-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- an excerpt from: Philadelphia and the China Trade 1682-1846 Jonathan Goldstein The Pennsylvania State University�1978 All Rights Reserved The Pennsylvania State University Press 121 pps. First Edition � Out-of-print ----- Philadelphia Merchants' Final Conflict with the Chinese Government, 1821-46 The increased Chinese militancy toward the American opium trade, beginning in 1815 and culminating in the Terranova incident of 1821, resulted in a major reshuffling of attitudes within the American community in Canton after 1821. Up to the Terranova incident, the basic attitude had been to try and live with the exactions of the Chinese. Thomas Randall, of the Empress of China, wa s perhaps the first American to enunciate this view in 1791: The idea of a representation, concerning the frauds and impositions of the Chinese to the Emperor, would deserve attention were there not the danger of making things worse.[42] As late as 1819, American merchants, not wishing to antagonize the Chinese, had rejected the proffered protection of one of their country's naval units when it touched at Canton. Latimer had expressed the view that "to contend with the Chinese would be madness. If they refuse to listen to our terms we have no recourse."[43] Part and parcel of the American policy of passivity was a willingness to accept those rights and privileges that Britain secured from the Chinese and that were extended to other Westerners as a matter of course. "We will not oppose you," Latimer informed his British colleagues in 1829. "Gain all you can, we are sure to come in for the benefits."[44] The most notable success achieved by this policy occurred in 1842, when the hard-won rights and privile ges which China granted to Britain in the Nanking Treaty were extended to the United States some two years before the conclusion of the first Sino-American treaty. The policy of passivity enabled Americans to present themselves to the Chinese as friends and allies, in ready contrast to the belligerent British, and yet to wind up with essentially the same gains as Britain.[45] In addition to American willingness to accept privileges secured by the British, the American traders in Canton engaged in a delicately orchestrated diplomacy of their own. The supreme caveat in the diplomacy was that under no circumstances should the risk be run of having the Canton market closed to American shipping. All other projects and propositions might be entertained. There was continuous Congressional lobbying by China traders for the upgrading of the United States Canton consulate into more than a ceremonial and unsalaried post. Repeated requests were made for the stationing of an American physician in Canton, attached to the consulate. This demand was fulfilled in 1827 when Dr. James Bradford of Philadelphia took up residence in Latimer's house in Canton and opened a practice. As early as 1821, prior to the Terranova incident, Robert Waln, Jr., advocated in a series of articles in Philadelphia's National Gazette that an American embassy be sent to China and a commercial treaty negotiated.[46] All of these suggestions, insofar as they required Chinese compliance in their implementation, overlooked the fact that the imperial Chinese government would be averse to enter into negotiations with Western powers so long as a contraband opium trade continued, as it did increasingly in the years after the Terranova incident. Latimer took over the opium trade of Benjamin Wilcocks when that entrepreneur returned to the United States in 1827. He expanded both the India and Turkey branches of the American trade, and stationed an opium-receiving ship in the outer reaches of Canton harbor. That vessel, the Thomas Scattergood, cleared some $30,000 for Latimer in the course of its operation. During the six seasons 1822-23 through 1827-28, foreign sales of opium in China annually averaged 8,043 chests, worth $8.7 million. The average of the next six seasons rose to 17,756 chests, worth $13.4 million. In the single season of 1837-38, foreign opium sales in China reached a record high of 28,307 chests worth $19.8 million, or more than double the annual average of the previous ten seasons.[47] The increase in contraband traffic, far from inducing the imperial government to grant concessions to Westerners, instead elicited increasingly militant Chinese efforts to halt the traffic. These efforts, in turn, evoked a heightened militancy among the determined traders who had survived the Terranova incident. American traders reconsidered their previous aversion to American naval involvement in China. The USF Congress had received a cool if not unfriendly reception from Americans and Chinese alike when it touched at Canton several times in 1819. When the USF Vincennes anchored at Whampoa in 1830, Latimer, W. H. Low, and other American merchants informed the captain that "delays and impositions peculiar to our flag" could be easily corrected by frequent visits to Canton of American men-of-war. In a lengthy memorial to the captain of the Vincennes, the American traders advised: Our national character would