DuPont companies was the eventual result of this campaign.[62] While Roosevelt sought to break up only the "bad" trusts, hoping in this way not to lose the benefits of large-scale production, his successor, the jurist and former law professor William Howard Taft, felt it was necessary to dissolve any consolidation formed primarily to achieve control over prices. Only those combinations whose market power was ancillary to some other purpose were, in his view, immune from prosecution under the Sherman Act. Taft's successor, Woodrow Wilson, went one step further. All consolidations representing monopoly power, whatever the reason they were organized, were . in his eyes illegal.[63] But while the presidential attitude toward industrial consolidation was growing increasingly hostile, the judicial response continued to be equivocal. More to the point, the process of building up a body of case law on the subject was extremely time-consuming. Years of investigation and pretrial testimony were required before a suit could even be filed, and this preliminary work had to be done by the already overworked U.S. attorneys in a few major cities. Then, many more years were to pass before the case reached the Supreme Court and a final decision was handed down.[64] Thus, when World War I broke out, the Wilson administration was still awaiting the results of an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the International Harvester Company, defendant in a suit testing Taft's theory that all combinations formed to exercise control over prices are illegal.[65] The war was to change dramatically the larger social and political attitudes toward industrial consolidation. The co-operation and material support in prosecuting the war which the Wilson administration received from many of the very same combinations that it had only a short time before planned to break up seemed to confirm the argument long advanced that the consolidations were necessary to achieve certain desirable social goals in general and the realization of operating economies in particular. Even the Wilsonian Democrats' ardor for trust-busting cooled noticeably. Moreover, the growing repute with which the large industrial combinations now came to be held gave added weight to a concern long felt by the judiciary in weighing the merits of dissolution. Was it fair, they were forced to ask themselves, to impair the equity of the many stockholders who bad invested in the combinations long after they were formed when there was every reason to believe that they were not illegal? The answer clearly depended on bow great a social evil the combinations were. The changing attitude toward industrial consolidation became evident in the Supreme Court's decision in the United States Steel case, which was handed down in the spring of 1920.[66] While the steel combination had not been guilty of the "unfair" tactics attributed to the petroleum and tobacco companies, its head, judge Elbert Gary, had just the same taken the precaution of allowing U.S. Steel's share of the market to fall from the more than 80 per cent it had controlled at the time of its formation to somewhat less than 50 per cent. The Supreme Court, in absolving the company of any violation of the Sherman Act under the "rule of reason," seemed to be taking into account these specific facts as well as the larger social and political trends. Whatever the court's specific motivation, however, the precedent was established that a corporation which accounted for less than half of an industry's market and which avoided aggressive tactics to discourage competition was relatively safe from dissolution under the antitrust laws. It was this ground rule, together with the tendency of the smaller firms that managed to survive in the various consolidated industries to merge during the 1910's and 1920's in order to provide stronger competition, which was to transform the monopoly originally created by the Corporate Revolution into oligopoly. Meanwhile, an organizational transformation was also occurring within the giant corporations that were emerging during this period. This organizational transformation was the third and final distinguishing feature of the Corporate Revolution. When first created the consolidations were generally little more than strong cartel arrangements, with the previously independent owner-entrepreneurs continuing to direct the operations of their own plants free of all outside interference except with respect to prices or output. As time passed, however, the central board of directors gradually increased its authority. The least efficient plants were scrapped entirely, marginal plants were held in reserve for peak periods of demand, and production was concentrated in the remaining plants where costs could be held to a minimum. As a result the consolidations were able to expand or contract production�the way in which changes in industry demand were now adjusted to-largely by starting up and closing down entire plants or plant segments. In this way, with the judicious management of inventories, it was possible to operate with something approaching constant marginal Costs.