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Click Here: <A HREF="http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/briefing/cia-6.htm">Chapter
3 -- Into Politics With Kennedy and Joh�</A>
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The Mystery Briefing of Late November
A number of books and articles written about the Bay of Pigs contain the
assertion that Kennedy was informed in detail of the planned operation and
gave his approval in a briefing by Dulles in late November 1960. A review of
the chronology of these publications suggests that most authors picked up
this piece of information from the widely read account of events contained in
Schlesinger's A Thousand Days. Schlesinger opened Chapter 10, entitled "The
Bay of Pigs," with the statement that "On November 29, 1960, 12 days after he
had heard about the Cuban project, the President-elect received from Allen
Dulles a detailed briefing on CIA's new military conception. Kennedy listened
with attention, then told Dulles to carry the work forward."[62]
If this briefing occurred, it would be by far the most important in the
series Kennedy received. This would place on the President-elect an earlier
and more direct responsibility for the development of the operation than
would otherwise be justified. In fact, however, the Dulles-Kennedy meeting of
29 November cited by Schlesinger appears not to have occurred at all.
Available CIA records contain no mention of such a briefing. Dulles's
personal desk calendar shows that he had a very full day, with 10 different
appointments running from 9:00 a.m. to 5:45 p.m., none of which were with the
President-elect. It would be most extraordinary if the Director's calendar or
other CIA records failed to note a meeting of the DCI with the
President-elect.
Similarly, there is nothing in information available about Kennedy's
activities to indicate that he met with Dulles that day. The New York Times
of 30 November reported that "The Senator worked at home throughout the day
[of 29 November] leaving only to visit his wife Jacqueline and son John F.
Jr. in Georgetown University Hospital." The newspapers also reported that
Kennedy had met at home that day with prospective Cabinet appointee Chester
Bowles, and with Terry Sanford, the latter visiting to recommend Luther
Hodges for a Cabinet position. Other visitors to the Kennedy home in
Georgetown included his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, Edward Foley of the
Inaugural Committee, and Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico.[63]
In thinking back on the briefings Kennedy received on the controversial Cuban
operation, Ted Sorensen, his speechwriter and confidant, recalls, "President
Kennedy did tell me, much later, that he had been briefed on the operation by
the CIA while he was President-elect. CIA told him what they had in mind and
why in some detail. That was the Palm Beach briefing." Sorensen doubted that
Kennedy received a more detailed briefing by Dulles on 29 November, adding "I
saw him every single day and we discussed the whole range of policy
matters--the foreign issues as well as 500 domestic ones."
Schlesinger was amused that he may have described a critical briefing that
appears not to have occurred. In a letter to the author in 1993, he
recommended that the original draft manuscript of his A Thousand Days be
reviewed to ascertain whether the controversial assertion was footnoted. "If
nothing turns up I must take Rick's way out," he wrote, referring to the
character in "Casablanca" played by Humphrey Bogart. "Bogart: 'I came to
Casablanca for the waters.' Claude Raines: 'What waters? We're in the
desert.' Bogart: 'I was misinformed.'"[64]
An important meeting concerning the Cuba operation, in fact, was held on 29
November at the White House at 11:00 a.m. with the President--Eisenhower--in
the chair. The President-elect was not included. Schlesinger and other
authors, writing a few years after the fact, had obviously learned that on
that date "the President" was briefed on Cuba and, being oriented to
President Kennedy, assumed that it was he who was involved. Indeed, the
meeting of 29 November was an important one. On that date, Eisenhower
underscored that he wanted to continue active planning for the project.
Eisenhower was pushing ahead vigorously; Kennedy was not yet responsible in
any degree.
Soon after his inauguration on 28 January 1961, Kennedy did receive a full
briefing on the planned Cuban operation. At that meeting the new President
authorized the Agency to continue its preparations and asked that the
paramilitary aspects of the plan be provided to the Joint Chiefs for their
analysis. Even in late January, however, Kennedy withheld specific approval
for an invasion, with or without direct US involvement.