be elevated in the estimation of the whole Chinese Empire and the neighboring governments, and especial care would be observed by all not to encroach on our rights, knowing that the power to protect the very valuable commerce of our country was at hand to appeal to, and that the appeal would not be made in vain. The fact of your visit, brief as it is, will be known throughout China and the whole Indian Archipelago. Should it be followed by those of other armed vessels observing the same deference towards the customs of China, and conciliatory disposition as exhibited by yourself, they will In our opinion increase the respect for our flag, enable us at all times to resist impositions with effect, and have a moral influence on all the inhabitants of the various coasts and islands in the route of our merchant ships.[48] American merchants were in effect requesting an increased display of what the British called "military presence." In the years subsequent to the merchants' petition, American men-of-war did touch at Canton several times. But far from having the "moral effect" on the Chinese government which the traders desired, the situation in Canton escalated into open warfare. In 1838, the Chinese Emperor abandoned efforts to halt the opium trade through the medium of Canton civil servants. He appointed Lin Tse-hsu, Viceroy of Hu-kuang, as a special imperial commissioner authorized to stop the opium trade in Canton province. Lin arrived in Canton on March 9, 1839. On March 22, he employed the technique of embargoing trade and sequestering foreigners, but this time the objective was the confiscation of all opium in the region. Lin further insisted that all foreign traders post bond consenting to the forfeiture of any of their ships on which opium might be found. The situation remained in deadlock on April 28 when the USF Columbia coincidentally sailed into Canton on one of its periodic visits. Some hostages in the confined foreign community considered the ship's arrival providential, and were bitterly disappointed when the ship's commodore declined to attempt to rescue them, on the grounds that the hostages were too few, and the enclave too well surrounded. The British and Americans subsequently acceded to Lin's demand for the confiscation of all opium in Canton, worth some $12,000,000, as the price of lifting the siege. The British Superintendent of' Trade in China, Captain Charles Elliot, refused, however, to sign the bond. He ordered all British merchants out of the city of Canton and requested British military assistance to redress what he saw as a flagrant violation of free trade. A British fleet arrived in 1840, initiating the Opium War. The Americans, on the other hand, signed a modified version of the opium bond, and by July 1839 were actively re-engaged in Canton commerce, carrying their own legitimate trade plus that of Britain, which more than compensated for the temporary loss of the opium trade.[49] The American decision to acquiesce was based on the twin assumptions of the futility of direct and forceful confrontation with Chinese government officials, and the profitability of letting Britain do precisely that, while Americans posed as friends and allies. S. B. Rawle, James Ryan, and others wrote that the voluntary American pledge to abstain from the opium trade was motivated by their belief in the "sincerity of the Government in their efforts to destroy the trade." When the British expeditionary force arrived in China in 1840, William Waln, unsure of the outcome of a Sino-Western military confrontation, wrote that "the Chinese are making every effort to resist and I do not believe the land force (5,000) sent by England can do anything towards attacking Pekin. That is the only way they can bring the Emperor to terms."[50] Rawle, Ryan, and others petitioned their government in 1839 to avoid military confrontation with the Chinese. But they stressed the value of military presence and diplomatic gestures as means of protecting American noncombatants in the Anglo-British conflict and at the same time obtaining without bloodshed certain key concessions: a commercial treaty; a fixed tariff; freedom to trade at ports other than Canton; compensation for losses incurred during Chinese trade stoppages (as in 1839); diplomatic relations at Peking; and a demand just short of extraterritoriality (that no Chinese punishment upon an American exceed a comparable chastisement in American or English law).