The Thousand Conspiracy - Secret Germany Behind the Mask
Paul Winkler
Charles Scribner�s Sons�1943
New York
381 pps. � First Edition � Out-of-print
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"I know no way of judging the future but by the past."
PATRICK HENRY
[Speech at the Virginia Assembly, May 17651
--[3a]--
--."[* The expression "people" employed by Bismarck in his discourse is
actually a euphemism�designating that mass of Landjunkers who alone opposed
realization of the democratic plan of 1848, rather than the true people, who
had supported this plan. When he speaks of the "Prussian army," he obviously
refers to the body of officers who, in their entirety, stem from the Junker
class. As for the spirirt of "South German insubordination," which he
vigorously opposes, this is, in reality, the Christian and humanitarian
spirit, respecting the "rights of man" which Bismarck and the Junkers
considered contrary to Teutonic traditions.]--
CHAPTER III
PRUSSIA COMES UP IN
THE WORLD
THE KNIGHT OFFICIALS, the real leaders of the Teutonic Order, maintained
their positions. The Junkers preserved their privileges. The secret societies
* undertook the task of keeping alive the mysticism and the "conspirational"
aspect of the Order. It may therefore be said that all the traditions of the
Teutonic Knights fully survived in the Duchy, and later in the Kingdom of
Prussia. [* We shall see at work the many subordinate organizations which
these secret societies found it useful to create in the period 1918-1933.]
The family branch of Duke Albert died out in 1618. The Prussian heritage
passed to another Hohenzollern, the Elector of Brandenburg, who was
henceforth to rule over both countries. He was, as Margrave of Brandenburg,
under the Emperor, and as Duke of Prussia, a vassal to the King of Poland.
But the Electors who followed were much more concerned with being rulers of
Prussia than of Brandenburg.
The Order's Traditions Survive in Diplomacy and Warfare
These electors no doubt wished to take advantage of the numerous traditions
of the Order which had survived in Prussia as well as of the unique tie-up of
interests between the Junker organizations and the caste of officials. They
felt that they might carry out much more ambitious plans thus than if they
built their reign around the dull heritage of Brandenburg, whose history was
hardly different and no more interesting than that of most of the other
German principalities.
Frederick William I, who was named the "Great Elector," contributed a great
deal to the maintenance and development of this Prusso-Teutonic tradition. H.
Bauer (in Schwert im Osten, 1932) comments on this with characteristic
enthusiasm: "In the creation of the Brandenburg-Prussian State by the Great
Elector Frederick William I, the State concept which had existed in the old
Order's State was revived. The moral strength of the officialdom and of the
army of the Order was given new life. Under Frederick the Sword in the East
was raised in the old Prussian spirit of hardness, obedience and duty-the
Sword through which the Reich (the age-old dream of all Germans) would be
created anew."
During the wars between Poland and Sweden, the Great Elector, alternately
siding with each of these countries, manoeuvred with a duplicity so ingenious
that he finally succeeded in having the complete independence of the Duchy of
Prussia recognized by both countries. Later, under his son, Frederick,
Brandenburg and the Duchy were transformed into the "Kingdom of Prussia."
Frederick chose this latter name because as sovereign of Brandenburg he would
have been vassal of the Emperor. But at the same time, by calling himself
"King of Prussia," he showed his intention of remaining faithful to Prussian
traditions. His sovereignty for this reason received the support of the
powerful ruling class composed of Prussian officials, descendants of the
Knights and affiliates of the Junkers.
His son Frederick II, named Frederick the Great, increased the power of
Prussia through aggressive wars, thus preserving cherished old-Prussian
principles. He attributed these wars in his personal memoirs simply to
ambition. All the wars fought by the great Elector and Frederick the Great
were wars of their own choice, as von Bernhardi stated in words previously
quoted: "Of all the wars through which he [Frederick II] led his people, not
one was forced upon him." These men acted for the sole purpose of constantly
extending the power of the Prussian State-just as the activities of the Grand
Masters had been devoted solely to continuous expansion of the territory of
the Order's State. Both were supported by the same feudal privileged class,
whose modes of living had varied little during the course of centuries.