Kennedy Visits the CIA
One unique aspect of Kennedy's familiarization with the CIA was the
President-elect's decision to visit CIA Headquarters during the transition
period. He was initially scheduled to visit the Agency's South Building, at
2430 E Street in downtown Washington, on 16 December. In preparation for the
visit, Dulles asked Huntington Sheldon, the Director of Current Intelligence,
to prepare a book for the DCI containing material he and senior Agency
officials should use in discussions with Kennedy.
The ambitious agenda that was prepared for the visit envisaged presentations
by the DCI and eight other senior officers.[65] Briefings were prepared on
the Agency's mission, organization, and budget, and on the legal basis for
its activities. Dulles and others would describe the Agency's relationship
with the Congress; the functions of such organizations as the Watch Committee
and the President's Board of Consultants; and the functions of the several
agencies that comprised the Intelligence Community. The Assistant Director
for National Estimates would describe the estimates process and brief one
specific paper, a recently published Estimate of the World Situation.
The chiefs of the Agency's key Directorates were primed to explain their
roles and activities. The clandestine services portion of the briefing
included a description of clandestine intelligence collection and the covert
action functions. In the latter discussion, the Chief of Operations was to
update "Cuban operations since the Palm Beach briefing."
Owing to scheduling difficulties, Kennedy was unable to visit the Agency on
16 December. The visit was delayed until after the inauguration and finally
occurred on Thursday, 26 January 1961. Dulles's desk calendar notes that the
briefings were to run from 2:40 until 4:10 p.m. In reality, they had to be
abbreviated considerably, much to the consternation of the participants,
because an unintended opportunity came to the President's attention.
For reasons having nothing to do with Kennedy's visit, the Agency, a few
weeks before, had put together an attractive exhibit of materials relating to
the history of intelligence that was located just inside the entrance of
South Building. A number of exhibits were displayed under a sign that read,
"These letters loaned courtesy of the Houghton Library of Harvard
University." The newly elected Harvard man immediately noticed the reference
to his alma mater. He stopped and read thoroughly the entire case of
historical materials, much to the chagrin of Dulles and other waiting CIA
executives.
Kennedy was already frustrated at press leaks from his new Administration
and, therefore, was especially taken with one of the letters in the display
case. Written by General Washington to Col. Elias Dayton in July 1777, that
letter included the observation that "The necessity of procuring good
Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged--All that remains for
me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon
Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it,
they are generally defeated. . . ." Kennedy asked Dulles if he could have a
copy of the letter, which, of course, was sent promptly. The President wrote
the CIA Director thanking him and the creator of the exhibit, Walter
Pforzheimer, saying "The letter is both a fine memento of my visit with you
and a continuing reminder of the role of intelligence in national policy."[66]
Origins of the President's Intelligence Checklist
Within days of his election, President Kennedy sent word to the White House
that he would like to receive daily briefings on the same material that was
being furnished to President Eisenhower.[67] The request from Kennedy came by
way of one of his assistants for transition matters, Washington attorney
Clark Clifford. Eisenhower approved the passage of this material to Kennedy
on 17 November, the eve of Dulles's trip to Florida. There is no record that
Dulles discussed this matter with Kennedy the next day, however, and some
weeks were to go by before there was any organized follow-up.
When Kennedy visited CIA Headquarters after his inauguration, Sheldon
described the current intelligence products that were available to him.
Kennedy reiterated that he wanted to read the publications and designated his
military aide, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton, who was present at the meeting, to
receive the material. Clifton had taken over Goodpaster's role of providing
daily briefings to the new President, although Goodpaster continued to serve
in the White House for a few weeks to help with the transition.
For the first few months of the Kennedy Administration, Agency couriers each
morning would deliver CIA's Current Intelligence Bulletin to Clifton. Clifton
or MacGeorge Bundy would then take the material to the President, reporting
back his questions or comments if there were any. Unfortunately, the
intelligence report was part of a large package of material Kennedy received
each day and was often not read. This left the new President less well
informed than he thought he was, a situation that was soon driven home to him
during his unfortunate encounter with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in
Vienna, when he found himself unprepared to respond to his adversary's
boasting and bullying.
