From "An Unorthodox Soldier - Peace and War and the Sandline Affair" by Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Spicer Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, Scotland. [ ISBN: 1 84018 180 X ] Chapter Three PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 'An army may be likened to water: water leaves dry the high places and seeks the hollows; an army turns from strength and attacks weakness. The flow of water is regulated by the shape of the ground; victory is gained by acting in accordance with the state of the enemy.' SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR Having described the traditional role of the military company and laid the 'mercenary' canard to rest, it is now necessary to describe the purpose of private military companies. Private military companies are organisations which do more than provide passive assistance in areas of conflict. The accent is on the word passive - PMCs are not passive; they do not stand about murmuring soothing words, and their operations extend beyond the guarding role. PMCs offer practical military help in an acceptable form to legitimate governments. Before continuing and providing some examples, it would be as well to outline the differences between a legitimate PMC and a modern mercenary. A mercenary will be an individual, recruited for a specific task. He is not part of a permanent structure and has only a limited range of capabilities. There is no group cohesion; before the job he will not know his colleagues. He subscribes to no doctrine or collective training standards and his ideas on discipline, the rule of law and human rights may be well short of those required by the law of armed conflict. He is recruited without adequate vetting, his standards of competence are not checked and his motives are suspect. A PMC, on the other hand, offers a packaged service covering a wide variety of military and quasi-military skills - a study of the chart will be helpful here. PMCs are permanent structures, corporate entities, which are run like a business. They have a clear hierarchy, are run on military lines and operate to high disciplinary standards and within the law of armed conflict, with a particular concern for human rights. In a well-regulated PMC, the involvement will begin with an analysis of the situation facing the client government and the preparation of a commander's estimate - a process known to an older generation of soldiers as 'making an appreciation of the situation', or, in lay terms, finding out what the real problem is and suggesting ways to solve it. The commander's estimate is crucial to the PMC's ethos. In it, the PMC's senior executives will analyse the situation facing the client, examine what is feasible and suggest what might be done to resolve the situation. PMCs do not simply supply what the client asks for. The closest and simplest analogy is with the medical profession. The patient goes to the doctor and says he feels ill; the doctor examines the patient, organises any necessary tests and proposes a course of treatment that will cure the condition; he does nor simply respond to the patient's request for a sick note and a bottle of pills. In short, as professional organizations operating in a highly technical field, PMCs expect to be consulted. The range of PMC facilities at the disposal of any suitable client can be considerable. PMCs may provide training and equipment to extend the capabilities of the client's existing military resources, or provide them with whatever strategic or operational advantage is necessary to suppress their opposition, or, going even further, play an active role alongside the client forces, as 'force multipliers'. A 'force multiplier' is something that makes a force more effective, a term best summed up by the use of helicopters during the Borneo Confrontation of the 1960s between Britain and Indonesia, when it was said that 'a battalion with helicopters is worth a brigade without them' - in other words, adding helicopter support increased the battalion's effectiveness by a factor of three. PMCs can be responsible for supplying trained manpower or equipment such as helicopters or battlefield radar, even deploying their own personnel into the field of conflict but with the strict caveat that they are acting within the chain of command of the client's military hierarchy, and, certainly in the case of Sandline, that military hierarchy must be the arm of a legitimate government. A PMC is, by this very definition, not in the business of providing arms to its client in isolation, and Sandline, incidentally, is not an arms-dealing company. Like any well-run PMC, we would prefer only to supply weaponry and systems within a wider package of training, support and operational use. To touch on the moral issue, we need to know what we are getting into, but the practical point to remember is that PMCs are not 'arms dealers' per se but packaged-services providers. Using the example of computers, well-run PMCs are not hardware providers. They deliver a workable package containing all the elements the client needs to make use of modern military technology, i.e. hardware, software, personnel, installation, training and implementation. PMCs have permanent structures and are not created simply to fulfil the needs of one contract. They do not recruit unemployed hit-men for obscure operations or interview would-be gunslingers in the bedrooms of sleazy hotels. Within the limits of commercial and political discretion, their