[51] William Waln's estimation of the military aspects of the conflict proved to be incorrect. Britain's modern navy inflicted a crushing defeat on the Chinese, who readily acceded to all British demands, including repayment for the confiscated opium. Peking did not have to be occupied. A peace treaty was signed at Nanking in 1842, which opened five more ports to Britain, abolished the cohong, established a uniform tariff, and ceded Hong Kong to Britain. In response to the urgent requests of American merchants at Canton, an American fleet under Commodore Lawrence Kearny arrived in Canton harbor in March 1842, where it remained without engaging in combat until May 19, 1843. Kearny was able to secure for American traders, through direct negotiation with the Canton Viceroy Ch'i-ying, many of the concessions suggested in the 1839 Rawle-Ryan petition and virtually all of the privileges granted Britain in the Nanking Treaty, except for the establishment of a colony. Kearny procured Chinese reparation payments for two violations of American neutral rights during the Opium War. Most important, Kearny helped to lay the diplomatic groundwork for the first Sino-American treaty. He asked President Tyler that the rights and privileges he had secured be codified in a formal agreement. In response to Kearny's request and the lobbying efforts of American traders and missionaries, Caleb Cushing was sent to China in 1844, and incorporated many aspects of the existing Sino-American entente into the first Sino-American treaty, known as the Wanghsia Treaty. In addition to privileges granted in the Nanking Treaty, the Wanghsia document guaranteed Americans the right of extraterritoriality, eliminating many of the jurisdictional questions that had arisen as a result of opium smuggling. In spite of the desire of American merchants that the negotiations with the Chinese be peaceful, there was one military encounter between Americans and Chinese. In July 1844, while deliberations were in progress, a Canton mob surrounded the American compound and marines were landed from Cushing's ship to break the siege. The skirmish that ensued was the first instance of the use of the American armed forces on the Asiatic mainland, although in this case the action appears to have been clearly defensive, and intended to prevent even greater carnage than what actually did occur. In December 1845, Commodore James Biddle brought to China the ratified version of the Wanghsia Treaty and established the first United States embassy in China. The treaty went into effect in April 1846.[52] The End of Philadelphia's Old China Trade While the First Treaty Settlement elicited hopes and expectations for new and expanded Sino-American relations, many of the attributes of the old China trade quickly became extinct. The highly regulated trade through the Canton cohong was replaced by open markets in five new Chinese ports, as well as in the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, which had the finest natural harbor facilities on the China coast. In 1848, regular transpacific steamer service was inaugurated between Hong Kong, the Hawaiian Islands, and San Francisco. The completion of the first trans-American railroads shortly thereafter eliminated the need of sailing around the Capes to China. Philadelphia and other East Coast cities could import China goods more cheaply overland from the West Coast than by a direct sea route from China. An old China trade firm wishing to remain in business after the First Treaty Settlement had to rapidly undergo at least two transitions. It had to expand its Chinese operation to at least Hong Kong and Shanghai, if not to all of the open ports. Most American China trade firms were able to complete this first phase shortly after 1842. Augustine Heard and Co. was the last significant American firm to remain in Canton, and it shifted its headquarters to Hong Kong in 1853. Firms were also faced with the necessity of developing new facilities on the American West Coast. In the case of Philadelphia firms, branches or outlets also had to be established in New York, which by 1846 had become the emporium of the United States, the port which handled virtually all direct Asiatic maritime shipping to the East Coast. Small entrepreneurs could not make all of these costly and extensive transitions. The weeding out of the weak from the strong, a process evident in the old China trade as far back as 1821, took on new impetus as a result of the First Treaty Settlement. Only two firms with strong Philadelphia connections were able to make the transition: Wetmore & Co. (which ultimately succumbed to bankruptcy in 1856) and the dynamic two-man firm of John D. Sword & Co. They competed in a new China trade dominated by a few shipping giants with fleets of vessels and worldwide buying and marketing apparatuses: Jardine, Sassoon, Olyphant, Heard, Russell, and its offspring, the Shanghai Steam Navigation Company. After 1848, just as New York came to handle virtually all the direct China trade to the American East Coast, San Francisco rose to prominence as the major entrepot for West Coast China commerce. That trade pattern remained essentially unchanged from 1848 until 1950, when the United States embargoed all maritime trade with the newly formed People's Republic of China. That embargo was modified as a result of Chinese-American negotiations in the 1970s. American ships once again began docking at the old treaty ports of the China coast, but originating from such new and diverse locations as Port Seatrain and Pascagoula, as well as Philadelphia and other established ports of' the American East Coast. Because of inconsistency in nineteenth-century foreign-trade statistics, it is difficult to calculate precisely Philadelphia's share in overall eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American commerce with the Orient. It does appear, as at least one scholar has observed, that between 1783 and 1846 Philadelphia may have controlled as much as one-third of United States trade with China, and one-ninth of China's total maritime commerce with the West.