>From the start of the Kennedy Administration, Dulles had few opportunities to
present intelligence directly to the President. In large part, this was
because Kennedy did not hold regularly scheduled NSC meetings as Eisenhower
and Truman had done. In addition, however, there was a problem of personal
chemistry and a generational gap between the new President and the CIA
Director. Agency veterans at the time had the feeling that Dulles may have
been patronizing to Kennedy in his early briefings, and, thus, was not warmly
welcomed to the White House.[68] Along the same lines, Sorensen remembers
Kennedy "was not very impressed with Dulles's briefings. He did not think
they were in much depth or told him anything he could not read in the
newspapers." In these awkward circumstances, Dulles's practice was to prepare
written memorandums for the President on items that he deemed to be of
particular significance, delivering them personally when possible. He also
made personal deliveries when he wanted to bring certain important National
Estimates to the President's attention.
The fiasco at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, reinforced by Kennedy's
frustration at the meeting with Khrushchev in early June, changed everything.
General Clifton informed current intelligence director Sheldon that the
President was reluctant to continue receiving intelligence in the normal way.
Clifton suggested that the Agency would have to come up with some entirely
different way of presenting its information if it were to regain the
President's confidence. He volunteered that there was no point in the DCI
discussing the matter directly with the President as that would be
counterproductive. Dulles took this implicit criticism calmly, possibly
foreseeing that the President's disappointment with the Agency on this and
other scores would lead, as it did in November 1961, to his own removal.
Dulles gamely soldiered on in his attempts to bring the new President the
fruits of the Agency's collection and analysis in the traditional manner, but
it was largely the unauthorized efforts of his subordinates that opened a new
and less formal channel to the White House that would satisfy Kennedy and
most of his successors. In mid-1961 Huntington Sheldon and other managers of
the Office of Current Intelligence--working with Clifton but without the
knowledge of their superiors either at the White House or the Agency--came up
with a new intelligence briefing publication designed exclusively for the
President. Longtime current intelligence specialist Richard Lehman worked up
a dry run of the proposed President's Intelligence Checklist and Sheldon took
it to Clifton for his approval. Clifton was pleased with the trial document,
which eliminated the bewildering array of source classifications and
restrictions common to intelligence publications and presented facts and
analysis in short, vernacular paragraphs.
The first issue of the new publication was delivered to Clifton on Saturday,
17 June, and carried by him to the President at his country home near
Middleburg, Virginia. The first Checklist was a small book of seven pages,
measuring 8-1/2 by 8 inches, that contained 14 items of two sentences each
with a half-dozen longer notes and a few maps. Agency managers spent a
nervous weekend; they were immensely relieved the following Monday morning to
hear Clifton's "go ahead--so far, so good."
Quickly it became clear that the President was reading the Checklist
regularly and issuing instructions based on its contents. Not infrequently he
asked to see source materials, estimates of developing situations highlighted
for his attention, texts of speeches by foreign leaders, and occasional
full-length Agency publications that provided more depth, details, and
explanations. Within a few months, the Secretaries of State and Defense asked
to see what the President was reading. In December, six months after
publication had begun, Clifton passed the word to the Agency that those two
Cabinet members should be added to the subscriber list.
No Agency officer sat with the President while he read the Checklist, but
Clifton was careful to pass back to the Agency the President's reactions and
questions. CIA officials regarded the new system as the best possible daily
channel to a President. The relationship with Kennedy was not only a distinct
improvement over the more formal relationship with Eisenhower, but would only
rarely be matched in future administrations.
Meanwhile, in November 1961, Allen Dulles had been replaced by John McCone,
who served Kennedy as DCI for almost two years. In the early part of this
period, McCone succeeded in rebuilding the Agency's relationship with
Kennedy. McCone saw Kennedy frequently, and the President--more than any
other before or since--would telephone even lower level Agency officers for
information or assistance. Interestingly, McCone's prescience in alerting the
President to the possibility that the Soviets would place missiles in Cuba
backfired for him personally. Although he was right when most others were
wrong, the President did not like McCone's public references to this fact,
and their relationship cooled noticeably.