operations are open to view. They employ or have access to the services of a large number of ex-service personnel from First World armies and the client government employs this expertise through a single contract with the PMC and not through a series of arrangements with individuals or small, informal groups. PMCs operate from established offices, delivering the necessary support services from within the company, e.g. marketing, sales, administration, accounting, personnel, procurement and so on - just like any other company working in the international arena. They make use of promotional literature to create awareness and do not operate 'in the shadows' as one might expect of the typical 1970s mercenary of the kind portrayed in entertaining films like The Wind Geese. Running a PMC is a business much like any other. It might be argued, 'Yes, but it's a dirty business,' so let me add that, once contracted and deployed, PMCs operate as a military hierarchy with associated discipline, observance of the laws and customs of the host nation, and adherence to the principles of the Geneva Convention and the international law of armed conflict. PMC operations can and do include such humanitarian activities as mine clearing, support for relief operations, the rescue of civilians trapped in a civil war - Sandline rescued scores of such people in Sierra Leone in 1997 - and training of Third World forces in human rights. This activity has its uses and should be given more official support. In their book War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Alvin and Heidi Toffler suggested, 'Why not consider creating volunteer mercenary forces, organised by private corporations to fight wars on a contract-fee basis for the United Nations - the condottieri of yesterday armed with the weapons of tomorrow?' I might take issue with the word 'mercenary' and suggest that PMCs exist to end wars rather than fight them, but otherwise the suggestion has merit. That said, the next question that needs to be answered is whether private military companies really can take on the role of the national armed forces? Do they have the equipment, the manpower, the resources and, most of all, the legitimacy? The answer will emerge as this chapter continues, for I intend to give a number of examples where the involvement of PMCs has been highly effective, even where the requirements have included the most sophisticated arms and equipment. If mercenary forces have a long and honourable history, the modern concept, private military companies like Sandline International, can be linked to those organised companies of professional soldiers that served the city states, and forms part of an expanding international network of specialised military companies. Sandline International is only one of a number of companies specializing in providing various forms of military expertise and our competitors are spread all over the world, notably in the USA. When it comes to selling military expertise, Sandline International and all the other PMCs are in competition both with each other and with a large number of Western governments. The usual conflicts between the 'private' and the 'public' sectors arise in this business, as in many others. The benefits of privatisation will become clear, but flexibility and a freedom from bureaucratic interference are just some of the assets PMCs have to offer. It would also be useful to look at the wider world of private military companies in order to put the present situation and Sandline International's operations into an accurate context. To do this we need to look briefly at some of the other PMCs, and in particular the South African company Executive Outcomes, or EO. EO was established in South Africa in 1989 and rapidly became the world's largest private military organization. Right from the start, EO fostered a clear, corporate image and kept its affairs in the public eye. As a step to that end, it was registered as a limited company with the South African Board of Trade and was organised on a corporate basis. EO activities were conducted on an open, day-today basis, without any attempt at secrecy. The private sector cannot compete on turnover terms with national governments, where arms sales are counted in billions, but it is alleged that in 1995 EO had an income in excess of $50 million, which is nor a small sum for a private limited company and indicates that their services were in great demand. EO's range of military-oriented services steadily expanded to include the recruitment and contracting of military personnel for private work, the training of state armies in the developing nations, where such training is sorely lacking, and the planning and conduct of military operations, and it could equip its client for a wide range of military situations, even those involving the use of armour, artillery and aircraft. EO's insistence on corporate respectability and accountability did not entirely dispel the 'mercenary' aura, but it certainly helped. EO's professional approach and the clear benefits which have been reaped by the countries that have employed the company, notably Angola and Sierra Leone, are undoubted. By declaring and then sticking to a clear set of rules - a corporate ethos - the organisation established a reputation that took it well away from the public concept of mercenary activity. EO - which ceased trading at the end of 1998 - was in the service-provider industry, and in order to provide such specialised services