[53] This determination is based on the fact that from 1804 through 1811 (the years for which the most detailed statistics are available), Philadelphia ships unloaded 38 percent of the dollar value of United States imports to China, or $10 million out of the $25.8 million. In terms of gross tonnage, Philadelphia shipping was 32 percent of total American tonnage in the China trade in the years 1804-11 (20,406 tons out of 62,851 tons). That percentage was a considerable drop from the year 1787, when Philadelphia shipping constituted over 50 percent of United States tonnage in Canton, but was an average maintained fairly consistently from about 1800 to the mid-1830s, when the percentage again began to decline. In terms of entries to the Port of Canton, Philadelphia ships also made up approximately 30 percent of the American total. In terms of composition of cargo, specie constituted 38 percent of the overall dollar value of American imports to China, yet made up 45 percent of Philadelphia imports. Philadelphia merchants' opening and development of the opium trade is all the more understandable in this context.[54] The structure of Philadelphia enterprise at Canton, as has been suggested, closely paralleled the inbred nature of commerce in the home port. The Canton trade of Benjamin Wilcocks, John Latimer, James Bancker, and John Dorsey Sword was overwhelmingly Philadelphia-oriented, toward the merchants they and their families had been dealing with for generations. These men included Girard, the WaIns, the Archers, the Thomsons, Manuel Eyre, Charles Massey, George Jones, and Richard Oakford. The growth of Wetmore & Co. into the second biggest mercantile firm on the China coast was facilitated by the successive mergers of the Canton business of the Philadelphians J. S. Wilcox, Benjamin Wilcocks, John Latimer, Joseph Archer, Jabez Jenkins, and Nathan Dunn.[55] The China trade facilitated a worldwide circulation of wealth. Practically every known port and trade route of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was utilized by the China trade. Sometimes traders like Robert Morris or Ledyard individually attempted to discover new avenues for the China trade. Other times large numbers of American China traders descended en masse on ports like Smyrna, where they established branches of their own firms to facilitate the China trade. Capital circulated continuously from East to West, West to East, creating industrial and social transformations as it moved. American China traders reinvested their wealth not only in stateside ventures but also in such Chinese enterprises as the Shanghai Steam Navigation Company�a joint venture with the heirs of Houqua. They also financed charitable projects in China on a scale comparable to stateside public endowments, for example, the Canton Hospital, established in 1835. Native Chinese merchants also ventured their capital in worldwide investments that included American railroads and the financing of the American opium trade to China.[56] And what of the opium trade-the nominal reason for which the Opium War had been fought? American merchants did keep their pledge to abstain from the opium traffic during Sino-British hostilities, and augmented their fortunes through the carriage of British trade. No sooner had hostilities ended than the illicit trade resumed in full force all along the China coast. Olyphant and Wetmore continued to abstain. But a weak and downtrodden Chinese government, beset with full-scale civil war by midcentury, was unable to put up any resistance at all to the traffic after 1839. In 1858, the Chinese legalized and for the first time imposed a tariff on the importation of opium, hoping to at least gain some revenue from a traffic which had thrived underground for fifty-eight years. A British visitor to China in that year reported that the sale of opium was "as open and as unrestrained in all the cities of China as the sale of hot cross buns on Good Friday in the streets of London."[57] William B. Reed, the American Minister to China, reported in that same year that "at every port, I found Americans dealing in opium freely and unreservedly, and at least one American built, but British owned steamer, with the American flag, plying regularly up and down the coast as a quick carrier of the poison." Between 1875 and 1885, opium was China's single largest import in dollar value. The end of the foreign opium trade to China came early in the twentieth century, when the Chinese government bowed to the interest of native Chinese opium growers and imposed such high import duties on the drug that the Indian, British, and American traders were forced from the trade entirely.