No German Unity Without Junker Hegemony
The wave of revolution which swept Europe in 1848 was directed at these
privileges, among other things, and also at the abuses for which they had
been responsible. The Junkers passed a few uneasy hours. But the upheaval was
unsuccessful, in that it did not reach the true root of the evil. In an
enthusiastic but somewhat naive spirit, the revolutionaries asked Frederick
William IV, King of Prussia, to assume leadership of their movement and to
accept the imperial crown. The King, flattered by the offer, at first agreed;
but soon "other influences made themselves felt," and he declined the
proposal. The high officials, the Junker Prussians and their allies in the
armed forces* had vetoed this proposition. [*The latter-the officers'
corps-was composed of descendants of the same caste as the first two groups,
and preserved all military traditions of the Order.]
This action might seem surprising on the part of a group which so strongly
desired the aggrandizement of Prussia. As proven by later events, their aim
was Prussian hegemony over the Reich as the first stage toward a more
far-reaching hegemony. Yet, apparently, they did not wish to seize the
opportunity offered them in 1848, whereby they might have united the various
German states under the rule of the King of Prussia:
The reason for this is simple: the "Pan-Prussians" knew that such unification
as was possible at that time would be risky, since it would have been based
on ideas much too democratic. Under such conditions there was absolutely no
guarantee that their feudal privileges (which for them came before the
interests of the State) would be preserved. The creed of the powerful
"Society of Lizards" was still strong: "Patriotic interests are to be
supported only where they are to the interest of the Junkers." The Junkers
preferred to wait until the unification of the Reich could be achieved on
terms favorable to themselves: i.e., through complete seizure of power over
all other German states by the Prusso-Teutonic clique. Bismarck, Wilhelm II
to a certain extent, and finally Hitler were to achieve this task as the
Prusso-Teutonics had conceived it.
Carl Schurz, the German patriot of 1848, who later became a great political
figure in America, described in his memoirs*[* The Reminiscences of Carl
Schurz, The McClure Co., New York, 1907.] the forces influencing the King of
Prussia in 1848:
"There was the landed aristocracy, the 'Junker' element, whose feudal
privileges were theoretically denied by the revolutionary spirit and
practically invaded by the legislative action of the representatives of the
people, and who artfully goaded the King's pride. There was the old
bureaucracy, the power of which had been broken by the revolution, although
its personnel had but little been changed, and which sought to recover its
former sway. There was the 'old Prussian' spirit which resented any national
aspirations that might encroach upon the importance and self-appreciation of
specific Prussiandom, and which still had strength in the country immediately
surrounding Berlin [ * ] and in some of the eastern provinces. All these
forces, which in a general term were popularly called 'the reaction,' worked
together to divert the King from the course he had ostensibly taken
immediately after the revolution of March, with the hope of using him for the
largest possible restoration of the old order of thingswell knowing that if
they controlled him, they would, through him, control the army and then with
it a tremendous, perhaps decisive force in the conflicts to come."
[* Potsdam, in the suburbs of Berlin, was the seat of Prusso-Teutonic
influence on the affairs of the State.]
The projects for German unification in accordance with the democratic plan of
1848-49 also met strong resistance from Bismarck, who throughout his entire
career had been a faithful servant to the Prussian interests: "I believe that
if we withhold our support from these projects it will be easier for Prussia
to bring about German unity in the manner already pointed out by the-
government. If it came to the worst, however, I would rather that Prussia
should remain Prussia, than see my king lower himself so far as to become the
vassal of Messrs. Simon and Schaffrath's [democratic leaders of that time]
political associates. In her own character, she will always be in a position
to give laws to Germany instead of receiving them from others."
It is this, actually, with which the Prussian clique is concerned: to impose
its own laws on the rest of Germany, and we know exactly what is meant by
these "laws."