EO maintained a regularly updated database estimated to contain the names and details of around 2,000 former military personnel, all highly skilled in various aspects of the military art. Having worked with some of them in Papua New Guinea, I can attest to their high standards of professionalism and personal conduct. Given its base in the troubled continent of Africa, it is not surprising that EO personnel were often ex-members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) or the South African Police - and, or so it is alleged, their ranks even included former members of the military wing of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela's ANC. But the company was more than an employment agency. Africa has plenty of warriors; what it lacks are competent professional soldiers, trained in all aspects of modern warfare, able to operate at the higher command level and offering a wide range of skills, including low-intensity operations and 'hearts and minds' activity. This is the business EO pitched for and its last brochure stated that the company was able to offer 'competitively priced, high-quality services and products tailored to our client's requirements . . . Executive Outcomes provides tailor-made packages for government armed forces, thus assisting in the creation of an environment conducive to peace and stability and a stable climate for investment.' EO's first foray into a civil war was during Angola's 'third civil war' between 1992 and 1994. A UN contingent - UNAVEM - had been deployed in Angola for some years, but the war was marked by terrible atrocities and a great deal of misery which the UN force seemed unable to prevent. This was largely the fault of its mandate, by which UNAVEM III was tasked only for peace-keeping and prevented from peace-making- a not uncommon UN problem. Since there was no peace to keep, the UN force was impotent. UNAVEM lacked both the military capacity and the necessary UN mandate and could offer no worthwhile protection to humanitarian aid workers who were often harassed by UNITA rebels. The weaknesses in UNAVEM's mandate created a security vacuum in which chaos and murder reigned. EO's first involvement resulted from a contract to recover the strategically important oil refinery and operating base at Soyo in 1992. This refinery had fallen into the hands of the rebel UNITA forces and EO were hired to turn them out and regain the plant intact; this task was completed early in 1993. The operation enhanced EO's reputation locally and encouraged the MPLA government of Angola to hire their services for the war against UNITA. According to MPLA ministers, the company was hired to provide security advisers to protect vital industrial and military installations, but EO personnel also took part in the Angola fighting; the EO share of the later Angolan war effort was substantial and effective, not least in the provision of training and support. Some 500 EO personnel were engaged to train recruits to the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and some of these men were also able to advise and direct security sweeps and took part in operations. Rigorous training turned FAA's 16th Battalion into an effective, hard-fighting force, while EO also supplied aircrew, who flew Angolan Air Force combat aircraft, and Special Force soldiers, who conducted commando operations against UNITA's command centres. Fundamentally, EO provided FAA with the military expertise that their army lacked. Apart from providing discipline and basic infantry tactics, the army was trained in night fighting and the use of explosives and provided with expertise in electronic warfare and air-assault operations. This gave the FAA a distinct edge over UNITA, which was forced out of its bases in the north-west of the country and cut off from supplies of food and ammunition. By August 1994, rebel-controlled territory had decreased from GO to 40 per cent of the country. Such FAA successes were largely credited to EO and the company was thanked for playing a significant part in forcing UNITA to the negotiating table, a step which resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accords in November 1994 - a highly satisfactory outcome for all concerned. The company then became involved in a not-dissimilar situation in the West African state of Sierra Leone, where the government had been engaged in a relentless war with the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) since 1991. Thousands of people had been killed, and tens of thousands wounded or injured. Almost five million people were living in refugee camps where disease and privation were killing them in large numbers. No help arrived from friendly countries or the UN, and by 1995 the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) - the government - was under heavy pressure from the rebel forces, the country was in a state of anarchy and the government's authority had all but vanished. Driven to desperation, they contacted EO. Having cut its teeth in Angola, EO made an appreciation and then moved fast. Some 160 operatives were deployed in-country, to reorganise and retrain the Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), and before long the company began to get results. The methods used in Angola paid off here, for apart from basic military [raining the company also provided instruction in counter-insurgency tactics, which proved highly effective against the ill-trained RUF fighters. As a result, the RUF guerrillas were quickly driven from the capital, Freetown, and other population centres were regained by government forces. After a series of defeats, the RUF rebels were forced to take part in talks that led to the November 1996 peace agreement, an agreement that enabled Sierra Leone to hold its first free elections in twenty-nine years. It cannot be denied, therefore, that EO made a direct contribution to the return of peace and stability and achieved a result that had eluded other means for nearly three decades. