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Click Here: <A HREF="http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/briefing/cia-6.htm">Chapter
3 -- Into Politics With Kennedy and Joh�</A>
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Chapter 3
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Into Politics With Kennedy and Johnson
The CIA's early relationship with presidential candidate John Kennedy could
hardly have been more different from the one it had established eight years
earlier with General Eisenhower. In 1952, the Agency's briefings in the
preelection period had been undertaken by working-level officers who, for the
most part, delivered current intelligence summaries in written form. With few
exceptions, the reports and analyses offered by the briefers steered clear of
policy issues. In 1960, by contrast, the briefings were handled personally by
the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and included extended
discussions of sensitive matters.
In 1960, the CIA and its programs for the first time became involved in the
political campaign, sometimes within public view and sometimes behind the
scenes. Issues arose relating to the need for, and the protection of, the US
Government's intelligence capabilities, specific intelligence collection
programs such as the U-2 aircraft overflights, and substantive analytic
findings related to Soviet economic and strategic capabilities. Charges were
made regarding the allegedly selective use of intelligence information by the
White House and the Agency. And, for the first time, CIA faced the question
of what obligation it might have to brief a presidential candidate on a major
covert action program.
The Presidential Debates
Many of these issues were on display during the presidential debates, held
for the first time in 1960. The first debate, in Chicago on 26 September,
focused exclusively on domestic issues, but in the second debate, on 7
October in Washington, Republican candidate Richard Nixon attacked Senator
Kennedy's earlier statement that the United States should have apologized to
the Soviets for the incident in which Francis Gary Powers' U-2 aircraft was
downed over the USSR during a CIA reconnaissance mission. "We all remember
Pearl Harbor," the Vice President began. "We lost 3,000 American lives. We
cannot afford an intelligence gap. And I just want to make my position
absolutely clear with regard to getting intelligence information. I don't
intend to see to it that the United States is ever in a position where, while
we are negotiating with the Soviet Union, that we discontinue our
intelligence effort, and I don't intend ever to express regrets to Mr.
Khrushchev or anybody else...."[31]
In the third debate on 13 October, featuring Kennedy from New York and Nixon
from Los Angeles, Kennedy cited the DCI as his authority for an invidious
comparison of US and Soviet achievements: "The economic growth of the Soviet
Union is greater than ours. Mr. Dulles has suggested it is from two to three
times as great as ours."[32] In that debate and in the fourth and final
encounter in New York on 21 October, Kennedy pursued the theme that the
Soviets were surpassing the United States economically and militarily, a
topic that headed the list of CIA intelligence production priorities.
Perhaps the most crucial foreign policy issue raised in the 1960 debates,
which derived directly from US intelligence analyses, was the alleged gap
between US and Soviet intercontinental missile production. Kennedy charged
that the Soviets had "made a breakthrough in missiles, and by '61-2-3 they
will be outnumbering us in missiles. I'm not as confident as he (Nixon) is
that we will be the strongest military power by 1963." Kennedy added, "I
believe the Soviet Union is first in outer space. We have made more shots but
the size of their rocket thrust and all the rest. You yourself said to
Khrushchev, you may be ahead of us in rocket thrust but we're ahead of you in
color television, in your famous discussion in the kitchen. I think that
color television is not as important as rocket thrust."[33]
During three of the debates, Nixon attacked Kennedy for his lack of
willingness to defend Quemoy and Matsu, the small Nationalist-held islands
off the coast of Communist China. The extensive discussion of the
Quemoy-Matsu issue did not create any direct problem for the CIA, but it led
directly to a controversial dispute between the candidates over policy toward
Cuba, where a popular revolution had established a Soviet-supported Communist
government. The politically charged clash had a number of repercussions in
the White House and at the CIA.
Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. later described the relationship of
these China and Cuba issues and the sequence of events in his memoir of the
Kennedy administration, A Thousand Days: "The Kennedy staff, seeking to take
the offensive after his supposed soft position on Quemoy and Matsu, put out
the provocative statement about strengthening the Cuban fighters for freedom."