In 1849, Bismarck made a speech on the same question: "What has hitherto kept
us going has just been our specific Prussianism, the remains of the heretical
old-fashioned Prussianism which has survived the Revolution, i.e., the
Prussian army and exchequer, fruits of intelligent Prussian administration,
and the vigorous interchangeable activity that connects King and People in
Prussia. . . . The people, whose truest representative is that very army,
does not desire to see its Prussian kingdom melt away in the putrid
fermentation of South German insubordination.* Its loyalty is not attached to
a proper Board of Directors of the Empire or to the sixth part of a Council
of Princes, but to its living and free king of Prussia, the heir of his
ancestors. . . . We all wish that the Prussian Eagle should spread its wings,
alike protecting and ruling, from the Memel to the Donnersberg; but we want
to see him free-not fettered by a new Ratisbon Parliament, or supported on
the pinions of those levelling hedgeclippers at Frankfort. Prussians we are,
and Prussians we will remain; and I hope to God that we shall continue to do
so long after this scrap of paper will be forgotten as though it were a
withered autumn leaf."[* The expression "people" employed by Bismarck in his
discourse is actually a euphemism�designating that mass of Landjunkers who
alone opposed realization of the democratic plan of 1848, rather than the
true people, who had supported this plan. When he speaks of the "Prussian
army," he obviously refers to the body of officers who, in their entirety,
stem from the Junker class. As for the spirirt of "South German
insubordination," which he vigorously opposes, this is, in reality, the
Christian and humanitarian spirit, respecting the "rights of man" which
Bismarck and the Junkers considered contrary to Teutonic traditions.]
The Teutonic Devil
In thus declaring himself for "Prussian" principles, and opposing those
principles which might be called "German," Bismarck supports a particular
type of Germany, discriminating against the other. The "Prussianism" to which
he declares himself faithful (which as a nationality has had a much shorter
past than the German) is none other than the tradition of the Order, which
has survived�a Teutonic tradition of everlasting expansion, supported by a
privileged caste. In distinction to this is found the other tradition of the
industrious city-bourgeoisie, of the peaceful principalities and of the
spirit of cooperation of the Hanseatic League. In a moment of sincerity
Bismarck wrote to one of his friends: "I have sold my soul to the Teutonic
Devil" (so reports! Moritz 'Busch, his literary factotum, who was very
devoted to him *). It is this very "Teutonic Devil" to whom all the "German
grandeur" theoreticians of the nineteenth century sold their soul. Because
this Teutonic Devil was the same as the Prussian Devil, they all, regardless
of their own origins, came to consider Prussia as the only country, the only
power capable of realizing their dreams. [* Moritz Busch, Bismarck, translated
by William Beatty-Kingston, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1891.]
Moritz Busch devotes much time to proving that although Bismarck was born a
Junker, had the Junker manners, and was the political ally of the Junkers, he
was nevertheless not the Junker prototype. Busch had been very close to
Bismarck, and it is likely he wished to present his hero in the light in
which the latter preferred to appear. His thesis to a certain extent is
valid. Bismarck throughout his career was sincerely devoted to the Prussian
monarchy. The latter, despite its alliances with the Junkers, despite
similarity of goals and methods, despite the origin of both from the Order,
had finally evolved its own goals and traditions within the framework of this
common background. (This commonly happens to institutions created to serve
the interests of others. When these institutions acquire an independent
existence, they end by developing their own traditions and aims, still
preserving those which lay behind their origins. The Teutonic Order itself,
having carried on the ambitions of Emperor Frederick II toward imperium
mundi, ended by endowing these ambitions with a more complex meaning. And the
same appears to be true if we compare the Prussian-Junker organizations with
the true Teutonic Order.) The Prussian monarchy was a servile instrument for
the Prussian Junkers, and as such represented a most opportune facade for
this group; but at the same time it had its own existence and evidently
cannot be considered absolutely identical with the latter.* [* Just so, in
1918, the monarchy, because of its role as facade, had to bear the entire
responsibility for the debacle. Because this monarchy existed as a separate
entity, it was possible to suppress it without actually affecting the forces
which hid behind it. Suppression of the monarchy seemed to be remedy enough.
The Prussian Junkers (with their affiliations in the army, among the
officials and, since the creation and development of German industry-among
heavy industry as well) were a much more dangerous group than had been their f
ront organization-the monarchy; and they were thus able to maintain their
position. They could do so because their activities and their secret
organizations escaped general attention.]