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, Sierra Leone's first democratically elected president in three decades, declared in 1996 that EO 'did a positive job . . . protection by other means. We didn't consider them as mercenaries but as people bringing in some sanity.' Another comment comes from a UN source. General Ian Douglas, a Canadian negotiator for the UN, referring to his time in Angola, said, 'EO gave us stability. In a perfect world we wouldn't need an organisation like EO, but I would be loath to say that they have to go just because they are mercenaries.' EO would probably deny that they were mercenaries, but otherwise the praise is well earned. Personnel protection and the guarding of plants are usually non-controversial; it is the military aspect of PMC activity that attracts attention. I consider that EO did a good job in both Angola and Sierra Leone. They defined a new kind of specialised military company, something quite unlike the groups of mercenary desperadoes led by Denard and 'Callan', groups with which they are all too often incorrectly compared. It cannot be denied that EO's activities in Angola and Sierra Leone made a significant contribution to peace and security by supplying the legitimate armed forces with the means and skills to mount effective military operations in a way that had previously been lacking. The argument that PMC involvement only exacerbates internal conflicts and leads to a continuation of the struggle is refuted by what EO achieved in Angola and Sierra Leone. It is often alleged that PMCs seek to continue the conflict in order to line their own pockets and that, once in a country, they cannot be forced to leave. This allegation cannot be substantiated because it simply is not true. PMC work is limited by contract; once the contract has been completed - or if it is terminated by the client - the companies withdraw. They cannot be drawn into an ongoing commitment unless a further contract is offered - and if the client government wishes them to leave, they could simply ask them to do so under the terms of the contract. The importance of working to a contract is fundamental to the activities of PMCs. If EO was the market leader until 1998, a number of other PMCs have been hired to assist the elected governments of countries outside Africa in the prosecution of anti-terrorist operations. In the Far East, the government of Sri Lanka, which has been engaged in a vicious war with the Tamil separatists in the north of the island for over a decade, engaged the British PMC Keenie Meanie Services (KMS) to train and direct government forces operating against Tamil separatists. This is an example of hiring specialist help, for KMS specialist in counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency training. Some time in 1995, at the height of the Balkan troubles, another PMC, an American company called Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), was hired by the Croatian government to train their army for a counter-offensive against Serb forces in Bosnia. Thanks to MPRI's expertise, the Croats were able to hang on to their remaining territory and contribute to the Dayton Peace Accord. KMS's active participation in the Sri Lanka fighting did nothing to end the conflict. Ending a civil war is a matter that lies far outside the limited brief offered by most PMCs. Civil wars require political will as well as military solutions. Using the military option is only justified if it contributes to a political end and brings the warring parties to the conference table. Solving the underlying situation is fundamental to a PMC brief, and among the first questions wise PMC directors will ask - of each other as well as of the potential clients - is 'What are we getting into here?' If what they are getting into does not improve the situation and cannot be seen as a clear step to that end, they would probably be well advised to stay out of it, if only in the long-term interests of their company. EO's operations took place against the background of the chronic instability prevailing in Africa, especially in the so-called 'failed states', that increasing number of places where the UN and the major players in the Western world are now unwilling to get involved. This is regrettable, for nothing can be done to improve the lot of the African people until civil war and political corruption are ended and security and economic stability are restored. Only then can democracy be established in Africa and inward investment and foreign loans and all the benefits that flow from such activity be attracted. PMCs have demonstrated that it is possible to deploy professional, well-led and well-trained troops in a way that can make a real difference to the prospect of peace and stability. Consequently, the sub-Saharan African states will continue to be a market for PMCs until the UN and the international community recovers its nerve. The outlook for further PMC involvement in sub-Saharan Africa looks promising, a