[67] Paradoxically, in order to exercise increased authority, the central board of directors had to delegate responsibility. The details of managing so large an enterprise were simply too great to be handled by any one small group of men. Managers for the various plants bad to be appointed, charged with seeing to it not only that the plant was operated efficiently but also that over-all company policy was carried out down the line. In time these new plant managers replaced the former owner-entrepreneurs who had initially brought the properties into the consolidation. In addition, men knowledgeable in the ways of corporate law, finance, sales, and other specialized areas had to be brought into the central office to oversee the various staff functions, with new techniques of business administration being developed to co-ordinate their as well as the line executives' actions.[68] The result was the emergence of a managerial group whose power, derived from specialized knowledge of how the company was run, grew as that of the stockholders waned. The former owner-entrepreneurs who had originally joined together to form the consolidation found that as time passed it was to their interest to sell off their holdings of stock. In some cases this was done to diversify an investment portfolio. In other cases it was done to take advantage of inside information. In still other cases it was done out of pique over the loss of influence within the company. Whatever the reason, the tendency over time was for the stockholders to become more numerous and scattered, with a consequent growth in the management group's power. This eventual separation of management from ownership, together with multiplant operations in an oligopolistically structured industry, was to produce the typical large corporation-or megacorp�of today. The fourth stage in the development of industrial organization is the one in which we are presently participant-observers. This is the Era of the Conglomerate, in which the megacorps that have arisen in specific industries have branched out into various other industries through diversification. Since the phenomenon is still too recent for proper historical perspective, any analysis must be tentative. This is particularly true since theoretical models for understanding the behavior of oligopolistic industries are still lacking. Still, as a preliminary hypothesis, it may be suggested that the conglomerate form of industrial organization reflects the need of megacorps in maturing oligopolistic industries to find new outlets for the investment funds they are able to generate internally through their control over prices. On the one hand, the continued technological progress which has led to the expansion of certain markets and brought a decline in others has meant that a megacorp, no matter bow formidable its position in any particular industry, could expect to maintain an adequate growth rate in the long run only by periodically shifting its resources and energies into an entirely new area of economic activity. Often, the technological change has been given a prodding by the megacorp's own research and development efforts, which, if not actually responsible for creating the new products or new techniques, have at least enabled the megacorp to keep abreast of the evolving state of the industrial arts, thereby reducing the time lag between the discovery and the exploitation of new knowledge. On the other hand, the further advance of management techniques�a form of technological progress the importance of which has not always been sufficiently appreciated�has made it possible for multiproduct firms to avoid the predicted handicaps of bigness.[69] In this current stage of the evolution of industrial organization in the United States, the megacorp has finally transcended the limits of its own original industry; and the economic theory which perhaps may be most relevant to its situation is that dealing with investment planning by nation-states. *** The chapters that follow attempt to describe this evolution of industrial organization as it occurred in a single industry, sugar refining. This industry is of special interest for several reasons. First, it was intimately involved in many of the critical events of both the transition phase of the Golden Age of Competition and the subsequent Corporate Revolution. One of the first major industries to be consolidated, sugar refining was the center of the legal battles over the trust and holding-company forms of organization. Its securities were among the first of any manufacturing firm to be traded on the New York stock exchanges. Most important, it experienced many of the same challenges and tribulations as the other consolidated industries, eventually falling victim to the antitrust sentiment that was to help transform monopoly throughout the American economy into oligopoly. On the other hand, the sugar refining industry has been virtually ignored by economic historians, despite the wealth of information which exists. The one attempt to describe the industry's consolidation is a 121-page monograph written in 1907,[70] but it probes neither widely nor deeply. It is in part this gap which the present monograph will attempt to fill. What follows, then, is in one sense simply the history of a particular business enterprise, the American Sugar Refining Company. It contains an account of the entrepreneurial activities of Henry O. Havemeyer and his colleagues in the sugar refining industry, a description of parallel developments in other industries, and an overview of antitrust and related legal actions. These various elements, however, are presented as part of a single, complex, interrelated process in order to illuminate more clearly what is, after all, the central focus of this study, the emergence of oligopoly in one industry as a result of the Corporate Revolution. t would, of course, be silly to suggest that the chapters which follow "substantiate" in any meaningful sense the general historical model of the evolution of industrial organization outlined above. First, that model has been formulated by taking into account all available empirical evidence, which in this particular case means the original source material uncovered pertaining to sugar refining, as well as the extant secondary literature.