Busch, to whom one may refer without being accused of having preconceived
ideas against Bismarck, says this of his idol:
"He is descended from an ancient family of country nobles, inhabiting the
Marches, which has supplied to the Prussian kings a goodly number of
'Junkers,' all of whom became officers in the army, not a few dying the death
on the battlefield, under Frederick the Great and during the War of
Emancipation, for Honor and their Country. When he had grown up to early
manhood, the 'Junkerish' attributes above alluded to-arrogance, high temper
and brusquerie�were strongly developed in him; the least objectionable of
them, however, were the most salient. As a student, he was notorious for a
spicy tongue and a ready sword; the older citizens of Goettingen still bear
his wild tricks in mind."
The description of Junker manners in the character of the young Bismarck
corresponds trait for trait with the traditional prototype of the Teutonic
Knights, the ancestors of the Junkers.
Busch has a few apologetic passages here on the subject of the Junker
connections and attitudes of Bismarck: "The Chancellor was a Junker; he lived
a Junker's life for a considerable time, and to some extent represented the
views of his fellow-Junkers. As a Minister, however, he belonged to the party
designated by the epithet 'Junkerdom' only to the extent that, like itself,
he was a Royalist in thought and feeling, and, above all, objected to
Parliamentary government. . . . If he were styled 'soldier' instead of
'Junker'�if his militarism were grumbled at instead of his Junkerdom�there
would be some sense in such a view of his character, although it would be no
reproach to him. What is spoken of as militarism is in reality that Prussian
discipline by virtue of which all the forces in the State, all the members of
the governmental organism in its various branches, work together with one
common object-that system, the first principle of which for all connected
with it (from the lowest to the highest in rank, including the Sovereign) is
obedience, or rather the subordination of each individual's personal
inclinations and opinions to those of his immediate official Superior in
particular, and to the interests of the State in general.* Every part of this
system is an accurate fit, dovetailing admirably with the part adjoining it;
all goes on smoothly, as in the army, which is merely the most marked outcome
of the spirit animating all our State institutions and officials, besides
being the chief and central school in which that spirit is imparted to the
population at large.
[ * The adherence by Bismarck and the entire Prussian school to the principle
of obedience, to the interests of the State and to Prussian discipline, is,
as we have seen, the product of a long tradition stemming from the Teutonic
Order.]
"Such a system as this-of which Bismarck himself once said: 'I am ambitious
to deserve one day the praise bestowed by history upon Prussian
discipline'�is quite compatible with an abundant measure of political
liberty, but not with the Parliamentary form of government demanded by our
Liberals . . . Bismarck is the incorporate ideal of the Prussian officer and
official, not of the Prussian Junker. Nothing short of stupidity or
dishonesty can account for any man mistaking him in this respect. Future
generations will not be guilty of such folly or wickedness.
Busch here seems to be raising an issue over words. For if we restrict the
use of the expression "Junker" to that class of Prussian "country-squires"
living in their Middle Age paradise, Bismarck, although springing from this
very class, far surpassed them in scope and daring. Busch says that in the
final analysis Bismarck should be considered basically as a Prussian officer
or official. However we know that these Prussian officers and officials are
sons and grandsons of the same Prussian "country-squires," or that they are
descended from other officers and officials whose families, since the time of
the Order, had been closely allied with the Landjunkers. Considering all
this, we are justified in saying that all these elements really formed one
great caste-regardless of whether we call it Junker or not. Because he was
more intelligent than the class he represented, because he had travelled
abroad, Bismarck became more "civilized" and developed a much broader outlook
than his associates. That is why he might have appeared, at times, to be
deviating from his original course. This was not so, for Bismarck until the
end of his career continued to serve the forces which had descended directly
from the Teutonic Order, always with the same devotion and ruthlessness: he
simply used a little more tact in his actions than did his masters.
Busch's division of the Prussian ruling class into army officers, officials
and Junkers goes back, under different names, to the time of the Order. The
Prussian army officers were formerly Teutonic Knights serving the Order by
the sword. The Prussian officials had previously been "Officials of the
Order." Lastly the Junkers were descended in a direct line from those friends
and relatives of the Knights who had come to Prussia as no more than
Bettlejunkers, and who had seized the lands with the complicity of the
Knights, at the same time absorbing the remnants of the Germanized Borussian
nobility. It is this Trinity-holy only to those individuals participating in
it-which for centuries has been the keystone of Prussian affairs, and which
has also become the keystone of Germany, since the time the "Reich" became
equivalent to "Greater Prussia."