[34] The controversial press release, crafted late one evening in the
Biltmore Hotel in New York City by speechwriter Richard Goodwin, said "We
must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro forces in
exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro."
According to Goodwin, the policy statement was not shown to the sleeping
Kennedy because of the late hour; it was the only public statement of the
campaign not approved by the candidate.[35]
The ill-considered statement on Cuba received wide press play and was
immediately attacked. The New York Times the next day ran the story as the
lead item on the front page with the headline: "Kennedy Asks Aid for Cuban
Rebels to Defeat Castro, Urges Support of Exiles and Fighters for Freedom."
James Reston wrote in the Times that "Senator Kennedy (has) made what is
probably his worst blunder of the campaign."[36]
Coming the day before the fourth presidential debate, the statement from the
Kennedy camp put Nixon in what he found to be an extraordinarily awkward
position. Many years later Nixon wrote in his memoirs, "I knew that Kennedy
had received a CIA briefing on the administration's Cuba policy and assumed
that he knew, as I did, that a plan to aid the Cuban exiles was already under
way on a top secret basis. His statement jeopardized the project, which could
succeed only if it were supported and implemented secretly."[37]
Throughout the campaign the two candidates had engaged in a spirited exchange
about whether the Eisenhower administration had "lost" Cuba, and Nixon knew
that the issue would be revived in the final debate, which was to be devoted
solely to foreign affairs. Nixon has written that to protect the security of
the planned operation he "had no choice but to take a completely opposite
stand and attack Kennedy's advocacy of open intervention." And he did attack,
saying, "I think that Senator Kennedy's policies and recommendations for the
handling of the Castro regime are probably the most dangerously irresponsible
recommendations that he has made during the course of this campaign."[38]
Former Kennedy advisers have underscored over the years that the statement on
Cuba was released without Kennedy's knowledge by staffers ignorant of the
covert action planning under way at the time and was crafted solely to ensure
that Kennedy would not again be put on the defensive about Communist
expansionism. These same advisers differ among themselves, however, on the
key question of whether Kennedy himself knew of the covert action plans.
Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen said in 1993, "I am certain that at
the time of the debates Kennedy had no knowledge of the planned operation.
His reference to more assertive action regarding Cuba was put in by one of my
assistants to give him something to say."[39]
The assistant was Richard Goodwin, whose memory is quite different. Goodwin
asserts that, "As a presidential candidate, he (Kennedy) had received secret
briefings by the CIA, some of which revealed that we were training a force of
Cuban exiles for a possible invasion of the Cuban mainland."[40] Goodwin and
Sorensen have both made clear that they were not in attendance at any CIA
briefings.
The US Government's planning for a covert action program intended to
undermine Castro had been approved by President Eisenhower in March 1960 and
was in progress throughout the period of the presidential campaign. The
question of when and to what extent Kennedy--or any presidential
candidate--would be informed of the covert action deliberations was important
to CIA because it raised the delicate question of informing individuals
outside the normally restricted circle in CIA, the Congress, and the
executive branch.
In 1960 this was uncharted territory. In subsequent presidential campaign
years, the Agency's practice came to be one of delaying briefings even on
established covert action programs, as well as on sensitive technical and
human-source collection programs, until after the election had determined who
would be president. This meant denying such briefings to presidential
candidates, creating the risk that they would inadvertently make statements
during the campaign that might embarrass themselves and the Agency, or--more
important--complicate the future execution of US foreign policy.