[71] It is thus fallacious to infer that any test of the model has been conducted. Second, a sample size of one industry, even if inflated to include the few other industries for which a comparable historical account already exists, is not very impressive. This is the basic weakness of all case studies. Still, it can-and will-be argued that the model presented above does provide a useful working hypothesis for the subsequent industry studies which it is hoped this monograph will stimulate. For on this question of what factors were responsible for the Great Merger movement at the turn of the century, the point has been reached where only in-depth investigations of individual industries over time are likely to shed further light. Surprisingly, only a few of the industries involved in the Corporate Revolution have been studied in this manner.[72] The one merit that will be claimed for this monograph is that it adds yet another industry to the list. pps. 1-25 --[notes]� 1. Ralph Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895-1956, p. 37. 2. Ibid., p. 102. 3. Henry R. Seager and Charles A. Gulick, Jr., Trust and Corporation Problems, pp. 60-61. 4. Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 5. Nelson, Merger Movements, p. 4. 6. George J. Stigler, "Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated." 7. "Megacorp" is used by the author as a better term to indicate what has variously been called the "large" or "modern" corporation. See his "Business Concentration and Its Significance," esp., pp. 188-89. 8. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, bk. 5. 9. Henry Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society, pp. 59-60. 10. Edward C. Kirkland, A History of American Life, p. 424. 11. George J. Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," pp. 28-30. 12. Nelson, Merger Movements, p. 91. which took place between 1897 and 1902, 68.4 per cent were listed on the New York, Boston, Philadelphia, or Baltimore exchanges." 13 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 14. T. R. Navin and M. V. Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902." 15. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Large Industrial Corporation and the Making of the Modern American Economy." 16 Nelson, Merger Movements, p. 103. 17. Ibid. Nelson also points to the fact that most of the mergers that took place were horizontal, between competing firms in the same stage of production. He then concludes that since most economies of scale result from vertical integration, the 1895-1907 consolidations were not designed to achieve economies of scale. I think Nelson errs in attributing most economies of scale to vertical integration. 18. Chandler, "The Large Industrial Corporation," pp. 80-82. 19. Jesse Markham, "Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers," p. 156. 20. Joe S. Bain, "Industrial Concentration and Government Anti-Trust Policy," P. 618 21. Nelson, Merger Movements, pp. 82, 83. 22. Ibid., p. 82. 23.Ibid., pp. 85-87. 24. Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems, p. ix. 25. See p. 1 above. 26. Myron Watkins, Industrial Combination and Public Policy, pp. 12-13. 27. Nelson, Merger Movements, p. 78. 28. Ironically, the author of this phrase was Henry 0. Havemeyer, one of those responsible for consolidating the sugar refining industry, which was itself a major beneficiary of the tariff. See Havemeyer's testimony before the U.S. Industrial Commission, Reports, 1, pt. 2: 10 1. 29. Nelson, Merger Movements, pp. 132-33. 30. Tariffs, while obviously not a factor in the British merger movement, still might have played an important role in the American Corporate Revolution. They may be part of the explanation why what was only a movement in Great Britain was a revolution in the United States. 31. Donald Dewey, Monopoly in Economics and Law, pp. 53-54. 32. Ibid., pp. 54-55. 33. Nelson, Merger Movements, p. 136. 34. It should be noted that the various explanations cited may not necessarily exhaust all the possibilities, but they do cover the explanations most frequently advanced by students of the Corporate Revolution and, more to the point, they cover the explanations that have been subjected to quantitative investigation by Nelson in Merger Movements. industrial organizat 35. For a description and analysis of the various models of pricing behavior, see Donald Watson, Price Theory and Its Uses, pts. 4-6, and Leonard W. Weiss, Case Studies in American Industry. 36. Thus, while Douglass C. North is correct in stressing the importance of the nature of demand in the American growth process (The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860), it is difficult to see how the nature of demand itself would have changed had it not been for prior changes in technology, in Europe if not in the United States. More generally, it may be suggested that consumer preferences are too stable a factor to produce by themselves any significant movement away from the static conditions of a long-run equilibrium. 