Editors of the Checklist were especially heartened in September 1963 when
Clifton passed back the President's personal expression of delight with "the
book." A month later, on a morning when Clifton, McGeorge Bundy, and the
Agency's briefing officer were huddled in the basement of the West Wing going
over the Checklist, President Kennedy called down asking where they were and
when they were going to bring it to him. Clifton and his Agency contacts were
also heartened by Secretary Rusk's comment that the Checklist was "a damned
useful document."
President Kennedy's Checklist was published daily for two and a half years,
capturing the regular attention of the President and serving his needs.
Created out of an almost desperate desire to please a President who had found
the Agency wanting, it proved to be the forerunner of the President's Daily
Brief, the publication that was to serve all presidents from 1964 to the
present.
The Transition to President Johnson
The transition to President Johnson was as abrupt for the US Intelligence
Community as it was for the rest of the country. In some respects, it was
also as uncertain. Johnson had received a number of intelligence briefings as
Chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and later as
Senate Majority Leader. He had met on one occasion with Allen Dulles in July
1960 while a vice-presidential candidate, but neither Dulles nor his
successor, John McCone, had paid much attention to keeping Johnson informed
during the intervening years.
Johnson, in turn, had paid relatively little attention to the products of the
Intelligence Community while he was Vice President. Each day his office
received the Agency's Current Intelligence Bulletin, a widely distributed
product that contained less sensitive and less highly classified information
than was included in the Checklist. Although the Checklist at the end of the
Kennedy presidency was being sent also to the Secretaries of Defense and
State and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Johnson was unaware
of its existence. For reasons undoubtedly growing out of the earlier
political rivalry between Kennedy and Johnson, Kennedy's intelligence
assistant, Bromley Smith, early in the administration had ordered that "under
no circumstances should the Checklist be given to Johnson."[69]
On Saturday morning, 23 November 1963, the day following Kennedy's
assassination, McCone instructed his Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, to
telephone the new President's secretary and inform her that the DCI would, as
usual, be at the White House at 9:00 a.m. to give the President the regular
morning intelligence briefing.[70] In reality, there was nothing usual or
regular about the DCI's involvement in a morning briefing, but McCone
obviously believed he needed to take an extraordinary initiative to establish
a relationship with the new President.
McCone was waiting in Bundy's office in the basement of the West Wing when
the President entered at approximately 9:15. Johnson had been an infrequent
visitor to those quarters, which also included the White House Situation
Room, but he was forced to come there for the meeting because Kennedy's
office had not yet been cleared out. R. J. Smith, CIA's Director of Current
Intelligence, was present and talked briefly with Johnson in Bundy's outer
office, writing later that "he looked massive, rumpled and worried."[71]
Despite the irregular and strained nature of the circumstances, McCone
accomplished his mission during that first meeting with President Johnson.
The President expressed his confidence in McCone, who, in turn, reassured the
new President that he and the Agency stood ready to support him in every way.
McCone introduced the President to the Checklist and reviewed with him the
unspectacular substantive items in the publication that day. Johnson had few
questions during their 15-minute session, but he did agree that McCone should
brief him personally each morning at least for the next several days. The
President asked that the Director bring any urgent matters to his attention
at any time, day or night.
The Checklist shown to Johnson on that first occasion was a bulky publication
containing five unusually long items and six additional notes. R. J. Smith
explained to Bromley Smith that the Agency had tried to provide, as
unobtrusively as possible, a bit of extra background for Johnson. Bromley
Smith approved the strategy but added that he hoped the Agency would not be
too obvious in its tutorials. In his memoirs, Johnson wrote of his relief to
discover "on that sad November morning" that the international front was
relatively peaceful and that there was nothing in the material McCone brought
to him that required an immediate decision.[72]
McCone met with Johnson almost every day for the next two or three weeks,
briefing him on virtually all the world's trouble spots and providing
information from CIA files and collection efforts on President Kennedy's
assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. The President told the Director to make sure
that CIA gave the FBI all information and support necessary to its
investigation of Oswald's background.