Well before the Cuba liberation issue came to a head in October, the outgoing
Eisenhower administration had realized that covert action planning on Cuba
could be a political bombshell. Following one of Allen Dulles's briefings of
the National Security Council in early August, for example, the Vice
President pulled the DCI aside to ask him whether Kennedy and his running
mate, Senator Lyndon Johnson, were being provided information on covert
action projects, specifically those related to Cuba. Dulles gave a carefully
crafted answer to the effect that Kennedy was being told a little but not too
much. According to former Agency officials familiar with the exchange, Nixon
reacted strongly to Dulles's reply, saying, "Don't tell him anything. That
could be dangerous."[41]
In his own account of these events, published in 1962, Nixon charged that
Kennedy, before the election of 1960, had knowledge of covert action planning
"for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself."[42] This
charge prompted a formal press release from the White House on 20 March 1962
denying that Kennedy had been told of any plans for "supporting an invasion
of Cuba" before the election. The White House denial was backed up by Dulles,
by then a former DCI, who explained that Nixon's comments were apparently
based on a misunderstanding of what was included in the briefings he had
given Kennedy.
Preelection Briefings: What Really Was Discussed?
As early as 30 March 1960, Edward P. Morgan of the American Broadcasting
Company used the occasion of a presidential press conference to ask
Eisenhower if the presidential nominees to be selected in the summer would be
given high-level intelligence briefings. At that early date the DCI had not
yet raised the subject with the President, but Eisenhower did not hesitate,
saying "We always do that. They did it for me in 1952 and I did it in '56, as
quick as the nominees are named they begin to get it."[43] Indeed, on 18
July, Eisenhower sent telegrams to the Democratic nominees offering them
briefings by the CIA. Undoubtedly recalling his own difficult exchange with
President Truman eight years earlier, Eisenhower included in his telegram a
paragraph saying, "Because of the secret character of the information that
would be furnished you, it would be exclusively for your personal knowledge.
Otherwise, however, the receipt of such information would impose no
restriction on full and free discussion."[44]
Senator John F. Kennedy, the Democratic presidential nominee, immediately
accepted the offer, and the first intelligence briefing was held five days
later, on Saturday 23 July. The briefing was conducted at Kennedy's vacation
home in Hyannisport, Massachusetts, by the DCI alone in a session that lasted
approximately two and a quarter hours. Dulles then briefed Senator Lyndon
Johnson, the vice-presidential nominee, at his ranch in Texas on 28 July.
In that first round of briefings, the DCI put heavy emphasis on Soviet
issues, including Soviet progress in strategic delivery capabilities,
missiles, and bombers, and discussed the nuclear testing issue. He also
reviewed Soviet statements on Berlin and Sino-Soviet cooperation. Dulles went
over the latest intelligence on the Taiwan Straits situation; Middle East
politics, particularly events in Iran; France's anticolonial problems in
Algeria and Belgium's in the Congo; and Cuba. The Johnson briefing differed
from that of Kennedy only because the Texas Senator was also interested in
discussing Mexico.[45]
Dulles recorded that both wanted to know what developments might arise during
the campaign, especially in Berlin, Cuba, and the Congo. Kennedy asked
Dulles's opinion about the likelihood of an early Chinese attack on the
offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits and inquired about the status of the
conference on limiting nuclear testing. Johnson, in addition to his interest
in Mexican and Caribbean matters, asked about Soviet missile developments,
reflecting his position as Chairman of the Senate Preparedness Committee.
At the conclusion of the first briefing, Kennedy stated that in future
briefings he wanted the DCI to cover potential trouble spots all around the
world, but subsequent scheduling difficulties delayed the next (and, as it
turned out, the last) preelection briefing session almost two months. On 17
September, a Saturday night, Dulles was dining with friends in Georgetown
when he was surprised by a telephone call from a member of the Kennedy staff
at about 9 p.m. Could the DCI meet with the Senator on Monday morning, 19
September, at the Kennedy home in Georgetown?[46]
When the DCI arrived with his hastily prepared briefing package, he found
Kennedy engaged in discussion with Senator Albert Gore, Sr., while various
other people, including Prince Sadruddin Khan, uncle of the Aga Khan, waited
their turns. When the other visitors had departed, the DCI had approximately
30 minutes with Kennedy to give him an update on world trouble spots.
Dulles's memorandum for the record notes that he discussed Cuba, the Congo,
Berlin, Laos, Jordan, Syria, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Soviet space
program.