[58] In concluding this chapter on the opium trade, and prior to an overall survey of Philadelphia attitudes toward the Chinese, it might be well to summarize the attitudes which Philadelphia smugglers took toward the Chinese race and culture, and toward the propriety of the trade. Although Philadelphia opium traders did exploit the Chinese people by opening and prosecuting a trade in an addictive poison, this treatment of the Chinese was considered by American traders as part of free trade, and did not imply that merchants had assumed a negative view of the Chinese race or culture. The legitimate merchant and smuggler substantially differed in attitude over the issue of respect for some Chinese laws. The opium merchant violated these far more than his legitimate competitor. Yet even in the area of respect for the law, it is clear that many militant abstainers flouted other Chinese laws when such behavior suited their commercial purposes, such as in requesting American military intervention in China. A strong similarity of belief between abstainer and smuggler appears when one considers aspects of China other than its government. A distinct example of this convergence of view was the great respect both types of trader accorded to the Chinese merchant class. Because of the central role of native Chinese businessmen in East-West interaction, they are singled out, by traders and abstainers alike, as a group of Chinese especially deserving of esteem and trust. Such commentary dates from the first U.S.-China voyage of the Empress of China in 1784. Robert Morris and others with an interest in that ship's legitimate cargo were informed by the supercargo that Chinese merchants were "respectable men, exact accountants, punctual to their engagements, and value themselves much upon maintaining a fair character."[59] Similar high praise for the Chinese recurred in the mercantile correspondence of Philadelphians who entered the opium trade after 1800. Stephen Girard considered Houqua both a "correct and intelligent merchant" and "my respectable friend." Esching was "of good repute, very polite, and a good judge of teas." These Chinese merchants bestowed Girard with such gifts as life-size paintings of themselves and lacquered tea chests. Girard prominently displayed these gifts in his Philadelphia counting house and also instructed that they be permanently exhibited in Founder's Hall, Girard College, under the terms of his will. Benjamin Wilcocks commissioned a personal portrait of his friend Houqua. Jacob Waln wrote Houqua's nephew Lin Yan-ken that any package bearing Lin's seal was sufficient assurance of quality. He also hoped for personal visits between the Lin and Waln families, a wish which was subsequently realized in the visits of the heirs of these two merchants to each other's nations. One of Lin's descendants came to America in 1872 as a member of the first official group of Chinese students in the United States.[60] It should be noted that, in the writings of both opium and non-opium traders from United States cities other than Philadelphia, there was also an expression of high opinion for Chinese merchants. William Hunter wrote that "as a body of merchants, we found them honorable and reliable in all their dealings, faithful to their contracts, and large-minded." He singled out Houqua as having "boundless" generosity."' John Murray Forbes' grandson, looking back on the long history of relations between his and Houqua's families, praised the Cantonese businessman as having been "scrupulously honest" in his financial and commercial transactions. So impressive was Houqua's trustworthiness that "his name has come down for generations as the last word in probity, sagacity, and generosity. His painted portrait hung on the walls of many American houses, highly prized as the symbol of all that is praiseworthy in public and private relation s."[62] Other traders published tales of how they were befriended by Chinese businessmen, and a great clipper ship was named for Houqua. When that Hong merchant died, Benjamin Low eulogized his Chinese colleague as being "in every inch the mannered gentleman" and of an "inviolate word," comments which were typical of praise for Chinese traders from Philadelphians and others.[63] Thus far, the views of individuals who were primarily businessmen in post-Revolutionary America have been emphasized. What remains to be examined for the post-Revolutionary period are the attitudes of individuals who may be considered primarily men of arts and letters. pps.46-70 Chapter 4 1. Letter: SG to Mahlon Hutchinson and Myles McLeveen, January 2, 1806. 2. The problem of glutting had been foreseen by Congressman Richard Henry Lee ten days after the return to New York of the Empress of China. He had written James Madison at that time that he feared that "our Countrymen will overdo this business-For now there appears everywhere a Rage for East India voyages, so that the variety of means may defeat the attainment of the end�A regulated & useful commerce with that part of the World." Letter: Richard Henry Lee to James Madison, May 30, 1785, in Lee, Letters, ed. Ballagh. On the problem of glutting, see also Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States (New Haven: Durrie & Peck, 1835), p. 304; Letters: William A. Foster to Richard Ashurst, March 20, 1827, HSP, Unger Collection; Joseph Archer to Jabez Jenkins, November 10, 1833, HSP, Joseph Archer Letterbook, 1; Nathan Dunn to Samuel Archer and I. C. Jones Oakford & Company, October 7, 1829, DL; Shaw Journals, pp. 350-5 1; Speer, Empire, p. 62. 