fact which pleases me professionally even if it saddens me personally. The market for PMCs is stimulated by the failure of the world community to regulate international security and introduce that 'New World Order' which President George Bush suggested had arrived after Saddam Hussein was soundly defeated in the Gulf War of 1990-91. But in 1999, eight years after the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein is still in power, and flaunting that fact in the face of world opinion. Other dictators, in Africa, Asia and the Balkans, are equally intransigent and there is no sign that the UN or the other world leaders have the will to take them on, or any idea of how to do so in practical terms, combining ground forces with air power to achieve a quick and favourable result, even supposing the popular support from the public and the media were there to urge them into action. There is, however, a constraint on PMC activity and, as I have said already, it is one which may inhibit the use of PMCs in the future - governmental interference. I have no quarrel with regulation, but any company, particularly one trading in the international market, has to know where it stands - and where it stands must not be on constantly shifting ground. At the moment, as the Sandline - or Arms to Africa - Affair demonstrated so clearly, the ground we are on is shifting not only between governments but between national governments and the UN, and even between government departments, where it seems that not only does the right hand not know what the left hand is doing, it will also move heaven and earth - and employ the lawyers - to stop the other hand from finding out. In such a 'Court of the Borgias' atmosphere, where do the PMCs stand and how can they plan their future operations? At the very least we need to know what the rules are, but in the absence of that information it is only sensible to speculate on how the governmental-PMC relationship will develop. Governments hate private initiatives in what they deem to be governmental affairs. It sometimes appears that they would rather see chaos reign, economies destroyed and people die in huge numbers than see a private company come in and sort the matter out - even when the PMC has been invited in by the host government, which is surely entitled to make its own decisions and employ whomever it likes. A typical governmental attitude seems to be, 'If we cannot do it, or do not want to do it, or cannot get the UN to do it, then we don't want it done at all. We will do a bit of hand-wringing and pass a few resolutions and impose sanctions and maybe send in a bit of aid, but that's it - and if anyone intervenes privately, and meddles in matters we regard as our domain, we will put them in jail.' It may not be that easy. While these chaotic civil-war situations exist, the demand for the services of private military companies will continue - nature famously abhors a vacuum. With EO now closed, other PMC organizations may compete for the position of market leader. I may be overstating the decline of the UN and the Western powers in the security arena, but I have seen them at work in Bosnia and elsewhere. While the people on the ground are magnificent, the results have been frankly disappointing. There is wide potential for more PMC activity and more PMCs will enter the marketplace. My guess is that governments will not turn a blind eye and, rather more likely, will begin to interfere. Success does not always breed success. In attracting praise from the countries they served, and by achieving results after years of failure, EO created a high level of 'concern' at both national and international level. This 'concern' centred on the issue of EO's 'lack of accountability' and the 'long-term impact' of their activities on the countries they worked in. These terms are little more than meaningless diplomatic waffle. Who are PMCs to be accountable to, other than their employers and the law of armed conflict? And as for the long-term effect of their activities, that can be limited by contract. This so-called 'lack of accountability' seems to pose serious problems for some of our higher-minded politicians, although they want to have it both ways. On the one hand, PMC involvement in civil wars or low-intensity conflicts reduces the need for official intervention, and they are happy about that. On the other hand, they lose out on the chance to appear 'decisive' and 'caring' and fret that the responsibility will be on them if a PMC operation goes awry. They can, of course, do what governments usually do in such cases, even when they are directly involved. If it works, hog the credit; if it fails, plead innocence and pass the buck. Governments can take comfort from the fact that ethical PMCs only work for legitimate governments. Clearly, given the human-rights record of some 'legitimate governments', this could still mean there is wide scope for error. Another part of the Sandline ethos is that we only work for the 'good guys', and we stick to that principle. Had Sandline existed during the Second World War, for example, we would have worked for the French Resistance, the Maquis, but not for the defacto Vichy government of Marshal Petain, which worked closely with the Nazis. PMCs might end up working for international villains; however, such people have not yet been supported by any legitimate PMC - and the Serb mercenaries employed by Mobutu were not PMC employees. Furthermore, any such government should be the subject