-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- an excerpt from: Hidden Fortunes � Drug Money, Cartels and the Elite Banks Eduardo Varela-Cid�1999 All Rights Reserved [EMAIL PROTECTED] w/Fabian Baez Michael C Berman;translator Hudson Street Press New York � Miami ISBN 0-935016-00-0 398 pps. � First Edition � In-print ----- Preface THE MAFIAZATION OF SOCIETY "The problem is not so much that there are a lot of corrupt people, but rather that there are so many that the honest are scared of the corrupt." This is how Frank Serpico, an ex-police official in New York, began his narrative. They no longer hide out, but rather attack and accuse those who have not come to terms with them, an agreement they usually call "loyalty." What happens when corruption gets to the point where it controls the police, appoints judges, and runs congress? The corrupt even have their own armies of journalists and lawyers. In Mexico, the brother of ex-president Salinas owns foreign bank accounts containing unexplained millions; he worked with partners in privatization deals carried out by his brother's government.- and, to top it off, an undercover agent of the DEA has connected the accounts with money laundering for a drug cartel. It is impossible to tell the whole story of what happens in Mexico. Let's just say that as the result of an investigation, all the Ministers of a particular state had to resign, all having been implicated in a cartel in the area. A drug trafficker was in prison, and after completing his sentence, he was made director of a bank. It would appear that requirements are not very strict for such a position. In Colombia, there are eleven legislators in jail. Until recently, I had kept a count: one hundred one legislators dead and two hundred seventy journalists murdered. However, it is really impossible to keep a count of the workers who have died and those who are in jail, and those who are not, but who have been indicted. The hero of this story is ex-Minister of justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, the politician who wanted to extradite drug traffickers because he found himself powerless to fight against them in his own country. First, they deposited $12,000 in an account to finance his campaign for senator; then they harassed him for months in congress using their own journalists who accused him daily of corruption; finally, they murdered him. The corrupt have their problems, but anyone who fights seriously against drug trafficking gets killed. Mafia operations to discredit those who work against their interests are impressive and discourage even the most valiant. In Peru, President Fujimori put the Armed Forces to work in the struggle against drug trafficking. First, an army captain asked for refuge and confessed that the army was charging smugglers $15,000 for each helicopter that left with drugs, and then they split up the proceeds. Top authorities denied the story. A short time later, an imprisoned drug dealer appeared before the prosecutor, and the charges against him were such that it took eight long hours just to read the indictment. A lot of people seemed to be involved. A few weeks later an Air Force plane was detained in Canada with 250 kilos on board, and a few days after that, two Navy boats were found to contain drugs. In Bolivia, when ex-President Jaime Paz Zamora took office, he said that he himself did not have a quorum, but that the drug traffickers did have one. He said that he would govern honestly the part of Bolivia that he controlled, but that there was another part under the control of others. In Brazil, I once visited a slum in the company of a legislator and a policeman. We had to ask permission of a gentleman who had a machine gun on a tripod and who let us through only grudgingly. In Argentina, a non-producing country due to its climate, and until recently of low consumption and without cartels as they are known elsewhere, there was a businessman, Alfredo Nallib Yabran. Everybody was afraid of him, and both politicians and journalists were careful not to go against his interests. Some worked directly for him, and others simply wanted to survive. Many know the journalists who work for him; if someone should happen to go against his interests, they immediately attack mercilessly. There is proof of his press operative giving out money at a table in a bar. Three important men of the financial world, a Swiss banker, a Spanish banker, and an ex-Minister of the Economy from Argentina, told me that in 1993 Yabran offered 800 million in cash to buy a majority share of stock in Aerolineas Argentinas. But this is not the most significant fact. Between 1994 and 1995, he managed to get so much control of parliament that he was having a law passed that would have privatized the post office, which he called a "custom-tailored suit." Everyone knew that Yabran would be the future owner of the post office, and the privatization law had a provision that would have authorized him to offer secret monetary services. This means money orders, transfers in Argentine pesos or any other currency, within the country or abroad, without limitation, with a legal prohibition against