McCone also used these opportunities to inform the President of a variety of
CIA covert action and technical collection programs, including the successful
effort to build what became known as the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft to
augment the U-2. McCone brought the President up to date on the status of the
program (by that time a number of aircraft had been built) and to brief him
on McCone's discussions with President Kennedy about the advisability of
making the program public. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara had urged Kennedy to
announce the aircraft's existence and Kennedy was inclined to do so. But a
discussion of the political and security issues involved prompted Johnson to
postpone any public announcement of the program. He ordered McCone to get as
many aircraft produced and deployed to the operating site as possible and
eventually revealed the existence of the aircraft at a press conference in
February 1964.
Vietnam
The most significant issue Johnson and McCone discussed during this period
undoubtedly was Vietnam. McCone was straightforward in providing the Agency's
analysis of the course of the war there. Initially, this won him favor with
the new President, who had not favored certain of the steps taken in Vietnam
by his predecessor, but it was to lead ultimately to a falling out between
McCone and Johnson.
On 24 November, a mere two days after Kennedy's assassination, Johnson met at
3:00 p.m. in the Executive Office Building with Rusk, McNamara, George Ball,
Bundy, McCone, and Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge. According
to McCone, Lodge informed the group that the United States had not been
involved in the recent coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem.[73] In fact,
Lodge had instructed a CIA liaison officer to tell the South Vietnamese
generals that the US Government had lost confidence in President Diem, and he
was kept aware of events before and during the coup on 1 November. During the
course of the military takeover, Diem was captured and then killed.
Lodge maintained that the population of South Vietnam was very happy as a
result of the coup, showing the group assembled at the Executive Office
Building some pictures of crowds in Saigon. Lodge argued that the change in
government in South Vietnam had been an improvement and that he was hopeful
about the course of the war, expecting "marked progress" by February or March
1964. He also stated, without elaboration, that there were indications that
North Vietnam might be interested in reaching mutually satisfactory
arrangements with the United States. McCone wrote in his memorandum for the
record that Lodge's statements were "optimistic, hopeful and left the
President with the impression that we were on the road to victory."
McCone presented the group with a much more pessimistic CIA assessment. He
cited the continuing increase in Viet Cong activity over the previous month,
predicting more and sustained pressures from the guerrillas. The Director
pointed out that the South Vietnamese military was having considerable
trouble organizing the government and was receiving little help from civilian
leaders, who seemed to be staying on the sidelines. McCone said the
Intelligence Community could not give an optimistic appraisal of the future.
Johnson stated that he approached the situation in Vietnam with misgivings
and was anxious about calls in the Congress for a US withdrawal. While
recognizing that he would have to live with the results of the coup, he was
particularly doubtful that the United States had taken the right course in
upsetting the Diem regime. He was critical, even harsh, about the divisions
within the ranks of US advisers about the conduct of the war. He made clear
his desire to replace several key figures in the US country team in Saigon
and dictated that he "wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more bickering,
and any person that did not conform to policy should be removed."
During McCone's daily discussions of the Checklist, the President regularly
raised the question of Vietnam. Despite his strictures against differences of
opinion, he appeared to appreciate the fact that McCone's assessments did not
correspond to what he was hearing from others. The President repeatedly asked
for the Director's appraisal of the situation, but the continuing exchange
between the two ultimately proved troublesome for the Director. In large part
this was because Johnson sought McCone's advice on the sensitive issue of who
should "run the show" in South Vietnam and discussed his thoughts on possible
personnel changes among his advisers and ambassadors.
Johnson remarked to McCone that, although he appreciated the work the DCI was
doing in intelligence, he did not want him to confine himself to that role.
The President invited the Director to come to him personally with suggestions
for courses of action on policy that McCone thought wise, even if his ideas
were not consistent with the advice others were providing. Johnson mentioned
specifically that he was not satisfied with the advice he was receiving on
nuclear testing, Cuba, and particularly South Vietnam. The President
questioned McCone closely about the prospects in South Vietnam, underscoring
his desire for an "objective appraisal." The President specifically asked for
any recommendations the DCI might have for modifying his Vietnam policy.
Johnson's confiding in McCone during the first two weeks of his presidency
clearly flattered the CIA Director but also put him in an awkward position
with other key players in the government, as well as with his obligation as
DCI to provide objective intelligence assessments. Within months, events were
to reveal that McCone probably took the President more literally than he
should have. The Director's candor in providing advice to the President
eventually strained their relationship.