During this second briefing Kennedy was interested in learning what
Khrushchev's objectives would be in his coming visit to the UN and what the
Agency believed the Soviet leader was likely to say or do. The Senator said
he wanted to be alerted to any critical areas that CIA thought might blow up
over the next six or seven weeks before the election, but Dulles apparently
took no specific action at the time to meet this request.
More than a month later, with the election looming, Robert Kennedy contacted
Acting DCI Gen. Charles Cabell to repeat the request for information on
possible trouble spots. This brought a response within 24 hours. On 2
November, Cabell traveled to California, where Kennedy was campaigning, to
deliver a memorandum that discussed a number of potentially troublesome
developments. These included the Soviets' October Revolution anniversary,
Sino-Soviet developments, tensions in Berlin and the Taiwan Straits, possible
Chinese nuclear tests, a Soviet space spectacular, the French-Algerian
impasse, events in Southeast Asia, King Hussein's delicate position in the
Middle East, the unsettled situation in the Congo, and possible action by
Cuba against Guantanamo Naval Base. In this review of explosive international
situations, the Agency cautioned that, in fact, "we do not estimate any of
them are likely to occur prior to 8 November."[47]
A search of CIA records has failed to confirm that Dulles briefed Kennedy on
the status of Cuban covert action planning in either of their two sessions
held before the election in 1960. The DCI's memorandums recording the
sessions in July and September mention Cuba only as one of many trouble spots
around the world. Taken alone, this would suggest that their discussion
concerned what was going on in Cuba rather than what the United States might
be planning to do about it.
An internal CIA memorandum of 15 November 1960 discussing an anticipated
postelection briefing mentions that "The following draft material is much
more detailed and operational than that prepared for the candidates in July."[
48] This formulation suggests that the message on Cuba Dulles conveyed in
July was at least a bit "operational," even if not detailed. Such an
inference would be consistent with Dulles's answer to Nixon's question in
early August that he had told Kennedy, in effect, a little but not too much.
When Dulles met with Kennedy in July (their only meeting before the exchange
between Dulles and Nixon in early August), the planning on Cuba and the
limited operational activities already launched related almost entirely to
propaganda and political action. Paramilitary planning at that point
envisaged the deployment of extremely small, two- or three-man guerrilla
units.
Contingency planning within the Agency for more forceful action intensified
over the next several months, but the idea of a conventional assault by Cuban
exile forces was not put before the interagency Special Group until 3
November and was rejected.
The Missile Gap
In the two preelection briefings in 1960, the most challenging issue the DCI
is known to have discussed at length was that of Soviet strategic
capabilities. Without intending to do so, Dulles had created a considerable
political problem for himself by giving a number of public speeches in which
he asserted that Soviet capabilities were growing and raised the question of
what the US response ought to be. He had highlighted the USSR's progress in
basic science, in training large numbers of scientists, and its research and
development efforts as well as its demonstrated achievements in building
spacecraft and missiles.
In early 1960 the United States was aware of the Soviet missile flights from
the Tyuratam test site, but did not know with certainty if any operational
Soviet missiles had been deployed. In the search for deployed missiles, among
other priority missions, U-2 aircraft had been flown over the Soviet Union
since July 1956. On 1 May 1960, Gary Powers was shot down. In the United
States, the West Virginia primary election campaign was at its peak; there
was no doubt that the U-2 incident would figure in the impending general
election campaign.
In his formal memorandums for the record, Dulles did not provide much detail
regarding exchanges he may have had with Kennedy about the U-2 shootdown. He
did note that the Senator, in the September briefing, had asked him about a
book by Maj. Gen. John Medaris, entitled Countdown for Decision. The Medaris
book had criticized the US government for its failure to replace the U-2 with
a more sophisticated aircraft or an invulnerable satellite reconnaissance
system.