This tripartite caste was no vague entity, but was well organized. Its
tactics and direction were determined by the secret societies we have
discussed. The Junkers, Prussian "country-squires," played a dominant role
within this group.
They were concerned with preserving the advantages derived from rights which
permitted them to exploit their land and men by methods used in the Middle
Ages. Because they maintained great unity among themselves, they were in a
position to exercise much influence behind the scenes in all questions of
political significance, and to make their opinions respected during all
periods of Prussian history. Their aims did not differ much from those of the
army officers and officials who remained their faithful allies, but because
they were better organized than the others and financially more independent,
they were at all times more influential in the affairs of the State. Further,
the Junkers were concerned with the interests of the State only so long as
they could maintain it as a servile instrument in their own hands.
The Prussian army officers and civic officials, many of whom were related to
Junkers (a fact which contributed to greater interdependence of the three
groups), loyally carried out the Junkers' intentions. A sort of "local
patriotism" masked private interests: these interests were, for the Junkers,
the raison d'etre for this association. As for the officers and officials,
the State had symbolically taken the place of the Order and they intended to
serve it with almost monastic submission and discipline. Collaboration with
the Junkers who were the masters of the State was simply a matter of doing
their duty�their Prussian duty; and, in doing it, they used all the
traditional harshness of Prussian methods.
The Technique of "Isolation"
It is Bismarck who extended Prussian power over all other German States with
the exception of Austria; Bismarck who in 1848-49 did everything to prevent
the King of Prussia from accepting the crown of Germany. King Frederick
William had to yield actual control of royal power because of his mental
state, which had become precarious. His brother William was elected Regent.
The new Regent believed as strongly as did Bismarck in the necessity for
uniting Germany under Prussian hegemony. He was hesitant as to the methods to
be pursued in this. Bismarck was to provide these methods for him. When
Frederick William died in 1861, the Regent became King William and in 1862 he
named Bismarck Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Prussia.
Bismarck's political experience dated back nine years. Dur-ing part of this
time he had represented Prussia in the Diet of the German Bund * at
Frankfort, where he spent his time principally in struggle against Austria,
which had a great influence on other German States. The Prussians considered
Austria as their only rival for German hegemony, and cost what it might, she
was to be eliminated from the scene. Moreover, Austria, with the urbane and
kindly methods of her administration was, for Bismarck, a shocking antithesis
to Prussian harshness and severity. As such she influenced the other German
States in a way which the Prussians considered pernicious. She had,
therefore, to be eliminated at any price.[ * The only existing bond between
German states at that time. It included Austria.]
Four years spent as ambassador to the Russian court familiarized Bismarck
with the intrigues of diplomacy; so that when he came to power in 1862 he
brought with him both national and international experience as background for
the battle he was going to wage.
At first Austria still seemed too influential for Bismarck to consider
immediately eliminating her from the Bund. Therefore it was first necessary
to "isolate" her. The Prussian technique for isolating an adversary from his
allies has always been the same since the early times of the Teutonic Order:
first, making overtures to the country or the Prince who was to be isolated;
second, after the victim fell into the trap, pointing out to his allies that
the former was willing to go along without them. Generally this was enough to
isolate him completely.
In 1863, while discussions on the eventual reorganization of the Bund were
taking place, Prussia demanded permanent presidency of the Bund, on an equal
footing with Austria. The proposal was rejected by the latter. But Bismarck
found another occasion to tie up with Austria, and to trap this country into
isolation from the other German States.
In 1864, the Bund favored the cause of the Prince of Augustenburg in his
struggle with the King of Denmark over the Duchies of the Elbe,
Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg, which had been occupied by Denmark. The
Bund attempted to restore sovereignty over these Duchies to the Prince.
Bismarck persuaded Austria to ignore the stand taken by the Bund, and to
remain on the sidelines.