informing monetary authorities about who sends money to whom, and when it is sent (Article 4, paragraph 5). In other words, in a country without bank secrecy laws, a businessman was going to have the ability, from the post office, to send and/or receive transfers from or to any part of the world, and monetary authorities were prohibited by law from exercising any control. Something like this: Welcome Money Launderers. Come, criminals of the world. A good question would be: Who is the real author of the bill that would create such a singular law? It is actually known that it was one of Yabran's lawyers, but this has not been duly proven. The two senators who introduced the bill understood nothing of its subject matter and they were never even able to debate it. No less strange is the attitude of the Radical Party (U.C.R.), which has been against all privatization's carried out by the Menem government (petroleum, gas, electricity, telephones, etc.), but supported without objection the privatization of the state-owned post office. The internal workings of congress were also notable, in that one year before the attempt to pass the law, several members of the Communications Committee were removed, a necessary step for the bill to get to the floor without objection. Finally, the law was not approved, thanks to the courage of a few legislators who opposed it even at the risk of destroying their political careers, Minister of the Economy Cavallo, who called things as he saw them, and the dignity of ex-President Raul Alfonsin, who, embarrassed by the orgy of corruption among parliamentarians, ordered a vote against it. The climate of impunity and resignation is such that all those legislators continue enjoying high prestige as politicians, as if nothing had happened. Some time later, in January, 1997, news photographer Jose Luis Cabezas was killed, apparently on the orders of Yabran, and the radicals accused Menem supporters of being Yabran's partners. They may not have been very far off, for when the FBI brought in Excalibur, it was discovered that more than 500 telephone calls had been made between Yabran and various of Menem's ministers and legislators, including calls to the President's own residence. Money gets laundered in all countries, but in few has criminal control of congress been so evident. The United States makes reports, certifies or decertifies, in accordance with its belief regarding the way a country is cooperating in the war on drugs, but within its borders it shows just as many contradictions as the other countries mentioned. The Bank of Boston laundered $1.2 billion over five years, while at the same time it went through an inspection by a representative of the Treasury Department; the inspector was a fool. The bank pled guilty and paid a fine of $500,000. Now it has just been discovered that the money laundered by Raul Salinas de Gortari went through Citibank of New York and its subsidiaries in London, Switzerland, and Mexico, using investment funds that lend out money to the very countries from which it has been collected. If we divide the world between the winners and losers, without asking how, we create an unmerciful and amoral philosophy of life. In defense of this position, the road taken by a large segment of society is a nihilistic ethic. "I don't get involved and I survive." What occurred during totalitarian periods under the communists and the Nazis is occurring again within the circles of corruption. Who would dare to have denounced Stalin or Hitler? Although totalitarianism does not reign today, the armies of corrupt politicians, journalists and lawyers can generate the same type of intimidation. The lawyers of the Mafia write books in the United States and produce television programs which hail the United States as a great country. But those who die (the losers) in the clutches of their clients (the winners) writ e no such books. Meanwhile, publicly, this whole process is being framed as a war on drugs. The residual discourse from this "war on drugs" has become a political exposition; however, none of the politicians in power explain what road we should follow to really exterminate this problem. Only between 5 and 10% of the drugs and between 2 and 3% of laundered money is seized. The problem of drugs and its resulting institutional corruption has been explained again and again. But what is the solution? More war? There are 1,300,000 people in prison in the United States, 59% of whom are tied directly to drugs. How many people are we going to put in jail? To the above figure, we need to add 2,700,000 more who are either out on bail or on probation. The Mafia bosses die of old age in their mansions; the prisoners are drivers, prostitutes, minor gunmen who cannot afford a good lawyer. But the lawyer of the BCCI was Clark Clifford, probably one of the most important lawyers in Washington, aide to President Truman (1948-1952), and Secretary of Defense under President Johnson. Money laundering is going to be the most important political topic in the next few years. In a meeting of the Latin American Parliament in 1991, a Uruguayan lawmaker voted in favor of a proposal to fight drug