3. Letter: H. W. Boyd to Jonathan Meredith, October 23, 1798; Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (House of Lords), 1821, VII Untie 30, 1820). "Minutes of Evidence Relative to the Trade with the East Indies and China," pp. 88-9 1; William Moulton, A Concise Extract from the Sea Journal of William Moulton (Utica: Printed for the author, 1804), p. 98; James Swan, The Northwest Coast (New York: Harper, 1857), pp. 423-24; Henry Ingram, The Life of Jean Girard (Philadelphia: Edition limited, 1888), pp. 1103-19; Wildes, Mid as, pp. 210, 385. 4. "Statement of the Shipping Employed in the Trade to Canton," The American Museum 7 (March 1790), 128; Thomas Ruston, "Reply to the Above"; "Dr. Ruston's Answer," The American Museum 12 (August 1792), 9 1 - 92, 94. See also Samuel Shaw to John Jay, December 21, 1787, in Shaw Journals, p. 353. 5. For a description of British trade, see Letter: Forester & Co. to SG, November 22, 1822; David Owen, British Opium Policy in China and India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934). 6. Robert Bennet Forbes, Personal Reminiscences (Boston: Little, Brown, 1878), p. 174; Daniel Henderson, Yankee Ships in China Seas (New York: Hastings House, 1946), p. 161. 7. Letter: John Latimer to Henry Latimer, April 3, 1829. John R. Latimer Papers, University of Delaware Library, Newark. 8. Letter: Benjamin Wilcocks to John Latimer, April 26, 1829, Latimer Papers, Library of Congress. 9. Nathan Dunn and Co. employed Dunn, Jabez Jenkins, and Joseph Archer. Wetmore employed Samuel Rawle and James Legee, and Olyphant & Co., James Bancker. Letters: Joseph Archer to George Carter, February 3, 1834, Archer Letterbook, HSP; Nathan Dunn to Joseph Archer, February 2, 1830, DL; Peter Dobell, "Travels in Kamchatka and Siberia," American Quarterly Review 9 (March and June 1831), 53; William Hunter, Bits of Old China (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885), p. 166; James Wetmore, The Wetmore Family of America (Alb any: Munsell & Rowland, 1861), p. 358; CR 5 (January 1837), 413-15; 7 (April 1839), 637; 8 (June 1839), 76. 10. W[illiam] Wood, Sketches of China: With Illustrations From Original Drawings (Philadelphia: Carey and Lea, 1830), pp. 206-7; Enoch Wines, A Peep at China, in Mr. Dunn's Chinese Collection (Philadelphia: Printed for Nathan Dunn, 1839), pp. 10- 11; Dobell, "Travels," p. 53. 11. Letter: John Latimer to Joseph Lesley, June 23, 1847, Latimer Papers, University of Delaware; Ranshaw, "Calendar," p. 23. 12. Mathew Carey, "Essays on the Public Charities of Philadelphia," in Miscell aneous Essays (Philadelphia: Carey & Hurt, 1830), p. 173. 13. Dobell, "Travels," p. 53. 14. For the Chinese legal viewpoint, see Immanuel Hsu, Chinas Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 6-7. 15. Letter: SG to Mahlon Hutchinson, January 2, 1806. 16. Charles Stelle, "American Trade in Opium to China Prior to 1820," PHR 9 (December 1940), 429; Gertrude Kimball, The East-India Trade of Providence from 1787 to 1807 (Providence: Preston and Rounds, 1896), p. 17. 17. United States Congress, Senate, Message of the President (on) Commerce and Navigation in the Turkish Dominions, S. Doc. 200, 25th Cong., 3d sess., 1839, pp. 81-86; Jacques Downs, "American Merchants and the China Opium Trade, 1800-1840," Business History Review 42 (Winter 1968), 42 1; Stelle, "Trade," 430-41. See also Letter: SG to Mahlon Hutchinson and Myles McLeveen, January 2, 1806. 18. Letters: Woodmas and Offley to SG, September 27, 1815; Dutilh & Co. to SG, March 24, 1819; Benjamin Seebohm, Memoirs of the Life and Gospel Labors of Stephen Grellet, 11 (London: A. W. Bennett, 1860), p. 28; [John Step hens], Incidents of Travel in Greece, Turkey, Russia and Poland, I (New York: Harper, 1838), p. 189; David Finnic, Pioneers East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 29; Walter Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 183 1," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1928, p. 67. 19. Hosea Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, I (London: Longmans, Green, 1910), pp. 20 1 -11; Morse, "The Provision of Funds for the East India Company's Trade," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Part II (April 1922), p. 227; Letters, George Blight to SG, March 4, November 21, 1807; Charles Macfarlane, Constantinople in 1828 (London: Saunders and Otley, 1829), p. 33; Wright, "Relations," p. 53; Stelle, "American Opium Trade to China Prior to 1820," PHR 9 (December, 1940), 432-33. 20. Letter: John Latimer to Mary Latimer, March 28, 1831, Latimer Papers, Library of Congress. 21. On opposition to the British East India Company monopoly by Latimer and others, see Letter: An American Merchant [John Latimer], The National Gazette, October 27, 1828; Paul Pickowicz, "William Wood in Canton," EHIC 107 (January 1971), 3-24; CR 6 (May 1837), 44-47; CR I I (January 1842), 1-2. See also Letter: John Latimer to Henry Latimer, April 4, 1833, John R. Latimer Papers, University of Delaware Library. Hunter, Bits, p. 276. 