In a memorandum sent to Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, the staff secretary of the
White House, on 25 September, Dulles recorded that Kennedy and Johnson had
separately inquired about intelligence techniques or capabilities to replace
the U-2.[49] Dulles was clearly uneasy about the security hazards in these
questions and noted that he had replied only in a general way, indicating
that research and development work on advanced aircraft and satellites was
progressing "with reasonably satisfactory prospects." Dulles added, "Unless I
hear from you to the contrary, I shall not give any more detailed briefings
on this subject." In fact, the first US satellite reconnaissance system was
being used in an experimental way in the late summer of 1960; it was launched
in August. Significant amounts of analytically useful imagery did not become
available from the new system until December 1960, after the election.
During the preelection period, Dulles was also in an awkward position owing
to a minor dispute or misunderstanding between the White House and the
Kennedy team about whether the Senator should receive a briefing from
Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates. During the preelection period, in the
interest of fairness to each candidate, Eisenhower wanted Kennedy to receive
general overview briefings on the world situation from the CIA, and these
were being provided. On the other hand, the President initially declined the
Kennedy team's request that he receive a briefing from the Secretary of
Defense. By the end of August, however, the White House had changed its mind
and approved a briefing by Gates.
Dulles had weighed in with the White House on at least two occasions,
including once with Eisenhower personally, to urge that Gates brief Kennedy.
The DCI knew that he would be courting political trouble if he answered what
had been Kennedy's first question: "Where do we ourselves stand in the
missile race?" As he had done on innumerable occasions in Congressional
appearances, Dulles insisted that the Defense Department "was the competent
authority on this question."
The White House was obviously uneasy that Kennedy would hear several versions
of the story concerning Soviet strategic capabilities. Democrats on the
Preparedness Committee, led by the uniquely well-informed Senator Stuart
Symington, were attacking the White House with claims that the Soviets were
outdistancing the United States. Gates had been trying to play down the
importance of the issue, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air Force Gen.
Nathan Twining, was emphasizing the more alarmist views of the Air Force. As
DCI, Dulles had been charged with pulling together a collective view of this
intractable problem of collection and analysis, but everyone, including
Eisenhower, knew the Agency did not have the detailed technical intelligence
or the bureaucratic clout to referee the contentious issue.[50]
In responding to Kennedy's questions about Soviet strategic capabilities,
Dulles did not improvise. On this critical and technical subject he stuck
very closely to the findings laid out in numerous National Intelligence
Estimates. During the period from 1957 to 1960, the Intelligence Community
published from two to four Estimates annually evaluating Soviet progress on
space and ballistic missile programs. In December 1957, the Community had
published one of its most ominous Estimates, referring to the Soviets' "crash
program." That Estimate had projected that the USSR sometime during calendar
year 1959 would probably have its first operational capability with 10
prototype ICBMs.[51] The same Estimate projected that the Soviet Union
probably would have "an operational capability with 100 ICBMs about one year
after its first operational capability date, and with 500 ICBMs two, or at
most, three years [that is, 1963] after first operational capability date."
By early 1960, the Community as a whole was using somewhat more moderate
language to discuss probable Soviet missile capabilities, but, nevertheless,
early that year three separate Estimates were published whose findings were
sufficiently alarmist to fuel the missile gap debate. The bottom line of an
Estimate published in February was especially important because it came as
close as the US Intelligence Community ever did to a net assessment. The
Estimate stated, "Our analysis leads us to believe that if the US military
posture develops as presently planned, the USSR will in 1961 have its most
favorable opportunity to gain a decided military, political, and
psychological advantage over the United States by the rapid deployment of
operational ICBMs."[52] The February Estimate went on to observe that the
Soviet ICBM program did not appear to be a crash program but was designed to
provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date. A separate Estimate,
also published in February, stated flatly: "The single-most-important
development affecting the structure of Soviet military power during the
period of this estimate will be the buildup of an ICBM force. Long-range
missiles will enable the USSR to overcome its inferiority to the United
States in nuclear strategic attack capability, as it was unable to do with
bomber aircraft."[53]
In terms of the political debate on the issue, an even larger problem was
posed by the Air Force conclusion that leaders of the Soviet Union were
endeavoring to attain a decisive military superiority over the United States.