trafficking, but against one that opposed money laundering. For that legislator, drugs were bad and he did not want them in his country, but let the money come. The same discussion took place in the House of Lords in the United Kingdom. They would not allow opium to come in, but money from the sale of opium was welcome. A famous Argentine journalist said repeatedly: "It doesn't matter where the money comes from, only where it goes," perhaps convinced that the traffickers were going to give it to him to buy radio stations to put on democratic programs criticizing corruption. REAL POWER AND APPARENT POWER Under capitalism, real power is concentrated in the hands of the few. Moreover, with the rise in technology, unemployment and gaps in opportunity have increased. The establishment wants neither to socialize nor democratize its. power. However, drugs cannot become a vehicle of social mobility and power. The millionaires want politicians to remain in office only a short time, with no chance of threatening their fortune or their power; then they want another inexperienced politician to enter the political arena for another short while. Although the politicians can argue the newspapers, the real power, the permanent power, is money, which is something else entirely. The debate over how to approach this situation is an important one. It is clear, however, that we cannot attempt to challenge the power of drug traffickers or money launderers by playing their game. That is, we cannot fight fire with fire, or in this case, money with money. Society would perish, strangled between the old establishment and the new Mafia. The story of Robert Kennedy's struggle against the Mafia is noteworthy. Kennedy had the infamous drug trafficker of New Orleans, Carlos Marcelo, exiled for two years. There is now evidence that indicates that Kennedy was one of the persons whom Marcelo marked for death. Marcelo died of old age at 83 in his mansion. So was Bobby Kennedy a loser and Marcelo a winner? Marcelo's lawyer wrote a book (Mob Lawyer), in which he basically concluded that if you want to be a politician, first make friends with a crime boss. Are politicians who adopt the alternative destined for transitory, unreal, and superficial power? Or to be cynical, must they be unscrupulous friends of the Mafia? Is this the only way to approach election campaigns? Where will this road of political incredulity take us? If a politician wants to be decent, how long before organized crime chokes him? Is it possible that anyone in Colombia believed that the minister of justice could have been bought for $12,000? Nevertheless, Lara Bonilla passed the last months of his life declaring that he had not endorsed the check. The journalist who was attacking him was the spokesman of the cartel, with a direct line to Pablo Escobar. This book will perhaps shed light on events that perhaps you were not familiar with. It supports the view that if we do not rethink this war on drugs, we will never win, or that there really never has been such a war, only maneuvers to increase prices. In sum, if we know we are in a war in which we know we will not win, why don't we try another approach to the problem? This war is full of heroes who have sacrificed their lives. It is also full of unserving bureaucrats and dozens of security organizations who waste the majority of their time fighting amongst themselves, perhaps trying to secure a bigger budget for themselves or increase the boundaries of their power. The police do their best to confiscate kilos of drugs, which go into tediously calculated statistics. All this takes place as if they did not know that the person whom they just arrested with the drugs is unimportant, that if he were important, then he would not have been there with the drugs in the first place. He is a driver or a triggerman. Is the Mafiazation of society inevitable? When Jose Oberholzer was vice president of the Union Bank of Switzerland, he advised many Latin American clients, among them Raul Salinas de Gortari. In the shady game of moving money, he helped create fronts in order to conceal the real origin of the funds. Now Oberholzer finds himself charged with laundering $150 million of the Medellin cartel's money. He was arrested by police in Canton de Vaud, Switzerland in February, 1994, together with Sheila Arana de Nasser, wife of Julio Cesar Nasser David, an operative of Pablo Escobar, the late leader of the Medellin cartel. Two months after his arrest, upon the request of the United States under the Legal Mutual Assistance Treaty, Swiss Authorities confiscated the $150 million.