37. The four-stage model, it should be stressed, is taxonomic rather than analytic. Thus there is no intention of suggesting that the separate stages have a specified time dimension or even that each necessarily led to the subsequent stage. The model is merely descriptive of what happened in the American economy cover a certain period of time, and the separate stages indicate which theoretical model of market behavior most closely approximates the market behavior actually observed. 38 North, Economic Growth, pp. 204-8. Economic historians are currently divided over the question of whether the decade beginning in 1840 marked a discontinuity in the growth rate of the American economy. Cf. George R. Taylor, "Ameri an Economic Growth Before 1840"; Paul A. David, "The Growth of Real Product in the United States Before 1840." What is being suggested here is not that the over-all growth rate necessarily accelerated at about that time but rather that the pace of manufacturing activity suddenly spurted. 39. Rendig Fels, American Business Cycles. 40. On the destructive effects of competition, see the testimony of various manufacturers before the U.S. Industrial Commission, Reports, 1, pt. 2. 41 As a producer of wallpaper later testified before the Industrial Commission, after first describing how an agreement in his industry bad succeeded in raising prices: "The greed of a number of manufacturers, however, did not allow this favorable condition of affairs to continue. They sold goods at less than scheduled prices and to cover up the transactions failed to report the sales to the [pool]. Fines were imposed for such violations when discovered, but they failed to check the evil. . . . and this dishonesty finally led to abandonment of the scheme" (ibid., 13:283). 42. See the studies of particular industries to be found in William Z. Ripley, ed., Trusts, Pools and Corporations; Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems. 43. Eliot Jones, The Anthracite Coal Combination in the United States; Jules Bogen, The Anthracite Railroads; Pennsylvania, Legislature, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, General, Report in Relation to the Anthracite Coal Difficulties with the Accompanying Testimony; Chester A. Jones, The Economic History of the Anthracite- Tidewater Canals; Marvin B. Schlegel, Ruler of the Reading. 44. Allan Nevins, Study in Power, 1:364. 45. Ibid., chaps. 4-14 46. Ibid., chap. 21; John Dos Passos, Commercial Trusts, pp. 12-14. 47. Navin and Sears, "Market for Industrial Securities," pp. 106-12. 48. People v. North River Sugar Refining Co. 49. Railway & Corporate Law Journal, 7 (January 18, 1890); State v. Standard Oil Company. 50 New Jersey, Statutes, 1889, chaps. 265, 269; see also Edward Q. Keasbey, "New Jersey and the Great Corporations"; Russell C. Larcom, The Delaware Corporation, chap. 1. 51 Arthur S. Dewing, A History of the National Cordage Company, pp. 4-32. 52. United States v. E. C. Knight et al., 156 U.S. 12 (1895). 53. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899) 54. Frederick Lewis Allen, The Great Pierpont Morgan, chap. 9; Nevins, Study in Power, chap. 32; John Moody, The Truth About the Trusts, pp. 490-93. 55. Arthur S. Dewing, Corporate Promotion and Reorganizations. 56. William S. Stevens, Industrial Combinations and Trusts, chap. 7; Ripley, Trusts, Pools and Corporations, p. 273; Watkins, Industrial Combination and Public Policy, pp. 73-76; Richard Tennant, The American Cigarette Industry, pp . 305-6. 57 Watkins, Industrial Combination and Public Policy, pp. 184-90; Eliot Jones, The Trust Problem in the United States, pp. 222-24. 58. Stevens, Industrial Combinations and Trusts, chap. 12; Ripley, Trusts, Pools and Corporations, pp. 280-303. 59 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, pp. 227-38. 60 Northern Securities Co. v. United States; see also William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America, chap. 6. 61 John M. Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, pp. 107-21; George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. x-xi, 112, 130-34. 62. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co 63. Letwin, Law and Economic Policy, pp. 250-53; Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 2:654-59. 64. It took five years to prosecute successfully the Standard Oil Company and three years to do the same to the American Tobacco Company. Suits with lower priority in the eyes of the Government generally required even longer to complete; the case against the American Sugar Refining Company, for example, required four years before it was even ready to go to trial. 65. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 696 (1927). 66. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 441 (1920). 67 See Watson, Price Theory, chap. 11. 68. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure. 69. Ibid., chap. 1, n. 27; Louis D. Brandeis, "Trusts and Efficiency," pp. 223-24. 70. Paul L. Vogt, The Sugar Refining Industry in the United States 71. See the Bibliography in this volume. 72 These are the petroleum and tobacco industries. See Harold F. Williamson et al., The American Petroleum Industry; Nevins, Study in Power; Tennant, Americ an Cigarette Industry. Alfred Chandler and Stephen Salsbury are presently at work on a study of the DuPont Company and the gunpowder industry. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soapboxing! 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