The President was not so completely preoccupied with Vietnam that he did not
remember to focus on another enduring problem--the Castro regime in Cuba.
Within a week of becoming President, he asked McCone how effective US policy
was regarding Cuba and what the CIA projected to be the future of that
country. Johnson was especially interested in the effectiveness of the
economic embargo of Cuba and wanted to know what the Agency planned to do to
dispose of Castro. The President said he did not want any repetition of "the
fiasco of 1961," the CIA-planned rebel invasion, but he felt the United
States could not abide the existing Cuban situation and wanted the CIA to
propose a more aggressive strategy. Johnson informed McCone that he looked to
the CIA for firm recommendations.
Initially, it was unclear whether Johnson would return to a system of regular
NSC meetings or continue the more casual Kennedy approach. There was,
therefore, much interest in the NSC meeting that the President called for 5
December 1963. At that meeting, McCone was to brief the group on the Soviet
military and economic situation. He prepared thoroughly for this first NSC
meeting with the new President, bringing one assistant, Clinton Conger, and a
number of large briefing charts to the meeting.
To McCone's surprise, Johnson had invited to the meeting the chairmen and
ranking minority members of the leading Congressional committees. The
Director accommodated this novel approach by quickly briefing the
Congressional leaders on the fact of, and restrictions related to,
communications intercepts, which were to be mentioned during the briefing.
Just as the meeting began, however, there was another surprise when the
President gave a nod and in came his White House photographer. McCone was
aghast as the photographer began shooting pictures left and right. He turned
around with a start to confirm that Conger had managed to turn over a map of
Soviet ICBM sites before the first pictures were taken of that end of the
room. In the subsequent months, it was to become clear that Johnson was no
more enamored of weekly NSC meetings than Kennedy had been. When a rare
meeting was held, however, it normally began with an intelligence briefing by
McCone.
With few formal NSC meetings, much of the Agency's relationship with the new
President came to rest on the briefings McCone was providing Johnson
privately. Unfortunately, these soon became a casualty of the differences
emerging between the two men regarding Vietnam. The momentum of McCone's
contacts with Johnson was interrupted by a trip the Director took in December
1963 to review the Vietnamese situation. It was his second trip to Saigon
since becoming DCI, and McCone was discouraged by what he found. His
pessimism made him skeptical of proposals Defense Secretary McNamara made for
an extended program of clandestine raids against North Vietnam in early 1964.
During a subsequent trip to Vietnam in March 1964, McCone's reservations
deepened, and he concluded that the war effort, even with McNamara's
enhancements, was not succeeding.
McCone recommended to the President a six-point program to reverse the
deteriorating situation that would involve an escalation of US military
actions significantly beyond anything considered by McNamara and Johnson.
Johnson refused to accept the DCI's recommendations. As the President came to
side with McNamara's approach to the conduct of the war, he became
increasingly impatient with McCone and with the continuing differences
between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. By the end of March 1964,
Johnson clearly had lost confidence in McCone and interest in his regular
intelligence updates. In the succeeding months McCone attempted periodically
to restart his briefings of the President, at least on an occasional basis,
but Johnson turned him aside.
In June 1964 the Director informed the President for the first time that he
would like to resign as soon as Johnson had decided on a successor.[74]
Despite his growing disenchantment with McCone, Johnson insisted that he
remain in his post until after the presidential election in November 1964.
Evolution to the President's Daily Brief
Providing the Checklist to President Kennedy had worked so well that CIA
naturally hoped the arrangement would continue with Johnson, but this was not
to be. In his first weeks as President, Johnson read the Checklist and seemed
interested in discussing its contents during his meetings with McCone. After
those meetings stopped, however, Johnson tended not to read the daily
publication.
Observing that Johnson was no longer reading the Checklist, General Clifton
(who had stayed on from the Kennedy Administration as military aide to the
President) proposed the idea of a twice-weekly intelligence report. CIA
managers thought this strategy was worth a try. In truth, they thought that
anything that would catch the President's eye was worth a try; several
formats were offered during this period. They had been dismayed by Bromley
Smith's assessment that Johnson was probably disinclined to read the
Kennedy-tailored Checklist that had been denied him as Vice President.