of a UN embargo, which would curtail or cut off the supply of PMC assistance. These basic provisions affect all business concerns trading in the international market and there is no clear reason why PMCs should be treated any differently. International 'concern' - a euphemism for government interference - was reflected in EO's decision to withdraw from Angola in January 1996, which was brought about as a result of political pressure from Washington, who wished to see a US PMC - MPRI - provide services there. PMCs do not operate in a political vacuum, and international 'concern' may be strong enough to delay or even terminate an otherwise successful operation. As far as EO is concerned, this 'concern' may have led the South African government to pass the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, which, if enforced and extended elsewhere, represents a potential challenge to all PMCs and may have contributed to EO's decision to close. This Regulation Act clearly reflects a popular governmental view: that security issues should be subordinated to politically accountable decision-making. We can agree with the principle, but to whose political decisions - those of the national government concerned, or those of some outside government which will not otherwise get involved? Perhaps these governments are anxious to suppress PMCs because the PMCs, by succeeding where they have failed, make them look bad before the electorate. Fortunately, realism is making some headway. There now exists a willingness in at least some foreign-policy departments to accept the fact that well-run PMCs have their uses. This view was influenced by the fact that when the Sandline Affair broke cover in the UK, the majority of the political media were solid in their support of what Sandline International had done and were still doing. Financial motives may not be better than political ones but they are not necessarily worse. While a PMC remains motivated by profit, those in control have to devote their time to their first duty, which is to their clients only. Of course, even though a PMC is a private company, its services cannot come cheap - sophisticated hardware and skilled personnel cost money - but the costs are in relation to the services provided and the results obtained. It has been alleged that in recent years the government of Sierra Leone paid sums amounting to some 25 percent of its Gross National Product for PMC services. They may have spent a considerable amount, but the amount was approved by the International Monetary Fund; presumably the government of Sierra Leone and the IMF thought it was worth it. There are some concerns over the sordid subject of money. It clearly depends on the individual point of view, but of all the motivations involved in international affairs I would argue that the profit motive is not usually the most sordid. I would go further and argue that the profit motive provides security for both the nation state and the international community. Yes, an operation may be cancelled if we feel that the client is about to renege on the deal, but that is just good business practice. On the other hand there is no evidence, as some allege, that a contract may act as an incentive to prolong violence and justify a PMC's presence. Quite the contrary; our contractual terms are clearly defined - and if we do a bad job our reputation suffers, so we have every incentive to get on with the job and fulfil our part of the bargain. There is no evidence to support this allegation, and plenty to show that the successful completion of one job leads to another one, often from the same client government. More and more people can see the potential for PMC activity. An article in The Economist in January 1999 posed a question that the powers that be have yet to answer: 'Is what these companies do so bad? Most of them draw a moral distinction between protecting people for profit and attacking them. Most mercenaries protect oil wells and embassies and fight battles only as a last resort.' A review of Privatising War by Mike Dewar points out, 'By and large these companies are run by experienced and capable ex-military men. Rather than label them as mercenary organisations, there is a need to engage with them. This would be the first step to controlling and regulating them. After all, there is no doubt that Sandline and the others could well prove useful to the UK and other Western governments.' The argument over PMCs is by no means only between the people running such companies and high-minded people in government and diplomatic circles; there are plenty of people who believe that in the current state of world affairs, PMCs have a useful part to play. When considering these issues and allegations, it is important to remember that PMCs exist and function because a demand for their skills has been created by the international community's failure to meet the demands for assistance coming from many Third World states. It may well be that the issue of 'accountability' will have to be addressed and a code of conduct drawn up to enforce agreed standards, but some credit should be given to the PMCs in the meanwhile. Surely they have helped some 'failed states' by restoring, if only on a temporary basis, the fundamental necessities of peace and security? PMCs can deliver the necessary elements for a political settlement and subsequent restoration of the national economy, and if no one else can do it, why should their efforts be impeded? It could also be