This superiority, the Air Force assessed, would enable the USSR "to launch
such devastating attacks against the United States that at the cost of
acceptable levels of damage to themselves, the United States as a world power
would cease to exist." This extremely ominous Air Force view was repeated in
several National Intelligence Estimates--often referred to inaccurately as
CIA products--published during the period. It was shared widely with the
Congress and leaked to the press.
The findings of these Intelligence Community Estimates were having a
significant impact on the White House, the Congress, and the voters. In the
words of Howard Stoertz, a senior CIA officer who often accompanied Dulles to
his briefings of the Congress and the NSC, "Our findings were sufficiently
scary that those who wanted a new administration to be elected were finding
support in our Estimates."[54]
One interesting index of the impact of this intelligence was provided by
former President (and Congressman) Gerald Ford in September 1993. Responding
to an open-ended question about whether he remembered occasions when
intelligence findings had created particular policy dilemmas, Ford
volunteered, "Mostly I remember the period from 1953 to 1964 when I was on
the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that provided the CIA's budget. Allen
Dulles and others from the CIA would come in and paint the most scary picture
possible about what the Soviet Union would do to us. We were going to be
second rate; the Soviets were going to be Number One. I didn't believe all
that propaganda."[55]
The same material that was briefed to the House had been provided to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, therefore, to one of its most
prominent junior members, John Kennedy. Kennedy made effective use of this
intelligence in his presidential campaign, to the discomfort of the CIA, the
White House, and Vice President Nixon--the Republican candidate. Goodpaster
remembers that the politics of the issue became sufficiently awkward that
Eisenhower sent him to the Agency to meet personally with Dulles and
Symington to get to the bottom of the problem. Howard Stoertz remembers well
that "Allen Dulles had us prepare a chart to prove we had not cooked the
books for the election."
Postelection Briefing on Cuba
Once Kennedy had won the election, the CIA felt free to provide him a
systematic briefing on the Agency's covert action programs worldwide,
and--most important--to inform him in detail about the deliberations under
way on Cuba. This took place at the Kennedy residence in Palm Beach, Florida,
on 18 November, some 10 days after the vote. Reflecting the importance and
sensitivity of the subject, there were two high-level briefers: Dulles, whom
Kennedy had announced he would keep on as DCI the day following the election
(along with FBI Director Hoover, his first appointments); and Richard
Bissell, the Agency's Deputy Director for Plans (Operations). Like Dulles,
Bissell knew Kennedy from the Washington social scene and, in his own case,
from a shared New England background.
In discussing the briefing more than 30 years later, Bissell recalled that
"Allen and I felt great pressure to inform the new President. The (Cuba)
operation had acquired a considerable momentum and could not just be turned
off and on. We settled outside on the terrace at a table and I gave him an
abbreviated but fairly complete briefing on the state of the operation. I
went on at least 30 minutes, maybe 45. I was fairly detailed in outlining the
plan of what we hoped would happen."[56]
A review of the briefing papers used by Dulles and Bissell suggests that they
gave Kennedy a careful overview of the Cuba plans as they existed in
mid-November 1960. Their review included an explanation of the Presidential
authorization, signed by Eisenhower on 17 March, for the Agency to undertake
planning. The briefing described the political action initiatives already
under way in which the Agency was providing support to various anti-Castro
groups and individuals inside and outside Cuba. They described the propaganda
operation in place at the time, including the preparation of publications and
radiobroadcasts aimed at weakening Castro's rule. These included broadcasts
from Swan Island, which years later came to play a prominent role in the
Agency's activities against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
The briefing of 18 November occurred in the midst of a fundamental review,
back in Washington, of the scope of the paramilitary aspects of the
anti-Castro program. At that time, everything was in flux. Nothing had been
decided, let alone finally approved. In these circumstances, Dulles and
Bissell planned to brief Kennedy carefully on a range of possible
paramilitary operations.