[1] A judge of Canton de Vaud, Jackes Antenen said that "this is the biggest confiscation of drug money in Swiss history." According to the DEA, David Nasser smuggled more than 25 tons of cocaine into the United States. Consequently, the police continued to look for another $755 million. Dieter Jann Cerrodi, the Swiss detective who continued with the investigation, accused Oberholzer of laundering money which originated in Latin America. The Swiss attorney general confirmed this accusation. Oberholzer after spending 48 hours in jail, remained under house arrest. However, the judge, considering the Swiss Penal Code of 1990, predicted that "maybe they'll give him a few months in jail." BETWEEN OPERATION CASABLANCA AND THE BANK OF BOSTON It looked like a meeting of more than a dozen rich and well-dressed business executives, who had traveled on their private jets to discuss some important agreement over dinner at a casino. After dinner, a convoy of limousines arrived from across 80 miles of desert to take the "executives" from the Casablanca Casino Resort, in Mesquite, Nevada, to Las Vegas, where they were to spend the night. But the vehicles crossed the brightly lit streets at high speed and returned to the highway, where police in patrol cars signaled them to pull over. Victor Manuel Alcala Navarro's chauffeur lowered the window that separated him from the passangers[sic] and offered this excuse: "I'm sorry. I'm afraid I was speeding." Alcala Navarro, presumably the most important money launderer of the most powerful drug cartel of Mexico, looked through his window at the group of civilian dressed agents that was coming toward the car and said, I believe that this is something more than a speeding ticket." The haul of limousines brought in on that Saturday night in the suburbs of Las Vegas�as it was described on Tuesday by U.S. Customs agents familiar with the operation�was part of what prosecutors describe as the biggest case of money laundering in the history of the U.S., which for the first time tied the Mexican banking system to the laundering of drug smuggling profits. The three year operation, directed by the U.S. Customs Service, implicated some of the largest and most prestigious banks in Mexico and penetrated the drug cartel in Juarez. Details of the operation, in which more arrests were made on Tuesday, surprised Mexican prosecutors, politicians, and financiers, none of whom were informed about the operation until the formal announcement was made from Washington on Monday. While Mexican and U.S. authorities had tried in the past to bring people involved in specific cases of money laundering to justice, and had documented the extensive corruption existing within political and justice circles in Mexico, never before had any government put together an investigative team that tried to document systematic corruption based on drug trafficking in Mexican financial institutions. American authorities indicated that the investigation could involve up to $152 million, in no fewer than one hundred bank accounts in the U.S., Europe, and the Caribbean. This is nothing, of course, compared to the $1.2 billion that the Bank of Boston laundered, but this money had come from outside the U.S., so was considered to be much more serious. Operation Casablanca started three years ago as a small-scale investigation that attempted to "locate and infiltrate those who were invisible to us." That is to say, entrepreneurs who moved millions of dollars in profits through complex financial paths that converted the cash into earnings from apparently legitimate businesses, as explained by an important supervisor from the Customs Service who led the operation. The operation really got under way when undercover agents set up a front, a business they called Emerald Empire Corporation, with offices in the Los Angeles suburb of Santa Fe Springs, according to the indictment presented in the federal court of that city on Monday. Agents who passed for executives of the company had gone looking for Mexican banks willing to accept their "dirty money." The fact that the money was always clearly identified as drug profits was never a reason for Mexican bankers to refuse it; the only matter discussed involved the commission to be paid to the banks for handling the money. The figure most often cited was around four per cent of the amount of the transaction. The supposed drug money was deposited later in Mexican bank accounts under false company and individual names. After the deposit was made, a corrupt bank official, sometimes a branch vice president or a division head, would call an unsuspecting colleague in an American branch of the same bank to say that he had approved a transfer of money involving the false individual or company. Alcala Navarro, who quickly realized that he had been caught there at the side of the highway on that Saturday night in Las Vegas, was one of the best contacts for the undercover agents, as the indictment points out: "Alcala Navarro was able to locate bankers who worked for banks headquartered in Mexico and ask for their help in laundering money representing profits from the ilicit sale of narcotics" and played a key role in recruiting other bankers, according to the indictment. The indictment describes a series of meetings between Alcala Navaro and Justice Department informants and undercover agents in which they presumably arranged for the laundering of tens of millions of dollars on behalf of the Juarez cartel and the cocaine and heroine Mafia of Cali. The indictment recounts a series of six money transfers that totaled six million dollars that were initiated by Alcala Navarro and which were deposited by money order in the Mexican bank Banorte between November 11 and