argued that PMC action might offer the basis for the risk-reduced introduction of UN peace-keeping personnel who could then continue the work started by the PMCs. This process would offer some political leaders that element of UN involvement without which they become unhappy and uncertain. One might even go further and invite their governments to take over the task begun and carry it on with their own forces now that the risk of conflict and loss of life has been reduced by PMC action. If they were willing to do so, the success of our actions in places like Sierra Leone would be enhanced and the cost of establishing a new, functioning democracy as a basis for economic reconstruction could be greatly reduced - and the process speeded up at the same time. If international governments continue to stay on the sidelines and remain reluctant to deploy regular professional forces on the ground in these places, how are such issues ever to be resolved? If they are not resolved, all the terrors - from tribal massacres to mass starvation and ethnic cleansing - will continue. Moreover, even if these governments find the resolve, they have so reduced their armed forces that they have difficulty finding the men, the kit or the money for long-term deployment. So nothing can be done on practical or economic grounds either. Is this what people want? If this is what people want then the television companies should stop beaming horrors into our homes, presenting the electorate with problems their governments have no intention of solving, and government ministers can spare us their well-honed expressions of regret and their empty promises of action. The situation in many Third World countries is far too serious for soundbites. If the UN, and the international community as a whole, continues to ignore its oft-vaunted responsibilities for solving or stemming civil wars and racial bloodbaths, it is hard to see where the involvement of PMCs like Sandline International or Executive Outcomes can do anything other than good. At the very least they should be allowed the chance to try. If we fail, blame us and point out our errors, but if the UN and the nation state armies still remain conspicuous by their absence in the trouble spots of the world, we should be allowed to ply our military trade and sell our expertise. Any PMC must adhere to the law of armed conflict, as defined by the Geneva Convention, and show a respect for human dignity and human rights. Although our operatives are always enlisted in the forces of the governments who employ us, not least to ensure a clear chain of command, if one of our people were told, for example, to attack a village, an action which would unnecessarily endanger innocent lives, he would not do it. Such actions are outside the Sandline mandate and we will not permit them - and we would discourage our host government from such a course of action as well. It has been suggested, most recently during the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee report on the Sandline Affair, that the law should restrict and codify the actions of PMCs. I am certainly not against the principle behind this notion, but who is to administer the law and what are the rules to be? The suggestion that a PMC should obtain permission for every job it undertakes and file a precise detail of its operational plan for approval by, say, the UN sounds a good idea in theory, but it would be quite impractical, if only on the grounds of speed and security. Nor does there seem to be any great interest in regulating PMCs. In March 1998 Sandline International submitted proposals on how PMCs might be regulated to both the Under Secretary-General for Human Rights and the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping at the UN; copies of our proposals were also sent to the UK government. At the time of writing, more than a year later, we have had neither an acknowledgement nor a reply from any of these people. In default of some official interest, Sandline is prepared to set up an Oversight Committee, a kind of non-executive board of directors, to examine client requests and check on the conduct of our operations. This committee would contain a number of senior and respected individuals from the diplomatic world, the military, the law and the media. Representatives from humanitarian organisations and relief agencies could also be among the members. A first step towards regulation must be the setting up of a list of PMCs, a register. Were such a register to exist, it would have to be monitored and PMCs would have to subject themselves to a procedural audit process whereby the registration body - and this should perhaps be a UN function - conducts an evaluation of the company's compliance with a predetermined set of internationally defined and accepted operating practices and also examines the quality of the PMC's internal procedures, rather as the Legg Committee investigated Foreign Office procedures after the Sierra Leone debacle. Such a process can be designed to be wide-ranging and rigorous. It can also be repeated at regular intervals to ensure that a snapshot assessment of compliance is maintained over time. The output would be a certificate issued by the registration body, which the PMC could present to prospective clients as a demonstration of the acceptability of the company's underlying ethos and business practices. The concept is an extension to registration and the audit should lead to inclusion of the PMC on a list of 'approved