The first option envisaged the development and support of dissident groups by
the Agency's Cuban assets to undertake antiregime guerrilla action inside
Cuba. A group of instructors had been trained who would, in time, oversee the
instruction of up to 500 additional men, and radio and flight training were
being provided Cuban pilots. The two briefers were to describe all these
preparations, as well as the role of a few small groups already placed inside
Cuba and the airdrops of supplies and equipment that were sustaining them.
The potential second phase of the paramilitary plan to be covered by the
briefers was a combined sea-air assault by trained Cuban exiles coordinated
with the guerrilla activity generated on the island. This undertaking would
attempt to establish a close-in staging base for future anti-Castro military
operations. A last phase, should it be needed, would be an air assault on the
Havana area in support of guerrilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground into
the capital. Mention was to be made of a contingency plan for overt US
military intervention that would include the use of Agency assets.
Bissell remembers emphasizing particularly the plans for the possible
movement of exile ground and air forces to Cuba both by sea and by air. He
recalls that he "put a lot of emphasis on the timing aspects, and the numbers
(of men and equipment) involved." Dulles and Bissell intended to inform
Kennedy that it did not appear that in-country guerrilla actions alone would
be successful in sparking a successful revolt against the regime. It is
unclear whether they intended to brief the President-elect of the even more
pessimistic assessment expressed by some in the Agency that even an invading
force of exile Cubans would be unsuccessful without direct US involvement.
Press accounts of the briefing of Kennedy in Palm Beach indicate that it went
on for two hours and 40 minutes. Bissell remembers that throughout the
extended session the President-elect "was almost entirely a
listener--although a very good listener. Kennedy had a number of questions
that grew out of the briefing, but he had no prepared list of questions ahead
of time."
Available CIA records do not suggest that Kennedy volunteered any opinion
regarding the wisdom, or lack thereof, of the plans presented to him. Nothing
in the documentation suggests that he either authorized the operation or
urged restraint. To the contrary, Dulles stated in a memorandum sent to Gen.
Maxwell Taylor, the President's Special Adviser on Military Affairs, on 1
June 1961 that "the purpose of the briefing was not to solicit the
President-elect's approval or disapproval of the program but merely to
acquaint him of its existence."[57] This implies, obviously, that Dulles had
not previously informed Kennedy of the plans.
As Bissell put it, "We were in an absolutely untenable position until the new
President knew what was going on, but we avoided seeking a yea or nay." He
added that "Kennedy was favorably interested, but extremely careful to avoid
a commitment, express or implied. We didn't get any negative reaction--I was
interested above all in his studious neutrality. Allen Dulles and I talked
about the Kennedy reaction after the fact. We had the same impression--on the
whole Kennedy's attitude was favorable." This shared impression obviously
cleared the way for continued Agency planning for what ultimately became the
Bay of Pigs operation.
Other Covert Programs
Dulles intended to have the briefing of the President-elect in Palm Beach
cover worldwide intelligence operations, of which Cuba was only one. His
records indicate he wanted to establish that the Agency was fully supportive
of the new President. "We made it clear to him that from this time on any
information he desired was at his immediate disposal and would be willingly
given."[58] In fact, Dulles was also working hard to solidify his personal
standing with Kennedy. Senior Agency officers undoubtedly had mixed feelings
when Dulles announced at a special staff meeting on 10 November that "all
liaison with the new Administration by CIA would be conducted by the
Director."[59]
According to handwritten notes prepared by Bissell, he and Dulles also were
prepared to brief Kennedy on a variety of issues, large and small.[60] For
example, one planned topic was the question of clearances. Although the
President would be told that he possessed all clearances automatically, he
should be advised of what was involved in providing special compartmented
clearances that would enable his staff to receive intercepted communications
and other sensitive material. Dulles also intended to discuss with Kennedy
the legal basis for CIA's worldwide special operations. On the substantive
side, in addition to Cuba, Dulles was prepared to brief Kennedy on operations
in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere in Central America.