In a treaty signed in 1864, Austria and Prussia decided to act on the
question as independent powers, and to determine by common agreement the fate
of the Duchies of the Elbe (without considering the desires of the Bund for
return of these Duchies to the Augustenburg family). In his memoirs, Bismarck
acknowledges that, by acting supposedly for the "liberation of Germans from
Danish oppression," he was endeavoring above all to procure these territories
for Prussia. He had clearly realized that the port of Kiel and the canal
connecting the North Sea to the Baltic might some day serve as a base for the
establishment of Prussian naval power. He was aware that his aims could be
realized only through conclusion of treaties which even before signing them
he intended to violate. But he confesses also (resuming here a thesis whose
moral inspiration stemmed from the Order, and which is found repeated among
the Prussian theoreticians of the nineteenth century) that a treaty had but
little value to him unless it gained additional validity, after its
conclusion, through the concordant interests of the contracting parties.
In August, 1864, following a short and victorious campaign by the Prussian
and Austrian armies against the Danes, Bismarck signed the Treaty of Vienna,
in which SchleswigHolstein and Lauenburg were to be administered jointly by
Austria and Prussia.
>From this point on, Bismarck concerned himself solely with eliminating his
associate, Austria, from the pact which had been concluded. Austria felt that
she was drawn by Prussia into an equivocal and embarrassing position with
respect to the other German States. To regain their confidence she now began
to look with favor on the settlement proposed by the Bund, which called for
the return of the Duchies to the Prince of Augustenburg. Bismarck refused to
subordinate the conquered territories to the authority of the existing Bund,
but declared himself ready to negotiate with a reorganized Bund, from which
Austria would be excluded. On June 14, 1866, the Diet rejected the Prussian
proposal by a vote of nine to six. The following day, Prussian troops marched
against Austria, crossing through Saxony. After a campaign of seven weeks,
Austria was defeated at Koeniggraetz.
A Tentacle Reaches Out
With her only rival for German hegemony thus easily eliminated, Prussia now
profited from the propitious psychological moment, to impose her terms on the
German States. Austria had to accept a "new German organization without the
participation of Austria." Two confederations were established: the North
German Bund, including all States north of the Main River, and the South
German Bund. Relations between the two Bunds were to be defined in subsequent
conventions. The North German Bund was to have the King of Prussia as its
permanent and hereditary ruler. The Duchies of the Elbe were simply annexed
by Prussia, as were the north German States which had previously favored
Austria: Hesse-Kassel, Hanover, Nassau, and the free city of Frankfort.
Half of Bismarck's plan was now accomplished: all north German States were
henceforth under Prussia's control. The North in its entirety had always had
more understanding of Prussian methods than had the South. Bismarck could
therefore hope to impose on it the severity of Prussian discipline, and in
this manner establish Prussia's rule over a limited territory as a first step
toward further expansion. He thought that this progressive expansion would
afford him much better opportunities for final success.
Of all the princes dispossessed from their estates in 1866, only the royal
family of Hanover continued for many years to protest against the Prussian
action. The Duke of Nassau and the Elector of Hesse formally renounced their
rights, and the daughter of the Duke of Augustenburg married the young prince
William of Hohenzollern, who later became Emperor William II. But the princes
of Hanover, who were also heirs to the throne of Brunswick, for a long time
considered themselves in a state of war with Prussia. Their faithful subjects
organized passive resistance to Prussian occupation. It is interesting to
note that the royal family of Hanover is descended from the Welfs or Guelfs,
whose struggles against the "Ghibellines" have become legendary. As we have
seen (p. 44) the Ghibellines were partisans of the Hohenstaufens, from whom
Emperor Frederick II was descended-the same Frederick who had bequeathed his
imperial mission to the Teutonic Order, the ancestor of Prussia. The struggle
between Guelfs and Ghibellines continued until the end of the fifteenth
century. It is perhaps no simple coincidence that the princes of Hanover,
descendants of the Welfs, were so violently opposed to the ambitions of the
Prussians�the spiritual grandchildren of Frederick II of the Hohenstaufen, or
Ghibelline line. The royal family of England issued from the same family of
Hanover. As such, they too descended from the Welfs, the traditional enemies
of the imperialistically ambitious Hohenstaufens, of whom Prussia became the
heir.