companies' maintained by the regulating authority. The authority would have the right to remove, suspend or fine a particular PMC if there was evidence to prove that the company had breached its now certified operating obligations and governing code. Bearing in mind the problems Sandline has had with the British government over Sierra Leone, this notion has a definite appeal, but it might even go further and include project authorisation. Prior to a PMC accepting an assignment, it would have to apply to the regulating authority for permission, setting out basic project details, a justification for its involvement and a statement of the parameters within which it would work. Again, given our experiences during the Sandline Affair, this notion has its attractions, but two issues need to be considered here: secrecy and speed. The regulatory authority (the UN? national governments?) must be willing to undertake this work within the confines of accepted security measures, so that the intended mission is not compromised. This is simple common sense, for if, for example, a rebel or terrorist organisation were to find out about the possible involvement of a PMC, security would be gone and lives would be at risk - and the lives of our operatives must not be at risk. Secondly, PMCs, by their very nature, are able to deploy very rapidly, and that ability must not be compromised by bureaucratic delays. The possibility that mercenary activity might be officially recognised was first raised in the 1960s and has been again in the decades since but it has not met with much sympathy from the UN or in the OAU - which, in spite of the fact that many members hire mercenaries, still maintains a rooted objection to their employment. In 1997, for example, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) organised a conference entitled 'The Privatisation of Security in Sub-Saharan Africa'. The conference was attended by officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, the intelligence community and Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as well as representatives from several African states, large oil companies and private security organizations and PMCs, including Sandline, Executive Outcomes and the American company MPRI. In their post-conference report the organisers declared, 'The market for private, foreign forces will continue in Africa in an attempt to meet a perceived security void. The challenge is to make private forces effective, efficient and loyal to their clients.' The conference pointed out that a number of international businesses and Third World states recognise that intervention by PMCs in African security situations is inevitable unless and until the African nations can guarantee such security themselves. The African states clearly recognise this for, unlike in the 1970s, when the Angolan government shot 'Callan' and his cohorts, there is no longer any clear consensus against 'mercenaries' - and Angola employed EO to protect their strategic assets and train their troops. As a matter of declared policy, though, the OAU still maintains, 'The difficulty of controlling the operations of mercenary organizations leads to the possibility that they Might be willing to offer their services to illegitimate causes. This would lead to a conflict of interests between the objectives of the international community to control 'rogue states' and the need for private security organisations to make a profit. The fact is that, at the moment, there is no clear, international consensus on the possibility of recognising and controlling organised mercenary activity, even in its new guise.' The objective observer is driven to the conclusion reached earlier in this chapter, that the real objection to the use of PMCs by governments, and the eagerness of their critics to call them 'mercenaries' and tar them with a dubious reputation, arises from a deep-seated, official fear of any private involvement in what they feel should be a governmental responsibility. Those who are facing a situation where military expertise is needed and people are dying because of the lack of it cannot afford to be so high-minded, or so careful to preserve the official status quo. This brings me back to the quote which opens this chapter; circumstances alter cases, and armies - and politicians - must respond to the realities of the situation and seek solutions, rather than go on banging their heads against a brick wall. Flexibility is called for. Victory will be gained by acting in accordance with the actions of the enemy and not, alas, by relying exclusively and continually on methods that have been tried and found wanting. The Sandline Affair of 1998-99 brought much of this into the open. I will not deny that the issues of transparency and accountability need to be addressed, but at least the bulk of the problem has been aired in this chapter and will, I hope, be fully understood by anyone interested in contributing to the issue. We have now looked at the basis of Sandline and what it attempts to do, covered the history of mercenary warfare and, in this chapter, outlined the current state of play regarding the modern manifestation of private military companies. Having come this far, it is now time to go back to the reasons why I became involved in this business. To do that I need to cover my own military career and follow the path it took me, from the streets of West Belfast to the heights of Tumbledown in the Falklands War. .....End of chapter three.....