Agency activities in Tibet were also a discrete item.
The majority of the items to be raised did not address specific countries or
regions. Rather, Dulles planned a thematic discussion of Agency propaganda
and political action programs, with illustrative successes from around the
world. Dulles was primed to provide examples of where the Agency had
succeeded in reducing the power of Communist parties abroad and in supporting
the growth of constructive opposition parties. In a review of what was, at
that time, still recent history, Dulles intended to inform Kennedy of CIA
actions related to coups in Guatemala, Laos, and South Vietnam.
Regarding technical collection, Dulles was undoubtedly relieved to be able to
discuss with Kennedy more fully the progress that had been made with aircraft
and satellite systems to replace the U-2. The DCI's notes suggest he intended
to discuss the existing U-2 program and two follow-on programs. One was the
SR-71 aircraft, then under development, and the other the first imaging
satellite, a film-return system.
Thirty years after the fact, there is no way to know with certainty how much
of the material Dulles and Bissell prepared was actually discussed with
Kennedy. Bissell remembers that the bulk of the time he and Dulles spent with
Kennedy in Palm Beach was used to discuss Cuba. After that discussion,
Bissell remembers that "Allen Dulles and John Kennedy drifted off to the end
of the terrace and talked for some time about matters having nothing to do
with Cuba." Bissell recalls that their conversation lasted at least 15 but
certainly no more than 30 minutes. When shown several pages of his own
handwritten notes concerning the issues the two had intended to raise,
Bissell laughed and asserted that, "Nobody had time to cover everything that
is on this list at any time prior to inauguration."
Records of the Eisenhower White House suggest that Dulles discussed, or at
least was authorized to discuss, only a narrow agenda with the
President-elect at the Palm Beach meeting. On 17 November, the day before
Dulles traveled to Florida, Goodpaster recorded that he had informed the
President that he had discussed the agenda with the CIA Director and with
Gen. Wilton Persons, the White House Chief of Staff. Goodpaster had informed
Dulles that CIA operations were to be disclosed to Kennedy only as
specifically approved on a case-by-case basis by President Eisenhower.
Goodpaster's memorandum confirms Eisenhower had approved Dulles's plan to
inform Kennedy of operations relating to Cuba as well as to "certain
reconnaissance satellite operations of a covert nature." No other subjects
were specifically approved.[61]
Dulles's notes state not only that Eisenhower authorized the Palm Beach
briefing but also that the briefing was given at his suggestion and that it
covered "worldwide intelligence operations." Bissell recalls that the
scheduling of the briefing came up rather quickly. To his knowledge, Dulles
received no guidance or suggestion from the White House on what the subject
matter should be.
In discussing the politics of these briefings in 1993, Goodpaster remembered
clearly the conflicting views the President and others in the White House had
about them. On the one hand, some of Eisenhower's preelection reservations
had evaporated by mid-November. He had issued a directive that, because
Kennedy was to be the next President, "We must help him in any way we can."
On the other hand, Goodpaster also remembers that Eisenhower had some
uneasiness about how far Dulles should and would go in his discussions. The
President believed ongoing deliberations by him and his advisers should
remain confidential, and he worried about the inherent problems of protecting
that confidentiality while at the same time briefing Kennedy fully.
Goodpaster's records indicate he discussed with the President and Senior
Staff Assistant Gordon Gray the "special problem" of Dulles's continued
attendance at NSC meetings once he had been designated by Kennedy to serve in
the next administration. Goodpaster informed Dulles that while the President
wanted him to continue to attend NSC meetings, the proceedings of those
sessions were not to be disclosed outside the NSC room. According to the
records, he had the impression "Mr. Dulles had not understood that this
matter was a delicate one." In 1993, Goodpaster reiterated that "there was a
feeling that all this had to be explained pretty carefully to Allen Dulles."
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
All My Relations.
Omnia Bona Bonis,
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
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