December 16, 1997. Morover[sic], the indictment lists dozens of deposits that exceeded $10,000, which by law should have been reported as suspicious, but which were not. The side of the deposits varied between $32,000 and $3.9 million. The indictment further states that on August 29, 1997, Alcala Navarro, in a meeting with drug traffickers and an undercover agent, sketched out the close ties between people from the Juarez cartel-including its one-time boss Amado Carrillo Fuentes�with "high-level Mexican authorities." At the same time that U.S. prosecutors were looking into the involvement of Mexican banks, they were carrying out a parallel investigation of the biggest and most influential drug Mafia of Mexico, the Juarez cartel, which had been led by Carrillo Fuentes up until his mysterious death during a plastic surgery operation last July. These were not people dressed in brightly colored tee shirts with their hair greased back. They looked like well-dressed businessmen with diplomas from top-notch schools. They traveled throughout the United States, Europe, and South American, dressed well and eating and staying in the finest hotels�a whole enterprise. These were the same men who were invited by undercover agents to spend a business weekend discussing and closing deals, while having a good time at the Casablanca Casino Resort. The customs agents chose their Mexican contacts very carefully, so that they would mix easily in a meeting of this type. Some of them arrived at the private airstrip near the casilno[sic] in jets belonging to the Customs Service, thinking they were the property of Emerald Empire. The men were later arrested and taken by limousines supplied by the U.S. government. Immediately following the arrest in Las Vegas of Victor Alcala Navarro, the "right hand man" of the financial director of the Juarez cartel, Jose Alvarez Tostado, the U.S. urged Mexico to arrest Tostado as being involved in the scandal made public on Monday. The acting U.S. prosecutor in Los Angeles, Julie Shemitz, told the New York Times that American authorities had never "shared any information with Mexico during the investigation for fear of risk to the safety of their undercover agents." Shemitz said, "It is not that we don't believe the Mexicans. In reality we did not speak with anybody. These kinds of operations are so dangerous that we can end up playing with the lives of the agents. Those first arrested were kept in jail until Tuesday, the twenty-sixth, when they were formally indicted. They were accused of laundering amounts of money between $212,000 and $19 million from drug trafficking. Judge Rosalyn Champan decided that they should remain in custody because they had few financial or family ties in Southern California that might reduce their risk of flight. She added that she would consider later on the possibility of bond. More than one hundred people are included in the indictment presented on that Monday concerning money laundering in six countries. Operation Casablanca pointed to employees of twelve of the largest nineteen Mexican banks. The case will produce a number of trials that may go on for months. In the first stage, $35 million were captured, but it is hoped that another $122 million can be seized in bank accounts in the U.S. and other countries. The first eight people indicted, all Mexican nationals, are facing money laundering and conspiracy charges, and if convicted, could be subject to life imprisonment. Only one of those indicted denied the charges immediately. Jose Angel Cazares' attorney requested dropping of charges against his client, claiming that authorities lacked probable cause to arrest him. The Magistrate dismissed his request "without prejudice," which means that it may be brought up again later. In spite of supposedly having received juicy commissions for helping to hide the origin of drug money, the eight people appeared before the Los Angeles federal court and made sworn statements that they did not have the economic resources to pay for their own defense; thus, they were assigned public defenders. The U.N. Office of Drug Inspection and Crime Prevention held a seminar under the auspices of Bolivian organization, the United Nations, and the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Citibank. (This was the same bank which supposedly is being investigated for laundering the money of Salinas de Gortari and the Juarez Cartel, an investigation rarely mentioned.) The Panamanian Association of Banks (Apabancos) jumped the gun and announced that it would come out clean from any association with the Mexican "scandal," although there had been no indication that Panama was involved. The U.S. government announced that Operation Casablanca reached Venezuela with the bringing of charges against five employees of four banks of that country. Those five were accused of laundering $9.5 million through the Banco del Caribe, Banco Industrial de Venezuela, International Finance Bank and Banco Consolidado. Three of the five who were arrested were identified as Carmen Salima Irigoyen, Esperanza de Saad and Carlos Izurieta Valery. The other two are Roberto Vivas and Marco Tulio Henriquez, who