22. W. C. Hunter, The Fan Kwae in Canton Before the Treaty Days (London: Kegan Paul, 1882), pp. 101-13; Frank King and Prescott Clark, A Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1965), pp. 15-131; Benjamin Silliman, Mr. Dunn's Chinese Collection in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: Brown, Bicking & Guilbert, 1841), pp. 14-15; Wood, Sketches; Latourette, Relations, pp. 82-180. 23. Letter: John Latimer to Sarah Latimer, April 28, 1827, Latimer Papers, University of Delaware. Peter Parker, "Thirteenth Annual Report of the Opthalmic Hospital at Canton," CR 14 (October 1845), 450; Friend of China and Hong Kong Gazette (Victoria) 3 (August 7, 1844), 459; (August 28, 1844), 483; CR 14 (January 1845), 5; 16 (January 1847), 5; (July 1847), 346; Simpson, Live s, p. 618; Morris, Makers, p. 99; Thill, "Delawarean," pp. 151,268. 24. Elisha Kane, fragment of a diary or letter, January 24, 1845, Whampoa Medical Affairs, Elisha Kane Papers, APSL. 25. Letters: SG to Robert Smith, January 1, 1810; to C. J. Burke, May 18, 1814; to Myles McLeveen and Edward George, April 8, 1818; George Biddle Papers, passim, 1805-12, Cadwalader Collection; HSP; Wildes, Midas, pp. 166-67. 26. David Porter, Journal of a Cruise Made to the Pacific Ocean, I I (New York: Wiley & Halstead, 1822), pp. 78-83, 144-78; George Preble, The First Cruise of the United States Frigate Essex (Salem: The Essex Institute, 1870), p. 73; Lindsay, Shipping, ILL p. 8; Scharf and Westcott, History, 1, p. 564; White, "Trade," pp. 17-18. 27. Letters: John Latimer to William Waln, October 19, 1815, Joseph Downs Memorial Manuscript Collection, Winterthur Museum, Greenville, Del.; Consequa to Peter Dobell, April 3, 1813, Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, LC; C. J. Ingersol to Benjamin Wilcocks, May 14, 1822, Society Miscellaneous Collection HSP. Te-kong Tong, United States Diplomacy in China, 1844-60 (Seatt le: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 13-16; Thill, "Delawarean," p. 74. 28. Letter: John Latimer to Henry Latimer, April 3, 1829, Latimer Papers, University of Delaware. For other accounts of the bribery procedure, see Letter: H. Lockwood, August 12, 1838, FMC 7, no. 5 (May 1839), 142; and Wood, Sketches, pp. 206-17. 29. United States Congress, House, Memorial of Russell Sturgis, et al., Canton, May 25, 1839, H. Doc. 40, 26th Cong., Ist sess., 1840; Ranshaw, "Latimer Papers," pp. ii-20; Morse, Gilds, p. 79. See also typed copy of a manuscript by Captain James W. Goodrich, NYHS, Goodrich Papers. 30. Letters: John Latimer to Benjamin Wilcocks, December 6, 1829, Latimer Papers, Library of Congress; Samuel Russell to E. C. Jenckes, December 17, 1821, Nightingale-Jenks Papers, Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence; Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 56-57; Latourette, Relations, p. 20; Morse, Chro nicles, III, pp. 318-20; Downs, "Merchants," p. 441. 31. Letter: Charles King to Talbot, Olyphant & Co., ca. 1837-38. Charles Talbot Papers, property of Miss Frances Talbot, on deposit with APSL; White, "Hong," pp. 128-49. 32. Cheong, "Trade," pp. 45-46. 33. Morse, Chronicles, 111, p. 237; Downs, "Merchants," p. 425. 34. Letters: Samuel Wagner to SG, October 28, 1815; Arthur Greland to SG, October 29, 1815; John Latimer to William Waln, October 29, 1815, Winterthur Museum, Downs Collection, Latimer Letterbook, 1815-16. 35. United States Congress, House, Message of President Van Buren Transmitting a Report of the Secretary of State, H. Doc. 71, 26th Cong., 2d sess., 1841; Morse, Chronicles, 111, 318-20; Downs, "Merchants," pp. 425-26; Dennett, Americans, pp. 119-21. 36. The figure for 1821-22 is average of conflicting estimates given in Morse, International Relations, 1, pp. 210-11; Greenberg, British Trade, p. 22 0; John Phipps, A Practical Treatise on the Chinese and Eastern Trade (Cal-cut ta: Printed at the Baptist Mission Press, 1835), p. 313. 37. Most official American correspondence relating to the event was reproduced in United States Congress, House, Message of President Van Buren, H . Doc. 71, 26th Cong., 2d sess., 1841. Other accounts include CR 2 (January 1834), 423; Letters: Edward George to SG, October 1, November 16, 182 1; Edwin Jenckes to Samuel Nightingale, October 21, 182 1, Nightin-gale-Jenks Papers; "Execution of an American at Canton," North American Review 40 (January 1831), 58-68; S. Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom, II (New York: Marlin Co., 1883), 461. 38. "Opium Trade With China," Niles' Weekly Register 23, no. 16 (December 21, 1822), 249-50. 39. Letter: Edward George to SG, November 16, 1821. 40. Letter: William Peter Van Veen & Sons to SG, December 17, 1822. 41. Kenneth Porter, John Jacob Astor. Business Man, 11 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), pp. 613-14, 666; Downs, "Merchants," p. 430; Dennett, Americans, p. 118. 