On 9 January the first issue of the semiweekly President's Intelligence
Review was taken to Clifton at the White House. The next morning Clifton
called Lehman at CIA to report that he had shown the new publication to the
President at breakfast and it had "worked like a charm." At the end of
January, Clifton again made a point of seeking Johnson's reaction to the Intel
ligence Review. The President observed at that point that he found it a
valuable supplement to the intelligence briefings he received and wanted the
publication continued without change.
Although the President read primarily the semiweekly review, his staff
requested that the Checklist continue to be published daily to enable them to
answer the President's frequent spur-of-the-moment questions. With the
President not reading the Checklist most days, McCone decided he would expand
its readership; he obtained permission to send it to four additional
officials in the State Department, two more in Defense and in the Joint
Chiefs, and to the office of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney
General.
The practice of producing two Presidential intelligence publications worked
well through the election year of 1964. The President typically read the Revie
w on the return leg of campaign trips, and his staff felt well supported with
the daily Checklist. As the election neared, however, Secretary of State Rusk
expressed to McCone his concern about the security of the Checklist as a
result of its expanded dissemination. Rusk was worried about possible leaks
regarding sensitive policy issues during the campaign. The DCI was more
concerned about the basic question of whether it made any sense to publish a
"Presidential" Checklist when the President himself almost never read it, but
agreed something should be done.
Meanwhile, during the 1964 electoral campaign, Johnson's opponent, Senator
Barry Goldwater, set a precedent by declining to receive intelligence
briefings. In July, after consulting with the President, McCone had
telephoned Goldwater to offer the customary briefings. According to his
assistant, Walter Elder, Goldwater replied only that he would consider it.
Within hours, an assistant called to decline, explaining that the Senator
appreciated the offer but felt he had all the information he needed to
conduct his campaign. McCone, reflecting a frustration he and Johnson shared,
mused "he probably does; the Air Force tells him everything he wants to know."
Responding to the concerns of the Secretary of State and the DCI about the
circulation of the Checklist, R. J. Smith proposed that the most graceful way
for the Agency to drop a number of the readers of the Checklist would be to
discontinue the publication and produce a new one. Smith observed that the
Agency would maximize the likelihood that Johnson would accept a new
publication and read it regularly if it were produced to conform as much as
possible to his work habits. Because Johnson did much of his reading at
night, in bed, Smith recommended that the publication be published and
delivered in the late afternoon as the Review had been, rather than in the
morning like the Checklist.
Smith's proposal was accepted, and after the election both the Checklist and
the Review were dropped. The new President's Daily Brief, designed
specifically for President Johnson, was delivered to the White House on 1
December 1964. Its fresh appearance obviously appealed to the President. His
assistant, Jack Valenti, sent the first issue back to Bundy with word that
the President read it, liked it, and wanted it continued. Quite apart from
the packaging of the current intelligence, President Johnson--like other
presidents--was becoming a closer reader of the daily products as he became
increasingly enmeshed in foreign policy matters. By mid-February 1965, for
example, he was reading not only the PDB but also CIA's daily Vietnam
situation report, which Bromley Smith insisted be delivered at 8:00 a.m. each
day so that it could be sent to the President early.
In early 1965, Johnson agreed that the time had come for McCone to return to
the private sector. That understanding undoubtedly was furthered by a letter
the Director delivered to Johnson on 2 April in which the Director argued
against an expanded land war in Vietnam and concluded that US bombing was
ineffective.[75] By coincidence, the day that McCone passed the directorship
of CIA to his successor, Admiral William Raborn--28 April--was also the day
US Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to deal with the crisis there. It
was during the Dominican crisis that word was received that the PDB had taken
firm root in the White House. Presidential spokesman Bill Moyers said on 21
May, approximately six months after the PDB had been launched, that the
President read it "avidly."