The Isolation of France
With Austria removed from German affairs, the first thing to do was to
neutralize those other influences which opposed Prussian domination over
Germany. Because the south German States made it a practice to invite
France's advice, it would be necessary above all to "isolate" France, just as
Austria had been isolated. To this end Bismarck employed the same methods: he
showed himself very friendly toward France and entered into discussions with
her. During these conversations, Bismarck suggested all sorts of
compensations for France if she would permit Prussian expansion of power.
Napoleon III at first claimed the left bank of the Rhine, but Bismarck
conducted negotiations in such a manner that a solution, calling for the
annexation of Luxembourg and Belgium by France, and the extension of Prussian
power to the south German States, gained preference in the discussions.
Nothing was concluded: neither Napoleon III nor Bismarck definitely accepted
the plan. But Bismarck preserved the original draft of the project which had
been written in the hand of Benedetti, the ambassador of France. He then
arranged for a facsimile of the plan in Benedetti's handwriting to appear in
the London Times, and at the same time, brought to the attention of the south
German States the original claims of Napoleon III to the left bank of the
Rhine.
The isolation of France was accomplished at one stroke. Suspicion was cast on
her in England and in the south German States. The latter, which then counted
on the support of France, from now on felt more disposed to deal with
Prussia. Bismarck now concluded a secret military pact-offensive and
defensive-with the south German States, by virtue of which the supreme
command reverted to the King of Prussia. He next tried to find a reason for
declaring war against France, so that Prussian command over all the German
armies might become a fact. Indeed, he believed that Prussian direction on
the military level-especially if this were successful-might easily be
followed by Prussian rule on all other levels over all German States.
Manoeuvring for the throne of Spain furnished the occasion for declaring war
against France. A Hohenzollern was candidate for this throne. France
protested and asked for explanations. The King of Prussia, William I, held a
meeting with Benedetti at Ems, the bathing resort where he stayed, and
matters seemed to work out amicably. The King telegraphed to Bismarck, giving
him the details of this meeting. Bismarck deliberately "edited" the telegram,
and had the altered version published. This ruse made the French attitude
appear more unfriendly, and the response of the King more abrupt than they
had been in reality.
Under the influence of this famous "Ems dispatch" a belligerent atmosphere
was created within France and Germany. This was exactly what Bismarck had
desired. Napoleon III, under the pressure of French public opinion, declared
wara war which immediately turned to the advantage of the German armies,
which were under Prussian command. In January, 1871, a few days before the
capitulation of Paris, the King of Bavaria (who had always been considered
the traditional ally of France) in the joy of conquest, proposed that William
I of Prussia be proclaimed Emperor of Germany. The proclamation took place at
the Palace of Versailles.
Bismarck, who had accompanied the King to Paris, settled at Versailles for a
few months. He used these surroundings to create conditions psychologically
favorable for his plans. In the impressive halls of the Palace he had no
difficulty in obtaining consent of the German princes to the formalities
necessary for the creation of the Reich. He passed all his time in Versailles
at this task and succeeded in establishing the unity, under Prussian rule, of
the States of north and south Germany.
Bismarck had thus put his theories of 1848-49 into practice: not to allow the
King of Prussia to accept the throne of Germany if the latter came as a
spontaneous offering of the people; but to acquire the throne through "blood
and iron," which according to the traditional conceptions of the Teutonic
Order was the path to more lasting results. It did not matter that to achieve
these goals it was necessary to provoke wars against Austria and France
artificially. Treitschke well expressed the essence of Prussian thought on
this subject when he deplored the fact that no physician could be found who
would have the audacity to prescribe war frankly as a wholesome potion for
the people.
>From the day Bismarck succeeded in subjecting the other German States to
Prussian rule the principal task was to impose the Teutonic spirit and
Prussian severity on the whole of the German population, and to combat their
easygoing tolerant ways-as a weakness, deriving from the "softening"
Christian philosophy and corrupting the soul.
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
All My Relations.
Omnia Bona Bonis,
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
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