42. Randall to Alexander Hamilton, August 14, 1791, in Hamilton, ed. Cole. 43. Earl Cranston, "The Rise and Decline of Occidental Intervention in China," PHR 12 (March 1943), 23-24; Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations, p. 182. Letter: John Latimer to Henry Latimer, September 30, 1821, Latimer Papers, University of Delaware. 44. Letter: John Latimer to Henry Latimer, November 1829, Latimer Papers, University of Delaware. 45. T. S. Tsiang, "The Extension of Equal Commercial Privileges to Other Nations After the Treaty of Nanking," Chinese Social and Political Science Review 15 (October 1931), 435; Hosea Morse and Harley MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931), p. 134. 46. Diplomatic theory held that the "consul ... is not invested with any diplomatic powers, and therefore is not entitled to communicate with the Government of the country in which he resides." United States Congress, Senate, General Instructions to the Consuls and Commercial Agents of the United States, S. Doc. 83, 22d Cong., 2d sess., p. 13; United States Congress, Message of President Van Buren; Robert Wain, Jr., "Embassy From the United States to China", National Gazette, February 5, 7, 20, 21, 1821; From a correspondent, "Outline of a Consular Establishment," CR 6 (May 1837), 69-82; Letter: John Latimer to Sarah Latimer, April 28, 1827, Latimer Papers, University of Delaware. 47. Forbes, Personal Reminiscences, p. 150; Downs, "American Merchants," p. 435; Morse, International Relations, 1, p. 2 10. Averages taken from slightly different figures in Greenberg, British Trade, p. 220, come out virtually the same. 48. Paullin, Negotiations, pp. 183-84. 49. For eyewitness accounts and Chinese and American documents on the immediate antecedents of the Opium War, see CR 7 (March and April 1839), 599-656; 8 (May 1839), 1-37, 57-83; Fitch Taylor, The Flag Ship, II (New York: Appleton, 1840), pp. 110- 11. 50. United States House, Memorial of Sturgis; Letter: King to Talbot, ca. 1837-38. See also Letter: William Wain to Lewis Wain, August 12, 1840, Society Miscellaneous Collection, HSP. 5 1. United States House, Memorial of Sturgis. 52. United States Congress, Senate, Correspondence Between the Commander of the East India Squadron and Foreign Powers ... During the Years 1842 and 1843, S. Doc. 139, 29th Cong., Ist sess., pp. 21-36; CR 12, no. 8 (1843), 443-44; Dennett, Americans, p. 124; Tong, Diplomacy, pp. 13-16; see also the series of letters between Kearny and the members of Olyphant & Co. in the Charles Nicoll Talbot Papers owned by Frances Talbot. 53. White, "Trade," p. 44. 54. "Exports to Foreign Countries from the Port of Philadelphia," Philadelphia Price Current I (February 16, 1828), 155; Robert Wain, Jr., "Abstract of Philadelphia Trade to Canton," WP; Dennett, Americans, p. 10. 55. Letters: James Bancker to C. N. Bancker, August 24, 1842, October 26, 1846; to Anne Bancker, January 17, 1846, JB; John Dorsey Sword, Business Letters, passim, HSP. Thill, "Delawarean," pp. 114, 262-63. 56. W. Cameron Forbes, "Houqua: the Merchant Prince of China. 1769-1843," Bull etin of the American Asiatic Association 6 (December 1940), 9-18; William Cadbury and Mary Jones, At the Point of a Lancet: One Hundred Years of the Canton Hospital, 1835-1935 (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Limited, 1935); Kwang-Ching Liu, Anglo-American Steamship Rivalry in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 12, 16, 179; Downs, "Merchants," p. 426. 57. George Cooke, China (London: G. Routledge, 1858), p. 179. 58. United States Congress, Senate, Dispatches from ... Ministers to China, Le tter, William Reed to Secretary of State Cass, June 30, 1858, S. Ex. Doc. 30, 36th Cong., Ist sess., p. 357. See also John Fairbank, "The Legalization of the Opium Trade Before the Treaties of 1858," Chinese Social and Political Science Review 17 (July 1933), 215-63; Owen, British Opium, p. 265. 59. Shaw, Journals, p. 133. 60. Letter: Arthur Grelaud to SG, May 16, 1816; Nora Wain, The House of Exile (Boston: Little, Brown, 1933), pp. 3-17; Wildes, Midas, p. 269; Girard College artifacts are catalogued A-2, 2046, R-2046, and #50; China Trade, p. 17, figure 92. 61. Hunter, Fan Kwae, pp. 40, 48. 62. W. Cameron Forbes, "Houqua," pp. 9-14. See also: John Murray Forbes, Remin iscences of John Murray Forbes, ed. Sarah Hughes, I (Boston: George H. Ellis, 1902), pp. 140-41; Robert Bennet Forbes, Reminiscences, 3rd ed. rev., 1892, pp. 370-71. 63. Benjamin Low, "Houqua," in The China Trade Post-Bag of the Seth Low Family, ed. Elma Loines (Manchester, Me.: Falmouth Publishing House, 1953), p. 60. See also the following commentary by American traders on the uprightness of Chinese merchants: "Generosity and Gratitude of a Chinese Merchant," in Freeman Hunt, ed., Worth and Wealth: A Collection of Maxims, Morals, and Miscellanies for Merchants and Men of Business (New York: Stringer & Townsend, 1856), p. 82; a similar account appears on p. 110. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soap-boxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'�with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds�is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://home.ease.lsoft.com/archives/CTRL.html http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