The PDB process that was in place in early 1965 continued more or less
unchanged throughout the Johnson administration. CIA did not receive from
Johnson the steady presidential feedback that it had received from Kennedy.
The Agency knew, however, that the President was reading the PDB regularly,
and Johnson's aides, usually Bromley Smith, were consistently helpful in
passing back the President's reactions, criticisms, and requests. The only
significant change made in the PDB process came when the President again
reversed himself and indicated he wanted to receive the PDB early in the
morning rather than in the evening. He had decided that he wanted to see the
PDB at 6:30 a.m., before he began reading the morning newspapers.
Those newspapers later provided conclusive evidence that the publication was
reaching the President. Agency personnel were surprised one morning to see a
photograph in the papers showing the President and Mrs. Johnson sitting in
the White House in dressing gowns. Mrs. Johnson was holding their first
grandson while the President was reading a copy of the President's Daily
Brief.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[31] The New York Times, 8 October 1960, p. 10.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[32] The New York Times, 14 October 1960, p. 21.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[33] The New York Times, 22 October 1960, pp. 8, 9.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[34] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1965), p. 225.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[35] Richard Goodwin, Remembering America (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1988), p. 125.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[36] The New York Times, 23 October 1960, p. E10.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[37] Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and
Dunlap, 1978), p. 220.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[38] The New York Times, 22 October 1960, p. 9.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[39] Theodore Sorensen, telephone interview with the author, 19 May 1993.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Sorensen's comments come from
this interview.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[40] Goodwin, Remembering America, p. 125.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[41] Knight McMahan, interview with the author in Hanover, New Hampshire, 18
April 1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[42] Richard Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962), p. 354.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[43] Dwight Eisenhower, in comments recorded by Allen Dulles, Memorandum for
the President,
9 July 1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[44] Dwight Eisenhower telegrams to John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Public
Papers of the Presidents, 1960, p. 582.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[45] Allen Dulles, Memorandum for the President, 3 August 1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[46] Allen Dulles, Memorandum for the Record, 21 September 1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[47] CIA, untitled list of significant developments in response to Kennedy's
request; no date.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[48] CIA, "Draft Cuban Operational Briefing: President-Elect," 15 November
1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[49] Allen Dulles, Memorandum for Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, 25 September
1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[50] Andrew Goodpaster, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 26
September 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Goodpaster's
observations come from this interview.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[51] Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-10-57, "The Soviet ICBM
Program - Conclusions," 10 December 1957, pp. 1,2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[52] National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-8-59, "Soviet Capabilities for
Strategic Attack through Mid-1964," 9 February 1960, p. 2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[53] National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-4-59, "Main Trends in Soviet
Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964," 9 February 1960, p.4.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[54] Howard Stoertz, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 27
September 1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[55] Gerald Ford, interview by the author in Beaver Creek, Colorado, 8
September 1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[56] Richard Bissell, interview by the author in Farmington, Connecticut, 17
April 1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[57] Allen Dulles, Memorandum for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 1 June 1961.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[58] Allen Dulles, My Answer on the Bay of Pigs, unpublished draft, October
1965.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[59] Lyman Kirkpatrick, Diary, 10 November 1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[60] Richard Bissell, untitled and undated notes for briefing President-elect
Kennedy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[61] Andrew Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 17 November 1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[62] Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 233.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[63] The New York Times, 30 November 1960, pp. 1,30.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[64] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., letter to the author, 23 June 1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[65] CIA, "Agenda for President-elect," 16 December 1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[66] John Kennedy letter to Allen Dulles, 10 February 1961.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[67] Goodpaster, Memorandum for Record, 17 November 1960.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[68] Richard Lehman, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 10 March
1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[69] Lehman interview, 10 March 1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[70] Walter Elder, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 21 April
1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[71] R. J. Smith, The Unknown CIA (Washington: Pergamon-Brassy's, 1989), p.
163.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[72] Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1971), p. 22.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[73] John McCone, Memorandum for the Record, "South Vietnam Situation," 25
November 1961.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[74] Elder interview, 21 April 1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[75] Elder interview, 21 April 1993.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Central Intelligence Agency
CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates
22 May 1996
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
All My Relations.
Omnia Bona Bonis,
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
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