were in Venezuela, according the Justice Department. Would it not be cheaper just to investigate the banks that did not launder money? These days we are witnessing an international spectacle of institutionalized cynicism. Undercover agents of the U.S. Border Police were able to infiltrate drug traffickers and money launderers from Mexico and Venezuela. Everything was carefully filmed and recorded, and in all recordings it was made clear that the money came from drugs; however, the bankers at no point expressed the least concern at that fact, preferring to limit discussions to their commissions. A U.S. government agency, working surreptitiously in other countries, and using a subterfuge, was able to bring the bankers to the U.S. and put them in jail. Power is what matters. Only the United States can do something like that. Not because the U.S. is better, but because it has greater power. The Bank of Boston laundered $1.2 billion for the drug trafficker Angiulo, but his drugs came from outside the country. Following this criteria, it would have been possible to invite the president of the Bank of Boston to Mexico and put him in jail there. But no one could imagine that scenario; such a procedure would open up mechanisms of reprisal that are available only to those in power. How did the investigation of Citibank, Raul Salinas, and Confidas end up? IBM In 1995, it was discovered in Argentina that IBM, in order to sell a computer system to the Banco Nacion, had paid $34 million in bribes to various officials of the bank. The Minister of Economy at that time, Domingo Cavallo, provided information to the Argentine judge that made it possible to detect the funds in distant accounts in Swiss banks and in Luxemburg, where the corrupt officials had sacked away their money. After the investigation, several ex-employees of the bank and the local branch of IBM were imprisoned. The problem became apparent when it was discovered, during the same investigation, that there were four employees of the main office of IBM in the United States that had the same responsibility: two Brazilians, Robeli Libero and Marcio Kaiser, an Australian, Peter Rowley, and the American Steve Lew. The Argentine judge asked Interpol to arrest them. The home office of IBM came to the defense of its corrupt executives. It is strange that the Department of State, which so often complains about corruptio n, repeated the same tired speech given by the corrupt company. In the United States, they make a sport of talking about corruption in Latin America, but just wait until it appears among top executives of the U.S. Even before the judge requested it, the Department of State spoke out against any order for international capture. IBM had been in first place internationally in terms of trustworthiness. Now, with the support of the U.S. government, it was determined to sabotage justice in a country where it had made a lot of money, using strategies against the laws of Argentine and the U.S. It was also posed to ignore an international legal order, with the support of its own government. In other words, IBM was acting just like the Bank of Boston, only a little smaller. The message given to South Americans would be: If you want to bribe, don't do it among yourselves, hurting our interests; if you want to launder money, don't you do it in detriment to our banks, but let us do it, because we have a special patent. Since 1977, the United States has had a law against Foreign Corrupt Practices. An executive of an (American) multinational who bribes a foreigner will be tried in the United States. Argentine Senator Leopoldo Moreau stated that "The speed with which the North American Department of justice reacted to. the request from Argentine prosecutors contrasts with the slowness with which the organization acted on the matter of providing information to Judge Banasco concerning bribe money deposited in American bank accounts. --[notes]� 1 Charles Intrago, Money Laundering Alert. This is a specialized monthly bulletin published out of Miami. Colombia: The Culture of Death The origin of the Antioquians goes back to the era of the Conquest, when the Catholic Kings of Spain expelled the Moors and demanded that any Jews wishing to remain in Spain convert to Catholicism. Many Jews preferred to flee the Old World and arrived in this region in central Colombia, changing their surnames. Therefore, they were called "transplanted Jews." The Antioquians have particular characteristics that differentiate them from other Colombians. One such trait is their great affinity for activities related to trade. Another is their devotion to the breeding of pure-bred horses. Because of its geographical position, Colombia is a bridge between large consumer markets and drug-producing regions. This "privileged" position for drug trafficking, as well as its social environment of dispossession and poverty, made Colombia a sitting duck for the flourishing of organized crime. And so, Colombia played host to these organizations, where their bases of power were established. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soap-boxing! 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